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Abstract
This organizational communication study involves critical analysis/ideology 
critique o f regulation, and deconstruction and resistance readings o f texts produced by 
the human subjects regulation system in the U.S. This regulatory organization includes 
federal government agencies and local entities called Institutional Review Boards 
(IRBs). Information related to the historical development o f the IRB system is provided, 
along with analyses o f federal and local systems and the relationships among the 
regulators, researchers, and the researched. Textual data include IRB application forms, 
the Human Research Subject Protection Act of 1997, and several reports from 
executive, legislative, and administrative entities.
Underlying theoretical support is found in Marx. Horkheimer. Adomo, Schütz, 
and Baudrillard. The work of constructionists is also employed, including Goffman, 
Mead. Berger and Luckmann. Additionally, the ideas o f Foucault, Habermas. Derrida, 
and Lyotard are utilized, in particular discursive formations and relationships o f power 
(Foucault), cultural reproduction and instrumental technical reasoning (Habermas), 
deconstruction, particularly language (Derrida), and performativity (Lyotard). More 
recent applications o f ideas in this vein are found in the critical management studies of 
Deetz, Alvesson, Manning, and others; these works serve as models for the present 
study.
V I11
An analytical device, (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, 
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS, was developed. Through utilization of 
(SINS), each term or portion o f text can be viewed as a social Structure at various levels 
of operation (from widely held beliefs to regional, local, and individual ones), and/or as 
an Institutionalization o f Structures, or ways these Institutionalizations become 
Naturalized in the lives o f individuals, or, finally, in the Simulations created with 
increased detachment o f structures (regulations) from the lifeworld (the research 
environment).
Alternatives are offered for consideration: 1 ) use o f more precise terms, for 
example, distinctions between participant/patient, doctor/researcher, and 
therapy/research); 2) developing different rules for social research, particularly 
qualitative methods involving no treatment and/or “minimal risk”; 3) insisting 
regulators focus on treatment when making decisions and contemplating rules; 4) 
developing realistic attitudes about what regulation o f any kind can do; and 5) engaging 
in and encouraging passive rebellion, i.e., rejecting local systems in favor o f federal 
standards for exemption from IRB processes when studies involve only “minimal risk.”
IX
Chapter One: Introduction
"Bui here lei me say lhal no one should suppose il could ever be 
possible lo devise a sei o f  rules or laws lo provide us wiih ihe answer lo 
every' elhical dilemma ... such a form ulaic approach could never hope lo 
capiure ihe richness and diversity o f  human experience. Il would also 
give grounds fo r  arguing lhal we are responsible only lo ihe leller o f  
ihose laws, ralher ihan fo r  our aclions. " The Dalai Lama, Elhics fo r  The 
New Millennium, p. 27.
Regulation o f human subjects research is tricky and important business, 
occurring in social, political, academic, and economic environments. It affects 
individuals not only as regulators, researchers, and participants in research, but as 
members o f  society, politicians and the political, academics and intellectuals outside the 
academy, and people with a variety o f economic interests.
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), charged with approving, revising, and/or 
rejecting research proposals, regulate researchers most directly (although researcher 
self-regulation may be more prominent, as discussed later in this chapter, p. 33-34; also 
see Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, especially p. 205). IRBs— not too indirectly— affect which 
research projects will or won't be undertaken as researchers become conditioned, 
entrenched within (often invisible) unquestioned boimdaries set by the regulatory 
system in the larger social context.
The present work may best be described as a critical organizational 
communication study, or a critical study o f  regulatory “management" (as described by 
Alvesson & Deetz, 1996 and 2000; Alvesson & Willmott, 1992; Alvesson & Skoldberg,
2000; see also Redding & Tompkins, 1988). Texts produced within and around the IRB 
system are utilized as data, and methods include Foucauldian analyses (Foucault, 1972; 
also see Manning, 1989, in his examination o f the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, 
especially p. 217-233) and resistance readings o f the texts, as well as other critical 
methods. The Institutional Review Board regulatory system, especially as it applies to 
certain qualitative and survey methods (methodological distinctions are described in 
more detail below), is in need o f scrutiny (see DHHS OIG 1998b, 2000b; GAO, 2001). 
The purpose o f the study, ultimately, is to make an effort to change this system. This 
will require, as 1 argue herein, changing the view o f individuals toward the system. This 
study is designed to enhance understanding of the ways texts work to produce negative 
effects and an overly restrictive regulatory situation in social science. As described by 
Redding and Tompkins (1988), the critical perspective within the field o f 
communication involves issues o f emancipation and empowerment, material interests 
and who possesses them, conflict and struggle over meaning, domination, instruments 
o f oppression, power relationships, distorted communication, infinite realities, ideology, 
and hegemony (see also .Alvesson & Willmott, 1992, and Alvesson & Deetz, 2000).
“To a greater or lesser extent, politics suffuses all social scientific research 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 125; see also Forester, 1989, p. 3-4). The bureaucratic 
suffusion o f politics into research and some o f its consequences is illustrated by the 
problems created by the Bush administration’s efforts to regulate the quality o f 
scientific information released by federal agencies. This is an effort to hold federal 
agencies more accountable for the money they receive {i.e., the guidelines are not
necessarily purported to have anything to do with science directly, though it is likely the 
mles will affect scientists, and therefore, science) according to sources reported in 
Brainard (2002, Mar 29b). An example is Bush administration standards “to govern the 
quality and objectivity o f scientific information released by federal agencies" (Brainard, 
2001, Sep 28, Daily News) released in 2001 (Office o f Management and Budget,
[0MB], 2001, Oct 1). A number o f difficulties (such as defining “quality,” “utility,” 
“objectivity.” “ integrity,” “influential” findings, and even “affected party”) and typical 
problems associated with attempts to standardize exist with the rules. (If scientists at the 
National Weather Service deliver a “low quality” forecast, are they to re-issue a 
“quality” forecast after the fact? And, as will be discussed at several points herein, the 
likelihood o f finding definitions that hold across the broad spectrum o f research types is 
slim. For example, what constitutes “quality” varies among clinical, social, and critical 
research methods, as does the role o f “objectivity” and perhaps most significantly, the 
t\pes o f treatments, risks, or lack o f them.) O f particular concern is the requirement that 
research findings released by federal agencies be “capable o f being substantially 
reproduced,” suggesting the agencies could somehow “ensure the results could be 
verified independently” according to Brainard (2001, Sep 28. Daily News). The Office 
of Management and Budget (0M B ) states that peer review may not be sufficient (0M B, 
2001. Oct 1 ). at least indirectly suggesting that bureaucrats/regulators might somehow 
be better suited to assess the quality o f research. Finally, 0M B  statements indicate a 
recognition that problems are inherent in “developing detailed, prescriptive, ‘one-size- 
fits-air government-wide guidelines” yet the agency proceeds to offer guidelines
anyway, stating the guidelines were designed “to be generic enough to fit all media, be 
they printed, electronic, or in other form” implying the form o f the dissemination o f 
information rather than the gathering and analysis o f information (or as mentioned, the 
treatment to be used) is the reason one size doesn’t fit all. It also appears inherently 
problematic (probably impossible) to make meaningful guidelines “generic enough to 
fit all.” These statements are, 1 argue, offered to meet political ends more than practical 
ones.
Most research is conducted in universities (Walker, 1996, Nov 8), and these 
activities are subsequently used as baselines by government to devise regulations. 
Government rules, in effect, supercede individual researcher’s desires, under the 
premise that researchers must be at least indirectly supervised, can’t be left to their own 
devices, i.e.. they can’t be trusted, and this view is reinforced by the 0M B  statement 
devaluing peer-review quoted in the previous paragraph. If  Bush’s recommendations 
are implemented, it will not necessarily be scientists who judge science, but regulators 
(who may or may not be researchers, i.e., no provisions are made for ensuring 
experienced researchers are selected as regulators, nor are there rules/guidelines 
requiring/suggesting that various methodologies be represented in the regulatory 
apparatus) will Judge the “quality and objectivity” o f studies and results. As I will show, 
regulators already do have more to do with what kind o f “science” is conducted and in 
what ways than any other group.
It is not the purpose, but the process of human subjects regulation (particularly 
as it is applied to many social scientific methods) that is absurd. Re-opening these
processes to scrutiny (via critical analysis) more readily leads to identifying and 
remedying problems (see Alvesson & Willmott, 1992; Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; 
Horkheimer, 1937/1976; Adomo, 1989a; Horkheimer & Adomo, 1944/1972). Some of 
the most controversial leading edge projects (gene therapy, stem cell research, and 
genetic engineering in agriculture are current examples)' are difficult for regulators to 
categorize, consider, or control. Yet, the common regulatory response to new areas of 
research (or atrocities) is to make more rules (see Office o f Protection from Research 
Risks [OPRR. 1999], especially the section entitled “An opportunity for federal 
leadership,” p. 13). These mles often have unintended effects (and do not meet the 
intended purpose). We stay mired where we never should have walked, bogged in what 
Baudrillard (1983) calls a cultural simulation— substituting signs (mles, words) for 
reality, making no distinction between the process and reality, normalizing
' Regarding gene therapy in general, see Robertson. 1993. Nov 24; and Walker. 1996, Nov 8. For 
developments during the Clinton administration, see Andrews, 1999, Jan 29; Brainard, 1999, Dec 13; 
Wheelwright. 2001, Jan; Southwick, 2000, May 12; and Southwick, 2000, ,^ug 24. George W. Bush’s 
policies are covered in Bash, 2001, Jul 18; and Southwick, 2001, Aug 10. Related issues and views are 
discussed in Schmidt. 2001. Apr 6; Frontline’s ’’Organ Farm.” a two-part report that aired Mar 27 and 
.\p r 3. 2001. on PBS, see http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/irontline/shows/organfarm/, accessed May 25, 
2002; Kahn, 1998, Jan 26; Kahn, 1999, Jun 1 and 2000, Aug 22; CNN.com, 2000, Aug 24; and 
CNN.com, 2000, Sep 14. Regarding the use o f stem cells, particularly controversial because of the 
relationship to the abortion debate, has celebrity and political endorsements, see Kiely & Hall, 2001, Aug 
8; and in particular, Mary Tyler Moore’s comments in E. Berger, 2001, Jul 11; Christopher Reeve’s in 
Cohen, 2001, Mar 8; Orrin Hatch’s in CNN.com. 2001, Jul 17; and Arlen Specter’s comments in Healy, 
2000, May 12. On the other side of the debate, and speaking to the notion that science and religion are 
politics, see Pope John Paul’s position statement in CNN.com, 2000, Aug 29, and finally for an 
outgrowth o f the debate, i.e.. the lifting o f the moratorium on stem cell research, see NIH, 2000, Aug 24. 
See also Patagonia’s corporate publication (2002, Spring) for a summary o f thoughts about genetic 
engineering of crops, and Atlantic Monthly (Weinberg, 2002. Jun) for an actual molecular biologist s 
view of cloning and important distinctions among various types, in particular reproductive cloning versus 
therapeutic cloning. Note that these ’’new” areas o f research have been debated, as indicated in this list of 
citations, for at least 10 years by diverse groups in diverse publications.
meaninglessness (see Baudrillard, 1983, p. 4)." Attempting to predict disasters and 
control the research world with one set o f rules for all treatments— spanning at least 
from observations o f the natural environment (too often contaminated when regulatory 
requirements are followed, as I will argue) near one end o f a continuum to installation 
of devices and drugs into (often desperately sick and vulnerable) peoples’ bodies (near 
the other extreme)— is fallible, dubious (and ludicrous) behavior.
Other considerations make the IRB system an interesting site for study, and a 
timely one. Developments in the world, particularly in the economic domain, affect 
research. Medical research is becoming more and more a commercial enterprise 
(Schmidt, 2002. Mar 29; DHHS GIG 2000a; Blumenstyk & Wheeler, 1998, Mar 20); 
lines between academia and commercialia are blurrier than they have been previously^ 
and many administrators (and legislators and governors'*) applaud this.' It is also
■ Also. Bormann ( 1972) contends, "the events may not be the things or ‘reality’ but the words ... are the 
social reality and to try to distinguish one symbolic reality from another is a [widespread] fallacy." p.
401).
■ See Blumenstyk. 2002, May 17, re: the (lack of) rights of researchers to their own ideas.
* .About the moves by several states to commercialize research. Schmidt (2002, Mar 29). writes that most 
of the efforts "have been politically popular" (as they have been positioned as economic development 
incentives and even by Gov. George Pataki of New York as "for the emerging homeland-security 
industry." as quoted by Schmidt, p. A26). and Schmidt adds, "have met linle organized resistance on 
campuses or elsewhere" (p. .A26).
■ Lyotard (1984) suggests "The games o f scientific language become the games of the rich, in which 
whoever is wealthiest has the best chance o f being right. An equation between wealth, efficiency, and 
truth is thus established” (p. 45). Mary Faith Marshall, director o f the bioethics program at the Medical 
University of South Carolina, states "What you see is a fear by administrators and researchers that if the 
public's confidence in their research and ethics is undermined, [scientists] will in the future no longer be 
able to support their research, because they depend on tax money" ... "And 1 think that's appropriate," she 
concluded (quoted in Brainard, 2000, Mar 17, p. A31). Cho (1997, Aug 1) reported that in a 1996 study 
of journal articles, in one-third o f  the cuticles sampled the first author listed had a financial conflict of 
interest, i.e.. being a patent holder or shareholder, and that evidence indicated that not only was the 
potential for financial gain leading to changes in researchers’ behavior, but also that industry made 
attempts to alter the timing and content of scientific research reports. (See also Mangan, 2000, May 26; 
Blumenstyk & Wheeler. 1998. Mar 20; Blumenstyk, 1999, Apr 9; DHHS OIG 2000a.)
reasonably apparent that conflict o f interest issues become more prominent when 
money is involved (and when researchers are invested in their findings^).
Academics serve business/ According to Kenneth Getz, Director o f Center 
Watch in a telephone conversation cited May 26, 1998, and reported by the Department 
o f Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (DHHS OIG, 1998d), “The 
clinical research market is roughly a S4 billion market. It is estimated that about 75 
percent o f clinical research is industry-sponsored” (p. A-1)*. And, o f  course, 
independent social scientists conduct large amounts o f  market research, product 
development research, and other studies directly sponsored by industry. “The amount o f 
interest in encouraging the commercialization o f university-developed technology has 
just exploded,” said Dan Berglund, the president o f the State Science and Technology 
Institute (as quoted in Schmidt, 2002, Mar 29, p. A26), and Berglund indicated he 
thinks there is no question that the view o f the role o f universities in most states is
" See Choudhiy. et al. (2002, Feb 6) re: doctor’s self-reported influence from drug companies; Boseley 
(2002, Feb 7) re: scientists to take money for papers ghostwritten by drug companies; and Deetz ( 1995) 
who says "Economic inequalities become political inequalities; without a means o f contestation, such 
conflicts are suppressed. All rationality is reduced to economic rationality" (p. 133). I suggest that the 
decisions (on the part of universities) to allow drug companies (with their obvious interests) to have so 
much control in the research environment, as well as journals that allow results to be published when 
researchers are financially invested in the product they are testing are evidence that Deetz is right. I have 
described this elsewhere as the-right-to-make-a-profit-at-any-cost mentality. Finally, Adomo (1989b) 
states. "Profit comes first. .A humanity fashioned into a vast network o f consumers ...behind the reduction 
of men to agents and bearers o f exchange value lies the domination of men over men" (p. 271). Doctors 
and researchers are dominated by drug company stockholders.
".Academics, particularly those in management studies, are often viewed as ideologists. They serve 
dominant groups through socialization in business schools, support managers with ideas and vocabularies 
for cultural-ideological control at the workplace level, and provide the aura o f  science to support the 
introduction and use o f managerial domination techniques" (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 199; Giroux, 
1988, presents an alternate view, see footnote # 74, p. 65, herein).
” The tendency is toward more infusion of capitol. President Clinton issued an executive memorandum in 
June 2000 directing the Medicare program to "revise its payment policy and immediately begin to 
explicitly reimburse providers for the cost o f routine patient care associated with participation in clinical 
trials, and to take additional action to promote the participation of Medicare beneficiaries in clinical trials 
for all diseases" (The VMiite House, Office of the fTess Secretary, 2000, Jun 7, p. 1 ).
changing. And in summarizing a corporate movement against genetic engineering o f 
crops, Patagonia points out one o f the rather obvious conflict-of-interest issues in this 
situation. “The underwriting o f science by corporations (through university grants) 
certainly influences the studies agricultural scientists pursue, or don’t” (Patagonia,
2002, Spring; see also Tacio, 2002).
From personal relations within, between, and among researchers across several 
communication genres and related areas o f study, to complex university research 
environments, and further, to the powers and policies o f  the federal government 
research entities, these contexts and their attendant constraints substantially influence 
research design, implementation, and, consequently, outcomes (see Gubrium & 
Silverman, 1989).
Issues surrounding the roles o f Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) are o f critical 
importance in academia, and central to the functioning o f the research environment. To 
test and adopt methods, procedures, boundaries for claims, and to make discoveries 
have existed as the primary goals o f science since The Enlightenment. And since that 
time, with more and more frequency, these tests involve the use o f human subjects. 
Further, from the apodictic to the assertoric, a persistent temptation exists to apply 
procedures, methods, claims, and more recently, regulation developed for the medical 
sciences to social sciences.
The IRB regulatory system is nonsensical as it relates (or fails to relate) to many 
social science methods; the rules are often not right or wrong, but ill fitting and 
irrelevant. For example, federal and local regulators describe their rules as “minimal
standards,” the “basement” or “foundation” for the regulation o f research (as is 
expressed in many o f the Office o f Human Research Protections (CHRP) documents 
cited herein, and these descriptions are based, in part, on the notion that the federal 
government should operate in a way that creates the least restrictive environment for 
those regulated, especially in matters related to public health and safety, areas o f rule- 
making generally reserved to the states.) For some proposed treatments, (and 
particularly non-treatment observation) federal regulation alone is hardly a foundation. 
It is inapplicable or unduly restricting, though substantially less so than layers o f “more 
rigorous” standards (often perceived as virtuous) imposed proudly^ by local IRBs.
In this attempt (even presumption) that one-rule-fits-all-methods, it is perhaps 
clear that both the rules and the methods are well established. It does not follow 
however that the rules and the methods work well together. The regulatory system and 
many qualitative methods are and have always been incompatible. Qualitative 
researchers have acquiesced, conceded, and have become involved in this regulatory
Because of restrictions a news reporter would not encounter, I cannot use— as data— information from 
an open forum I attended during 2001. However, references to statements made in this forum and those 
made during conversations I have been a part of during the years are presented as "loose” recollections, 
(although few in number are contained in this document) appearing perhaps weakly worded, lacking in 
detail, or vague. I do have field notes of these encounters, which include much detail: names (coded), 
dates, times, and places. Further, I have permission from the people with whom I have spoken to use their 
comments (except in the cases involving public officials, when such permission is not necessary to 
obtain). Under the local (and 1 will argue, unlawful) interpretation of IRB rules, however, 1 am restricted 
in the use of this data. 1 will say (under what I consider to be rightful ownership and subsequent right to 
the use of my own life experiences) that I recall a time in an open forum conducted by local and federal 
regulators when the local regulators repeatedly, as a matter of arguing their virtues, indicated the local 
restrictions were "more rigorous” than the federal ones, and the federal regulators in attendance, again, 
just in my recollection, echoed the comments of their local counterparts by describing federal regulations 
as the "basement” or "foundation” o f the system. I will argue this is not the case, particularly for many 
social scientific approaches, especially where no treatment is involved; that federal and local rules 
contribute to restriction (in terms o f topic and method) and represent debilitating intrusion rather than a 
"minimal foundation." I will argue, further, that local interpretations are to a very great extent 
uninterpretable and. therefore, greatly meaningless.
process against their will and sensibility (see O’Connor, 1979; Klockars, 1979; Wilkins, 
1979; Whyte, 1987; Punch, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 2001).
Human Subjects Regulation Issues for Consideration
Several questions should be re-opened with respect to the IRB system, including 
this positivistic bias described by Knights.'*’ And Agar (1980) suggests that the intent" 
behind the “bureaucratic feeding frenzy” is a good one, “but the procedures'* are 
becoming an annoyance that may or may not have anything to do with insuring that the 
intent is realized” (p. 183). Not only is there a lack o f whying'^ on the part of 
researchers, but also researchers (and regulators) are asking “wrong” questions about 
the IRB process. For example, qualitative researchers find themselves asking “How do 1 
make a successful application?” or “When might 1 know whether my protocol is 
approved?” rather than “Why should 1 ask for approval?” And IRB and other regulators 
are asking questions o f researchers that many perceive to be beyond the scope o f the 
regulators’ interests (see Brainard, 2000, Mar 17; 2001, Mar 9; and Campbell, 1998. 
Apr 3).
Another example of this bias comes from a GAO report (1991b) that makes the assumption “given the 
need to collect uniform data from numerous persons or organizations...“ (p. 10) when describing ways to 
evaluate or choose interview methods. 1 would suggest “uniform” data is often contrary to the goals of 
much interviewing, and is not in the interest of “thick” ethnographic descriptions, as described by Geertz. 
Further, the use o f the term “many” is meaningless across methods, and even within them, as there is and 
has been traditionally much debate about what constitutes “adequate” samples and sample size.
" i.e.. purpose 
i.e.. processes
.^domo (1989a) speaks about “unquestioned, unanalyzed, and undialectically presupposed” 
perpetuation of processes (p. 133), and in 1989b, he says “Situation[s] are unreconciled, contemplated 
without theory, in a kind o f mental asceticism, and what is accepted thus ultimately comes to be glorified: 
society as a mechanism of collective constraint” (p. 270). Foucault’s genealogy analyzes practices that 
“were instituted in the name o f reason but that threaten to harden into unquestioned but oppressive
10
It seems the regulatory system may have abundant form but inadequate, if  even 
existent, substance. Atrocities and infractions happen that rules, i.e., administrative law 
in the case o f IRBs, are in place to prevent. Conversely, many people who have no 
knowledge o f the rules often “follow” them. There are rules that are ignored and 
therefore do not work; there are rules that cannot be understood and therefore do not 
work; there are rules that are unknown and therefore do not work; and there are rules 
that are unlawful themselves that may or may not, and maybe should not work; there are 
rules that allow unsafe or exploitative behaviors and certainly should not work'"*; there 
are interpretations of rules and therefore they do not work consistently, and so on. The 
inherent fallacy that rules are doing what they call for on the surface has perhaps even 
deeper roots in criminal law.
Regarding form, if a research study proposal is standardized, “normal,” has been 
done before, or “contributes to the body o f knowledge,” it is perceived to be safe, i.e., 
less risky in a legal sense. It appears these pseudo-qualities take considerable priority 
over saying anything important, significant, risky, difficult, or interesting. This is not to 
imply that a research project can’t both conform to IRB regulations (or other rules such 
as those presented in stylebooks) and render interesting results, but that occurrence is as 
likely to be by coincidence as by design.
necessity” (Hoy & McCarthy. 1994, p. 148). This is what I mean by whying. I use this term (rather than 
“questioning”) because of its euphonic resonance with whining.
See Shogan & Ford, 2000. for an example involving doping in competitive sports.
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Regulators have demonstrated their concern, and appear frustrated and confused 
(see DHHS OIG, 1998b-e, 2000b; GAO, 2001) Federal regulators and members o f 
local IRBs find themselves in a somewhat common bureaucratic situation of 
administering rules that no longer fit the afTairs they are to control as evidenced by the 
steady stream of calls for and actual issuances o f “updates” in virtually every regulatory 
system one could imagine and also evidenced by the steady pressure on the regulatory 
organization from inside and out (see Brainard, 1999, Nov 18; 1999, Dec 13; 2000, Feb 
4; and 2000, Sep 13; AAUP, 2001; Ellis testimony, U.S. House, 1998, Jun 11, and 
others cited later) to acknowledge deficiencies in the rules, particularly as the 
deficiencies pertain (or not) to new areas o f research, as mentioned above {i.e., stem cell 
and gene therapy research, as examples).
“Real” unregulate-able life keeps appearing. Reactionary responses to media 
“heat” lead to rule quagmires, for example the Bush administration’s guidelines 
mentioned early in this chapter. Defining terms related just to these regulations has 
taken more than a year, and may never be “finished.” Another example is the case o f 
oral history: older people who are most often the participants in historical research 
constitute a protected class under IRB rules. Difficulties in getting these studies 
approved have increased according to the Association o f Oral Historians (see American 
Association o f University Professors, AAUP, 2001). (Far from being harmed, many of 
these elderly participants are eager to share their stories; interaction and attention o f this
'■ Puglisi, former director o f human subject protections in the OHRP/OPRR and having 20 years of 
experience in the protection of human research subjects, also states, “If no one at your institution has the 
expertise [to answer questions about IRB expectations or requirements] call OHRP or email m e...” 
(Puglisi, 2001, p.3).
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kind has been shown to have positive benefits (see intergenerational literature, 
particularly Baumhover & Beall, 1996, and this situation, I would suggest, is an 
example o f the Hawthorne effect, i.e., attention and being asked about oneself is 
positive, often enhancing the self esteem o f people.) Even the idea that these researchers 
are required to make application to an IRB is unknown to many o f these historians and 
unreasonable to many more (see Brainard, 2001, Mar 9).
Bureaucracies are often ill equipped to handle the issues o f the day (or the 
volume o f the week). Rules are outpaced by “real” life, with which we must eventually 
contend. “Real” life is dynamic, and, by definition, ambiguous. It is a liquid target, and 
a local phenomenon. While a variety o f thresholds exist for various participants’ 
suggestions about the dysfunctional aspects o f the IRB (or any) system, eventually 
nearly all participants will describe some aspect o f the system as deficient, absurd, 
frustrating, unreasonable, etc., whether they are regulators, regulatees, or regulatands. 
For example, regulators, often politically appointed and motivated, point out the 
“problems” (deficiencies) with the former administration’s regulatory efforts, or 
regulators themselves indicating they don’t understand how to apply a rule, or even how 
to explain it to regulatees. In turn, regulatees often criticize the system as unreasonable 
and vague (deficient). These criticisms are justifiable: The system is deficient, 
unreasonable, and absurd if regulators can’t explain rules to researchers, and neither 
group can explain adequately the rules to participants in research. Actual observation o f 
the informed consent process as it occurs between researchers and participants is rare. 
One o f the only occasions for close scrutiny o f this process occurs when an
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investigation o f an infraction occurs. In many cases the participants indicated they did 
not even understand the basic difference between research and treatment (see Advisory 
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments [ACHRE], 1995; DHHS OIG, 1998b, 
2000b). This o f course is perhaps the most important “minimum standard” and is 
frequently not met in part because o f the complexity and interpretation and execution of 
the rules.
In other cases, researchers are sometimes confused, according to IRBs 
interviewed by Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) investigators 
(DHHS OIG, 1998b), about what types o f research need to be submitted to the IRB.
New objects o f study and new methods to address questions emerge continually (and 
thankfully) and, while emerging ideas often contribute to better understandings, they 
also contribute to regulatory confusion (emerging ideas are, by definition, non­
standard). However, researchers don’t call into question (often enough, loud enough, or 
with a broad enough scope) the limitations o f the regulatory process itself {i.e., what 
regulations can do, or prevent), and the limitations imposed on researchers (what 
regulations prevent us from doing). Such is the nature of intellectual captivity, of 
bars’*— we fail to acknowledge regulation as a matter of choice; we seem to view it 
(when we see it at all) as something inevitable and unchangeable. We “confine” 
ourselves, build our own bars, and stay within them.
A second area o f  confusion exists in the ways that IRBs are inconsistent, as is 
the nature o f any localized (and temporally located, therefore, every) system (see DHHS
See quote at beginning of Chapter 2. p. 44 and also J. Buffett reference, p. 94.
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OIG, 1998b, p. 3 for description o f the basic structure o f this system, and the General 
Accounting GtTice [GAO, 2001, p. 3] for description o f OHRP role; for a discussion of 
the inconsistencies at the federal level generally, see GAO, 2001, p. 3 and 11 for 
more specific inconsistencies between the Food and Drug Administration [FDA] and 
the National Institutes o f Health [NIH], see Burd, 1994, Jul 13; at the researcher level, 
Sobal, 1984). 1 maintain that all “real” systems are local, and in the case o f IRBs, there 
was a (perhaps rare) convergence o f the desire for the regulation system to be local and 
the local nature o f  the “real” world. This situation, coupled with the transient nature o f 
scholars’ lives, {i.e., not often does a scholar study and subsequently work at that same 
institution for an entire career), creates the potential for more confusion on the part o f 
the scholar/researcher.
Further confusion is produced because IRBs are inconsistent on at least two 
vortices. First, they establish local rules, so there is variance across IRBs (OHRP, 2002, 
Apr 2; ACHRE. 1995; DHHS OIG, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, and 2000b; also variance 
across federal agencies, see Burd, 1994, Jul 13; GAO, 2001, p. 3; see also Appendix B, 
Legal citations section, p. 350). Second, and more problematic, IRB decisions are
' The GAO (2001) states, ‘‘FD.A officials told us they are revising all of the agency’s Information Sheets 
for investigators and IRBs, including the guidance on informed consent” which increases the likelihood 
of confusion on the pan of investigators and IRBs and the FDA itself, in the first place, and these 
“revisions” may produce little toward enhancing human subjects protections or efficiency in the system. 
The GAO (2001 ) also states “beginning in 1999. NIH has fUnded 12 studies on informed consent and 
research ethics. The studies include an evaluation o f the cognitive ability required to comprehend 
different aspects o f a research project and an analysis of how potential participants weigh risks and 
benefits: the results are not yet available” (p. 11). Even the GAO (2001) seems to acknowledge, at least 
indirectly, that all the "activity” hasn’t resulted in substantial differences in the system, "Although 
problems with the oversight of human subjects protection have received increasing attention since the 
1990s, it is only recently that DHHS has made a concerted effort to address these issues” (p. 12). O f 
course, this rhetoric still begs the question of “problems,” (especially in social science) failing to 
distinguish where the "problems” may be, what evidence of the problems exists, etc., as well as begging 
the question about the effectiveness o f past, current, or new rules.
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internally inconsistent, making it impossible for a researcher to adjust, i.e., to know how 
to make a successful application. Nearly identical applications may be treated 
differently by the same IRB.'* And, it appears not all departments within universities 
adopt the process o f IRB approval (see findings o f DHHS OIG and GAO reports, 
among others). One graduate student told me that when he'^ asked about the IRB in the 
English and cultural geography departments, only one professor seemed to know what 
he was talking about. When I asked students from other departments (long before 1 
recognized any o f these conversations as potential data) they seemed nearly obsessed 
with the IRB and its requirements and impact on their research, or attempts at research. 
Regardless o f the “accuracy” of the comments from any o f these and other students, if 
accuracy is discernable or distinguishable at all in this instance, the fact that students 
make such comments indicates confusion about the process. Students and faculty 
members have, in numerous conversations o f which I have been a part, expressed an 
understanding and acceptance o f the purpose for regulation, and often suggest that the 
process and the purpose appear unrelated to each other.
It is perhaps no surprise, then, given the confusion o f regulators and researchers, 
that the researched— the very people who should be informed before giving consent —
During my time as a graduate student. I have heard several stories from other students about their 
having submitted similar applications, one within a year or so of another. In several instances students 
expressed puzzlement that one application passed with no problems or revisions required, and a later one, 
modeled on the first, failed evaluation o f the same IRB. Further, an evaluative study o f NIH 
commissioned by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) found that research proposals 
are not generally rejected outright by IRBs, but that fewer than twenty percent are approved as submitted. 
In an exploration o f the revisions requested by IRBs, Brainard (2000, Mar 17) suggest wordsmithing 
consent forms occupies much o f the time in IRB meetings. He and others offer reason why this is the case 
which I will take up in Chapter Six, especially p. 212 and p. 222.
Throughout this study, with respect to personal recollections, 1 have used gender references alternately. 
1 use "he" in this instance and “she” in the next, etc.. rendering the gender references meaningless, used 
as syntactic placeholders only.
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are confused. Perhaps “confused consent” is a more apt label (and is considered in more 
detail below, see p. 114, and p. 222; see also ACHRE, 1995, Discussion o f part 3, 
http://tis.eh.doe.gov/ohre/roadmap/achre/dispart3.html, accessed May 25, 2002).
Official regulators (federal or institutional) are not the only forces working to 
create rules. Qualitative researchers themselves continue working to establish a set of 
ethical standards to guide their research, according to Deyle, Hess, and LeCompte 
(1992). I would argue that a set o f ethical standards is already guiding (individual, local) 
qualitative researchers, and that what Deyle, et al., are actually talking about is a 
written, (and thereby more legitimate in the view of some) formalized statement of 
purpose or a set o f procedures (the kind of interference Klockars, 1979, warned against, 
see p. 35 herein). Regardless o f who is writing rules, or whether they are called 
guidelines or rules, many qualitative and survey researchers are being squeezed into an 
ill-fitting regulatory space.
Changes in the “real” research world, the lack o f change in “real” regulation, 
and “real” escalation in litigiousness have created difficulties for everyone involved in 
this system. Regulators are unable to keep up with the needs o f the research community, 
(DHHS OIG, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 2000b; ACHRE, 1995) and researchers find 
themselves lost in a paper maze-to-nowhere. Participants in research are at least as 
misguided and confused as they have ever been, and probably more so as research 
becomes more specialized, complex, and costly (or profitable). Somewhat ironically, 
the participants— the very people for whom informed consent and other provisions exist 
— are those least affected by them. While regulators and researchers focus intently on
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informed consent documents, research participants, as described in the various reports 
cited, sign them, but often they don’t understand or even read them thoroughly. One 
must ask what difference it “really” makes. If informed consent documents read more 
like the fine print o f contracts (this being a prime example o f  legal issues, specifically 
fear of litigation, driving the system), it stands to reason that participants would treat the 
two documents in much the same way, i.e.. mostly ignoring the fine print. On the other 
hand, in qualitative and survey research, informed consent documents state the obvious 
(you are being interviewed, you are completing a survey, and so on), so participants 
remain confused. In this latter case, participants may be puzzled about why they are 
being asked to sign a form that states the obvious. This might make even the most 
unsuspecting o f participants at least a little suspicious. (The form creates in my way of 
thinking an unsettling “real life redundancy.”) Informed consent forms for these 
research activities are mostly meaningless; the purpose is important, but the process is 
impotent.
The proliferation o f research studies, stresses created by growth in both volume 
and diversity, along with the rise in the number o f private and academic IRBs. the 
intensifying o f commercial interests (DHHS OIG 2000a; Blumenstyk & Wheeler, 1998, 
Mar 20; Andrews. 2000. Mar 10, and 1999, Jan 29; Amos, 2000. Apr 26), and structural
Similar to the proliferation of professional tax preparers since the dawn o f income tax. private 
companies are emerging to offer assistance to researchers in writing informed consent documents. One 
such company is Consentwrite: the owner Sandra Philipson suggests "Protocols are often complex, and 
writing a readable and comprehensible document may be time consuming and difficult for the researcher 
since most physician writers have had little or no training in writing for varying levels o f reading 
comprehension (Philipson. et al.. 1995; Philipson. et al.. 1999). This is precarious; writers generally have 
little or no training in medicine. Besides, the main concern o f physicians appears to be a legally 
defensible consent document, not necessarily readable or comprehensible (see American Medical 
.Association. AMA, 1998).
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changes at the federal level combine to make this a very good time for taking a snapshot 
(implying “natural setting” and “unposed”) o f the IRB regulatory system. In the face o f 
continuing political, moral, and scientific debates about anthrax vaccine administration 
to troops during Desert Storm (see CNN.com, 2001, May 2; 2000, Oct 11), the debates 
surrounding gene therapy and stem cell legislation (see references listed, foomote # 1, p. 
5; see also Time's cover story, “At your own risk,” Lemonick & Goldstein, 2002. Apr 
22 [released two days before the defense o f this dissertation], which includes many of 
the cases presented here), and other issues suggest a study such as this one is 
appropriate and timely. (And Alvesson & Willmott, 1992, Horkheimer, Adorno, and 
others would argue that anytime is a good time to scrutinize “managerial” or regulatory 
ideologies.*') With the infiltration of technology into every aspect o f our lives, the 
consideration o f managerial motives is particularly important today. “These 
technologies for information distribution provide sensory as well as behavioral 
domination” (Deetz, 1995, p. 165). And Lyotard (1984) says, “In the computer age, the 
question o f knowledge is now more than ever a question o f government” (p. 9).
In 1995. the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE) 
called for more direct oversight o f the informed consent process. In June 1998, the 
DHHS OIG ( 1998d) made the explicit suggestion that more direct oversight o f the 
informed consent process is needed; this was reiterated three years later in a General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report (2001). DHHS OIG (1998e), issued in October 1998,
"Critical theoiy never aims simply at an increase in knowledge as such. Its goal is [our] emancipation 
from slavery*’ (Horkheimer. 1937/1976, p. 224). "Studies of management that take little or no account o f 
such struggles [such as whose purpose or interest (owner, manager, producer, or consumer) is to be
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indicated the federal oversight process should be reengineered. This talk has added 
momentum to my efforts.
Rules proliferate in a litigious social system. Rules are, in litigious societies, 
often made in attempts to avoid (or create an environment for the proliferation of) 
lawsuits'". The casualties o f this system as mentioned are scientists, doctors, faculty, 
researchers, and other members of the intelligentsia. Eventually, rules restrict behavior 
until nearly nothing can be done (including taking a critical look at the University of 
Oklahoma's IRB, as will be explained).
It appears, for example, that a review o f IRB minutes might be a rich source of 
data.'^ Federal regulators, in enumerating the problems they found at Johns Hopkins 
University in July 2001 (and seemingly supporting my contention about the “richness” 
o f them), wrote “minutes o f IRB meetings do not yet exist for 18 o f the last 21 meetings 
dating back to October 2000,” that “the minutes o f  meetings for all IRBs often failed to 
document the basis for requiring changes in research,” and that “IRB actions were not 
documented separately for each individual protocol” (from the letter declaring 
sanctions, issued by the Office o f Human Research Protections [OHRP, 2001, Jul 19, p. 
6], available http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/detrm_letrs/julOIa.pdf, accessed May 25, 
2002). These comments speak not only to the activities, focus, and priorities o f 
regulators, but also to the ways IRBs are conducting various aspects o f their business 
(see also http://www.uab.edu/Iister/hopkins.htm for information about this case.
ser\ ed by work, or struggles about how work is organized, i.e., autocratically, bureaucratically, 
democratically] are intellectually shallow and politically naïve” (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992. p. 7). 
“  See Blumenstyk. 2002. Jan 11, as an example o f this proliferation.
I requested minutes from board meetings from my university, but my request was “discouraged.”
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accessed May 25, 2002, and to read Hopkins officials’ statement in which they say they 
believe the OHRP action to be “an unwarranted, unnecessary, paralyzing, and 
precipitous.” see http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/ohrpsuspends.html, accessed May 
25, 2002, [Johns Hopkins, 2001, Jul 19, p. 1]).
Call for Overhaul
The IRB system is in flux, and this, 1 perceive, is typical o f social structures in 
general. At the risk o f replacing existing dogma with new and just as impotent dogma, it 
appears this regulatory system must be updated or eliminated to allow certain 
qualitative researchers to work in the natural world. It seems very clear that, for all the 
time and effort devoted to making, maintaining, and enforcing universal rules, these 
attempts (and the rules) have made little difference. Universals are problematic for 
many reasons (see Whyte. 1987; Goffman, 1971; Gardner, 2001, Mar 9, and others re: 
similar efforts in positivism). Lyotard (1984) states, “ ... we are all stuck in the 
positivism o f this or that discipline o f learning, the learned scholars have turned into 
scientists, the diminished tasks o f research have become compartmentalized and no one 
can master them all” (p. 41).*'*
Within the public and (fueled by the) mass media, distrust in the system— the 
entire research enterprise— persists, and seems justified. Examination and analysis 
about how atrocities have occurred and how they are viewed (ACHRE, 1995;
Lyotard (1984) draws on the work of de Solla Price (1963), who "emphasizes the split between a small 
number of highly productive researchers (evaluated in terms of publication) and a large mass of 
researchers with low productivity. The number o f the latter grows as the square o f the former, so that the 
number o f high productivity researchers only really increases every twenty years. Price concludes that
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President’s Commission for the Study o f Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research, 1981), consideration of the potential for lasting effects 
(ACHRE, 1995; DHHS OIG 1998b, 1998e), and acknowledgement about the very 
limited role administrative rules actually play in affecting the behavior o f any o f the 
participants (Greenberg, 2001, Jan. 19; AAUP, 2001; Brainard, 2001, Mar. 9;
Campbell, 1998, Apr. 3, Brainard, 1999, Nov 12, Manning, 1978, and others) may yield 
useful information about the (SINS) STRUCTURES,
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS'^ in operation.
When existent administrative rules don’t work, why is it that we make more of 
them?*^ Why is it our knee-jerk response to do so? How did we get like this? Was it 
in the same/a similar way we contributed to (by not resisting or whying) the 
entrenchment o f  a pro-positivism bias, i.e.. trusting statistics more than our lived
science considered as a social entity is "undemocratic" (p. 59) and that "the eminent scientist" is a 
hundred years ahead of "the minimal one" (p. 56).
"1 have found this acronym useful (as an analytical device) when considering specific texts for analysis; 
it has helped me to see more of the ways objects operate in the lifeworld. "Structures" I associate with the 
organization-in-society level of analysis, specifically the ideology critique o f Marx.
"Institutionalizations" I have used to describe organizations and ideologies in and o f themselves. 
"Naturalizations” have to do with the individual-in-organization and self-regulatory behaviors, as 
described by Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 199. "Simulations," as described by Baudrillard (1983, and 
described in more detail elsewhere), are used to consider the hyperreal aspects o f regulation, i.e.. the 
detachment of the regulatory processes and managers from the "real" research world. I use this acronym 
to remind myself and the reader that any data contained herein (and beyond), regardless of the issue being 
addressed at any particular point, can also be anal>"zed via any of the other constructs (SfNS) and can be 
thought of in (any of) those terms. (See further explanations of each component o f the acronym, p. 58- 
M . ) ~
It may be that rules matter in this way; that our natural bias toward "more rules” when problems arise 
should be reversed completely, i.e.. when problems arise, we should look for the rule that contributed to 
the problem. .Additionally, an argument could be made that fewer rules may contribute to a better 
understanding o f and more compliance with the rules that are in place, i.e.. Fewer Rules = Better 
Compliance, or simpler (sets of) rules are more likely to be understood at all. Perhaps the more beneficial 
behavior would be (nearly automatic) proposals to eliminate rules when a problem arises.
■ Rules are like alcohol. One takes a few drinks and feels great, and, while under the influence decides 
that if three drinks worked so well, think of what six will do! So it goes with rules. O f course, as we learn 
we eventually realize more is not better.
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experience?'* (See Goffinan, 1971.) Deviation is inherent (and desirable) in (life and) 
rules, so attempts to standardize life via rules is delusional (and undesirable, too). It 
seems that standardization is inherently “expected” o f rules, and attempts to standardize 
experience (i.e.. the lifeworld) in terms of the ideals o f “uniform application o f law.” 
“blind justice,” “(separate but) equal education,” and other myths, proliferate in 
numerous levels o f society'^.
Even with provisions o f the Nuremberg Code (1949), the Declaration of 
Helsinki (1964. and amended in 1975, 1983,1989, 1996, and 2000), the Belmont Report 
(1979), regulations, and the history of research atrocities, abuses persist. Thalidomide 
distribution, the administration o f cancer cells to chronically ill and senile patients, the 
Tuskegee syphilis study, uranium miners studied without their knowledge or consent,^® 
and even more recent events^' have occurred though considerable regulation was in 
place, designed to prevent them. What rationale supports the need for more rules? Rules 
don't work. (Manning, 1978, states: " ... rules can only function as resources for 
organizing and rationalizing a given contingency,” p. 77.) From this one might imply, 
and I do, that rules serve to create and maintain standards by which actions are justified
.\lvesson and Deetz (1996) state, “to the extent that technical reasoning dominates, it lays claim to the 
entire concept o f rationality and alternative forms of reason appear irrational” (p. 200).
.4domo (1989b) points out, "It is well known that the formal possibility o f equal education does not 
correspond in the least to the actual proportion of working class children in the schools and universities” 
(p. 272).
.According to Brainard (2001, Mar. 9). such research "falls under a set of federal regulations that have 
evolved during the past 50 years in response to abuses like Nazi experiments on prisoners during World 
War 11. and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (1932-1972) in which the U.S. government was found to have 
deliberately and deceptively withheld treatment from poor black men in order to study the progression of 
the disease” (p. A 21 ).
For example, in hearings before the U.S. House, testimony about non-therapeutic. non-beneficial. 
medical experiments that involved only African-American and Hispanic male children was presented. 
(See U.S. House, 1998. Jun 11, p. 5.) See also Time magazine’s cover story, "At your own risk,” 
(Lemonick & Goldstein. 2002. Apr 22) and Onion (2002, Mar 13).
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(or not), and are related to issues such as social desirability, political correctness, and 
legal liabilities. Rules may guide behavior when people are aware o f and accept the idea 
of their usefulness, but rules do not “ensure” anything.
Regardless o f  what rules may actually do, rules don’t prevent atrocities 
(Brainard, 2000, .A.pr 14). Even the “ultimate” rules, i.e., constitutional and near- 
ultimate federal statutes don’t work. Extended arguments to support these assertions 
have been made. Alcohol prohibition didn’t work (see Amendment 21 o f the U.S. 
Constitution, Repeal o f Prohibition). Marijuana prohibition isn’t working (U.S. 
Department o f  Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services, Administration Office o f Applied Studies, Preliminary Estimates from the 
1995 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse; Becker, 1953, 1963; National 
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), 1999; Novak. 1980). Laws 
prohibiting certain sexual and social conduct don’t work, hence creating “criminals.” 
(See Associate Press and other news stories related to the Boston and numerous other 
archdioceses, and Utah polygamists, as examples.) And, rules to prevent atrocities in 
research don’t work. Solomon (1985), who conducted an analysis o f journal articles 
produced by the Tuskegee researchers, for example, argues that “journal reports o f the 
Tuskegee syphilis study ... employ rhetorical conventions which can obscure and de- 
emphasize any ethical, non-scientific perspective” and discussed “the role that rhetoric 
played in the study’s continuation” (p. 233). Much o f the rhetoric employed in journal 
articles is similar to that employed in regulations, by design. (The rhetoric then becomes 
part o f the “fine print” we block and move without reading, sign without understanding.
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etc.; we often listen to what the people who prepared or are presenting a document say, 
we choose to believe what people say or follow along with what others are doing, 
signing documents without reading the “fine print.” Examples are ignoring the fine print 
on the back o f credit applications, loan contracts, or admission tickets.)^" This would 
indicate that rules (and the automatic following without questioning, i.e., the bias 
toward and default to make and comply with administrative rules) worked to the 
detriment o f the Tuskegee “participants.”
Proposals for new rules proliferate when there is a failure, and often the 
proposed rules are remote to the original problem (See Agar, 1980, p. 183; for specific 
criticisms o f the IRB system regarding the lack-of-fit o f administrative rules, see 
ACHRE, 1995; DHHS OIG, 2001b; OHRP, 2001, Jul 19. See also the Littleton 
argument, below, footnote # 40, p. 29.) W e’re swinging in the dark at an unknown 
target when the first thing we think about is “what went wrong with the rules” and/or 
“we must need more rules” and second, since we don’t know what we’re doing, we 
make irrelevant and ill fitting regulations. We then keep them around for eons and, 
unfortunately, “build” on them, spin webs o f them.^^ This o f course is a cycle that can 
be broken only with near-endless dissention and intense, perpetual whying in every kind
Contracts are relatively new. In my memory. I recall Indian people “going to the stick.” This was a 
ceremony conducted when a cooperative effort (a marriage, a farming venture, land partnership, etc.) was 
to be made. The parties to the agreement stood opposite each other and held onto the bonding stick (the 
first person’s left hand, the other person’s right hand, the first person’s right hand and the second person’s 
left hand, knuckles facing opposite directions) and said what it was they intended to do, in front of 
many/all tribal members. This was the way contracts were conducted well after the tribal members 
learned to read and write English; even after many tribal members had become lawyers, agreements were 
still made in this way.
.A.mong numerous examples is the new accountability initiative of the Bush administration (discussed 
on p. 2-3), built on the Government Performance and Results Act that took effect in 2000 (see Brainard, 
2002, Mar 29b). O f course, we could start earlier: The Nuremberg Code begat the Declaration of 
Helsinki, begat the National Research Act o f 1974, begat the Belmont Report, and so on.
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o f meeting for eons to “unbuild” (deconstruct) the web o f regulation, and as 1 hope to 
make clear, that starts with changing our minds about administrative rules and their 
value/'* Adding to the woes, new rules often have unintended effects. For example, in 
the Littleton tragedy, the talk about instituting new rules about the selling o f guns is 
removed from the issue o f what 17-year-olds can bring to school. In the IRB system, 
rules related to informed consent, and mostly designed to protect patients by making 
clear distinctions between therapy and research, are irrelevant to the needs (or the lack 
o f them) that might exist for interview participants or survey respondents who undergo 
no treatment.^^ It may be helpful at this point to explain that it is this lack o f treatment 
(and lack o f any substantial risk) that is the most common reason for highlighting 
differences between qualitative and quantitative methods. Later, other distinctions are 
mentioned such as the difference in qualitative and quantitative methods with respect to 
a priori hypotheses and the lack o f them. I also explore the distinction between the role 
o f researchers’ values and objectivity in quantitative and qualitative methods in general. 
In making these distinctions, 1 do not imply that qualitative and quantitative research 
methods are somehow “opposite.” 1 argue simply that in a general way, qualitative and 
quantitative research methods are different in some important ways that (I suggest 
should) affect the ways they are regulated (or not regulated). See also Becker’s (1993) 
views discussed on p. 94 herein, for more about qualitative/quantitative distinctions.
^  This dissertation is a case about rules in administrative law and the ways they are perceived, created, 
valued, etc. While I use a variety of lifeworld examples in various places in the dissertation, it should be 
noted that only similar but not identical problems are presented by rules o f  basketball, speed limits, and 
the prohibition of marijuana.
And even certain clinical trials are exempt from the informed consent process. For example, the FDA 
allows the use of devices and drugs in life-threatening situations where patients are unconscious and there 
is no time to contact relatives (see FDA, 1995; Campbell, 1997. Oct 24; Burd, 1995, Nov 3).
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Flowing from the position that mles don’t work (in the way they are intended or 
perceived to work, if  at all) is argument surrounding the placement o f values in human 
conduct. Many hold, as I do, that people “prevent” atrocities by virtue o f their own 
virtues {i.e., values).
“Prevention” has little if anything to do with written codes, rules, and 
regulations.^' Lyotard (1984) states, and others support his notion, “Most people have 
lost the nostalgia for the lost narrative. It in no way follows that they are reduced to 
barbarity. What saves them from it is their knowledge that legitimation can only spring 
from their own linguistic practice and communicational interaction” (p. 41). Morley and 
Shockley-Zalabak (1991) suggest “proponents o f the ‘strong culture’ perspective view 
the construction of social realities, which contribute to shared values, as the very core of 
culture and central to high organizational performance” (p. 422; see also Deal & 
Kennedy, 1982) and “the more an individual values what the organization values, the 
more likely the individual is satisfied with communication activities and has positive 
expectations about the organization” (p. 427). Morley and Shockley-Zalabak (1991) 
state, with respect to the evolution of organizations (relying on the work o f Schein,
“It doesn’t matter how many checks you have in the system if you don’t have a scrupulous provider. ” 
says Susan Winckler, group director o f policy and advocacy for the American Pharmaceutical 
.Association (see Sealey, 2001, Aug 17; see also Cassell, 1982, p. 155; and Frieden, 2001, Aug 24 re: a 
Kansas City pharmacist who watered down chemotherapy drugs, alleged to have affected thousands of 
patients.
In the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE) report, issued in 1995, the 
Commission concluded that current policies do not safeguard against the recurrence of atrocities, 
particularly the lack of informed consent for studies involving very high risk to participants. And Gary 
Ellis, former director of Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR), in testimony before the U.S. 
House stated “1 talked about a non-zero possibility o f catastrophic failure and that’s just what it is. It’s not 
zero, and I’m not saying there’s no problem...I’m talking about the numerator o f a ratio and in the 
denominator is a huge, huge volume o f research activity as we pursue new knowledge in biomedical and 
behavioral research’’ (U.S. House, 1998, Jun 11, p. 49). See also, Campbell, 1998, Dec 18 and GAO,
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1985), “organizational maturity brings cultural constraint on innovation with an 
emphasis on preservation o f the past” (p. 425). I will demonstrate this entrenchment o f 
habits, i.e., the ways we do things, is present in the IRB system. The behaviors o f 
participants demonstrate the tendency to avoid thinking, to follow without question. 
Also ideas such as “the letter o f the law” implies a single and “correct” interpretation 
exists, i.e.. an example o f inherently futile absolutism. These behaviors greatly affect 
the research environment, as 1 will also show.
I am arguing that ossification, while maybe not part o f the problem directly, 
(because the problem is a lack o f whying), is the by-product o f the problem o f not 
thinking, defaulting to rules, etc., and this ossified mass is big, heavy, and hard to move 
out o f the way. An even more stubborn mass than calcareous deposits. Solid. Heavy. 
Stuck. Inertial. To add further complication, this mass is invisibie/we are blind.^*
Strong “real life” evidence suggests most people don’t want to commit 
inhumane acts, don’t even wish to see them, and those who are inhumane are not
2001. Personally. 1 wonder how much behavioral research boosts the ratio, to the benefit of much riskier, 
sometimes horrifying medical trials. See also foomote n 253. p. 251. herein.
“It is like a pair o f glasses on our nose through which we see whatever we look a t ... it never occurs to 
us to take them o ff ' (Wittgenstein, quoted in Trachtman, 2002 Apr, p. 125). I will argue that we often 
don’t even realize that we need glasses (or that we are wearing them, whichever the case).
About torture for example. Rose ( 1986, Oct) argued that “torture is most often associated with 
commitment to an overarching ideology ... you have to convince people that they are working for a great 
goal in order to get them to overcome their repugnance to the task of causing physical pain to another 
person, ” and "[torture] is not always private and perverse but sometimes social and institutional, vetted by 
the government and. o f course, the Church” (p. 1 ). She adds “there have been few bigger fans o f torture 
than Christianity and Islam ... Righteousness, as much as viciousness, produces torture” (p. 1 ). Rose 
suggests an antidote to societies’ inclination to use torture may be a matter o f prioritizing the immediate 
and material (as I call it. the liquid and the local) over the abstract to refuse to “allow the nobly abstract 
to seduce us from the sweemess of the concrete” (p. 39; see also Baudrillard. 1983 and 1988. re: 
seductions). I also will argue that the first step in reforming the IRB system is recognition on the part of 
the regulators and the researchers that oversight o f the “liquid and local” research environment is 
impossible and, therefore, all compliance to administrative rules is “really” voluntary, and further, that 
this situation is adequate, i.e.. it works just fine. Also I argue that researchers don’t hurt participants
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stopped by administrative rules. Why not? Because those who commit inhumane acts 
have no regard for people, why would anyone expect respect for rules from such a 
person? To think otherwise is, I suggest, social-level delusion. Individuals’ morals and 
values rather than rules are the (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, 
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS protecting the human subjects o f research 
(and most other humans)."*® Individuals’ morals and values are the SINS because what 
we accept as natural (normal"*') and reasonable creates the simulation that we live in.
My point is that our acceptance, our creation o f “normal” or "natural” is often by 
default rather than conscious consideration of choice."*'
Contemporary developments in the federal regulatory structure create an interest 
for study. The Office o f Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) was moved from the 
National Institutes o f Health (NIH) where it had been since 1972, to the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services’ office (a move “up” the bureaucratic ladder), “ in order to
because the researchers’ personal (local) values prohibit it, making administrative rules redundant at best, 
particularly in social science research involving no treatment and no protected classes.
■*“ strong but rather complex case could be built on the basis of the following examples. The first 
situation surrounds the 1999 school shooting tragedy in Littleton, Colorado. What happened there 
(specifically carrying guns to school and killing classmates and teachers with them) was against the law 
already, yet people talked then, and continue to talk as if more gun control would have prevented it. The 
War on Drugs is another example. The use of drugs has increased in spite o f more laws, enforcement 
efforts, and huge expenditures. It appears to be a war on people who use drugs, as incarceration rates have 
also increased substantially during the “war” years. Rules are not only impotent, but worse. Rules 
increase complacency, creating the illusion that as a society we are doing something about a problem. 
.\nd. as Rose (1986. Oct) alluded, rules made to support values (often implicitly) can be used to 
encourage people to kill each other (military and religious rules as examples, the upholding of values 
such as freedom, democracy, justice, various issues related to morality, etc.) supporting the contention 
that values are more potent than rules.
■" Throughout this document, (and especially in the SINS device), I employ the term used by Alvesson 
and Deetz (1996). "naturalization” in a way similar to some uses of the word "normalization” in social 
science, i.e.. what seems normal or natural to us. things we do not (at least often) question, things 
perceived as "self-evident."
Consider the plight o f Mennonites who are sometimes forced to buy insurance to comply with a rule. 
.Vlennonites see "insurance” as contrary to being responsible. That we may think Mennonites are
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enhance the office's power,” according to a statement made by the Department o f 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) Secretary (see Healy, 1999, Jul 30). The office is 
now known as the Office o f Human Research Protection (OHRP), changed effective 
June 18. 2000 (see Federal Register, 2000, Jun 13; see also GAO, 2001, p. 3), and 
mostly notable as it relates to who has the right to name and re-name, and the timing of 
the event, as noted in the Chronicle o f  Higher Education (see Brainard, 2001, Jan 5; 
Federal Register, 2000, Jun 13), i.e.. the changes came less than a year after the 
September 1999 death o f research patient 18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger in a gene therapy 
trial at the University o f Pennsylvania^^ (Brainard, 1999, Dec 17; see also Gelsinger, P., 
2000) and recommendations o f the OPRR in June 3, 1999 (see Wheeler, 1999, Oct 8; 
OPRR 1999), and amidst the revealing reports o f the DHHS OIG (particularly 1998b, 
1998d, 1998e, 2000b) and the GAO (1996; see also 2001, for argument that “problems” 
still exist), the new OHRP director’s own statements about the need for reform 
(Brainard, 2000, Sep 13), and introduction o f a bill in the Senate (see Human Research 
Subjects Protection Act, S. 193. 1997).
Whether the entity is called the Office o f Protection from Research Risks or the 
Office o f Human Research Protections is not particularly significant. The power to
“strange" in this regard is an example of "naturalization,” i.e.. the reification o f insurance and rules 
requiring it.
"  It was believed that Gelsinger’s was the first gene-therapy trial death, but it was later found to be the 
seventh death (see Brainard, 1999, Dec 17). The reason for this is the prior deaths were reported to the 
FDA that “does not publicly disclose reports of deaths unless the therapy is eventually approved or the 
sponsor o f the research gives permission" (p. A40). For reasons unapparent to me, this never became a 
big story. I would suggest it is the story. (Also see Brainard, 2001, Jan 5, regarding an NIH proposal to 
relax guidelines "that require researchers to promptly report deaths and complications among patients in 
gene-therapy studies." p. A33). Not only is the reporting of deaths and harm among if not the most 
important activity one could do to prevent more harm, to not require such reporting is dangerous and 
absurd. Further, I believe it is a clear illustration of at least one serious and negative effect of 
commercialization on the integrity o f the human subjects protection system.
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name (and re-name) the office is o f interest, however. Also o f interest is the change in 
the enforcement effort (based on the increased number o f  sanctions issued during 1999 
to mid-2000), immediately followed by a dismantling and restructuring o f a big part o f 
the enforcement system. And, as mentioned, government reports have suggested more 
direct oversight o f the informed consent process is “needed,” and that the federal 
oversight process should be “reengineered” (see DHHS, OIG, 1998b, p. Hi and .v/;
GAO, 2001). As o f mid-2001, the OHRP initiated an elaborate IRB registration (see 
http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/fmreltn/faq.htm, accessed May 25, 2002). 
This registration system itself it could be argued is an outgrowth o f the congressional 
realization that one did not exist; Ellis couldn’t tell the representatives how many IRBs 
function in the U.S. (see U.S. House, 1998, Jun 11).^ For some reason this seemed 
important to them. i.e.. that the legislators seemed to think that knowing the (exact, or 
close to it) number o f IRBs was indicative o f “doing a good job” as an administrator, or 
something akin to that assessment. The number o f  IRBs overall doesn’t seem 
particularly important or relevant to designing the way an individual IRB is to operate 
to adequately protect human subjects o f research.
Purpose o f Studv
It appears the IRB system (including federal regulation, institutional renditions, 
and self-regulatory behavior) that has existed for at least 25 years in the U.S. is in a
"  The registry is available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/assurance/inum.htm, accessed 
May 25, 2002. The G.40 (2001 ) reported as part of the new assurance process (details available, and 
changing frequently, at OHRP website) “Registration will enable DHHS to build an IRB database, which
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somewhat common situation o f administering, imposing rules and regulations that no 
longer fit important aspects o f the “real” world they are meant to constrain (and, as time 
goes by, often have less to do with the intended purpose, i.e.. protecting human 
subjects). The IRB regulatory system may be described as a simulation (Baudrillard, 
1983),'*  ^ a discursive formation (Foucault, 1972) that will be made more visible in the 
interest o f critique (and perhaps deconstructing and abandoning). This system is in need 
o f scrutiny, for the benefit of regulators, researchers, and the researched. Management, 
and regulatory entities, should be openly and regularly questioned and challenged, for 
the benefit o f management and the managed. “Management [is] a social phenomenon 
meriting serious critical examination” as “established management discourse and 
practice tends to incorporate and ‘swallow up’ larger and larger domains o f social and 
personal life, such as culture, conflict, and even pleasure” (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992, 
p. 3; see also Burrell. 1992).
The system o f regulation for human subjects research in both social and medical 
science has reached a point o f diminishing returns, even detrimental effects. This is the 
essential problem o f concern for the present study. The “grand narrative” and other
will Facilitate the identification of and communication with officials who actively review projects using 
human subjects" (p. 6).
Baudrillard's notions will be covered in the description o f SINS, below, p. 58-64. However, his words 
may be useful here. "The real is produced from miniamrized units, from matrices, memory banks, and 
command models -  with these it can be reproduced an indefinite number o f times (and across spans of 
time and places. I would mention by way of extending to my topic). It no longer has to be rational (as is 
often the case that regulation is irrational)... it is nothing more than operational (process over purpose)”
( 1983, p. 3). .\nd with respect to regulators themselves, I would apply Baudrillard’s comment, "For it is 
with [the same] Imperialism that present-day simulators try to make the real, all the real, coincide with 
their simulation models. (These formations are positioned as things we must do to make the world “work" 
or "function.” i.e.. the idea that [administrative] rules must be in place or chaos [or abuse] will 
[inevitably] result.)
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institutionalized structures surrounding (particularly social) science regulation must be 
re-opened, questioned, and revised or eliminated. First they have to be exposed/*
Fundamental debates continue about the very soul o f research, including the 
tensions among the goals o f social science and research ethics, bureaucratic protection 
and secrecy, political control and individual rights and obligations (Whyte, 1987; 
Garfinkel. 1967; Bantz, 1981; Greenberg, 2001, Jan 19; Pence, 2001, Jan 12; ACHRE, 
1995).
Much IRB regulation, for example, is designed to protect the privacy of 
participants o f research. But, what is public and what is private? (See O ’Connor, 1979, 
p. 249; Kelman, 1982; Caplan, 1982; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, and others.) When can 
research be said to be “harming” people? Who has the right to decide? In what ways are 
ethical norms institutionalized? Or are they? How do respect, beneficence, and justice 
work? Accountability? Responsibility? To what extent do deception, invasion of 
privacy, or other “harms” occur? And to what extent do those rare cases damage field 
relationships, contribute to researchers becoming cynical and devious, and'or enrage 
participants? How many times is the greatest harm damage to the reputation o f social 
scientific inquiry-at-large? And, how many potential benefits are lost (not to mention 
the rights o f researchers in a more general way) because researchers give up trying to 
get a study proposal, or a type o f study proposal (e.g., covert yet treatment-less studies) 
“past the IRB?”
^  Working to be sensitive to the operation of these multi-level structures is somewhat like hearing 
voices—a rather prominent din. And, I’m only “hearing” a few structures relative to the number likely 
operating. (This is one reason I have found the SINS device fimctional for this analysis.)
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“Management is too potent in its effects upon the lives o f employees, consumers 
and citizens to be guided by a narrow, instrumental form o f rationality” (Alvesson & 
Willmott, 1992, p. 1). I suggest this is especially true in terms of researchers and 
regulators who often know little about the type o f research they are “regulating” at any 
given moment. And this overly narrow and often uninformed “guidance” for social 
science researchers in particular (/.e., those who employ methods without treatments 
such as observation, survey research, etc.) is combined with the problem of researchers’ 
consenting to this frequently absurd system through their very participation in it.
Hamilton (1998) in arguing that participatory research is emerging, points out 
that Habermas has focused on the deconstruction o f science (p. 126). Habermas (1971) 
suggests that Cartesian absolutism be replaced with mutual understanding, and that 
social research is “an interactive rather than a controlling process,” (Hamilton, p. 126). 
Habermas (1971) states “objectivism deludes the sciences with the image o f a self- 
subsistent world o f  facts structured in a law-like manner; it thus conceals the a priori 
constitution o f these facts” (p. 69; see also Sun wo If & Seibold, 1998, p. 287). 
“Participants aim for mutual understanding over the coordination of their subsequent 
actions. Applied research, therefore, is not about social conformity but about social 
justice” Hamilton (1998, p. 126) concludes. Finally in this vein, Derrida (1978) states 
that deconstruction brings down the “unities” o f meaning, theory, and self, and Cooper 
and Burrell (1988) state, “It is [such] legitimizing meta-positions to which 
postmodernism objects” (p. 98). (See Figure 2, p. 87; X-axis designed to aid and/or 
imply conformity [marketing research is an X-axis phenomenon, for example]; Y-axis
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designed to study effects o f structures on people [workplace features and their effects
on workers, for example].)
And how would those who would try to institutionalize ethics answer critical
theorists and postmodernists who would likely say that institutionalization is
domination? That respect, beneficence, justice, accountability, and responsibility are
entirely local phenomena"*^ and cannot be given a general or universal definition in any
meaningful, standardized way. Attempts to control them amount to attempts to control
thinking. (I use the many wags who have uttered, “you just can’t legislate morality” as
further evidence o f the futility in this.) These questions address ethical, moral, legal,
professional, theoretical, and practical problems and positions -  and the answers, along
with the view none exist -  that continue to reverberate in classrooms, boardrooms, and
conferences, in all parts of the academy and beyond. As mentioned, the focus o f this
study is how regulation affects social science, and in particular qualitative researchers.
The implication for fieldwork is to be most wary o f any and all attempts to 
fashion rules and regulations, general guidelines, rules of ethics, or standards of 
professional conduct, which would allow well-meaning bureaucrats and 
concerned colleagues to mobilize punishments for morally dubious behavior. 
Doing so, will, 1 think, only have the effect o f forcing decent fieldworkers to lie, 
deceive, wear masks, misrepresent themselves, hide the methods o f their work, 
and other%vise dirty their hands more than their vocation now makes morally 
necessary. (Klockars, 1979, p. 279-80)
“It is time to get on with the multidisciplinary project called qualitative 
research. Too much critique will stifle this project” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998a, p. 410).
■* In my theoretical approach, all rules are local, as all interpretations and "real” actions are local, and 
occur only in the "lifeworld” as described by Husserl, Schütz and Luckmann, Dilthey, and others, i.e.. the 
region o f reality in which people are engaged and where people can change while operating in it. At the 
same time, though, the objects and events (such as regulations) that are already found in this realm (i.e.. 
the bars, see p. 14 and 44) limit free possibilities of action.
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And, I would add, too much regulation has had the same affect. Durkheim (1933, pp. 
65-110; 1951, pp. 335-392, as quoted in Grabe, 1999) argues “the ritualization o f crime 
is a powerful means to draw publicly the line between good and evil, thereby 
constructing morality” (Grabe, 1999, p .156). I will argue that regulation works much 
the same way, in that “rules” imply notions about what is right and wrong. There are 
many arguments against this notion, i.e., that many rules aren’t strict enough to prevent 
wrongs, others are overly restrictive, disallowing what many might call “right,” “good,” 
or at least “reasonable” in any given liquid and local situation, i.e., the lifeworld, and 
still other rules are required but unnecessary, irrelevant, and/or ill-fitting. (See footnote 
# 93. p. 81, re: “liquid and local.”)
Tensions between bureaucratic protection and political control; necessity (or 
lack o f it) for covert activity (O'Connor. 1979, p. 250), secrecy or deception (a clinical 
example is the use o f placebos, which involves all o f these things, however, i.e., blind 
participation, not knowing whether a patient takes “real” medicine, not to mention 
issues related to the right to receive “real” medicine, etc.); individual rights and 
common good; and between therapy and research perpetuate debate about the use of 
human subjects.
Simply, the most significant reason for doing this study this way is to open 
authority to questioning, a theme I find to be o f enduring value. To reveal (SINS) 
STRUCTURES. INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, 
SIMUL.A.TIONS involved in the construction and operation o f the IRB system is a 
primary goal for this study (see Alvesson& Willmott, 1992; Alvesson & Deetz, 2000;
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Horkheimer. 1937/1976. 1972, and 1989; Adorno, 1989a). And, ultimately (and 
consistent with the goals o f critical management/regulatory study), I hope to contribute 
to efforts to reform the IRB process, specifically to create true and complete exemptions 
for social researchers 'vho deliver no treatment to participants— to emancipate these 
researchers employing unobtrusive methods from local interpretations o f federal rules, 
as 1 will explain in the next several chapters.
“Through obscuring the construction process, institutional arrangements are no 
longer seen as choices but as natural and self-evident... [this] protects them from 
examination" (Alvesson & Deetz. 1996. p. 199). Adorno (1989a) describes mass media 
in a way that is relevant: It is not “a question of primary concern for the masses, nor of 
the techniques o f  communication as such, but of the spirit which sufflates them, their 
master's voice. The culture industry misuses its concern for the masses in order to 
duplicate, reinforce, and strengthen their mentality, which it presumes is given and 
unchangeable” (p. 129).
1 call for renewed questioning of the IRB system (i.e. whying to regulators, each 
other, and ourselves, and about regulations and the “management” o f them), with 
specific emphasis on the relationship between qualitative methods and regulation. I call 
for the widespread de-regulation o f social science research restrictions when no 
treatment and no protected classes are involved, the acknowledgement o f the “real 
world” lack of direct oversight and lack of reasonability o f attempting or possibility of 
attaining it"**. It is already the case that researcher compliance is “really” only voluntary
Deetz (1995) says. "Even if they wanted to. government cannot micromanage companies” (p. 25). (I 
suggest the same is true o f institutions and processes related to the IRB system.) Deetz uses the savings
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(without oversight, it can be nothing but). We, as researchers, cannot be watched every 
minute, and even if we could who would do the watching? What do they know? Would 
they say what they know or would they say what they are “supposed” to say according 
to the “script” o f the rules and policies? Would they know what they were doing, i.e., 
would they think they were saying what they mean, when they might “really” be saying 
what they think others wish to hear? It is this kind of whying that should be more 
prevalent in the face o f regulators/regulation.
1 believe we have allowed too much control to be taken by “the process,” too 
much control about what we have to “obtain consent” to do ourselves. For example, 
first-hand direct experience belongs to the experience-er, thus no “consent” can be 
required."*^ Are we to sign our own informed consent forms before we ask ourselves to 
“describe” our own(ed) experiences? WTiether considered to be in non-protected classes 
or not. (the categories themselves are in no way determinate, definitive, or “real”) adults 
participate moment-to-moment in their own lives. As researchers/people, we ask 
questions, scientifically and socially, formally and informally. When we are asking as 
scientists, we act as scientists. We often use tape recorders and notebooks, making them 
obvious to participants/conversants. We ask whether or not the person (participant) 
wishes to be anonymous in our reports, if  in fact we even know the identity o f the 
person with whom we may be speaking or about whom we may have recollections.
and loan fiasco as suppon for his statement, saying "Bad decisions were made, the companies failed, the 
pubic paid the bill, and the managers walked away with bundles of money" (p. 25). O f course, there is 
now another rich example in the Enron debacle.
■“* Wlten do we know that an encounter will become relevant as an example (as data, rather than "fact”) of 
a construct we're presenting in a scholarly work? Or a story we’re telling in life? (See footnote # 9, p. 9 
re: the use of recollection herein.
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Based on this “real world” description, I assert that social researchers as I have 
described embrace the purpose o f regulation, but abandon the local processes. It is often 
the case in what I have seen in local IRB interpretations, that the federal government is 
in a better position to make viable rules than are local boards. First, the federal 
government in making administrative rules only has two higher levels o f law to 
consider, and to avoid contradicting: the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes. The 
local IRB must contend with both o f those legal levels, as well as a state constitution (or 
in the case o f multiple site studies, numerous state constitutions), state statutes, and 
often a university handbook (or. again, several in the case of multiple site studies). 
Additionally, the local IRB, which in theory given the larger legal “maze” would need 
more legal expertise to write rules that would stand up to court or other procedural 
challenges, has less legal expertise at its disposal than do federal agencies, traditionally.
.A.gar (1980) writes about IRB regulation, “there are hundreds o f problems here” 
(p. 183) for ethnographers and social scientists. “If minors are involved, how do you get 
parental consent, especially if the study is o f some behavior o f the minor that s/he does 
not want the parents to know about?^° Or what if it is an experiment in which you 
cannot tell the subjects exactly what is going on because it would bias the results?^' Or 
what if the sample is drawn from an institution where it is questionable that the subject 
has any “choice?” (p. 183-84). Agar (1980) continues, “An ethnographer would not
This can, of course be some “really” important work.
■' Further, following the rules most often alters the natural environment, the lifeworld, rendering it useless 
for research purposes (i.e.. one might enjoy the day in the particular environment, but cannot study it).
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object to the spirit o f protecting human subjects -  it is just that the written form can be a 
problem” (p. 184). Several documents cited herein support the idea that the written 
informed consent form has little to do with actual process o f consent (see US Agency 
for International Development [USAID, 1999]; ACHRE, 1995; and others). These 
administrative rules can be difficult in any kind o f research (qualitative or quantitative, 
social or medical, treatment and non-treatment methods) because much research is 
conducted to develop new knowledge and is therefore unpredictable (see Brainard, 
2002, Mar 29b). “There are too many cases in science where you can’t measure 
relevance in 5, 10. 15, or 20 years,” said Irwin Feller, a professor o f economics at 
Pennsylvania State University at University Park, and quoted by Brainard (2002, Mar 
29b, p. A25).
1 suggest, assuming the risk inherent in any dogma, the present system be 
replaced with a “blanket assurance.” (See Lofland’s idea o f a “certificate of 
competency” for field researchers, as mentioned in Punch, 1998, p. 157; and see the 
University o f Oklahoma, IRB policy and procedure
[http:7research.ou.edu/policy/IRB_Human_Subjects_Policy.html, accessed May 25, 
2002], specifically the provision for student researchers under Section 5.) Lofland’s 
idea represents a “professional guideline” outcome, whereas blanket assurance is a 
“self-regulatory” outcome, to be adopted by researchers in lieu o f countless contrived 
applications and other mute parts o f the process. This is taken up in Chapter Eight.
Among the benefits o f deregulation may be the preservation and expansion in 
the diversity o f research approaches, the enhancements that diversity brings, the
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enhanced view o f diversity itself, and the raising o f the “actual” social capital o f 
diversity, not just the discourse surrounding it. To show respect for the unorthodox, the 
non-traditional, the non-standard, the strange and the weird is beneficial, I contend. To 
demonstrate the (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, 
NATURALIZATIONS. SIMULATIONS associated with, and the folly of, “being 
normal” or even attempts to define what that may be is useful.
Outline o f Contents
Forester (1993) suggests the importance o f linking control structures to daily 
experience in forming what he terms a “structural phenomenology” (p. 140; see also p. 
73 herein). Further, Forester holds that the organizing o f attention is a central feature of 
administrative and organizational processes o f social reproduction. As Forester 
advocates, I will present an illustration (what Forester calls a map) o f  the “ formal 
mandates, informal routines, and various precedents [that] frame participants’ attention” 
(Forester, 1989. p. 159), viewing both the staging and framing o f  social (in this case 
regulator} ) interaction. The data for this study is written communication, i.e.
“discursive formations” (FoucaulL 1972, pp. 31-49) along with a few o f the author’s 
recollections, presented at (I’m told minor) risk o f breaking (local interpretations of) 
rules about the use o f one’s own direct personal experience. The risk is in the potential 
o f having one’s direct first hand experience “swallowed up” in the interpretations o f 
some local IRB as constituting human subjects data although no human subjects were 
subjected to treatment and none are identified in these recollections.
41
Employing Foucault’s position that discourse constitutes organizations, and the 
value he and others place on ordinary texts, i.e., the written products o f ordinary, local, 
day-to-day existence of regular people doing regular things, the data for this study, as 
described, is predominately these forms o f texts. With respect to organization of the 
present study, and consistent with Habermas’s (1984) model explained in the next few 
paragraphs. Foucault suggests the rationalities o f government are. among other things, 
associated with discipline and the “shepherd flock” model (see Hindess. 1996, p. 20). 
Foucault presents each of these rationalities as present at a number o f levels, from 
external supervision to self-regulation and personality modification (see Hindess, 1996). 
Chapter Two contains epistemological/theoretical considerations and Chapter Three, the 
data and methods employed here.
Habermas's (1984. 1987. p. 107) model o f reproduction includes three areas that 
work well to explain some o f the chapter divisions in this study. First in Habermas’s 
model is “cultural reproduction o f worldviews.” including ideas, knowledge, beliefs, 
etc. In Chapter Four, the development o f the IRB system o f regulation is discussed, how 
it came about and parts of the “original” (and ever-evolving) system that have been 
rather consistent in the discourse, and remain apparent. Chapter Five includes 
Foucauldian analyses and resistance readings o f various documents produced within the 
system, including government reports, local application forms, and documents designed 
to provide guidance to compliance.
The second part o f Habermas’s (1987) model is “social integration,” during 
which norms and other patterns o f social membership are reproduced. This corresponds
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to the focus o f analysis for Chapter Six, i.e., the institutional reproductions o f federal 
regulations. An example o f this level o f  analysis is scrutiny o f the “translation” of the 
Code of Federal Regulations and similar texts to university research policy handbooks. 
Renditions o f events in the press, and comments o f university officials and researchers 
also provide insight about IRB system operations.
Third in Habermas’s (1987) model is “socialization” which includes the 
development and alteration o f social identities, motives, and expressions o f self.
Chapter Seven includes an analysis o f  the affects on the identities, motives and self- 
expression of researchers.
Finally, two appendices are included. Appendix A offers a few samples o f the 
Foucauldian analysis conducted herein. Appendix B contains a resource/bibliography of 
congressional hearings, government reports, and other documents related to human 
subjects protection in the U.S.
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Chapter Two: Epistemological and Theoretical Considerations
"Modern society has subjugated the populace to the point that it no longer even sees 
the bars o f  its cage. " Anarchism-as-sensible-resistance-to-our-subjugation proponent 
and WTO protester John Zerzan, as reported by Derrick Jensen, Alternative Press 
Review, reprinted in Utne Reader, May-June 2001, p. 49.
•Mvesson and Deetz (1996) suggest that critical theory and postmodern thought 
oppose objectivists with their goals o f prediction and control o f nature and people, as 
well as humanists who set forth a “naïve version o f human freedom” (p. 205) by 
privileging certain individual points o f view. “Both critical theory and postmodern 
thought share the view that domination is aided, and both people and organizations lose 
much, if we overlook social constructions by treating the existing world as natural, 
rational, and neutral” (p. 211). Even with these shared aspects, critical theory without 
postmodern themes “easily becomes unreflective in regard to cultural elitism and 
modem conditions o f power” and without critical theory, postmodernism becomes 
“esoteric” (p. 211; see also Huspek. 1991).
Hegemony is a process o f “pervading common sense and becoming part of the 
ordinary way of seeing the world, understanding one’s self, and experiencing needs” 
(Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 201; see also Gramsci, 1971; Angus, 1992; Trachtman, 
2002, Apr). Schütz and Luckmann (1973) suggest, “In contrast to specific experiences, 
[these] fundamental structures do not enter into the grip o f consciousness in the natural 
attitude” but they are “a condition o f every experience o f the lifeworld (p. 103). These 
experiences enter “the horizon o f experience ... each experience ‘obviously’ or ‘self-
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evidently’ has an unchangeable spatial, temporal, and social arrangement” (p. 103; see 
also Sunwolf & Seibold, 1998, p. 287, and Giddens, 1979, re: structuration). An 
example is “science” about which Baudrillard (1983) says “science never sacrifices 
itself; it is always murderous” (p. 14).
How does this IRB (or any) regulatory enterprise maintain itself (each of its 
parts) if  the participants -  the rule makers themselves -  don’t support (parts of) it? 
Perhaps this is a component o f reform. What will constitute “critical mass” for change? 
Who will be the Hundredth Monkey? (Schell, 1982)^'
Historically and currently, with respect to regulation o f all kinds, the 
(hegemonic) opinion that more direct oversight, more rules, more enforcement, more 
penalties are needed is pervasive. In the case o f human subjects regulation, direct 
oversight is “needed” because of concerns about rules being followed (DHHS OIG, 
1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 2000b; GAO, 2001) not necessarily, nor centrally, concerns about 
the protection o f people. (This situation is an example o f detachment from the lifeworld 
of research, as described in the “Simulations” section, below, p. 62.) These rules 
themselves, much less more direct oversight, are especially unnecessary in social 
science research studies in which no treatment and/or “minimal risk” are involved, as 
defined by the federal government. What are we “protecting” people who participate in 
“minimal risk” studies fro m l (The federal definition o f “minimal risk” implies we 
would be protecting people from life’s risks.) We have developed an unwarranted belief
The anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s was stalled. Schell, in The Fate o f  the Earth 
employed the “Hundredth Monkey” fable in an attempt to increase the level o f individual activism by 
convincing people their work as activists was worthwhile. Schell argued that a single individual would 
eventually tilt the balance toward change, making every individual of, at least potentially, “critical”
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that rules plus compliance equals protection. They do not, and the belief that they do is 
SINSflil (see National Bioethics Advisory Commission, [NBAC, 2001]; and Brainard, 
2001, Jan 12).
The Entrenchment o f  Enlightenment Ideology
I have chosen to highlight the distinctions between qualitative and quantitative 
research, including aspects o f their historical development. This distinction, while not 
perfect, is best suited for the purposes here. Some notes about the distinction are 
appropriate, however. First, this analysis does not require nor suggest that qualitative 
and quantitative research methods are “opposites” or even totally exclusive o f each 
other. For many portions o f this study, the main distinction is not the particular method 
per se, but the treatments (or lack o f them) associated most generally with certain 
methods. An overwhelming majority o f clinical studies are quantitative in nature, and 
most studies involving no treatment are qualitative. In other parts o f this study, the 
important distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is related to the 
nature o f what is assumed by researchers to be the end product o f the method they 
employ. For example, in completing application forms (most often designed by and for 
clinicians, or derived from forms originally designed for clinical researchers), 
qualitative researchers (who don’t often employ hypotheses) often find the questions 
and requirements o f the process and forms absurd. For example, many qualitative 
researchers have very little idea about the “outcome” o f their research, or even what
importance to the movement. See O ’Leary (1988), for a copy of the fable and analysis o f its use. Also 
see Habermas' (1975) “legitimation crisis," i.e.. failure to maintain mass loyalty (footnote # 75. p. 66).
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data might be useful in a ‘Tinar’ analysis (see Van Maanen quote, p. 48; Agar quote, p. 
49; and Feller quote, p. 40).
The positivistic, naturalistic bias is very much with us (O ’Connor, 1979; 
Klockars, 1979; Whyte, 1987; Knights, 1992; Flyvbjerg, 2001, just to highlight a 32- 
year micro-slice o f the debate). Too often, qualitative researchers are required to spend 
considerable time justifying their existence.^^ Yet, prediction is highly problematic 
even when/if we don’t acknowledge that is the case. Whyte (1987) suggests “ ... the 
history o f recent failures in [quantitative] social research points to the need for an 
anthropological orientation to research,” to researchers with “the ability to 
conceptualize human behavior into systems of interpersonal, intergroup, and 
interorganizational relations, to relate the structure and functioning o f the organization 
to the structure and functioning of the community, and finally, to integrate economic 
and technological with social data” (p. 161 ; see also Sunwolf & Seibold, 1998, p. 286, 
re: “boundary spanners;” Vidich & Lyman, 2000; and Jones, 1999, Feb 18, re: the 
usefulness and popularity o f those holding anthropology degrees with businesses). With 
respect to organizational theory. Mumby (1987) states, “several authors have sought to 
question the legitimacy of organizational models based on the notion that organizations 
are intrinsically rational in their moc/z/j operandi' (p. 115).
I suggest it is time for (renewed) vigorous whying on the part o f researchers, 
organizational and otherwise. The IRB system appears to be unreasonable in many
“Qualitative research has a long and distinguished history in the human disciplines. In sociology the 
work of the “Chicago school" in the 1920s and 1930s established the importance o f qualitative research 
for the study of human group life. In anthropology, during the same period, the work o f Boas, Mead,
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respects, and critical reviews of the processes may be useful in reforming the system. At
(at least) one institution, though, rules constituting the process have prohibited
observation o f the p rocess.O bv iously  if this interpretation o f the rules is employed
{i.e.. IRBs refusing to approve studies designed to study IRBs), the system remains
beyond the scope of open critique and discourse that would perhaps enhance
understanding o f the system (and even the system itself) for all involved parties:
regulators, researchers, and participants o f research.
In some ways IRB regulations have always been inappropriate. It is time to
acknowledge the absurdity o f some IRB requirements (and pursuant interpretations),
particularly in social science research, i.e.. observational, non-treatment, minimal risk
(i.e.. no risk beyond that found in life in general) studies. These characteristics o f
qualitative research make preparing IRB application forms, as they exist now, hardly
possible (as unreasonable, irrelevant, contrived, required but unnecessary texts-as-ritual
rather than meaningful texts).
Qualitative research is endlessly creative and interpretive; the 
interpretations are constructed from field texts, i.e.. notes and documents.
The writer-as-interpreter moves from this text to a research text: notes 
and interpretations based on the field text. This text is then transformed 
to a working interpretive document, containing the writer’s early 
attempts to make sense out o f what s/he has learned. Finally the writer 
produces the public text that comes to the reader. This final tale o f the 
field may assume several forms: confessional, realist, impressionistic, 
critical, formal, literary, analytic, grounded theory, and so on. (Van 
Maanen, 1988, p. 29-30.)
Benedict, Bateson, Evans-Pritchard, Radcliffe-Brown, and Malinowski established “fieldwork” as a 
method (see Denzin & Lincoln, 1998a, p. I). See also Geertz (1973, 1983).
^  I submitted four applications to the IRB at my university in April 2001, one of which included a request 
for interviews with IRB members for the purpose of gathering data for this dissertation. While there has 
been activity about my applications, there has been no action on them. The board as of June 2002, more 
than one year later, has not approved nor denied any o f my applications.
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What is the researcher, particularly the qualitative researcher, to do? A dilemma 
is inherent: A qualitative researcher cannot know the future and therefore cannot gain 
advance approval for data that presents itself, often on-the-spot {i.e., in the lifeworld) or 
at later times {i.e.. recollections o f the lifeworld), in the mind o f the writer, i.e., a 
connection is made from life's experiences, and becomes, in a post hoc fashion, relevant 
data, hardly something for which advance approval can be sought. (And, this differs 
considerably from hypothesis-driven approaches.) Agar (1980) suggests “You can’t 
specify the questions you’re going to ask when you move into the community; you 
don't know how to ask questions yet. You can’t define a sample; you don’t know what 
the range of social types is and which ones are relevant to the topics you’re interested 
in. None o f this goes over well with hypothesis testing fanatics” (p.70). Even the 
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA, 1995) states, “There is now a much greater 
demand for creativity and resourcefulness on the part o f behavioral and social science 
researchers to expand and integrate traditional research methods and develop new 
approaches” (p. 1 ). Regulations and applications do not contribute to or accommodate 
“creativity” (unless perhaps in developing circumvention tactics)'^ but to sameness. 
Detailed advance planning snuffs out the opportunity to do much expanding or 
integrating or development-in-the-moment. The federal rules are apparently in conflict 
with the federal goals in this instance. The NIDA also admits, “Despite the increased 
receptivity toward qualitative research methods, however, there is still some lack of 
clarity in what qualitative methodologists do” (p. 6; see also Vidich & Lyman, 2000).
See section about researcher circumvention, p. 260
49
Qualitative research holds to no single methodology or set o f methods, doesn’t 
privilege one over others, has no theory or paradigm that is distinctly its own, and is 
used in many disciplines including education, communication, psychology, history, 
organizational studies, medical science, anthropology, sociology, and others (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000)'*. Qualitative researchers use semiotics, narrative, content, discourse, 
archival, and phonemic analysis, even statistics.^’ They also utilize various aspects and
Search 1
Date: 4/22/00, 2:56 and 2:58 pm
Institutional Review Boards: 99 matches; 73 on Chronicle pages; 26 in Daily news 
releases
B. Institutional Review Boards and Social Science: 6 matches, 5 on Chronicle pages; 1 in 
Daily news releases 
Search 2
Date: 7'26/01, 7:49 and 8:11 pm
Institutional Review Boards: 136 matches; 93 on Chronicle pages; 43 in Daily news 
"headline” releases
B. Institutional Review Boards and Social Science: 8 matches, 7 on Chronicle pages; 1 in 
Daily news "headline” releases
The comparison shows a 37 % increase in 15 months in overall matches for A, and a 
33% increase for B. Twenty more stories appeared on the Chronicle pages, averaging 
more than 3 stories every two months, while in Search condition B, only two new stories 
appeared during the entire 15-month interval. The ratio of A:B is 99:6 (6.06 % for 
social science) for Search 1 and 136:8 (5.88%) for Search 2.
Figure 1
applications o f ethnomethodology, phenomenology, heimeneutics, feminism, 
deconstructionism, ethnographies, interviews, psychoanalysis, cultural studies, survey
1 suggest that some amount of qualitative research is present in many quantitative studies but is simply 
not labeled as research, see "exempt by label” section, p. 269-272
■ Strauss and Corbin ( 1990) broaden the definition: "By qualitative research we mean any kind of 
research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of 
quantification" (p. 17-18). .And, some researchers utilize qualitative techniques; the data gathered are 
subsequently coded and analyzed statistically. These researchers, in effect, quantify qualitative data, as 
explained by Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p. 8). See also footnote # 53, p. 47.
'* In qualitative interviews alone, techniques range substantially in the form they take, from informal to 
semistructured interviews and life histories (Agar 1980; Fontana & Frey, 1994; Glaser & Strauss, 1967;
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research, participant observation, and others (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 6). Diaries, 
and diaries in combination with interviews, are also useful (see Zimmerman & Wieder, 
1977)/^ Qualitative research is, therefore, according to Denzin and Lincoln (2000, p. 8) 
“interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary,” and sometimes a “counterdisciplinary” field, it is 
“multiparadigmatic” and researchers in this field value “the multimethod approach” to 
answering questions. Qualitative researchers are committed to the “naturalistic 
perspective” and “ interpretive understanding o f human experience” (Denzin & Lincoln
(2000, p. 8).
Social Science Regulatory Observations and Considerations
In a search o f the Chronicle o f  Higher Education for ten years’ time, 73 stories 
were found under the heading “Institutional Review Boards” overall, but only five of 
those were social scientific in nature (see Figure 1, p. 50).**’
Pelto & Pelto. 1978; Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). The main unifying feature is the collection of textual 
data through tape recording and note taking. Open-ended interviews are allowed to flow freely, other 
interv iew situations are more restrictive. Both require preparation and skill on the part of the qualitative 
researcher to encourage individuals to talk about themselves. .And. o f course, a huge variance in interview 
approaches is required given the range of possible topics. (.Also see Gotlschalk, 1995, for example of the 
use of unstructured interviews in a postmodern vein.)
Minutes of meetings (and results o f audits and annual reports) constitute what might be viewed as a 
diary of an organization, for example.
**’ .A similar search o f the NIH website (http://search.nih.gov/advanced.html. accessed May 25, 2002) 
conducted September 2. 2001, yielded the following results:
1 ) Your search for "Human subjects" matched 5842 documents out of 147002.
2) Your search for "human subjects" and title <CONTAINS> "behavioral research" or title 
<CONT.A[NS> "social research" matched 25 documents out of 147002.
3) Your search for "human subjects" and title <CONTAINS> "clinical research" or title 
<CONTAINS> "medical research" matched 176 documents out o f 147002.
4) Your search for "human subjects" and keywords <CONTAINS> "behavioral science" or 
keyw ords <CONTAINS> “social science" matched 12 documents out of 147002.
5) Your search for "human subjects" and keywords <CONTAINS> "clinical research" or 
keywords <CONTAINS> "medical research" matched 1839 documents out of 147002.
This would also indicate that in general, the focus o f government funding organizations, such as 
the ‘himbrella” NIH, is on clinical and medical trials rather than behavioral or social research. In Search
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In the qualitative research arena, the questions surrounding the protection o f 
human subjects o f research shrink in volume and narrow in focus: What is public and 
what is private? What distinctions {i.e.. interpretations) are made between 
“confidential” and “anonymous” and when do they {i.e., are they interpreted to) apply? 
When does the distinction matter, in terms of regulation? When does it matter in “real” 
life? And, what can the researcher promise the participant anyway? Does a researcher 
who refuses to break a promise of confidentiality or anonymity have immunity from 
formal/legal, professional, academic, or other forms of prosecution?
What is “harmful” research? What is “minimal risk?” “Greater than minimal 
risk?” “Somewhat greater than minimal risk?”*' “Only slightly greater than minimal” 
risk?** Who labels it so? *^  Who has the right to distinguish? Who has the ability? When
2. only one document pertained to rules for social scientists; the rest were announcements o f research and 
all appeared to be quantitative in nature. A title search for the term “ethno” yielded one match in 147002 
documents, for example. Finally. OHRP Director Koski (see Brainard. 2001. .Mar 9) indicates that social 
scientists' concerns are a priority of a DHHS advisory committee that met for the first time in December 
2000. However. Brainard (2001. Mar 9) reports only one social scientist is on the 17-member panel. 
(NOTE: Wildcards were used to broaden the search, i.e.. medical to include “biomedical” and ethno to 
include ethnographic, ethnography, etc.)
.According to the Common Rule (45 CFR § 46.102 (i), minimal risk means “that the probability and 
magnitude o f harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and o f themselves than 
those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance o f routine physical or psychological 
examinations or tests.” Local IRB interpretations often imply (in their failure to exempt certain kinds of 
research exempted under federal law) that being observed at a shopping mall, or interviewed in a park is 
more dangerous than driving to the mall, park, or elsewhere. A related issue is weapons testing; can we 
not assume weapons are dangerous, and that would include the testing of them? (See CNN.com, 2001, 
Jan 15.)
See Charo ( 1999. Mar 26) who says “Many boards already struggle with the difference between 
'minimal' and ‘greater than minimal’ risk, despite regulatory definitions o f those categories. Boards 
evaluating research on children have not found a third category o f risk -  ‘only slightly greater than 
minimal' -  any easier to define with precision” (p. B9).
The answer to this question is rather obvious. Based on the Common Rule definitions provided in the 
previous two footnotes, it is the federal government in this case that has the power to define. The answer 
to the next question about who has the ability to define is o f course uncertain and mostly unasked.
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is covert research activity justified? When is regulation justified? What is the role of 
regulation in all o f  this? And, how does it workl
How does it work? Not only in terms o f efficiency, i.e., how well it works, but 
also more basically how it operates. These are important local questions, even if no 
absolute or comprehensive answers exist. And certainly, an understanding o f how 
something operates is a logical prerequisite to understanding how to evaluate, reform, or 
improve it. (For examples o f analysis, see Appendix A, p. 344)
Epistemological Position
Evaluations o f the “true” effectiveness o f regulatory efforts may not be 
comprehensive, conclusive, possible, useful, or advisable. High degrees of 
intersubjective agreement are not likely to exist, especially in regulatory situations. 
However, observations and subsequent descriptions o f regulatory activity, in an attempt 
to understand how the system works {i.e., operates) seems a reasonable pursuit.
From the position that the regulatory system is substantially detached from the 
research system (in a sense, hyperreal, as described by Baudrillard, 1983, and also by 
Russell. 1972). “this passage into a space whose curvature is no longer that o f the real, 
nor o f truth” (p. 3-4) is the onset of “the age of simulation” which “begins with a 
liquidation o f all referentials,” {i.e., things corresponding with the lifeworld, p. 4), and 
made “worse.” by “their artificial resurrection in the form o f signs” (p. 4). It involves 
the “substituting signs o f the real for the real itself, an operation to deter every real 
process by its operational double” (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 4). Epistemologically, then it is
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important to critically analyze the “curvature” o f the regulatory world without, to the 
extent possible, making “flat earth” assumptions. Deetz (1995) says, “The management 
o f work must be reintegrated with the doing o f work” (p. 170).
Simulaiionally. then, much o f the science o f human communication relies upon 
the optimistic assumption that behavior can be both understood and improved through 
systematic study. Further, it assumes that improvement must be based upon 
understanding, which converges on the primary goal o f science. Some communication 
scientists “positivistically” assume that they can find important patterns in social 
behavior through observations o f many similar actions. Positivists believe they can 
devise and support general laws about behavior (Skinner, 1938; and more recently in 
the communication field, C. Berger, 1991; Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Burgoon & 
LePoire, 1992; nearly anything coming from the McCroskey Machine or the grinding of 
Gudykunst's Gears). Some communication theorists want to understand and interpret, 
and to know the affects and meanings communication holds for the participants 
themselves in every conceivable context (interpersonal, group, organizational, societal, 
etc.). And still other theorists want to take up the issues o f change, emancipation, and 
critique (,A.lvesson & Willmott, 1992; Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; and predecessors Marx, 
Horkheimer, .\dom o, and later Foucault, Habermas, Derrida, and others).
For example. Redding and Tompkins (1988; see also Tompkins & Cheney, 
1985), from a postmodern viewpoint (though not explicitly stated as such) suggest that 
communication distortion does not mean the same thing to a critical scholar that it 
might mean to a traditionalist. Following their argument, when communication
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traditionalists^ talk about distortion, they focus on (in)accuracies or errors in 
(in)formation that lead to (in)efficiency and (in)effectiveness (mal-formation) in 
communication or some such conjecture. Traditionalists might observe and measure 
managers’ communicative behaviors in order to classify them in degree o f “openness” 
or some other notion, or purport to measure the levels o f job satisfaction among 
employees or managers, or perform statistical analyses related, they would contend, to 
whether employee job satisfaction is greater under “high-openness” or low, etc.^^ These 
terms (operationalizations, or what might be described as “real” world detachments, or 
Baudriesque simulations), i.e.. “measure,” “openness,” “high-openness,” “job 
satisfaction,” etc. point out language that dominates thinking about jobs, happiness, the 
desirability o f whatever “openness” is defined as, what an adequate sample size is, what 
efficiency is, and even what science is. This thinking is SINSful (see next section, p. 58- 
64), specifically assumptions that these processes, definitions, observations, 
measurements, observations, and conclusions are relevant, or fit, or are fit to describe 
more than a tiny sliver o f “reality.” These same processes, definitions, observations, 
measurements, and conclusions are too many steps removed from the “real” world to be 
used alone or authoritatively about what life is like, yet we accept them as institutions, 
as natural, normal, as preferable, as “science.” In my way of thinking Baudrillard’s 
“simulation” (the second “S” in SINS) is very close in meaning to “operationalization”
I find the term "traditionalist” a further indication o f the reification of positivism. For an example o f a 
similar situation, re; use of the term “critic.” see p. 160.
Generally speaking, traditionalists might examine communication processes and some perceived 
relationship to organizational effectiveness. This trend toward "managerial” interests in communication 
departments is troublesome, see Mumby & Stohl (1996).
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(see footnote # 108, p. 92, re: Schütz comments about lost relationships to meaning in 
the natural sciences). Jackson (1989) says that the “ impersonal idioms” we use in 
talking about our “unsystematic, unstructured nature o f  our experiences” helps us 
“create illusory word-worlds which we can more or less easily manager because they 
are cut off from the stream o f life” (p. 4). Jackson concludes, “In this sense, objectivity 
becomes a synonym for estrangement and neutrality a euphemism for indifference” (p. 
4).
“In a postmodern approach ... language which is produced by the empirical 
process does not equate with an increasingly accurate correspondence with reality. 
Instead it represents a process o f professional self-justification” according to Hassard 
(1993, p. 12). Further, the inherently impossible value-free position o f positivists 
contributes to this “distance from reality” (i.e.. detachment) problem. In turn, these 
departures from reality create a layer (or several layers) o f  what might be called “buried 
superficiality.” i.e.. we know something we do does not work, and is not based on 
“reality.” but we keep doing it. burying our concerns in some kind o f un- or de-being 
process. (See Schütz & Luckmann, 1973, and/or foomote # 247. p. 241 re: use o f rules 
as simplifying.)
.\nalvtical Framework
Each person is bom into ongoing discourses that have a material and 
continuing presence ... Available discourse positions the person in the 
world in a particular way prior to the individual having any sense o f choice. 
[This discourse] structures the person’s subjectivity, providing a particular 
social identity and way o f being in the world. The person, contra
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humanism, is always social first and only mistakenly claims the personal 
self as the origin o f experience. (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 205)
Schütz and Luckmann (1973) use the term "historizations" (in describing a
phenomenon similar to “discourse structures”) saying they “originate from socially
conditioned motives" (p. 283-84; see also Sunwolf & Seibold, 1998, p. 286-87).
Language is inherently limiting; it hides important alternatives. (See Poole, et
al., 1985. for discussion about boundary establishment and identity maintenance within
structured environments.) Once we subscribe to the patterned system, we begin talking
“at” or past” each other, role-to-role {i.e., detached) rather than “with,” (real-to-real) in
a sort o f pseudo-engagement. This notion of pseudo-engagement is particularly relevant
to the issue of regulation, i.e.. we rarely have face-to-face encounters with regulators.
Our conversations with them, if they occur at all. are focused on the fulfillment o f rules
rather than the reasons for them (Baudrillard, 1983, 1988; Foucault. 1972, 1980;
Habermas, 1975. 1984, and others).^*’ For example, most regulators would likely be
“offended” by and probably unable to answer “why” questions; they are accustomed to
answering “how” questions (even i f  when unable).
Individuals arrange for—and often direct the flow of—activities (talk) within
settings (Goffman. 1974; Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969; Chomsky, 1965; Garfmkel, 1967;
Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Foucault, 1972, and others). .Asking questions that
others must answer, and making requests and issuing directives to which others must—
In this case. I cite Baudrillard for his discussions about simulations. He might say something like what 
we do at the office is deal with how to do things at the office rather than why we have an office, for 
example. Foucault I bring for his comments about discursive formations, specifically, though he doesn’t 
use this phrase, that "texts drive activity.” And. 1 cite Habermas for his ideas about legitimation and the 
rather interesting and somewhat terrifying process of tethering activity and beliefs to other activity, ideas.
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at least are expected to— respond (and to respond in specific ways) are examples.
People create rules, specialized vocabularies, and certain forms o f argument. They form 
hierarchies, rituals, and routines via this discourse. Individuals produce (or more 
accurately, co-produce) control and power, then, through discursive dominance, i.e., 
making some resources (including ways of knowing, i.e., what is considered fact, what 
is considered logical, what is considered risky [or less than risky, or somewhat less than 
risky], what is public and private, and perpetuating the myth o f a singular truth, justice, 
beneficence, etc.) available to themselves and others, and acting to make other 
resources less available. .A.nd people do this through talk. In the case o f regulatory 
bodies, most o f the talk results in written documents, i.e., rules and reports.
SINS (Structures. Institutionalizations, Naturalizations, Simulations)
In the present study, the works o f the classical theorists-W eber (1947), Fayol,
( 1916/1949), and Taylor ( 19I9/I947)-are useful for understanding the roots o f the IRB 
system and may provide glimpses o f the (SINS) STRUCTURES, 
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS operating in 
the system. SINS may be described as “unacknowledged” knowledge. SINS are neutral 
but powerful. (See Foucault, 1980; 1977/1995, p. 297, re: “carceral continuum,” 
“carceral net,” and “carceral circles” underlying morality, power relations, and order; 
and Durkheim, 1933, p. 79, re: “common consciousness” creation.)
expectations, etc. rather than the tethering of activity and beliefs to reality {i.e.. the use of instrumental 
reasoning).
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The power o f  any position has been traditionally gathered from its grounding. 
This grounding could be to either a metaphysical foundation -  such as an 
external world in empiricism, mental structures in rationalism, or human nature 
in humanism -  or a narrative, a story o f history, such as Marxism’s class 
struggle, social Darwinism’s survival o f  the fittest, or market economy’s 
invisible hand. With such groundings, positions are made to seem secure and 
inevitable and not opportunistic or driven by advantage. (Alvesson & Deetz, 
1996, p. 208)
Structures. Marx offered the earliest ideological critiques o f the workplace in 
1844 and 1867 (.Alvesson & Deetz, 1996). Marx focused on economic exploitation 
practices, direct coercion, and structural social differences, but he also described ways 
exploitation is disguised and comes to be legitimized (see also Lefebvre, 1969. p. 7 and 
10). The focus o f study shifted to scrutiny o f active consent, and the (SINS) 
STRUCTURES. INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS. NATUR.ALIZATIONS. 
SIMULATIONS (and concessions) that make the need for coercion rare. In this view, a 
worker’s xeZ/'-understanding o f experiences became, and remains, important to 
understand.
Similar to Adorno (1989a), Hall (1986) offers the example that marketing 
research operates with the ideology that capitalism is good, similar to the contention 
that science and regulation continue to operate with a bias toward positivism (see also 
Whyte. 1987; Agar. 1980; Goffman, 1971).
I believe this is consistent with Marx’ economics-as-deep-structure premise, and 
this perspective may be useful in gaining more understanding o f (SINS) 
STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, 
SIMULATIONS affecting the IRB system. For example, the notions that rules are
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perceived by many individuals as desirable or as constituting protection. There appears 
to be a bias toward compliance, perhaps in part because o f  this notion o f protection, and 
because it is easier, safer, and substantially more “appropriate” to conform than to 
rebel'’'. (Re: rules perceived as desirable, following rules as good, and rules as 
protective, see Schütz & Luckmann, 1973; re: maintenance o f status quo, see Adorno, 
1989a and Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/1972; also see Brainard, 2001, Jan 12; NBAC, 
2001; Sunwolf & Seibold, 1998). The (mythical) ideas that rules are good, and even that 
following rules is good,'’* are obvious, particularly on the part o f federal and 
institutional regulators, as I will show.
(SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, 
SIMULATIONS are operating in the IRB system, even when the rules (often symptoms 
of even deeper structures) are being (at least occasionally) criticized. It may be that the 
IRB (or other) system remains in place (and is expanding in some local interpretations 
to include film makers, journalists, historians, cultural geographers, and others 
previously not affected) even though it is considered abusive and unnecessary by many 
(see, in particular, AAUP, 2001 and others cited herein), because the oppressed allow it 
(see Adorno. 1989b, footnote # 67, below), and then contribute to entrenching the 
system o f rules by the SINSftil assumptions that the system is unavoidable, cannot be 
deconstructed, has a “higher purpose” of which an individual researcher is unaware, etc.
” .Adomo (1989b) sates, "The whole [system] sun^jves only through the unity o f the functions which its 
members fulfill. Each individual without exception must take [on] some function ... order to prolong ... 
existence; indeed, while [his] function lasts, he is aught to express his gratitude for if ’ (p. 268).
See also Sunwolf & Seibold (1998), for a similar argument about juries and nested values, specifically 
they sate, "the rule that ‘the law should be followed’ interpenetrates with the social rule that people 
should not report the transgressions of a friend’’’ (p. 303). In our own experiences we may recall times
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Institutionalizations. More or less following Marx, Giddens (1979) defines 
ideology as a set o f  assumptions and beliefs comprising a system o f thought. Ideology 
provides the structure o f an organization’s “mode of rationality,” and is essential to an 
organization’s deep structure. Ideology, in Giddens’ (1979) view, serves to privilege 
certain groups. Members o f  dominated groups participate in their own oppression (they 
concede) by identifying with and consenting to the system preferred by the dominators. 
In organizational settings, according to Williams (1977), such dominance occurs when a 
group in power (managers, for example, or regulators) convinces an oppressed group to 
adopt the interests o f the dominant group (the we’re-all-on-the-same-team pitch, 
loyalty, patriotism, and corporate cultism are examples), or makes some reality claims 
more available than others (Foucault, 1977/1995). Hall (1986), in the context o f mass 
communication, suggests that the media do not reflect the status quo ideology, but the 
media actually reinforce it. (See also Grabe, 1999, particularly the last sentence, “This 
study's results support the notion that television mass disseminates messages to nurture 
the survival o f the existing social order,” p. 168.)
Naturalizations. According to Alvesson & Deetz (1996) naturalization involves 
social formations that are abstracted from the “historical conflictual site” of their origins 
and treated as fixed entities. These reifications “become the reality rather than life 
processes” and these “institutional arrangements are no longer seen as choices but as 
natural and self-evident” (p. 199). Adorno (1989a) states that “conformity has replaced
when w e have felt the law was been followed but justice was not served, or that certain rules are not fair 
or not fairlv followed, etc.
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consciousness” (via models in the media o f how to dress, think, behave, etc.) and “the 
concepts of order which [the culture industry] hammers into human beings are always 
those o f the status quo. They remain unquestioned, unanalyzed, and undialectically 
presupposed, even if they no longer have any substance for those who accept them” (p. 
133; see also Mumby, 1987, p. 51). And Derrida (1981) says that normative*’*^ social 
structures are products o f systems privileging unity and identity over separation and 
difference. This work has relevance to the “ invisible functioning” o f the IRB regulatory 
system, the (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, 
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS, at work. “Nothing offers a more striking 
symbol for the fact that people’s lives, what they hold for the closest to them and the 
greatest reality, personal, maintained in being by them, actually receive their concrete 
content in large measure from above” (Adorno. 1989b, p. 273).
Simulations. To further explain Baudrillard’s (1983) ideas about simulations. I’ll 
first present a descriptive example he offers, and then a brief discussion o f  the “phases 
of the image” as he outlines. Baudrillard (1983) presents feigning versus simulating an 
illness in illustrating his idea. When feigning an illness, a person “can simply go to bed 
and make believe [he] is ill” (p. 5); when someone simulates an illness, though, the 
person produces in him/Tierself some o f the symptoms of the illness. Therefore, 
“ feigning or dissimulation leaves the reality principle intact: the difference is always
The term “normalization” might have been used in this StNS device, though it has been used in other 
ways. I chose “naturalization” (the term used by Alvesson and Deetz) because it is a linie more precise, 
more clearlv attributable, and has fewer unintended connotations.
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clear, it is only masked; whereas simulation threatens the difference between ‘true’ and 
‘false,’ between ‘real’ and imaginary’” (p. 5).
Baudrillard’s (1983) phases o f the image include first a ‘‘good appearance,” i.e., 
a reflection o f a basic reality. Next, characterized as a “bad appearance,” is an image 
that masks and perverts a basic reality. Third, what Baudrillard terms sorcery, masks the 
absence o f a basic reality. And finally, simulation, in which an image “bears no relation 
to any reality whatever; it is its own pure simulacrum” (p. 11). In the case o f the IRB 
system, many examples o f these phases can be seen. Application forms, completed by 
researchers for presentation to IRB members, “good appearances” (phase one). They are 
“good” in that they are produced by the person who will actually conduct or at least 
conduct a potion o f the study, i.e., will be in the liquid, local research environment. That 
these applications are accepted as accurate representations o f what actually happens in 
any local situation is a masking,/perversion (phase two) o f that local reality (and 
especially perverted, perhaps, is an irrelevant/ill fitting regulatory structure).
Researchers contribute to the sorcery (phase three) in “masking” the absence o f reality 
in the system (regulators’ acceptance o f written documents as ensuring protection 
and/or compliance to rules, or the assumptions that rules, if  followed, provide protection 
and/or that researchers know and comply with rules). An argument could be made, with 
respect to phase four, that the entire IRB system (and indeed many regulatory systems) 
is a “simulation.” Examples o f  evidence o f this image phase might be the (rather 
prevalent) idea that regulatory systems are needed and/or are accomplishing their goals.
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or that regulators and the regulated often perceive regulations to be “mandatory” (when, 
without direct oversight, the system can only be in a “real” sense voluntary)/"
Bringing SINS into View: Foucault's Archeoloev
Critical theorists, with a focus on communicative and symbolic approaches to 
power, argue that assumptions within a group that things are or should be a particular 
way is most powerful. “Domination involves getting people to organize their behavior 
around a particular rules system” (Mumby, 1987, p. 115). Foucault, it seems, agrees 
when he advances the idea that power is a set o f relationships that people hold with the 
texts ' that constitute organizations to which they belong’". Further, Foucault’s idea that 
the more invisible the power is, the more effective it is resonates with Mumby’s
" For this study. I am not concerned with whether the entire IRB system is a simulation or not. I am, 
rather, concerned with the various ways in which specific procedures are simulated” in this way, i.e. the 
level of detachment among federal regulators, regulations, local interpretations of regulations, actual 
researchers, the researched, and their local environments.
' Derrida considers "text” in a way that indicates, for me, something more akin to "context," i.e.. Derrida 
says the text refers to both the interplay of discourses (political, social, etc.) and the "stage upon which 
the process of deconstruction is enacted” (as described by Hassard, 1993, p. 10). Thinking of texts in this 
way supplements the Foucauldian analytic approach (in my view).
■ Dissertations are an example. Dissertations, I would assert, are "non-authored” texts produced by texts 
(see Foucault, 1972, re: discursive formations). Every dissertation ever written provides a frame for every 
dissertation that will be written. Previous dissertations, read by scholars who serve on committees and as 
chairs, work to formulate the view o f what the dissertation text should be. Texts (including guidelines and 
stylebooks, as examples) are used to disseminate rules, which in turn dictate what dissertations must look 
like (at least to a very great extent). IRB regulations dictate what the dissertation can and cannot contain. 
.\nd the dissertation "writer” creates a new text, based on previous and related texts, and the prospectus, 
rough draft, and (mostly written) critiques o f chairs and committee members. Therefore, there is no single 
"writer” o f a dissertation; the dissertation is a text produced by texts. In this example, who is on the 
committee, who writes the rules, or who punches the keys to actually create the text doesn’t matter. 
Dissertations are framed and produced in this same way, regardless o f who the student is, who the chair 
is, which institution the "dissertation production entity” involves, or who writes rules. Somewhat 
ironically, the document bears the student’s name although offen the student had the least to do with the 
"writing.” However, the student generally does the "word processing.” and it is then this feat of word 
processing, rather than any true "authorship,” that is used in the “final” evaluation o f the student. The 
student must defend the document s/he has (not) authored. In this way, one might argue that dissertations 
are textually dictated (rather than “authored”) typing tests. (See also Hassard, 1993, “Research proceeds 
on the basis of discourses which are already shared within a particular scientific community," p. 12.)
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statement about assumptions, as well as the views expressed by Hall, Gramsci, and 
others.'
Deetz (1982) suggests the goals o f critical scholarship are to gain a richer 
understanding o f naturally occurring events, to criticize systematically distorted 
communication and false consensus (the result o f insufficient whying; see Adorno,
1989a, p. 133), and to work to expand the intellectual, cognitive horizon from which 
organizational members think and work. In order to do this, 1 suggest the “horizon” 
must be made more apparent than it often is, and expanded to better accommodate 
(maybe someday even welcome) those with atypical or unorthodox {i.e., strange, weird, 
etc.) approaches.
In a departure from those critical theorists who focus almost entirely on issues o f 
domination and oppression, Foucault (1980) examined the codes and theories o f order 
by which societies operate (see Manning, 1989, p. 213 and 232), and suggested that 
power is not domination, rather Foucault made a distinction between the two.^^ In the 
Foucauldian scheme, power is viewed not simply as a pervasive force, but also a 
productive, creative one. Foucault asks, “ If power were never anything but repressive, if 
it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey 
it?” (1980, p. 119).'-' In attempting to describe the (SINS) STRUCTURES, 
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS in place in the
’ .And Hall (1989) states that hegemony is "not the old notion o f determinism in a new disguise, for it 
refuses to ascribe the positions o f power, whether in discourse or across the whole social formation, 
permanently to anybody” (p. 51-52), and he further states that hegemony isn’t total, a plot, and is not 
force. (See also Hall, 1996.)
■* Similarly, Giroux (1988) suggests schools can become institutions where ideas, values, and social 
relations are taught for the purpose o f students’ critical empowerment rather than subjugation.
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IRB regulatory system, I will utilize questions set forth by Foucault in 1972 (see Table 
1, Appendix A, p. 345) to assist in the exploration o f  IRB discourse related to 
regulations, guidance documents, sanctions, evaluations, and other discursive 
formations within the system.
Loss o f  Foundations (Habermas ' Legitimation Crisis). In the first o f two views 
about the loss o f foundations and grand narratives described by .Alvesson and Deetz 
(1996), they suggest some analysts hold that foundations and narratives have always 
been a hoax. They have been used (often unknowingly and in ways that are 
unacknowledged and unarticulated, i.e., mindlessly) to support a dominant worldview. 
The second position focuses on “growing social incredulity” (p. 211) toward 
foundations and grand narratives; Lyotard (1984), for example, demonstrated the 
decline o f grand narratives o f spirit, emancipation, patriotism, etc.
Growing public skepticism (or astuteness) added to the proliferation o f the profit 
motive in research and the record o f atrocities in (almost exclusively medical or 
military/medical) research, can be associated with what Habermas (1975) termed 
“legitimation crises.” Deetz (1985) suggests legitimation appears “ in the rationalization 
of decisions and practices through the invocation of higher-order explanatory devices ” 
(p. 127; see also NIH, 2001, p. 1, regarding “Decision Trees”) and argues Habermas 
(1975) has “convincingly” demonstrated motivation and high productivity have been 
sustained in the Western world more by the Protestant work ethic {i.e., the belief that
' Habermas ( 1975) states that legitimation crisis occurs when "the legitimizing system does not succeed 
in maintaining the requisite level o f mass loyalty" (p. 46).
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work is preferable or more valuable or virtuous than play, that leisure and family time 
are expendable in the face o f work, or adages about idle hands and devil’s work)’  ^than 
by intrinsic work experiences (see also Weber, 1930. who shows how one group’s set o f 
social norms can become infused into the wider socio-cultural context). Lyotard’s 
(1984) view suggests only local narratives exist, leading to explorations o f how stories 
in organizations connect to legitimizing narratives and how some are more local, 
situational in nature (see Martin 1990; Deetz, 1997, 1998). Others have used this 
position to illustrate the false certainty in management narratives (Jehenson, 1984; 
Ingersoll & Adams, 1986; Carter & Jackson 1987). The rise o f “performativity” ’^ 
occurs when measures o f means toward social ends become ends in themselves and 
when new forms o f control arise, directed not by a desire for social good but simply by 
more production and consumption, according to .Alvesson and Deetz (1996, p. 209). I 
believe the IRB system has clearly arrived at this point, i.e., means overshadow ends, 
process has supplanted purpose.
Proliferation o f private free enterprise (as an activity and as a value) encroaches 
on other realms o f “real” life, including politics (FACs, for example), education (we 
now teach “marketable skills” in the continuation o f the “vo-teching” o f the university).
* It may be possible, eventually, to change the compliance bias. If/when rules are bad (i.e.. ineffective, 
ill-fitting, irrelevant, debilitating) it could be argued that they should be ignored. But. rather obviously, 
the SINSful idea that following rules is good contributes mightily to the pervasive tendency to follow bad 
rules rather than ignore them.
“Performativity,” according to Lyotard (1984) rose to the greatest prominence, catapulting convenience 
and efficiency, productivity, profitability and other measures of "return on investment" ahead of 
everything else in importance. In Habermasian terms, these values are cultural reproductions, and an 
example o f instrumental reasoning privileging the means over the ends, aiding dominant groups’ 
(positivists and regulators, for example) ability to accomplish their goals invisibly. (See also the concepts 
of "glocalization" and "globalization.” Kraidy, 1999.) My local point is that perpetuating the process is 
privileged over accomplishing the purpose in the IRB system, and that compliance takes precedence over 
critique.
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and on even deeper levels, including the human consumption o f animals and their 
habitat, and our own habitat including air, water, earth, and space. According to 
Mumford, (1970), “Western society has accepted as unquestionable a technological 
imperative that is quite as arbitrary as the most primitive taboo: not merely the duty to 
foster invention and constantly to create technological novelties, but equally the duty to 
surrender to these novelties unconditionally, just because they are offered, without 
respect to their human consequences” (p. 185-186). The right-to-make-a-profit-at-any- 
cost mentality is prevalent.
With respect to the IRB regulatory system, it seems, when these are in conflict, 
that we favor process over purpose, maintaining the status quo over development and 
implementation o f new ideas, and compliance over critique. We are conforming to (at 
best) a pointless system o f protection (and in some cases a potentially debilitating 
system) rather than rebelling against it. Why don’t we ignore it? Engage in passive 
rebellion? Encourage our colleagues and students to ignore (certain ill-fitting and 
meaningless parts of) the system? Insist that our professional organizations endorse the 
ignoring of these (selected) rules? Why don’t we act as if this is possible?'*
Because the IRB system is highly political (as will also be shown), 1 suspect 
federal regulators, (once the momentum of the rebellion is apparent)^"^, would perhaps
* Deetz (1995) suggests that “the production of particular oppositions and conflicts” would be as much a 
part of [compliance] “as the production o f integration and order ... the dialectic o f control ... delimits and 
limits dominant groups . . .” (p. 166). He continues, “Communication researchers in looking at such 
constitutive processes are not so interested in the production o f a dominant culture as in the cultural 
fragmentation and dispersion that function to control and make productive resistance difficult” (p. 166). 
■\nd Adorno (1989b) states. “When details come to seem the strongest reality o f all, on account o f their 
tangible immediacy, they blind the eye to genuine perception” (p. 269).
See Schell ( 1982), re: the Hundredth Monkey, and Habermas (1975) re: legitimation crisis as a 
consequence o f failure to maintain mass loyalty (foomote # 75, p. 66. herein).
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move quickly to dismantle the system (as it pertains to “minimal risk” studies, as 
described and defined by the federal government) and claim credit for wbat might be 
spun as a system “ innovation."
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Chapter Three: Data and Method
"Against positivism, which halts at phenomena -  'There are only facts ’ -  /  would say: 
No. facts is precisely what there is not. only interpretations. We cannot establish any 
fac t 'in itself: 'perhaps it is fo lly  to want to do such a thing. Friedrich Nietzsche, The 
Will to Power, p. 267, (emphasis in original).
Data
“Discourse is the way we do things ... discourse becomes social structure” 
(Loseke, 1993, quoted in Miller, 1997, p. 170). Social settings and institutional 
discourses create possibilities for reality construction (see Hindess, 1996, especially p. 
19; Sun wolf & Seibold, 1998). “Reality” construction is not so precisely determinate 
that participants may predict the exact ways issues will be interpreted, but reality 
construction occurs under conditions, i.e.. (SINS) STRUCTURES, 
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS, that make 
some reality claims more available than others, as Foucault (1977/1995) suggests.
Foucault’s methodology (as discussed in 1972, especially p. 6-8) is 
characterized by the kinds o f data he chose to utilize. Rather than documents o f renown 
or merit produced by famous philosophers or texts surrounding extraordinary events, he 
most often employed common, generally unknown and/or disregarded documents, those 
considered by many to be insignificant. Examples include records kept by doctors, 
teachers, and priests; manuals; grant proposals; files kept by government agencies or 
other organizations; and personal diaries and journals o f ordinary people doing ordinary 
things (see Sacks, 1970). Foucault wanted to address “a layer o f material which hitherto
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had no pertinence for history and which had not been recognized as having any moral, 
aesthetic, political or historical value” (Foucault, 1980, p. 50-51). Such documents are 
local, providing a look at the way a system really works (In a day-to-day sense, these 
documents providing nuts-and-bolts parts, an empirical way o f observing the discourse 
which constitutes the system). Examples o f such documents utilized in the present study 
are the rules written by regulators, with the various interpretations o f those rules 
appearing in the handbooks and on the websites o f research institutions. These texts 
provide insight as to the ways federal regulations are used by participants to produce 
new layers o f institutional-level rules. Foucault’s (1972) ideas about what constitutes 
data are not inconsistent with those set forth by Dilthey (1900/1969) and Kant 
( 1781 1958). Dilthey (1900/1969) advocated the use o f literature, art. social life, and 
"the course o f history” as data. And Forester (1992) utilized (as data) twelve lines o f 
text, a transcript from an “ insignificant” city planning meeting (see footnote # 85, p.
74).
Based on these theoretical ideas, data for this analysis includes textual materials 
from the regulatory bodies holding (by virtue o f being given) the power to make policy. 
These materials include transcripts o f Congressional hearings; commission reports; 
journal articles; the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR, the codification o f general and 
permanent agency rules published in the Federal Register); handbooks issued by federal 
regulators and those written by institutions; information user-lists featuring 
announcements about changes in and interpretations o f regulations; press releases from 
government agencies; transcripts and reports from proceedings designed to stimulate
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discussions about human subject research and regulation; articles from the Chronicle o f  
Higher Education and other academic, research, news, and related publications; 
numerous websites o f regulatory agencies and research institutions, and other materials.
This study will examine the talk,*° the discourse produced by regulators, 
research institutions, and others related to the policy and rule making surrounding the 
use o f human subjects. Deetz (1982) suggests this (kind of) discourse is o f interest to 
interpretive researchers as data for analysis of the “processes by which the meanings o f 
organizational events are produced and sustained through communication” (p. 132)*'. 
Emphasis in the present study is placed on social science and qualitative methods 
(particularly the distinctions between these and clinical methods, as described earlier, 
see p. 26). Documents spanning approximately 60 years -  from 1940 to the present time 
-  are part of the analysis. The discourse, the “conversation” that constitutes this 
regulatory system involves 10s o f organizations, 100s o f regulators, 1000s o f 
institutions (IRBs), 10s o f 1000s o f researchers*" and 100s o f 1000s o f two-legged 
research participants (not to mention millions of feathered, finned, furred and four-
“  “Talk" is implied by many words, including "accrediting,” “examining," “a full accounting of,” “to 
simply and clearly address,” “interview s,” “surveys,” and two instances o f talk about talk: “drawn on 
information.” and “drawn on their comments.” All of these examples are found on one page o f one 
government report (DHHS OIG. 2000b, p. 7).
Interpretations, better understanding, and/or thick descriptions are only part o f this dissertation project. 
It is also part of the purpose of this work to change the system (via passive rebellion, i.e.. ignoring certain 
portions of the IRB system en masse). See Horkheimer statement in foomote # 21, p. 19 and also Chapter 
Eight, herein.
In an evaluative report of National Institutes o f Health (NIH) commissioned by the National Bioethics 
.Advisory Commission (NBAC), it was reported that in 20(X) in the U.S. approximately 4,000 IRBs 
operated and between 35,000 and 45,000 researchers conducted human-subject research in 1995. 
Southwick (2002. May 3) reports more than two million people participated in clinical trials in 2001.
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legged participants). Specifically, the discourse among and between the regulators, the 
institutions, and researchers within the IRB system constitutes the data for this study.*^
Somewhat extended analyses are done utilizing a federal government agency 
report (GAO, 1996), a presidential commission report (ACHRE, 1995), a guidance (i.e., 
how to be in compliance) document (USAID, 1999), a Senate bill (the Human Research 
Subject Protection Act o f  1997), and the University o f Oklahoma’s IRB application 
form.*"^
Method
In a way consistent with the mission of critical theory, proceeding with 
postmodern sensitivity and sensibility (see Lash & Urry, 1987, who place emphasis on 
disorganization, untidiness and flexibility), and utilizing the work o f  Foucault 
(particularly 1972), these qualitative, phenomenological, and critical methods, 
especially Foucauldian analysis, can be used to address the questions posed here. 
Forester (1993) says by linking control structures to daily experience, voice, and action, 
we form a structural phenomenology: “it is structural because it maps the systematic 
staging and framing o f social action; it is phenomenology because it explores concrete
’'■.\nd this is not unusual. According to Denzin. “except for the dissertation ethnography and for those 
anthropologists who choose to move in on the turf of the equally postmodern sociological ethnographers 
of urban and industrial settings, the ethnographic task o f anthropology may become one devoted to 
reading texts and writing critiques. The ‘field’ may be located in one’s library or one’s study’’ (Denzin, 
1989. p. 79). See also Foucault (1972).
1 had hoped to include “real’’ applications and consent forms as submitted and the attendant 
correspondence bet^x een the researchers and the OUIRB, as well as official minutes o f meetings of 
review boards; interviews with faculty members, OUIRB members and members o f other campus boards, 
and researchers; and ethnographic observation and tape recordings of OUIRB and similar meetings. None 
of these requests was approved by the OUIRB, or were they (technically) rejected. Indeed, none were 
even considered by the OUIRB, as they were “held up” by three administrators, and not “allowed” to go 
to the actual board.
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social interactions (promises, threats, agreements, deals, conflicts) that are so staged”
(p. 140)/'
Postmodernism “primarily serves to attempt to open up the indeterminacy that 
modem social science, everyday conceptions, routines, and practices have closed ofT’ 
(Alvesson & Deetz. 1996. p. 210). This is the purpose, as mentioned, o f the present 
study, i.e.. to open questioning, to begin more active, more aggressive whying as social 
scientists, especially those researchers employing unobtrusive methods about 
unobtrusive topics. The result of such questioning and re-evaluation of the arrangement 
between purpose for the IRB (and other organizations) and the processes that have 
come to constitute them, is a kind o f anti-positive knowledge (Knights, 1992; see also 
.Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). Knights argues that conventional approaches to management 
and organizational study involve the (SINS) STRUCTURES,
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS. SIMULATIONS of positivism, 
encouraging researchers to produce positive knowledge in the “ form of representations 
o f what they consider to be the real world o f  management” (p. 514; see Reyna, 2001, p. 
10-11 for an example in anthropology; Agar, 1980, particularly Chapter 4; Mumby & 
Stohl, 1996, about the role o f communication department in the study of management; 
and Goffman. 1971 on the failure o f positivism to deliver) or the academy, as 1 have 
argued (see footnote # 72 regarding dissertation production, p. 64).
For Denzin (1989), traditional ethnographic concerns regarding the search for 
valid generalizations and substantive conclusions, are currently, perhaps temporarily.
Forester (1992) studied a city staff planning meeting. His data was twelve lines of transcript from the 
meeting. From this, he explored ways social and political relations are established, reordered, and
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set aside, replaced by “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973, 1983) that will in turn make 
possible “thick interpretations” -  joining ethnography to both biography and lived 
experience (Denzin, 1989, p. 32-34). Postmodern, contemporary ethnographers are 
informed by the work o f deconstructionists such as Derrida, Lyotard, and Baudrillard,** 
and make attempts to disprivilege “all received texts and establish discourses in behalf 
o f an all-encompassing critical skepticism about knowledge” (Denzin, 1989, p. 78). 
Legitimate, important conflicts can occur about questions such as how we know what is 
“needed.” Who says? Why do we do certain things certain ways at certain times? Why 
do we think these ways are The Way. that a certain way is any more “right" {i.e., 
appropriate) than some other way(s)?
Changes in social, political, and research conditions provide new areas of 
application for postmodern and critical theory work, deconstruction, and resistance 
reading (see next paragraph) in organization studies. “Critical theory and postmodern 
writing have provided innovative and instructive analyses” (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 
192). The IRB regulatory system provides an excellent area of application for this kind 
o f scrutiny: The IRB is a useful “vehicle” for illustrating regulation functioning in 
general, and it is an organization particularly relevant in academia.
Two primary postmodern methods are deconstruction and resistance readings. 
Deconstruction involves the exploration o f suppressed terms and the system that allows 
positive terms to become established. Resistance reading is a broader process in which
reproduced as the staff talk and listen.
Hassard (1993) writes. “Five key epistemological notions ... underpin the works o f Baudrillard, 
Lyotard, and Derrida— representation, reflexivity. writing, differance [ s / c ]  and de-centring [ j j c ]  the 
subject" (p. 11 ).
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the construction activity is demonstrated and indeterminacy illustrated. “The positive 
and the polar constructions are both displayed as acts of domination, subjectivity doing 
violence to the world and limiting itself in the process” (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 
210). Conflicts that were suppressed by the emergence o f positive terms are re-opened, 
brought back for creative redetermination -  constant dedifferentiation and 
redifferentiation” (p. 210).
“Given the power o f closure and the way it enters common sense and routines, 
especially in simulations, such rereadings require a particular form o f rigor and 
imagination ... a keen sense o f irony, a serious playfulness, and freedom from the dull 
compulsions o f a world made too easy and too violent” (Alvesson & Deetz. 1996, p. 
210; see also Cooper & Burrell. 1988. re: serious play). Virtually every piece o f text 
analyzed in this dissertation utilizes these techniques.
Regulatory processes are the focus o f much critical theory and postmodern 
writings.'' These have “now found fertile ground in management studies** [in part 
because of] the decline and disillusionment o f what is broadly referred to as modernist 
assumptions by both organizational theorists and practitioners” (.Alvesson & Deetz, 
1996. p. 191; see also Mumby & Stohl. 1996). As is generally understood by writers 
such as Alvesson and Deetz. who pointed out. a central feature o f both critical and
" "[Critical theorists and postmodernists contend] something fundamental has gone awTy and more 
technical instrumental solutions will not fix i t ... Critical theorists see the modernists' project as sick and 
see hope for reconstruction in recovery of good parts and redirecting the future. Postmodernists 
pronounce its death and proclaim the absence of a thinkable future” (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996. p. 195). 
.And .Alvesson and Deetz ( 1996) consider postmodernism a “carnival of positionings and structurings" 
involving "a serious playfulness” (p. 210).
In general. I’m equating “management activities” with “regulation activities” (and regulatory 
management activities for that matter) in theoretical applications.
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postmodern studies are attacks on modernist traditions." “[Critical theory] tends to treat 
management as institutionalized and ideologies and practices o f management as 
expressions o f contemporary forms of domination” (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 198; 
see also Alvesson & Deetz, 2000).*^ O f course, critiques o f the postmodern perspective 
(for example Hammersley. 1995), abound.
When “naturalization and freezing of contemporary social reality” (Alvesson & 
Deetz. 1996, p. 211) occur, opportunities for important conflicts, i.e., open questioning 
of “authority” and, in this case regulatory systems {i.e., the authorities and processes), 
are lost. Some groups o f  people and values (such as qualitative methodologies and 
researchers utilizing those methods) are marginalized.
A critical theory/postmodern approach to the study of management and 
regulations, and particularly analysis of the IRB system seems appropriate. Precedents 
exist, for example, Alvesson’s (1987) study of constraining work conditions that lead to 
intrinsic work qualities such as creativity, variation, development, and meaningfulness 
being ignored or subordinated to instrumental values, and various studies concerning 
the development and reinforcement of asymmetrical social relations between experts 
and non-experts (or M arx’s distinction between owners o f capital and owners o f labor, 
see .Alvesson & Willmott. 1996; or Fischer. 1990, especially “politics o f expertise, p. 28 
and 106; Forester, 1989, re; the politics of planning, p. 3-4; and also Hollway, 1984). 
Additionally, there are precedents in studies o f extensive control o f employee mindsets
Both critical theory and postmodernism proponents see organizations and the social sciences that 
support them as relying increasingly on a form of instrumental reasoning privileging the means over ends 
and aiding dominant groups' ability to invisibly accomplish their ends. Habermas describes this in terms
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and a freezing o f  their social reality, more recently referred to as “culting,”^  (Mumby, 
1987; Amott, 2000), and far-reaching control of employees, consumers, and the general 
political-ethical agenda in society, through mass media and advocating consumerism 
and the priority o f  the money code as a yardstick for values, perception o f individual 
worth'’' and collective political decision-making -  perhaps most relevant to the 
“commercialization” o f research (Alvesson & Willmott, 1996; Deetz, 1992; DHHS OIG 
2000a).
From their neo-Marxist, critical theoretical perspective, Alvesson and Deetz 
(1996) state. “ In the guise o f technocracy, instrumental rationality has pretenses to 
neutrality and freedom from the value-laden realms o f self-interest and politics. It 
celebrates and “hides’ behind techniques and the false appearance o f objectivity and 
impartiality o f  institutionalized sets o f knowledge, bureaucracy and formal mandates” 
(p. 204). This is at once why it is difficult to locate the many techniques of domination
o f ‘instrumental technical reasoning' and Lvotard in terms o f ‘performativit> '” (.-Mvesson & Deetz. 1996.
p. 211).
"Culting." as .A.mott (2000) describes, is developing an acceptance of the way things are done, and 
being part of a team or “corporate family." The use of the term here implies a deep sense of attachment to 
or an extravagant admiration or blind acceptance of certain principles, life styles, ways of doing things, 
habits, etc. “Culting" would involve taking on the goals of the organization (the organizational culture) 
as one's ovm. thinking of the workplace as a “home.” colleagues as “family" and a “team." etc. One may 
be said to be “culted" when a certain way of doing something becomes sacrosanct.
See Adorno. 1989a. with respect to “culture industry." particularly “the culture industry transfers the 
profit motive naked onto cultural forms” (p. 129) and “although the culture industry undeniably 
speculates on the conscious and unconscious state of the millions toward which it is directed, the masses 
are not primary, but secondary; they are an object of calculation, and appendage of the machinery. The 
customer is not king, as the culture industry would like to have us believe, not its subject, but its object” 
(p. 129). .And Deetz (1995) states “Democracy is reduced to capitalism, and citizens are reduced to 
consumers ... free-market capitalism was never intended to present the public well; it was intended to 
describe how to make a return on financial investment” (p. 23). Deetz. who acknowledges the ideas of 
Polyani in this area (especially 1944). quotes Kelly (1993) who says, “Human beings and the natural 
environment became 'commodities.' with no intrinsic worth ... all people, all the Earth’s resources were 
to be used by the market for one purpose only: to increase profits (p. 6 o f  Kelly). I will argue that 
regulation of human research often ignores the “masses” o f research participants, i.e.. participants may be 
the objects o f regulatory activity, but they are no t often, the subjects o f it.
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and a justification for attempting to do so. A form o f technological determinism, i.e., the 
view that if  something is technically feasible then it is both desirable and bound to be 
realized in practice, exists even if we don’t want it ana even if it is likely to be socially, 
culturally, (or environmentally) harmful (Watson & Hill, 1997). As mentioned, we as 
researchers do things, we go along, in the name o f process even when the purpose 
doesn’t seem clear, important, useful, right, sensible, moral, or logical to us. (See also 
Adorno quote, footnote # 67, p. 60, herein.)
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Chapter Four: Development of Federal Human Subjects Regulation
‘7  had no idea as to what don Juan wanted, and yet I  did understand him to 
perfection. ” Carlos Castaneda, The Active Side o f  Infinity, p. 10.
In mapping the ideas, knowledge (and ideas about that), and worldviews at work 
in this regulatory system, I will offer observations about the development o f science, the 
positivist/humanist split (and the distinctions between them that “really” matter in this 
analysis, see p. 26, herein) along with the regulatory system in general that is the focus 
of this study. By doing this, it is possible to show which terms, concepts, constructs, etc. 
that appeared in the discourse in the “beginning” still appear today, and how they may 
be operating. I will consider these cultural-level reproductions, as Habermas (1984) 
describes, along with views about the underlying moral/value and other structures 
(SINS) that can be seen working in the system through the text that produces it, as 
Foucault (1972, 1980) and Forester (1989) might suggest.
1 am not providing a history of science or o f the system to be relied upon as the 
story for the analysis (rather a story for an analysis), as 1 share the belief with Foucault 
and others'^* that a single, accurate, definitive history is impossible. Portraying one’s 
own time as unique and a period o f great importance, an important transition, etc., is an 
unfortunate tendency o f many Western thinkers, Foucault remarked (1983).
'*■ For example, .\ivesson and Deetz (1996) contend “Let us be clear at the start: all such social histories 
are types o f fiction. They often serve present social purposes more than record the past” (p. 193). I 
contend that history should be treated the same way as truth, never a capital letter or used in the singular, 
i.e.. the only possible appropriate terms are “histories” and “truths.”
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What I intend to do alternatively is tell a creation story (what Foucault might 
describe as a genealogy, see Knights, 1992, p. 517; or what O ’Connor, 1979, termed 
“interpretive investigation,” p. 238; also see p. 51 herein) based on texts o f  laws and 
rules, events, the ways they were positioned, and by whom. 1 do not presume to know 
the way things “really” were or are, and it is not necessary nor possible to know that. A 
primary goal in doing this study is to find and reveal, to describe structures (SINS) 
operating in the system and the possible effects o f abandoning these structures, rather 
than attempting to explain the roots or values o f these (SINS) STRUCTURES, 
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATUR.ALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS. To suggest 
ideas and offer an accounting o f the time at which certain terms or ideas are reported to 
have first appeared in the discourse, not when they actually did  appear will be useful to 
this analysis. To consider the views held by various participants does not claim absolute 
accuracy, nor is it nihilistic nothingness. It is for me simply an acknowledgement that 
life is liquid and local.^^ We react to interpretations rather than an absolute, objective 
“reality.” Our eyes are not windows, but sensory receptors (see Kolak & Morgan, 2001, 
or http://www.wpunj.eda'cohss/philosophy/LOVERS/surprise.htm, accessed May 25, 
2002. Besides, social structures are most often slippery (sometimes, for some, even 
slimy) and difficult to grasp. These structures are implicit and interpretable, liquid, and 
local. Timmermans (1999) studied CPR in emergency rooms and described survival 
rates as “part o f a scientific story in which the assumptions, the interpretation, and the
I don’t know if anyone has used the exact phrase “life is liquid and local” before, but 1 think this way 
because of dozens o f people, including Goffman (1974), Mead (1934), Garfinkel (1967), Sacks, 
Schegloff, & Jefferson (1974); Sacks (1970); Becker (1963); Geertz (1973, 1983, 1988); Schütz ( 1973); 
Berger & Luckmann, (1966), and others.
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conclusion are predetermined” (as quoted in Wheeler, 1999, Oct 15, p. A21). 
Timmermans says if  survival rates are low, CPR researchers recommend more training 
and technology; if  they are high, CPR training is considered a success. This is not 
unlike regulation: if no problems are reported, the system is successful; when problems 
(often atrocities, in the case o f human subjects regulation) do occur, more rules, 
oversight, and enforcement are “needed.”
Creation stories about how “scientificity” became dominant have been told 
many times. This one is drawn predominantly from Polkinghome (1983), Anderson 
(1996), Denzin & Lincoln (2000), and Hamilton (1998). Given Aristotle’s enduring 
rules o f rhetoric (Original SINS?), it wasn’t until the 1600s— the time o f Bacon (1620; 
introduction o f the inductive-experimental method), Galileo (assertion that nature is 
ordered), and Newton (mathematization o f observation)— that science began to rival 
and overtake philosophy and religion as the dominant paradigm. These ideas paved the 
way for positivism, and it was during this time (from the 1600s to the Enlightenment) 
that views o f human phenomena (including communication phenomena) were changed 
significantly.
In the early days o f  the reign of science (“positivism” has become too 
synonymous with “science”),"' the Cartesian model was employed, i.e., knowledge was 
held to the standard o f absolute certainty. About pursuant developments, Anderson 
(1996) states, “From Hume (skepticism) to Kant (transcendental idealism, see below, 
and also footnote # 94, p. 83) to Husserl (transcendental phenomenology) to Peirce 
(semiotics), there have been lines o f argument that sought to liberate the human mind
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from Locke’s empirical prison” (p. 20). Locke’s blank-slate passivity paradigm was 
replaced by Kant’s view that the knowledge is in the knower. This produced a 
knowledge that was nonhistorical, i.e.. a knowledge that did not change.^"* Dilthey 
(1900/1969) contradicted, asserting Kant’s view did not account for the knowledge we 
have o f human phenomena, our understanding o f life and other persons. For Dilthey, 
and perhaps most relevant to issues in the present study, the study o f life is a 
consideration o f particular individuals living at a particular time in a particular place, 
i.e.. the study o f life, and life itself, are local phenomena. It took some time for these 
views to infiltrate science significantly, if it can be said that they have.
.\s  early as 1725, Vico had anticipated the growth o f the positivistic approach to 
human phenomena and resisted the trend by asserting that we can gain a true knowledge 
o f human phenomena through the study of history (see Croce, 1964, p. 19). This 
movement recognized the life experience o f humans, the emotional and vital feeling of 
life, and the engagement that humans have with others and the lifeworld. Vico said what 
was wrong with positivism was that it neglected meaningful experience (the “real” 
world). (I think of these arguments as falling along a continuum, from absolutism
Hassard (1993) describes two types o f modernism: systemic and critical. “Critical modernism stands 
against the programmatic absolutism of systemic modernism. The main contemporary advocate of this 
position is Habermas ... whose objective is to confront the increasing power o f instrumental reason in 
social life and in so doing to recapture the spirit of enlightened rationalism for late modernism ... For 
Habermas it is through the ‘language o f the community’ that we will rediscover that lost sense of 
enlightenment that Kant first revealed to us’’ (p. 5; see also Power, 1990). Regarding modernism in either 
form. Cooper and Burrell (1988) state that whether we are considering systemic modernism, i.e.. 
championing the mechanization of social order, or critical modernism, i.e.. seeking the emancipation of 
the lifeworld, both modernisms share a commitment to an inherently logical social world constituted by 
reason. In systemic modernism the rational subject is the system itself; in critical modernism, it is the 
knowing subject (see Hassard, 1993, p. 5)
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[modernism], to a mid-ish point at relativism [interpretivism], to the polar extreme, 
fragmentation [postmodernism].)
Mill (1910/1972) and Comte (1910)^^, co-fathers o f positivism, provided a 
philosophical and logical foundation for empiricism as the ground o f knowledge. The 
preference for positive knowledge continues. (I would argue interpretivists [and other 
though not all other non-positivists] are more empirical than positivists in today’s 
research environment, in large part due to the use o f operationalizations by the latter 
group.)
"Science” (or the most prominent representation o f it, as Habermas or Derrida 
might describe it*^ )^ was (and remains) deterministic, reductionistic, and in search of 
covering laws of cause-and-efTect relationships. Researchers were— and are— held to a 
“value-free" standard. The purpose of positivistic science is to describe, predict, and 
control. Scientists— again the term “positivists” is unfortunately too synonymous—  
utilize experiments, sometimes administer surveys, and are to report with a 
(passionately dispassionate?) disinterested, disconnected (and de-valued) voice'^ . 
Positivists believe this is possible; only those statements free from metaphysical
Comte proposed (between 1830 and 1850) that the study of human phenomena should conform to the 
methods used in the natural sciences. All “fictitious" or "negative" philosophical speculation about the 
human realm should be given up, and the “positive" or scientific study o f human beings should be 
undertaken. He coined the term "sociology" in 1839.
For an explanation o f the problem o f representation as it is viewed postmodemistically, see Hassard. 
1994. p. 11-12, who says. "Our knowledge of the world is constructed as a problem o f representation" 
rather than one of factual accuracy ... attempts to discover the genuine order of things are both naïve and 
mistaken ... In particular, the modernist objective of determining factual relationships through the 
empirical method is considered problematic ... research proceeds on the basis o f discourses which are 
already shared within a particular scientific community ... findings produced through empirical science 
reflect pre-existing intellectual categories" (p. 12). See also Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p. 16-17.
See Jackson ( 1989), quoted p. 56. herein, especially the comment about neutrality as euphemism for 
indifference.
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overtones and personal bias can assure certainty. All sciences, in this paradigm, are to 
limit their assertions to these kinds o f positive statements, including the sciences o f 
human phenomena. Social life is considered to be rational and rule governed and the 
rules for rational conduct were to be derived from “scientific” (meaning, then and now 
in a very pervasive sense, positivistic) inquiry. Positive science became knowledge, as 
described in Habermas’s (1984)^ model, replacing rhetoric, religion, and other 
enterprises claiming to know “The Truth.” That this remains the case is demonstrated 
rather clearly in many documents. (See GAO, 1991a, p. 113-117, regarding criteria for 
evaluating case studies, and GAO, 1991b, regarding evaluation o f structured 
interviewing.)'*”  Further, Solomon (1985) states “The Tuskegee study reveals the 
hollowness o f claims that scientific language is always neutral, objective, and value-free 
... While all o f us appreciate the importance o f reason in human affairs, we also 
recognize the value o f human emotion in tempering our behavior” (p. 244-45). She 
continues, “ If allegiance to objectivity and detachment blinds us to other values, it 
produces neither humane behavior nor sound science” (p. 245). Allowing those who 
know less and care less about our work (i.e.. regulators or “jackasses,” see footnote #
'*** That this remains the case was demonstrated when, in about 1999, at least one ordinarily affable 
“qualitative" member of a doctoral committee during a dissertation defense and after several exhausting 
and tedious discussions rather strongly asserted. “It’s not that kind o f study!" to a particularly dogmatic 
positivistic thinker.
Habermas ( 1984) separates tu o historical learning processes and forms o f rationality: the 
technological-scientific-strategic, associated with the system world, and the communicative-political- 
ethical. associated with the lifeworld. and. according to Alvesson and Deetz (1996), Habermas “tries to 
contribute to the latter" (p. 202). (See Figure 2. p. 87.)
In this report, criteria for the evaluation of case studies are focused on issues o f researcher impartiality, 
standardization of data gathering techniques, generalizability o f findings, and, according to the GAO, 
include explicit statements o f  observations and whether “the identification o f these factors was based on 
insight and recognition or on quantitative techniques” (p. 117).
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238, p. 230) tell us how to go about doing our work produces work lacking in values 
and value, and bearing our names.
The functioning of the IRB system, especially with respect to qualitative 
methods often utilized in sociology, anthropology, education, and communication 
research, and to a lesser extent in political science and psychology departments, is an 
example o f the institutionalization o f a positive definition o f science. The notion that all 
researchers should be treated the same way as a matter o f “ fairness,” regardless o f the 
treatment they plan to implement, is inherently unfair (see Forester, 1989, p. 3, re: 
planners, for example). We, as scientists, do not work in a neutral stage, in some ideal 
setting involving all affected interests; we work instead in political and social 
institutions. We are, at once, political, social, and scientific actors, and these “selves” 
are inextricably linked. Interpretivists for example sometimes seek (or are “forced” to 
seek) legitimization by having their study protocols subjected to the same scrutiny as 
positivists. This practice o f treating all procedures as alike may be a contributing factor 
to over-regulation (AAUP, 2001; Brainard, 2000, Mar 17 and 2001, Mar 9; O 'Connor, 
1979) in the IRB system currently and historically, and especially in areas o f social 
science research.
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Figure 2
Analytic, reductionist, quantitative, particularistic, positivistic, nomothetic, etic, 
or micro- or individual-level analysis, and other terms are used to describe the science -  
and often positioned as the only science— that pursues universal laws to guide the study 
o f human behaviors.'*^' Simply, quantitative methods are used in the search for 
generalizations along the X-axis, as described in Figure 2 (above; see also footnotes # 
98. 99. and 100. p. 85). while qualitative studies, if they seek to generalize at all, are 
more prone to do so along the Y-axis. When quantitative researchers (positivists) strive 
to “predict and control” individual behavior, they are often serving the interests of 
organizations (corporations, product manufacturers, and political candidates and causes.
' From the positivist perspective, social sciences don’t have the success that physical sciences have. i.e.. 
a set of central principles about which all (or most) agree. Perhaps that is because it is easier to predict 
moon phases than mood phases. Or. perhaps social scientists are less optimistic—or more astute, or 
both—about what “science" is and what it can do. On the other hand, there are social theorists such as 
Gudykunst (1995); he sets forth 47 axioms contained in his Anxiety/Uncertainty Management Theory. 
These axioms represent “conclusions” for Gudykunst. whereas they represent “possibilities” for 
qualitative researchers.
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as examples), while qualitative researchers attempt to generalize about organizations or 
how people operate within them, often with the idea o f benefiting individuals (although 
that is not necessarily what prompts them). An example o f qualitative, X-axis thinking 
is a researcher's interest, perhaps, in assisting individuals in the “negotiation” o f the 
lifeworld within certain organizations, such as intercultural studies or studies o f political 
movements.'' None o f this suggests, however, that quantitative/positivists and 
qualitative/interpretivists cannot or do not work together to produce results that benefit 
both individuals and organizations. Nor is there any suggestion that positivism is 
inherently more moral or ethical than interpretivism, or visa versa. However, from a 
critical perspective, the desire to control and predict the behavior o f individuals is o f 
great interest for critique (see also Alvesson & Deetz. 1996. re: anti-positivism).
Postmodern traits, according to Alvesson and Deetz (1996. p. 205-210). include 
the centrality o f discourse (textuality). fragmented identities (industrial, technical, and 
academic specializations, as examples), essentialistic understanding o f people, a critique 
o f philosophy o f presence and representation (as found in Mead. 1934; Wittgenstein. 
1953/1975; Heidegger. 1927/1962; and Habermas, 1975), the loss o f foundations and 
power o f grand narratives (Habermas, 1975; Lyotard, 1984; Derrida. 1981), 
abandonment o f the notion that knowledge is innocent or neutral (Gadamer. 1960/1989; 
Heidegger. 1927/1962); hyperreality, simulacra replacement o f the “real world” 
(Baudrillard. 1983). research aimed at resistance and indeterminacy (Marx,
Horkheimer. Adorno. Deetz. S. Hall, and others), and a general preference for irony and 
play over rationality, predictability and order. Detachment, displacement, and a high
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level o f disengagement dominate deconstructive postmodernism. Groundlessness is the 
only constant. (Power, 1990, describes postmodernism as the death o f reason; Hall,
1986, suggests it is Marxism with hope but without guarantees,” p. 58.) Values, history, 
and ethics are considered arbitrary {i.e., based on the liquid and local, the lifeworld). 
Deconstructive postmodernists hold that most all aspects o f  human existence are 
culturally created and developed in particular, localized circumstances. Generalizations 
are, therefore, not reasonable, possible, or desirable (except to dominators, perhaps, and 
then only for short-term benefits). This is not inconsistent with Dilthey’s particular 
person, place, and time thesis. The fairly prevalent notions held by regulators, i.e., that 
no distinctions between qualitative and quantitative methods {i.e., between social and 
clinical research) need to be made in r e g u la t io n is  an example o f SINS that need to be 
re-opened for questioning.
The Sensibilitv o f Different Regulator/ Stances
Rorty (1979) comes down equally hard on scientists and humanists when either 
side claims a “Mock” on truth. He says that there are some irreconcilable differences 
between the two groups. He argues that both groups are self-sealing language 
communities that don’t— and really can’t— talk to each other. The questions in one 
approach don’t have answers in the other. At the risk o f sounding like P u n c h o r  Miss
These notions are rather obvious in that no separate rules exist and that federal regulators rarely 
address purely qualitative methods in any o f the literature they produce. Further. I recall several 
comments made by federal regulators during an open forum I attended.
’ Punch (1998) asserts he would accept some field-related deception so long as the interests of subjects 
are protected. This comment demonstrates what I call the Miss America Posture, drawing an “ideal 
world” rather than “real world” picture. This is something akin to engaging in an epistemological debate.
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America, we need to acknowledge and respect each other. In the view o f rhetorician 
Nichols (1963) “the humanities without science are blind, but science without the 
humanities may be vicious.” Similarly, Alvesson and Deetz (1996) point out that critical 
theory without postmodernism can be blind to its own elitism and power, and without 
critical theorv', postmodernism becomes esoteric (p. 211). It would appear cooperation 
rather than competition produces better results, scientific or otherwise.
Technocracy- as an outgrowth o f  positivism. A slogan used to publicize the 1933
Chicago World’s Fair succinctly presents this technocratic tenet (demonstrating again
the 1984 Habermas model) and provides testament to its tenacity: “Science Explores:
Technology Executes: Mankind Conforms” Denzin & Lincoln, 1998a, p. 122). Goffman
(1971), and o thers '^  long before and since, reject scientific claims o f positivistic
sociologists altogether:
The work begins with the sentence, “We hypothesize that ... ,” goes on from 
there to a full discussion of the biases and limits o f  the proposed design, reasons 
why these aren’t nullifying, and culminates in an appreciable number of 
satisfyingly significant correlations tending to confirm some o f the hypotheses 
as though the uncovering of pattern in social life were that simple. A sort of 
sympathetic magic seems to be involved, the assumption being that if you go 
through the motions attributable to science then science will result. But it hasn’t, 
(p. xvi)
gening backed against the wall, and bailing to an ontological “well it’s all up to god anyway” 
default'surrender strategy.
Gardner (2001. Mar 9) states. “Indeed, when it comes to questions of the human mind, consciousness, 
and experience, philosophers retain one powerful weapon ... a good many people—especially those who 
consider themselves humanists—still prefer to believe that there is something special about human 
beings, some properties that do not lend themselves to explanations in the same way that one can explain 
the structure of the universe or the anatomy of the cell or the food preferences o f other animals” (p. B7).
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Habermasian ideas about cultural reproduction'^^ can be used to illuminate the 
underlying theme o f positivism in both science and regulation. Texts will be offered 
(and analyzed in Chapters Five and Six) as evidence o f beliefs such as the existence of 
absolute and.br universal truths, value-free science, the ability o f humans to accurately 
predict and control each other and nature, to order the world, etc. (see Dreyfus. 1992).
Culturallv Reproduced Positivism Operating in the IRB Svstem
Historically, there has been a heavy emphasis on quantification in 
science. Mathematics is often termed the 'queen o f sciences,’ and those 
sciences such as physics'"^ and chemistry that lend themselves especially 
well to quantification are generally known as 'hard.’ Less quantifiable 
arenas, such as biology (although that is rapidly changing) and 
particularly the social sciences are referred to as 'soft,’ less with 
pejorative intent than to signal their putative imprecision and lack of 
dependability. Scientific maturity is commonly believed to emerge as the 
degree o f quantification found within a given field increases. (Cuba & 
Lincoln, 1998, p. 196)'“"
Cultural reproduction: Statistics are o f  more value than personal 
experience
Declaring that "hard data” are more reliable or revealing than personal 
experience doesn't make the declaration true. These notions (biases) are cultural
Cultural reproduction of worldview, according to Habermas (1987), involves the "transfer of cultural 
reproduction, social integration, and socialization from sacred foundations over to linguistic 
communication and action oriented to mutual understanding. To the extent that communicative action 
takes on central societal functions, the medium o f language gets burdened with tasks o f producing 
substantial consensus. In other words, language no longer serves merely to transmit and actualize 
prelinguistically guaranteed agreements, but more and more to bring about rationally motivated 
agreements as well" (p. 107. emphasis in original).
See also Pellegrini. 2001. .Aug 15. who reports that even physics is in need of overhaul.
Critical theory is neutralized in a different way: via labeling it as non-scientific and (therefore) of no 
value in "real" scientific debate. 1 would counter "real" scientific debate has become political at the social 
level and is censored (self or otherwise) at the individual level. Science reporters offered commentary 
after President Bush spoke about stem cell funding August 9. 2001. rather than scientists themselves, for 
example.
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reproductions; the ideas are commonly b e l ie v e d .T h e re  is widespread agreement that 
quantification equals credibility (see next section); alternately, the idea that local 
experience is more credible than a national statistic is not as commonly believed. This is 
a product o f the (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, 
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS operating in the IRB system, and the 
academic enterprise at large. This bias affects IRB rules and downstream interpretations 
(as will be shown, especially in the next chapter) including application forms and the 
acceptance, revision or rejection of them, for example.
Cultural reproduction: Quantifying = credibility
Regarding the quantification bias, “That this is the case is hardly surprising,” 
assert Cuba and Lincoln (1998, p. 196). Positivists focus on efforts to verify' positivistic 
science or falsify post-positivism (frequently debunking non-positive methods as non- 
scientific. ungeneralizable, unreliable, and biased, just for starters.) Formulaic precision 
is central when the aim of science is prediction and control o f natural phenomena.
Given that the tools are readily available, what is needed to perpetuate positivistic 
science is widespread belief in it. Sechrest (1992) argues such a widespread notion 
persists— that only quantitative data are valid or o f high q u a l i ty .T h is  is evidence o f 
the structure within a structure— of what has become valid or true in science. As
Schütz ( 1973) states “The natural sciences generally, and especially the natural sciences which use 
mathematics, have lost their relation to their basis o f meaning, namely the lifeworld” (p. 127). Schütz 
surmises, “Physical science ... has to develop devices by which the thought objects of common-sense 
perception are superseded by the thought objects o f science” (p. 4).
“Even the fundamental laws o f physics may be mere suggestions” (Pellegrini. 2001. Aug 15).
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mathematization of the ideas o f a science becomes possible, that science becomes more 
valid. Because mathematics can offer proofs, and derive an (positioned to be the) 
"answer." if a finding can be quantified, it represents “proof’ whereas if we see or 
experience something, it proves nothing “scientifically” speaking, and regardless, it 
may be that neither the quantified or the experiential result passes the Grandmother 
Test."° A local example o f this cultural reproduction is the clear preference for the 
words o f others over the “reality” o f  personal experience in the graduate learning 
environment (the latter often referred to disparagingly as “merely anecdotal.” implying 
immaturity and irrelevance).
How is one paradigm replaced by another? As geocentric cosmologies were 
replaced by heliocentric worldviews, as The Truth and History are replaced by 
provisional truths and personal histories (not assuming any o f these conversions is 
complete or, for many, even possible), what is happening? Life is transition, moving, 
dynamic. Liquid. Local. One contemporary transition is not from  positivism to 
postmodernism, rather toward the inclusion o f postmodernism, a recognition o f the need 
for deconstruction, and acknowledgement o f ways life is liquid and local, and most 
relevant perhaps, not regulate-able. A minute-by-minute active negotiation, encumbered 
with the incredible (and often non-credible) weight o f tradition.
“Realistic social scientists do not mention tradition,” Shils remarks (1981, p. 7). 
Tradition, as described by Shils (1981) is much like Habermas’s (1984) cultural
The grandmother test was relayed to me by Professor Chris Swoyer. who attributes the idea to his 
mentor. Paul Meehl. Meehl “used the test to determine whether a piece o f research was worth doing. 
Doing an experiment to show something that your grandmother knew all along fails the grandmother test” 
according to personal correspondence I received fham Swoyer in March 2002.
93
reproductions. For example, one might catch a glimpse o f the bars when considering the 
words “communication traditionalist.” Reading “traditional” literature (for non- and 
anti-positivists) can be likened to watching the wheels (Lennon, 1980) or pacing the 
cage (Buffett. 1996)."' The scholars I have brought to demonstrate “traditional” works 
in communication (see footnote # 111. p. 94, below) are those inextricably linked to 
positivistic science. Shils (1981) suggests the concept o f tradition lost formative value 
in The Enlightenment. Knowledge accepted via authority was replaced by science 
(putting new “authorities” in place.). Science, and through it, knowledge, became the 
“experience o f the senses and its rational criticism” (p. 4). Knowledge is (remains) tied 
to money, as well (see Lyotard, 1984, who stated “games o f scientific language become 
the games o f the rich ... whoever is wealthiest has the best chance o f being r ig h t... An 
equation between wealth, efficiency, and truth is thus established,” p. 45). Deetz (1995) 
states, “Information [defined as codified knowledge] is only loosely connected with 
decisions, hence, political power struggles and processes o f  social control substitute for 
rationality” (p. 136), and quotes Lageza (1992) who says, “Information and decisions 
are linked by knowledge claims ... knowledge claims have an interactive and rhetorical 
dimension” (p. 7).
Becker (1993, as cited in Denzin & Lincoln, 1998a, p. 8) says qualitative and 
quantitative research methods differ in significant ways, because o f differing ways of 
addressing the same set o f issues (for example, the uses o f  positivism, acceptance of 
postmodernism, and the examination of constraints o f  everyday life). Each tradition is
' ' ' This statement is conservative from my anecdotal view. C. Berger. Burgoon. .McCroskey. Gudykunst, 
and most other “traditionalists" actually scare me. This may have more to do with how their works are
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governed by different structures: genres, their own classics, and their own preferred 
forms o f representation, interpretation, and textual evaluation (see Becker, 1986b, 
p. 134-35). The variance across qualitative methods is also relevant. Regulation is 
difficult enough within either the qualitative or the qualitative tradition, leading to no 
surprise that across traditions involving such diverse methods, it is very unlikely that 
one set of rules will ever fit all methods” '  (or, more precisely, treatments).
Emerging Alternative Methodologies
Postpositivists suggest there is no correct method to follow (see Richardson, 
1994; Denzin & Lincoln. 1998a. 2000). As noted, Goffman (1971, p. xvi) argued that no 
authentic science is simply an activity o f following methodological recipes that yield 
acceptable (and statistically significant) results. Along similar lines. Hall (1989) argues 
that critical theory rejects the “body counts” o f survey research, “which consistently 
translate issues that have to do with signification, meaning, language, and symbols into 
crude behavioral indicators” (Hall. p. 42). an outgrowth o f operationalism (see 
Bridgeman. 1927. as cited in Anderson, 1996. p. 19).
One effect o f adopting these views {i.e., broad acceptance o f diverse methods) is 
the possible expansion o f notions about what constitutes science and what science o f 
any kind can do. With these postmodern, postpositive views emerging, the likelihood o f 
science becoming a creative search designed to better understand the ways o f things is 
enhanced, and scientists will be allowed to use a broader variety o f sometimes
(mis) used than the actual production of them, of course.
"■ See Rorty ( 1979) re: positivists and humanists and their inability to “talk" to each other.
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improvisational approaches, responsive to, rather than the SINS in science-defining 
dogma, the particular questions and subject matters addressed (and will be called 
"scientist” even when not employing positivism).
The downside o f these views is that the distinction between social science and 
other scholarly activities loses its edge. A postmodernist might answer, "W ho cares?” I 
would agree. No distinction can exist. In other words, it is not the process (method) but 
the purpose (understanding) that matters.
Considering the di(Terences in various research approaches is useful because it 
points us to the differences in treatments traditionally associated with various 
approaches. It is important to recognize that these basic philosophical orientations or 
worldviews are not mutually exclusive, exhaustive, nor totally contradictory. A 
dichotomy (between qualitative and quantitative research) has emerged for several 
reasons— some historical, and some practical (see Liska & Cronkhite, 1994). A 
recognition that a variety of philosophies are at work, to a greater or lesser extent, in 
many studies is important because the variety has a bearing on what sorts o f standards 
IRB regulators may reasonably/properly enforce with respect to differing forms o f 
research. These qualitative/quantitative, social science/medical science distinctions are 
relevant to the purpose herein, because "treatment” (and only treatment, as I have 
argued) is what should concern regulators.” ^
" ■ Sometimes IRB regulators find themselves making judgments about the scientific adequacy o f the 
proposed research as a concern that is affiliated with their interest in seeing that the benefits outweigh the 
risks (even when there are no evident risks nor immediately knowable effect&benefits). Given the variety 
o f kinds of research that is submitted to an IRB on a campus like the University o f Oklahoma, such 
judgments are likely to strain the resources o f the board. Additionally these judgments are not authorized 
by federal regulations (see 45 CFR § 46.10I[b]).
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“Themes o f the Enlightenment are deeply embedded in modernist management 
theory” (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 194). Three such Enlightenment leftovers, {i.e., 
cultural reproductions, SINS) at work in this system (and all three beg the assumptions 
that life can and should be standardized) include blanket assurance provisions''■* (the 
“same page” the federal government requires all institutions receiving federal research 
dollars to be on"^), the Common Rule (45 C.F.R. § 46, 1991), and informed consent 
(perpetuating/reifying the “positive” notion that if we can standardize the actual paper 
form, we can somehow standardize the “real” world; see Lincoln & Cuba, 1989; Sobal, 
1984).
Leftovers related to blanket assurance, the Common Rule (45 C.F.R. § 46,
1991), and informed consent include e.xpertism/respect for authority, i.e., who is given 
the power to name, establish criteria, and define t e r m s . I n  this case, “process” and 
“punishment” are exam ples"' along with “adverse effects” and “timely reporting” as
' .According to a written statement prepared for the U.S. House, ( 1998. Jun 11 ) by Ellis, former director 
of OPRR. ".An .Assurance statement is a formal, written commitment to: 1 ) widely held ethical principles; 
2) the DHHS regulations for Protection o f Human Subjects; and 3) institutional procedures adequate to 
safeguard the rights and welfare of human subjects. The terms o f the institution’s Assurance are 
negotiated with OPRR. The detailed written assurance statement becomes the instrument that OPRR 
[federal regulators] uses to gauge an institution’s compliance with human subject protections if there is a 
problem’’ (see Institutional review boards: A sy stem in jeopardy, 1998. p. 45).
"■ OHRP’s (1999) instructions (sample language) for the assurance document are 24 pages long. See 
http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/assurance/mpa.htm, accessed May 25. 2002.
"" See NIH, 2001, Jun 26, for a demonstration of the federal regulators’ power to define both types of 
research and the role o f research, and the power to set priorities and agendas for research. NOTE: Here, 
and throughout. I’m not (always) suggesting that the regulators shouldn't be doing this, or even that they 
do it poorly. 1 sometimes conclude both personally, but the point here is simply to identify who is 
allowed to name and define and what it may mean to others who are not allowed to name and define. 1 
also wish to point out that when 1 speak of abandoning the system in passive rebellion (in upcoming 
chapters), 1 am limiting that suggestion to researchers who employ unobtrusive methods, administer no 
treatment, and involve no protected classes.
" ' .Also see OHRP (2001, Jul 19) regarding right to name viable sources o f information. On page 2 of 
that document, the OHRP in issuing sanctions against Johns Hopkins University stated that researchers 
“had failed to obtain published literature about the known association between hexaméthonium and lung 
toxicity. Such data was readily available via routine MEDLINE and Internet database searches, as well as
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reported by Brainard (2000, Apr 14 and 1999, Nov 12); hierarchical rigidity (for 
example, in which arenas discourse gains legitimacy); and absolutism/one-right-way- 
ness (demonstrated in the ways parts o f  the regulatory process have become entrenched 
as objects o f discourse, especially in education/the academy and to great potential 
detriment, i.e.. if  unorthodox approaches aren’t accommodated/accepted/promoted at 
universities, then where? Few profiteers allow very much unorthodoxy). Finally, ways 
the notion that standardization is desirable or possible can be shown to be SINSfully 
operating within the system.
Power in the Svstem
Power o f  federal system, effects on institutional system, and subsequent effects 
on researchers. Knights and Morgan (1991), using Foucault’s discursive practices 
model, point to a number o f power effects o f corporate strategy discourse, including the 
sustaining and enhancement of the prerogatives o f management, the generation o f a 
sense o f personal security for executives and managers, and the facilitation and 
legitimization o f  the exercise o f power. These power effects are operating in the IRB 
system, for example, the withholding by regulators o f federal funds for research 
(regulatory coercion, the exercising o f legitimate power), the voluntary adoption o f the
recent textbooks on pathology of the lung” (p. 2). This is an example o f not only the OHRP defining 
terms but also defining legitimate sources and thresholds for “adequacy.”
When asked about the lack of reporting about six gene therapy deaths, Ruth Macklin, a member o f the 
NIH advisory committee and a bioethicist at the Albert Einstein College o f Medicine at Yeshiva 
University asks “If death is not a serious adverse event, what is?” Considering the NIH regulations 
requiring “immediate” reporting of “adverse events.” it seems reasonable that in spite o f the liquidity of 
definitions {i.e.. lack o f “unity” in meaning), disclosure o f patient deaths seems reasonable by any 
interpretation including FDA, NIH, other sponsors, IRB, researchers and participants. It seems critical to 
anything we might label as “protection.”
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federal rules by institutions (sustaining and enhancing the prerogatives o f regulators 
without coercion), the approval/disapproval o f researchers’ protocols (generating a 
sense o f security and importance for regulators themselves, via control o f researchers), 
and even the self-regulatory behavior o f researchers themselves (facilitating and 
legitimizing the power o f regulators). Adorno’s (1989b) comments about internal (or 
self) coercion to maintain the status quo are fitting here: “The whole business keeps 
creaking and groaning on. at unspeakable human cost, only on account o f the profit 
motive and the interiorization by individuals o f the breach tom in society as a whole’’ 
(Adorno, 1989b, p. 272).
How Power is Derived
“Forester (1989) distinguishes between unavoidable and socially unnecessary 
disturbances, between socially ad hoc problems [liquid and local “reality’’ issues] and 
more socially systematic, structure-related sources o f distortions [SINS]” (as quoted in 
Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 204). Organizations may be understood as structures o f 
systematically (nonaccidental, non-questioned, and possibly avoidable) distorted 
communication. Without regard to the extent to which distortions can be avoided in 
practice, knowledge and insight o f these distorted communications are certainly of 
value. From a communication perspective, organizational power might be described 
based on the extent to which power is (perceived to be) gained/maintained through 
dogma (closed communication) or dialogue (open communication), for example.
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Alvesson and Deetz (1996) suggest corporate visions and cultures are strategic 
local narratives that aid management’s objectives (see X-axis description. Figure 2, p. 
87). They also create and maintain the local hierarchies and “relationships o f power” as 
Foucault (1972, 1980) describes (see also Clegg, 1989, re: “circuits” o f power). These 
localized visions, sometimes manifested in grassroots movements, town hall meetings, 
quality circles, company picnics— and corporate and other cults— could be viewed 
(risking the oxymoron) as “grand local” narratives, i.e., local stories including who is in 
charge, what to wear, when to talk, where to shop, why rituals are done and how they 
are done, and so on. And on."^ And in the case o f the IRB system, the instructions 
have become more and more detailed. More and more cumbersome, restricting, 
ambiguous, voluminous (as I show below, for example, see p. 166, re: consent forms; p. 
282, re: assurance documents, and footnote # 139, p. 119, re: historical documents 
related to the system).
Power in the IRB System. Applying Forester’s (1993, 1989) structural 
phenomenology idea yields the following formulation: In the IRB system, at both 
federal and institutional levels, the discursive activities constitute a dogmatic entity that 
defines terms and procedures without offering ju s tif ic a tio n .T h e  system sometimes 
has the appearance o f an open system, taking on the role o f educator rather than 
enforcer (holding seminars, maintaining user-lists, and more recently providing S28.5
‘ These stories are defined as brainwashing and cult indoctrination when they involve unpopular people, 
positions, and organizations.
And, justification is rarely requested.
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million in grants to help research institutions improve their efforts to protect people who 
volunteer for medical research, see Brainard, 2002, Mar 29a; see also NIH, 2002, Mar 
5, or http://grants2.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RfA-OD-02-003.html, accessed May 
25, 2002). At other times, the system is blatantly (and curiously) closed, for example, 
the q u i r e ’s due process and appeal provisions, or administrative rule changes done 
without input from more than a few people’*'. An applicant at OU may, under the rules, 
only request a hearing before the very board that disapproved the application. The 
OUIRB’s written rules provide no other avenues o f appeal.’** Problems with a lack of 
specific written appeal procedures include the lack o f standardization in the process 
(generally a highly valued goal o f regulators), lack o f clear access to the appeals process 
(leaving those who might wish to appeal wondering how and to whom), lack o f written 
guidelines leave the process “optional” (increasing the potential for regulators and 
administrators to say in certain cases “there’s not really anything that can be done” or 
“this situation appears normal, sorry you’re frustrated”) and, finally, the lack of written 
rules for appeal procedures leaves the process wide open to improvisation (an unusual
I recall a time when a faculty member told me that the chair o f an IRB, with great excitement, declared 
“we." [the IRB], have “redone the entire application system.” It appears this particular regulator has no 
lack of confidence in her ability to devise a regulatory system without the input o f those she is regulating.
.According to the OUIRB policy statement 
(http:/ research.ou.edu/policy/lRB_Human_Subjects_Policy.html, accessed May 25. 2002) at Section 10, 
Part 5. the authors state: “The IRB-NC shall notify each investigator in writing o f its decision to approve 
or disapprove hisTier proposed research activity, or o f any modification required to secure IRB-NC 
approval o f the activity. If the IRB-NC disapproves a research activity, the notification shall include a 
statement o f the reasons for its decision and the investigator shall be given an opportunity to respond in 
writing or in person. The IRB-NC may. at its discretion, re-review and reconsider its decision to 
disapprove a research activity at any time. And at Section 6, Part 5: “The investigator shall abide by the 
decisions o f the IRB-NC requiring changes (for approval) or disapproving the research. When the 
proposed research is to be funded by a federal agency, and that agency’s regulations permit, an 
investigator may appeal an IRB-NC decision to the appropriate official (e.g.. the Secretary of the DHHS) 
or section o f that agency. However, for research activities not submitted to federal agencies for
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accommodation to be given to those enforcing/making “rules” or “laws”). Collectively, 
this lack o f written guidelines, then, contributes to the likelihood that more “uneven” 
application and administration of the rules will occur. It contributes to the condition that 
make appealing an action an option o f the IRB rather than the researcher who is denied 
permission to conduct research. The lack of a written, specific appeal process is in 
apparent contradiction to obligatory due process and appeal provisions o f law generally, 
and this particular absence o f rules seems to benefit, overwhelmingly, those making 
(rather than those who may be attempting to understand or follow) the rules.
Historical Development o f IRB Svstem: Earlv. Middle. Later, and Contemporarv Stages
Early stages. “The history o f human subject protections follows a fitful journey 
between trust and tragedy, from the Hippocratic oath to the Holocaust, from the 
Nuremberg Code to Tuskegee, from the Common Rule (45 C.F.R. § 46, 1991) to the 
irresponsible administration o f pyridostigmine bromide to U.S. troops in the G ulf War," 
said Rep. Christopher Shays, Chair o f Congressional hearings about IRBs {Institutional 
Review Boards: A system in jeopardy, 1998; see also Campbell, 1998, Apr 3; Charo, 
1999, Mar 26).
More than 50 years ago, judges o f the Nuremberg court announced their verdict 
in the trial o f 23 Nazi doctors for crimes against humanity (see ACHRE, 1995, 
particularly Chapter 2). The trial followed the discovery o f gruesome medical 
"experiments" performed on prisoners o f war. Since at least the time o f the trials, and
sponsorship, the decision o f the IRB-NC shall be final.” This finality appears to fly in the face of 
prov isions of the U.S. Constitution and most administrative rule makers’ sensitivities.
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adoption o f the Nuremberg Code in 1947, society has maintained skepticism about the 
nature o f research and the inherent conflicts o f interest present in all research.
Distrust seems justified. Even after the adoption o f the Nuremberg Code, and the 
subsequent Declaration o f Helsinki by the World Medical Association in 1964, abuses 
persist as noted (specifically Tuskegee, New York/Willowbrook, anthrax vaccination o f 
military personnel,'"'' etc.; see also Lemonick & Goldstein, 2002, Apr 22).
.Also in 1947, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was created in the U.S. 
The .AEC was a major source o f research funding, a major user o f human subjects (for 
radiation experiments), and has been described as a major violator o f  human rights (see 
ACHRE, 1995, Chapter 1; see also CNN.com, 2001, Jan 15 for related contemporary 
issue re: uranium missile fears). So, the problems (atrocities) appeared in the U.S. 
consciousness and began to affect policy. However, because these government agencies 
operated in the name of national security, most of what the U.S. government researchers 
did to people wasn’t made public until decades later.
A 1966 article by Harvard medical researcher Henry Beecher brought prominent 
attention to human research abuses within U.S. medical schools and hospitals (not 
insignificantly, this was one o f the first times problems outside government research 
were publicly exposed), citing 22 cases involving highly questionable ethics. Atrocities 
(and lesser infractions), along with the eventual acknowledgement o f them, contributed 
to passage o f the National Research Act (1974) that set forth the formal requirements 
for establishing IRBs. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations followed in
Anthrax and vaccinations for it took on many more levels of meaning after September 11, 2001. My 
references are to pre-September 11 issues, specifically those related to military personnel’s resistance to
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1981. By 1991, 16 federal agencies had adopted the Federal Policy for the Protection of 
Human Subjects, known as the “Common Rule” making regulations applicable to all 
human subjects research these agencies conduct or sponsor.'
Beecher (1966) stated, “Ethical errors are increasing not only in numbers but in 
variety” (p. 1354) and offered as an example the “recently added problems arising in 
transplantation o f organs” (p. 1354). Today, stem cell research and gene therapy, and 
intensifying conflict o f interest issues are newer versions o f  the problems Beecher 
noticed.
Between 1944 and 1974 in the U.S., (enhanced by works such as Beecher's) 
tensions between the treatment o f patients and clinical research (between humanitarian 
values and the pursuit o f  knowledge, i.e., between therapy and research) emerged 
throughout the medical science community. This activity was a product, at least partly, 
o f the times— the wartime atrocities revealed during the post-war years, and later the 
activism o f the 1960s, sometimes militant, and often centered on human rights issues 
(including the rights to say and to know, self-determinism, individual rights and 
autonomy, etc., see particularly information about the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, 
1964, http://home.att.net/~enfield/fsmhistl.html, accessed May 25, 2002). These 
developments contributed to the institutionalization o f informed consent. (See p. 135 
regarding the first known use o f the term.) Federal sanctions occurring between 1999 
and 2001, specifically those at Duke University, the University o f Oklahoma, and Johns 
Hopkins University (see Andrews, 2000, Mar 10), indicate that ethical struggles to find 
the proper balance between the rights o f patients and the rights o f researchers, between
taking anthrax vaccinations during the Gulf War e ra  before FDA had approved its use.
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safety and discovery, and between over- and under-regulation continue in American 
society. Basic questions remain about what constitutes “advancing medical science” or 
the loftier “improving the quality o f life” (which are nearly coterminous and often 
subsumed by “attempts to advance one’s career” or “protecting the flow o f funding;” 
see also Shilts, 1987). Just where does “protecting the rights and interests o f  patients” fit 
in with keeping one 's job, avoiding litigation, playing the game, and covering one’s 
ass? Arthur Beaudet, chairman o f the department o f molecular and human genetics at 
Baylor College o f Medicine says, “Let’s face it -  we’re all interested in our careers,” 
and adds, “ Investigators could be perceived as having a conflict o f interest with their 
own desire to be successful” (as quoted in Brainard, 1999, Dec 17, p. A37; see also 
Blumenstyk, 1999, Apr 9; 2000, Nov 6 and 2001, Apr 26; Mangan. 2000, May 19 and 
2000, Oct 30; and Schmidt, 2002, Mar 29, regarding various state legislative actions to 
commercialize research at state-run universities).
This is a rendition o f the classic debate betw een the common good versus 
individual rights and freedom, and the neo-classic rendition in this regulatory system, 
specifically debates between what constitutes research (benefits for the masses) and 
what constitutes therapy (treatment for the individual). It is also indicative o f  a belief 
someone (or some “body”) can know what the common good is (see O ’Connor, 1979, 
especially p. 226; Nietzsche, 1968; and Rand, 1957/1992), or that such a condition 
exists. It follows that common good and individual freedom are (SINS)
STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, 
SIMULATIONS, i.e., institutionalized, simulated, naturalized structures, just not “real”
105
(in an absolute sense), nor real(ly) just. Common good and individual freedom are 
social constructions similar to “average.” None o f these exist in the lifeworld. They are 
examples o f the abstract being treated as concrete'*"*. With respect to common good and 
individual freedom, we act as if they are good (always) and possible (ever); we treat 
them as “real.” somewhat like promotions in the workplace, i.e., promotions are 
perceived by employees as “always” beneficial; employees do not question (until later, 
perhaps) whether they themselves actually benefit or whether the promotion may 
benefit management most (and of course, this is often perceived as good management).
It appears “really” there is (a condition that is) good for you, good for me, good for us, 
good for them, but there is no “common good.” Yet we allude to it, respond to the 
“need” for it. and live in ways that are designed to accommodate it. Even when we can 
see in our immediate surroundings a workable solution to a current problem, we may 
restrict ourselves from doing what seems right in the situation, rationalizing “1 can’t do 
that for you, because everybody might then expect it.” In other words, it wouldn’t be in 
the interest o f  the (abstract) “common good” to do what makes sense for the (concrete) 
particular good {i.e., one’s life at the moment).
These questions and debates become more complex, often unanswerable, though 
answers may flow freely. Newer, narrower, and more specialized problems associated 
with developments in science, such as gene therapy trials, stem cell research, and their
'*■' .A.nd even if there was such a thing as "common good.” Deetz (1995, especially chapter two) suggests 
"neither the marketplace nor governmental action are likely to lead to more effectiveness and the fuller 
accomplishment o f public good,” p. .rvi.
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attendant ethical considerations have emerged.*'^ American regulative bodies are not 
prepared for their arrival. As in the past, atrocities may serve as catalysts in the system, 
a system that is built primarily to offer a reactionary response.
Middle stages. In 1974. the Department o f Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) published regulations, pursuant to the National Research Act (1974), governing 
the protection o f human subjects. The Act created the National Commission for the 
Protection o f Human Subjects o f Biomedical and Behavioral Research, the members of 
which authored the Belmont Report (published in 1979; for information about the Act 
and the text o f the Belmont Report, see
http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.htm, accessed May 25. 
2002), a guiding document in American research policy (see also O'Connor, 1979). 
.Additionally, the Common Rule— the guiding tenet for contemporary researchers— has 
its roots here, although the Rule wasn't codified until 1991 (45 C.F.R. § 46, 1991). It 
took at least 17 years to write this one procedural contribution, the purpose o f which 
was overwhelmingly being met without the Rule.'*'’ As another example, it took more 
than three years for the government regulators to define “scientific misconduct,” 
according to Brainard (1999. Nov 19), much less to determine what the degrees o f or
These issues have surfaced in many places. For example, see CNN online archive for numerous stories 
about stem cell research especially during 2000-2001; .Andrews. 1999. Jan 29; and Walker. 1996. Nov 8. 
See also G.AO. 2000. for an example o f the role government researchers play in the process of policy 
formation, especially labeling and defining criteria. See also foomote # 1. p. 5.
.\  calculation based on the ratio between studies conducted and atrocities committed, or at least 
reported.
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penalties for it may be (see also NIH, 2001, Jun 26, p. 4-6, regarding attempts to define 
behavioral and social sciences; and problems with the Bush administration proposals, p. 
2-3 herein).
Later stages. The Common Rule (45 C.F.R. § 46, 1991, explained in detail 
below ) is a guiding institutionalization, (actually an '‘institutionalization” within layers 
of other SINS) a construction that is an attempt to legislate not only integrity but also 
humanity. It can be argued that it is not feasible, not “enforceable” to act (because o f an 
.Act) as if we can control the hundreds o f thousands o f interactions between researchers 
and participants. It can be argued that the Common Rule (45 C.F.R. § 46, 1991) is an 
instance of social-level delusion, detached from reality, a Baudrillardian (1983) 
seduction into simulation.'*' We act as if  the Act is protection.
Private research that is not supported by the government, or researchers who are 
not seeking FDA approval o f a drug or medical device are not required to apply the 
Common Rule to research. Therefore, the government has little recourse (and even less 
direct knowledge because o f lack of engagement in the process, commonly termed 
“oversight.” but what might be more precisely described as “technological” or 
rer/wa/ogical oversight'**) if “improper” research practices occur. Federal and 
institutional regulators define what is improper yet do not traditionally “see”
'■ The Common Rule "seduces” us into believing (if we follow it), protection of participants in research 
is guaranteed, the “simulation” (see Baudrillard, 1983. 1988, especially p. 166-184). A similar seduction 
(Baudrillard, 1988. especially p. 149-165) is the idea that our protection on the highway is guaranteed by 
following safety rules such as wearing a safety belt, abiding by the speed limit, paying insurance 
premiums, etc.
'** “Technology is the knack o f so arranging the world that we do not experience it” (Frisch. 1977).
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improprieties unless called to their attention by death, injury, complaint, lawsuit, or 
whistleblower, i.e., until a problem/atrocity occurs and is reported.
The Common Rule, officially titled “Federal Policy for the Protection of Human 
Subjects,” (45 C.F.R. § 46. 1991) is the result, as we can see, o f regulations being 
slowly developed by various federal agencies throughout the 1980s, until the Rule was 
adopted in 1991. The Common Rule requires institutions receiving federal support and 
federal agencies sponsoring research to establish internal committees— IRBs— to 
review research proposals for their potential risk to human s u b j e c t s . T h e  Rule also 
requires that “legally effective” '^° informed consent o f the subject or legally authorized 
representative be obtained, and that researchers should maintain written documentation 
o f the consent, i.e.. the signed consent forms (45 C.F.R. § 46.111). Further, DHHS 
regulations specify’ 14 elements o f informed consent, eight o f which are required, 
according to a written statement from Ellis, director o f OPRR from 1993 to 2000, (and 
responsible for bringing more sanctions than any previous director), to the U.S. House 
1998.Jun 11:
The consent document must provide to the participant: 1) a statement 
that the study involves research, an explanation of the purposes o f the 
research and the expected duration o f the subject’s participation, a 
description o f the procedures to be followed, and identification o f any 
procedures which are experimental; 2) a description o f any reasonably 
foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject; 3) a description o f any
i:>) The Common Rule, however, does not apply to all human subjects. These regulations apply only to 
studies sponsored by one of the 17 agencies and departments following the Common Rule, and to studies 
of drugs, devices, and other items regulated by the FDA under interstate commerce regulatory provisions. 
.At least two agencies that conduct research on human subjects— the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 
the U.S. Department of Labor—have not adopted the Common Rule (Campbell. 1997, Sept. 12: also see 
Gary Ellis' testimony. Institutional rev;e% boards: .4 sy stem in jeopardy, 1998, p. 51-52 and John Glenn’s 
comments upon introduction of S. 193, the Human Research Subjects Protection Act. 1997).
The meaning of this term is not explicitly stated in the law (45 C.F.R. § 46.116). and is open to layers 
of interpretation besides.
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benefits to the subject or to others which may reasonably be expected 
from the research; 4) a disclosure o f appropriate alternative procedures 
or courses o f treatment, if  any, that might be advantageous to the subject; 
5) a statement describing the extent, if  any, to which confidentiality of 
records identifying the subject will be maintained; 6) for research 
involving more than minimal risk, an explanation as to whether any 
compensation and an explanation as to whether any medical treatments 
are available if  injury occurs and, if  so, what they consist of, or where 
further information may be obtained; 7) an explanation o f whom to 
contact for answers to pertinent questions about the research and 
research subjects’ rights, and whom to contact in the event o f a research- 
related injury to the subject; 8) a statement that participation is voluntary, 
refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss o f benefits to which 
the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discontinue 
participation at any time without penalty or loss o f benefits to which the 
subject is otherwise entitled. (U.S. House, 1998, Jun 11, p. 45-46)
Ellis’ report states: “A researcher who seeks to recruit an individual for research 
without conveying these elements o f information in language understandable to the 
potential subjects is not obtaining informed consent” (U.S. House, 1998, Jun 11, p. 6; 
emphasis in original). There are no separate informed consent provisions or guidelines 
for those researchers employing observational and other unobtrusive methods, i.e., there 
is no accommodation for the substantial variance in treatments. In the interest of 
treating all researchers the same way, i.e., being “fair,” and based on both social 
desirability and legal interests, one set o f rules to be equally applied to everyone is 
being culturally reproduced (naturalized, institutionalized) by the participants in the 
IRB system, contributing substantially to irrational, irrelevant, and ill-fitting regulation 
for much research activity (see Nelson quote, in Brainard, 2000, Apr 14; DHHS OIG 
1998b, 1998d, 1998e; ACHRE, 1995; AAUP, 2001). Adorno (1989b) states, “Irrational
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institutions are useful to the stubborn irrationality o f a society which is rational in its 
means but not in its ends” (p. 273).
Federal regulatory- bodies: Who makes rules and define terms. Bodies explicitly 
charged with establishing policy regarding some aspect or context o f human subjects 
research include, in addition to the NIH and the FDA, the U.S. House and Senate, the 
judicial system, the National Commission for the Protection o f Human Subjects o f 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, the Commission on Research Integrity, Applied 
Research Ethics National Association (ARENA), the executive branch: President 
Clinton in his 1997 apology for the Tuskegee tragedy, the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission (NBAC), the .Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments 
(.ACHRE). the Office o f Protection from Research Risks (OPRR, now renamed the 
Office o f Human Research Protection, OHRP), and others. These entities are “voices” 
in the discursive formation (Foucault), actors in the Burkian scene or Coffman’s stage, 
perpetuators o f  Baudrillardian seduction and simulation. What is notable about this is 
that professional organizations, universities, researchers, or participants are 
marginalized, involved generally on an ad hoc basis, i.e.. they aren’t integrated into the 
standing decision-making process, but only invited (allowed) to speak (usually briefly) 
in the press, at Congressional hearings, in commission meetings, etc., and often in 
situations that resemble indictments (see U.S. House, 1998, June 11, particularly Ellis 
testimony, as an example)'^'. This is not to say that professional organizations o f
131 See list effects o f strategy discourse on power relations devised by Knights and Morgan ( 1991 ).
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doctors and teachers and university administrators do not establish policy (see AAUP, 
2001. and publications o f professional organizations, particularly the Consortium o f 
Social Science Associations, the American Anthropological Association, the American 
Sociological Association and others; see Appendix B, p. 349 for website addresses). 
These entities do establish policy, locally, as do researchers and the researched, via the 
use o f unwritten and often informal conventions, as often, perhaps, as (their 
interpretations of) written or explicit rules (see Punch, 1998; Geertz, 1988; Hall, 1989). 
And individual researchers establish policy, as well, demonstrated in their personal 
behaviors, even if no one (a regulator, for example) is watching and even if the 
participants don't “see” it themselves. In other words, participants may feel they need 
the protection o f regulation, when “really” they already know whether they should or 
wish to answer a certain question, or whether they feel comfortable filling out a survey 
questionnaire. People establish policy continually in their lives. Within the liquid-and- 
local reality frame, a participant chooses whether to show up for the scheduled 
inter\ iew or not. whether to answer any particular question or not, decides whether to 
answer honestly or not, etc. This may have something to do with social rules, but not 
IRB rules, 1 assert, because most o f the rules are not even known to participants (see 
also Foucault’s. 1980, comments about universal and specific intellectuals, p. 126).
To be “explicitly charged with establishing policy,” as are the entities mentioned 
above, means these bodies (and individuals, see Shalala, 2000, Dec 21)‘^ ‘ are allowed
During the swearing in o f the National Human Research Protections Advisory Committee December 
2 1, 2000, Donna Shalala (as Secretary of Health and Human Services) spoke about those researchers 
seeking only to make a name for themselves, those seeking “only to unmask a discovery.” or to secure 
“some kind of financial reward.” are “researchers whose priorities are wTong, and who need to find
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to label (see Campbell, 1999, Oct 22, and Brainard, 1999, Nov 18, as examples), 
impose procedures, sanctions, and fines (where federal dollars are involved this is 
explicit, but is voluntary or at least implicit otherwise, see Campbell, 1999, May 21; 
Brainard, 2000, Feb 4; OHRP, 2001, July 19; Andrews, 2000, Mar 10; and Brainard, 
2000, June 2). These bodies may shut down research activities (before or after the onset 
o f the activity), an (Tor withdraw, withhold, or deny funding (in virtually every 
announcement o f grants available from the government, the standardized language 
covers the rules that must be followed, including the process, reporting, record keeping, 
etc. The penalty for breaking the rules in every case is the withdrawal o f  the funding; 
see also OHRP, 2001, Jul 19, letter to Johns Hopkins University). Technically this 
involves rescinding the MPA (Multiple Assurance Document) generally for only a few 
days (see Campbell, 1999, May 28, for example). Exceptions were the University of 
Illinois at Chicago and the University o f Colorado Health Sciences Center in Denver 
(see Brainard, 1999, Oct 8 and Brainard, 1999, Oct 29). In seven sanctions issued prior 
to November 1996, only one suspension was enacted; the institutions, except the 
University o f Virginia, were cited for violating rules, but allowed to continue 
conducting research involving human subjects under close government supervision (see 
Walker, 1996. Nov 8).
Governmental impact on the research environment extends beyond laws and 
rules, to include the reports o f (mostly presidential and always political) commissions.
another line of work" (see Shalala. 2000. Dec 21). Perhaps Shalala (and her successors) would agree with 
a similar argument, i.e.. that regulators who don’t seem to know or follow the rules, or who are more 
concerned with power and process than with protection and purpose, also find other lines o f work.
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The ACHRE report (1995, Roadmap section), commenting mostly on human subjects in
medical research, states:
... contemporary human subject research does not suffer from the same 
shortcomings witnessed in the 1940s and 1950s, but poses different 
issues that need to be addressed...W e found that subjects needed 
protections to ensure their basic rights to consent to or to refuse 
participation in research. While this need to protect the right o f  consent 
continues, in the current period we found that subjects also need 
protections to ensure their interests are served in understanding the 
distinctions between research and therapy and the limits o f the benefits 
research may offer, (p. 3)
The writers o f the report conclude that written information provided to 
participants is often obscure, and ambiguities about crucial differences between 
research and medical care (therapy) are likely contributing to confusion between the 
two on the part o f research participants (see also p. 17 herein, re: “confused consent” 
issues). In general, the ACHRE (1995) report states that consent forms over-promised 
what research could offer sick patients and downplayed the potentially negative 
research effects on patients’ quality o f life. Earlier, at a meeting organized by Public 
Responsibility in Medicine and Research, a Boston-based group that educates 
professionals and the general public about ethical, legal, and policy issues related to 
research. Jay Katz, professor o f law, medicine, and psychiatry at Yale University, said 
physicians needed to be more careful not to exploit the trust that patients place in them 
and to draw a sharp line between what they propose as a treatment and what they 
propose as research (as quoted in Wheeler, 1991, Dec 4, p. A 14; see also the 
organization’s website: http://www.primr.org/, accessed May 25, 2002).
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As is probably apparent, the federal system is difficult to discern. Texts are
innumerable. Researchers face a daunting task in attempting to decipher the regulations,
but also in determining who to listen to, i.e., whose discourse applies to their own. Even
federal regulators themselves acknowledge the convoluted nature o f the system.
.A.ccording to Ellis in his testimony before the U.S. House 1998, Jun 11:
The federal authorities over IRBs are partitioned in a most complex way 
... the universe o f involvement o f human subjects research is broad, and 
the outer limits are actually unknown ... two statutes that are especially 
pertinent: first the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and the Food and Drug 
Administration discharges its responsibility under that statute to protect 
human subjects when an investigational drug, device, or biologic is 
involved. Second, the Department o f Health and Human Services, under 
the Public Health Service Act, discharges its responsibility when DHHS 
funds or support are involved. That’s where my Office for Protection 
from Research Risks sits. And the jurisdiction o f these two statutes 
overlap ... share congruent regulations on informed consent and 
Institutional Review Boards. The Food and Drug Administration 
conducts numerous IRB inspections. Our office conducts very few site 
visits... [DHHS] is formally yoked with 16 other departments and 
agencies. We are in lock-step. We share a common rule ... any change in 
regulation for the protection o f human subjects ... at the federal level 
must be agreed upon by 17 departments and agencies. (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 1998, Jun 11, p. 51-52; see also GAO. 2001, p. 3)
In the community o f regulators, NIH is one o f eight health agencies that is part 
o f the U.S. Department o f Health and Human Services (DHHS). Within NIH, the Office 
o f Extramural Research oversees the bulk of research funded by the NIH. Within the 
Office o f Extramural Research was, until May 2000, the location o f the Office o f 
Protection from Research Risks (OPRR). The OPRR was the entity that, until the 
change in May 2000, had the most direct federal government contact with local IRBs.'^^
This relationship between federal rules and institutional interpretations is the focus o f the Chapter Six.
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(For information about the past and current structure o f DHHS, go to www.dhhs.gov 
and for NIH, www.nih.gov; see also GAO, 2001 for a “state o f the system” report).
Contemporary- stage. An estimated 3,000 to 5,000 IRBs operate in the U.S.'^'* 
Federal regulations require that the boards have at least five members with varying 
backgrounds (45 C.F.R. § 46.107). At least one member must have primarily scientific 
interests, one must have primarily nonscientific interests, and one must be otherwise 
unaffiliated with the institution in which the IRB resides. A frequent feature of 
institutional compliance is to fill these latter two roles with a single individual.
Most IRBs remain in large teaching hospitals and medical centers (see Walker, 
1996, Nov 8), but the addition o f new commercial and hybrid settings (an example o f 
such a hybrid organization is found at the University o f Oklahoma: the H.A. Chapman 
Institute o f Medical Genetics, a private research organization, is located on the OU 
Tulsa Schusterman campus) has created new research situations (DHHS OIG 2000a). 
Also, multi-site trials are much more common today and add to the difficulties o f 
adapting the old regulatory system to the new world o f research. At the time many o f 
the rules were written, studies were typically conducted by a single researcher with a 
small number o f subjects, much lower financial stakes, and far fewer conflict o f  interest 
concerns.
Ellis, when head of the OPRR and during House testimony in 1998, estimated the number o f  IRBs 
operating at 3.700. The AAUP (2001) reports that approximately 4,000 IRBs were operating (in 2000) in 
the U.S., mainly at universities, teaching hospitals, and private research facilities.
1 1 6
Power shift. Ellis was named director o f OPRR in January 1993 (see Brainard, 
2000, May 30). He brought more suspensions in 20 months than in the 20 years prior to 
his appointment. Since October 1998, federal regulators have “imposed an 
unprecedented series o f suspensions on campus research efforts involving human 
participants, after finding that some institutions were not following mandatory 
guidelines'^^ meant to safeguard the safety and dignity o f the participants” (Brainard, 
2000, Feb 4). Notice that the accusations, indeed the sanctions, did not involve the 
purpose o f regulation, i.e., protection of participants from harm,'^* rather harm to the 
process, the regulatory structure, was the concern (see Brainard, 1999, Sep 10). The 
process was at risk. Papers weren’t filed'^’ in many o f the sanction cases, the
It is unclear what distinction is to be made between “mandatory" guidelines and what might be called 
"the force of law."
Brainard (2001, Mar 9) reports that "methods and ethics of social science and behavioral research 
were not at issue in the federal suspensions” (p. A 21). And Brainard (2000, Mar 17) states, concerning 
the sanctions at Duke University, "The [OPRR] voiced concern that Duke's board was overworked to the 
point it was no longer meeting its responsibilities" (.A21). Even more seriously, the regulators said, the 
board had violated federal rules about how to conduct its deliberations. This was true in 1994 when the 
OPRR "in an unusual step" issued sanctions against the University o f Virginia for failure to have on their 
Behavioral and Educational Sciences Institutional Review Board a member “whose primary concerns are 
in non-scientific areas" (Burd. 1995, Apr 14). Inconsistency is a problem as well. In 1999, two New York 
institutions were allowed to continue federally sponsored research in spite o f having subjected children to 
"intravenous lines for multiple blood drawings, genetic testing, and the infusion o f the banned 
flenfluramine" (Campbell, 1999, Jun 25, p. A43), yet the University o f Virginia was sanctioned in 1994 
for not meeting the composition standards for their IRB.
' '  The 1999 four-day shutdown of Duke's medical research was described as "all about procedure" 
(Brainard, 2000. Mar 17) and as "administrative lapses" (Duke officials, quoted in Campbell, 1999, May 
21 ). The board had failed to review some continuing research projects at least once a year. Among other 
problems, the IRB lacked formal training for researchers and board members about regulations covering 
human volunteers. Duke was scolded as well for such seeming minutiae as failing to keep sufficiently 
detailed minutes o f IRB meetings. Regulators did not allege that volunteers had been physically harmed 
in experiments by Duke researchers" (Brainard, 2000, Mar 17, p. A31). Chairman of the Yale University 
IRB and editor o f IRB: . \  Review of Human Subjects Research says, “ If you don’t like the way an IRB is 
keeping minutes, you can say so, but you don’t need to close an institution to bring about change of this 
sort" (quoted in Brainard, 2000, Feb 4). And in the letter delivered by the OHRP in July 2001 announcing 
sanctions at Johns Hopkins University, the regulators cited numerous paperwork infractions. (See OHRP, 
2001, July 10.) With respect to social scientific studies, privacy concerns emerge occasionally, but 
damage suits, even in this litigious society, are rare. In my reading about this subject, 1 haven’t
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implication being that if the papers had been filed (that is, the process had remained 
intact) that the filing of paper would protect people (meeting the purpose). The process 
of paper filing has become institutionalized, i.e., SINSfijl’^^ ; the paper forms are 
equated with protection o f  research participants, rather than with the much more 
tangible {i.e., actual, “real”) situation o f protection o f  the iiniversity/IRB personnel from 
somewhat remote, yet potential problems with federal overseers, researchers, or (even) 
participants. This process is a manifestation o f the “I” in SINS, specifically universities 
and regulatory agencies (institutions) have developed a pattern o f paper filing, and have 
perpetuated it—an institutionalization organized by the texts that come before and after 
any given piece o f paper being put into the process at any given moment (see also 
footnote # 72, p. 64). The result is that the institutional-level players (IRB members and 
administrators) fulfill the (paper, textualogicaf) process, without ever seeing an 
informed consent process in the lifeworld, without ever meeting a participant, without 
any contact (at least a very high probability o f no contact) with the "real” research 
process at all. This also demonstrates the Baudrillardian idea o f simulation (the second 
“S” in SINS). We are seduced by the "goodness” o f the (stated purposes for) rules to 
create the paper process, and further seduced by the fulfillment o f the paper process, 
which in turn, further contributes to the simulation o f  protection.
encountered any information related to a "survey-gone-bad" or any lawsuits related to observational data 
gathering techniques.
Brainard (2000. Mar 17) observed an IRB meeting at Duke University after sanctions were issued 
there in 1999. His observations “revealed a paperwork-driven process that places great faith in the 
precision of language, and in the careful review o f documents that scientists submit to justify research 
projects. The process does not involve direct oversight by board members o f the research itself. All of 
those features are typical of review boards at other universities” (p. A31 ).
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SINS and paper processes: Further explanation. The paper process is accepted, 
institutionalized, as “the way we do things,” and its acceptance is based on structures 
{i.e., ideologies) such as “the way we do things is good” {i.e., effective, meets the goal), 
and “these things are good for us” (the goal is worthy/possible). These are three stellar 
leaps o f faith; the more faith we have, (I would add that I believe this is mostly passive 
defaulting rather than active faith) the deeper the SINS, i.e., the more invisible the 
STRUCTURES; the more firmly entrenched the INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS become, 
accepted, not questioned even when they seem unreasonable or inelTective. 
NATURALIZATIONS occur as objects become “obvious,” “normal,” or “natural,” this 
based on the sheer number o f people who participate in the process, perpetuate it, 
mostly without question, without whying. NATURALIZATIONS support and 
perpetuate INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS; and we are more easily seduced into more 
complete SIMULATIONS {i.e., situations involving processes ever more detached from 
“real” lifeworld events).
These phenomena would likely be observed in many regulatory entities and 
other organizations.'^^ But situations vary in interesting ways. I’ll give two somewhat 
contrasting examples. First, consider the probation process for criminal offenders. The 
probation process involves as a central feature a “real” world, a contact visit in the 
lifeworld, between the probation officer and the “real” parolee, a local attached 
“reality” (and realizing that not all such appointments are kept, o f course.)
IRBs seemed a good choice for a dissertation.
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Alternatively, consider typical unemployment insurance procedures. An unemployed 
person goes to the Employment Office and completes a form that states s/he has 
solicited work at some number o f places during the past few weeks or month. This 
form, in the organizational view, actually constitutes the process o f “ looking for work.” 
The unemployment paperwork is similar to the IRB assurance document process 
between the federal government and the institutions (described more fully below, 
footnote # 140, p. 121) though the employment example is more local, i.e., the parties to 
the process (the unemployed person and an employment service employee) are directly 
involved in the making and accepting of the assurance. As pointed out above, the IRB 
assurance document is negotiated among people who often conduct no research at all 
and who rarely if never meet each other in person. The parties to the making o f  the 
assurance document are the federal regulators and institutional administrators, not, in 
the normal course o f things, the researchers or research participants who actually 
“ fulfill” the assurance, an assurance they didn’t write, and often have never read. This 
paper-only process also adds to the detachment (i.e., hyperreality) o f  the “assurance” 
from the research environment. Regulators and administrators particularly are seduced 
by the goodness o f the ideas in the document and the faith in the overall bureaucratic 
process to believe such a document can be meaningful, will have an impact, will be 
followed, is possible to accomplish, etc.
In the employment paper process example, it is not significant (with respect to 
getting the unemployment check issued) whether the unemployed person actually 
sought employment or not. It is only significant that the person fill out the paperwork.
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correctly and on time, etc. The unemployed person gets the check for doing the 
paperwork, not for “really” looking for work. It is a charade, a “just tell me what 1 must 
hear” presentation, and known to all parties as a charade, but as a “natural” (or at least 
"normal”) charade, i.e., it has come to be the “way we do things.” This is unlike what 
happens if a parolee doesn’t show up to fulfill the paperwork process ... s/Tie is declared 
to have absconded from parole, and a warrant is issued for his or her arrest, making 
running from parole much more than a paper process.
The assurance document. The assurance document is perhaps an important 
example o f (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, 
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS operating in the federal-institutional 
interface.” '"’*^ Regulators, both federal and institutional, function as if this document 
protects participants, i.e.. as “real” assurance. Yet, it would be nearly impossible for the 
regulators to know what effect, if any, the assurance document has. It is impossible for 
the regulators to know how the assurance document/process works because no “real 
world” oversight exists (nor can it practically, “real”-istically exist) to assure the 
assurance (see Brainard, 2000, Mar 17). In other words, without direct oversight or 
exposure to the process, assurance can only be voluntary {i.e., self-controlled) rather
The assurance document is negotiated between the regulatory agencies and the research institutions. 
The upfront assurance document specifies an institution’s agreement to comply with the human subject 
protections required by federal regulations. The assurance document outlines the organization and 
purv iew of the IRB, along with processes for reviewing protocols and other procedural issues. (For 
details, see Appendix B o f DHHS OIG, 1998e, which states: The assurance process is conducted “entirely 
through document transmittal and phone communication” (p. B-1). .Also see U.S. House. 1998, Jun 11. 
particularly Ellis' testimony. For examples o f assurance documents, see University o f Utah, University of 
Louisville, and University o f Texas multiple assurance documents (website addresses given in
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than regulator/regulation-controlled, and is detached from reality, (hyper-real, 
simulated). The assurance process creates the illusion o f assurance by containing 
promises that processes are and will remain in place according to federal rules to ensure 
the protection o f research participants. When the “real” world crashes through, shatters 
the simulation with the occurrence o f a research-related death or injury, a 
whistleblower, or a paper process failure (the latter, fortunately, being the most 
common), the focus o f regulators and the regulated, often immediately and nearly 
always, turns to an assessment o f what went wrong with the process that was in place to 
ensure such problems (or tragedies) were prevented. In this case, the process is an 
institutionalization (the “I” in SINS), the notion that the process can prevent problems is 
a structure (the first “S” in SINS) that underlies the simulation (the last “S” in SINS) 
that protection, based on the formulaic production and dissemination and even the 
occasional reading o f texts, is somehow ensured. That we do all o f this is natural, (the 
“N” in SINS) even if  it seems unreasonable, illogical, pointless, etc.
The assurance document completes a portion o f a socially constructed regulatory 
process. The institution provides a ceremonial document (the assurance) with words 
dictated by the regulators. The assurors (institutions, IRBs) make promises to the 
assured (federal regulators) that may or may not be kept (as is the nature o f all 
promises) but that can provide a basis for various kinds o f additional paperwork 
processes, from grant applications to sanctions, i.e., an assurance must be on file to 
apply for grants. And the assurance document is often the “rope” used to hang research
bibliography). Also see the OHRP website which outlines procedures for filing assurance documents: 
http://bhrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/irbasur.htm, accessed May 25, 2002.
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institutions, i.e., nearly always among the array of “charges” is violating the assurance 
document (see as an example the OHRP’s letter to Johns Hopkins, 
http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/detrm_letrs/jul01a.pdf, accessed May 25, 2002). Further, it 
cannot be assumed that the assurance document directly addresses nor changes the 
research environment because the local participants in the assurance ceremony do little 
if  any research, and the researchers and research participants who are directly involved 
in research overwhelmingly don’t even know the document, process, or ceremony exist. 
To summarize, the “assurance” is an institutionalized process sustained by people who 
most often aren’t involved in the research process they are making and accepting 
promises about, and this process seems natural (i.e. has been normal for many years). 
The assurance process is not tethered in (attached to) “reality,” rather it occurs apart 
from the research environment, is detached from the research process and those 
conducting it. It is a process involving people making promises about things they don’t 
do in their owm lives and can’t control in the lives o f others. It is hyperreal in that very 
few “real” researchers know what an assurance document is. what it is for, what it says, 
who signed it, or who sent it. It has no direct meaning for the researcher, and less 
meaning for the research participants or patients in medical trials who, in 
overwhelmingly large numbers, do not even know it exists.
According to DHHS OIG (2000b), published in April 2000, NIH/OPRR had 
conducted an on-site investigation''” at only one institution between April 1997 and
.A "site visit" is defined as a " \ isit by OHRP officials, representative, or consultants to the location of a 
research activity to assess the adequacy o f IRB protection of human subjects or the capability of 
personnel to conduct the research” (http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/irb/irb_glossary.htm. accessed May 25, 
2002). In a report from OPRR to NIH in January 1999, it is stated that OPRR. now OHRP, has the
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May 1998. However, between June 1998 and March 2000, it conducted ten on-site 
investigations. Similarly, FDA’s number o f routine on-site investigations o f IRBs 
increased from 213 in FY1997 to 253 in FY1998, and to 336 in FY1999. Further, 
OPRR’s reviews, which resulted in the suspension o f federally funded research at eight 
institutions (beginning with sanctions at Duke in May 1999 to the most recent to be 
included in Brainard’s comment, sanctions at the University o f Oklahoma in June 
2000)’’*' have been particularly influential in drawing attention o f the national research 
community to the (in)adequacy(ies) o f IRB oversight and human-subject protections. 
For more than a year after the “restructuring” o f the federal system, described in the 
next paragraph, no sanctions were imposed until, prompted by the death of a healthy 
volunteer, Johns Hopkins University was sanctioned in July 2001.
authority to "identify locations and agendas for site visits" (See
http: ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov references/060399b.htm. accessed May 25. 2002.) The FDA has a lengthy 
Investigations Operations Manual (see http:/ (da.gov/ora/inspect_ref iom/10Mfbreword.html. 
accessed May 25. 2002) that outlines many procedures for various types of investigations such as 
vaccines, medical devices, food additives, etc. None of these concern social science issues. Also, in 
related news: In .April 2001. the FD.A solicited hospitals to participate in as volunteers for site visits, 
assuring potential participants that "activities of these facilities will be observed for instructional benefit. 
Again, the intent is not regulatory. We will look at the procedures followed and the records that are 
maintained to ascertain each hospital's "state of compliance.' A special report will be provided to each 
hospital outlining the deficiencies identified in an effort to provide them with a better understanding of 
what must be done in order to comply with the applicable regulations" (see
http:, 'www.fda.gov/cdrh/reuse/04200i_pilot.html. accessed May 25, 2002, for copy of solicitation letter).
More than a year after the OU suspension, the government suspended all federally funded research on 
human subjects at Johns Hopkins University July 19. 2001. prompted by the death o f 24-year-old Ellen 
Roche, a healthy research participant. (The term "participant" is appropriate rather than "patient:"
Roche's death was "directly related to the study and not part of an underlying illness" according to Curry. 
2001. June 29. See analysis regarding use of these terms, p. 132. herein.) The Hopkins suspension was 
the first under the newly organized OHRP and its director, Greg Koski. It is also notable that Hopkins 
traditionally receives more federal funds than any other institution, more than S770 million in 1999. and 
more than S301 million to the medical school in 2000. as reported by the Chronicle o f  Higher Education. 
On July 3. 2001, Johns Hopkins was awarded a 12-year. S600 million contract by NASA.
Brainard (2001. Mar 9) reports “In the past two years, the federal government has ratcheted up 
pressure on all researchers studying people, urging them to do a better job o f protecting the participants' 
safety and dignity. The push has followed some widely publicized lapses in review of medical 
experiments -  especially the September 1999 death of Jesse Gelsinger in a gene-therapy trial at the
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After the death o f 18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger, a research patient at the 
University o f Pennsylvania in 1999, and the discovery that six prior deaths had not been 
reported as required by federal law (see footnote # 43, p. 30, herein), the OPRR was 
criticized by legislators, members o f  the public, NIH officials, the FDA (in issuing 
sanctions), bioethicists and others for not doing enough to protect research volunteers 
(see Brainard. 1999, Nov 12 and legislative hearings transcripts, particularly in the 
questions raised by Reps. Towns and Shays in Institutional Review Boards: A system in 
jeopardy, 1998). In June 2000, Ellis was “reassigned,” and the OPRR was moved (up 
the regulatory food chain) to the Office o f the Secretary o f DHHS (Brainard, 2000, May 
30). This development can be interpreted in numerous ways, o f course. Naming a new 
person at that particular time, i.e., just as Ellis was enforcing the rules he was stripped 
o f his responsibility to do so, and the changing o f the structure, location, and name of 
the OPRR (to the not-so-different OHRP) may indicate a desire, on the part o f 
regulators and researchers alike, for change in the role and/or boundaries o f the 
system.'"" In other words, Ellis, while enforcing the provisions o f law may have called 
attention to a lack o f support for the law. It could also be argued that the 
overhaul/reorganization activities, including Ellis’ reassignment, were at least in part 
political responses (see Brainard, 2000, May 26a, and 1999, Sep 10, as examples). In 
this case, it was socially desirable for the federal regulators to appear responsive and 
caring in the face o f mounting pressures: the release o f the concern-ridden ACHRE
University of Pennsylvania. Between October 1998 and July o f last year, officials o f the National 
Institutes o f Health suspended federally financed research at eight institutions” (p. A21).
Brainard (2000. May 30) states, “Some observers have concluded that [DHHS] wants to scale back the 
tougher enforcement of the research-risks office under Mr. Ellis's leadership over the past 20 months”
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report (1995), the Executive Order forming the NBAC (see Clinton, William J., 1995, in 
bibliography). President Clinton’s public apology in 1997 for the Tuskegee incident, the 
DHHS OIG reports (issued from 1998 to 2000), capped by the Gelsinger death in 1999, 
and other sanctions following. It could be argued that the federal regulators had to do 
something. (Also see Nelson, quoted in Brainard, 2000, Apr 14, p. A45.) And whatever 
the federal regulators do affects institutions and researchers with little or no regard to 
treatment, in large part because o f federal regulators’ (expressed) beliefs that 
consideration o f the distinctions among treatments is not necessary.
Avoiding litigation. Hayes, Hayes, and Dykstra (1995) suggest when IRBs 
make mistakes, thorough, periodic evaluations— particularly ones conducted 
externally— would serve to re-orient the groups to their missions and objectives. Hayes, 
et al., state the IRB process is too important not to include careful evaluation. They 
further suggest such procedures protect not only human subjects, but also institutions 
and investigators against l i ab i l i t y . Thes e  and other comments (numerous similar ones 
from government reports, DHHS OIG 1998b, 1998e, and 2000b; ACHRE, 1995; U.S.
(Daily News). That has. in turn. Brainard indicates “prompted criticism from some university officials, 
who have privately called Ellis's actions excessive and unwarranted.”
I have field notes from an OHRP open forum I attended in 2001 to support this assertion, but I have no 
permission to use the data. If I were a reporter in this situation, I could write about it. But as a researcher, 
under the OLTRB administrators’ interpretation of the rules, I caimot.
.\n argument could be made that the latter takes precedence in today’s “real” (and highly) litigious 
world and much of the activity of the IRB system is directed toward the avoidance of litigation. Consider 
the language of the Legal Issues for Physicians document prepared by the American Medical 
.Association’s Litigation Center “To protect yourself in litigation, in addition to carrying adequate 
liability insurance, it is important that the communications process itself be documented. Good 
documentation can serve as evidence in a court of law that the process indeed took place. A timely and 
thorough documentation in the patients’ chart by the physician providing the treatment and/or performing 
the procedure can be a strong piece o f evidence that the physician engaged the patient in an appropriate
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House o f Representatives, 1998, Jun 11, for example) support the idea that, in addition 
to (or superceding) any motivation toward human subject protection, legal 
considerations drive the IRB system.
In comparing medical and social sciences, “in the past, particularly in medical 
research and psychological experimentation, there was a considerable amount o f 
deception and, in some cases, a demonstrable element o f harm” (Sieber, 1992, p. 4) 
including (in an example given by Sieber) distributing LSD to visitors at a brothel’"*' 
and filming the incident with a hidden camera. “One person committed suicide while 
under the influence o f the drug” (p. 68). Attempts to control this deception have also 
had an impact on social science in general, for example enhanced regulation and 
scrutiny o f the informed consent form, and what some consider local IRB interference 
in areas exempted by the federal government (45 CFR § 46.101 )’■**. Federally funded 
(and most other) research’"*^ in the U.S., as mentioned, must conform to the process 
described here including auditing by review boards. In addition, professional
discussion" (.\M .\. 1998. available; http:, ama-assn.org/ama/pub/calegory/4608.html. accessed 
May 25. 2002). .\lso see AAUP (2001. p. 7) re: pressure o f possible litigation.
"" The administration of a drug (LSD in the example above) would mean the study would be placed in 
the "medical" category, regardless o f whether the researchers considered themselves "social scientists" or 
something else.
The main complaint against the OPRR, according to Brainard (2000. Feb 4) is that "its suspensions 
have focused largely on universities' failure to document their oversight of experiments involving 
humans, and to follow federally mandated procedures” (p. A29). He continues. "Critics note that several 
o f the OPRR’s suspensions included no allegations that human participants had been injured by risky 
experiments or had not given informed consent” (p. A29). See also the argument made by the chairman of 
the Yale University IRB . foomote # 137, p. 117 about the severity o f sanctions).
Tropp (1982) extends civil rights precedents requiring the extension of civil rights statutes to all parts 
of a university campus, not only those receiving federal dollars, stating these precedents apply "exactly to 
the issues o f protection of subjects in nonfederally funded research” (p. 395). Tropp maintains the 
precedent requires that IRBs assert their authority over all research, campus-wide, if that campus receives 
federal funds at all. George Annas, an ethicist and professor o f Law and Public Health at Boston 
University states, "We can’t tolerate having one rule for private firms to do research, out o f the public 
view, and for public scientist not to be able to do research .. and that’s the situation today” (as quoted in 
.Amos 2000. Apr 26; see also Campbell. 1998, Dec 18).
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associations have adopted and advocated/required the following o f {i.e., attempted to 
institutionalize) various codes o f c o n d u c t . T o  this end, there is disagreement about 
many things. As presented, regulators vacillate between positions o f “stricter 
enforcement” and the “relaxing o f rules,” i.e.. between enforcer and educator personas 
(Brainard, 2000, Feb 4, and Mar 17; 2001, Mar 9) and professional organizations 
struggle with whether to attempt to establish “guidelines” and “policies,” even 
“certification” schemes o f their own (see AAUP, 2001; Punch, 1998).
Even though contradictory opinions exist (a seemingly healthy, desirable 
condition), attempts to stifle dissention are apparent. Approving of the effort to 
cooperate with federal authorities, Sieber (1992) says, “In essence, there is a strong 
argument, reinforced from disparate but powerful forces,” that “sound ethics and sound 
methodology go hand in hand” (p. 4). Translation: Believe as we believe and do as we 
do and you will be sound (and heard). And protected from legal liability. And called a 
“good team player.” And so on. The Grand Narrative produces The Grand Illusion (see 
Baum, 1900/1965).
Many voices, (AAUP, 2001; ACHRE, 1995; Brainard, 2000, Feb 4; Brainard, 
2000, Mar 17; Brainard, 2000, May 30; Brainard, 2001, Mar 9; Campbell, 1997, Sep 
12; Campbell, 1998, Apr 3; Campbell, 1998, Dec 18; Charo, 1999, Jun 25; Charo, 1999,
.'\ccording to the .\.\U P  (2001). the Oral History Association, the .American Historical Association, 
and the Organization of American Historians in 1998 corresponded with approximately 700 IRBs to 
encourage them to take into account the standards of practice relevant to historical research in their 
evaluations of oral history projects. And, Professor Murray Wax, anthropologist from Washington 
Universit)' in St. Louis states. “The problems that emerge within anthropological research ... have to do 
with human beings, not Just as physiological specimens, but as social creatures living in families, clans, 
groups, tribes, or nations ... the risks and benefits to the people [who anthropologists study] are very 
different from those faced by subjects of biomedical research” (as discussed in AAUP, 2001. p. 4).
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Mar 26; DHHS OIG 1998b; DHHS OIG 1998d; DHHS OIG, 1998e; DHHS OIG,
2000b; GAO, 1996; GAO, 2001; Geertz, 1988; Gray, 1982; Greenberg, 2001, Jan 19; 
Protecting human subjects: Status o f  recommendations. 2000\ Institutional review  
boards: A system in jeopardy. 1998; Hall, 1989; Hayes, Hayes & Dykstra, 1995; Healy, 
1999, Jul 30; NBAC, 1997 and 2001; OHRP, 2001; Okie, 2001, Aug 6; Pence. 2001,
Jan 12; President’s Commission for the Study o f Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1981; Punch, 1998; Tropp, 1982; and Wheeler, 
1991. Dec 4) are suggesting (and have been for more than 20 years now) that the system 
(especially as it pertains to the regulation o f non-treatment, no risk approaches) doesn’t 
work. I join the chorus. The purposes remain important, and the processes, impotent.
Fortunately, the process is text (Foucault, 1972). It can be rewritten.'^'
.additionally, the American Sociological Association and the American Anthropological Association and 
several other groups participated in the study conducted by the A.\UP (2001 ).
The .A.AUP (2001) argues “ ... genuine threat[s] to academic freedom could be removed by rewriting 
the regulations so they do not sweep unnecessarily broadly or by better educating members o f the IRBs” 
(p. 5-6). (I would add that educating those in charge of supervising IRBs. specifically deans and 
university legal counselors, also be better educated about unnecessarily or unlawfully sweeping 
researchers out of operation.) .And Schütz and Luckmann (1973) state: "Subjective loiowledge can be 
translated into the ‘idealizing’ and anonymous’ interpretive matrices of a system o f signs, and it can be 
again transformed into subjective knowledge by means of an appropriately meaningful retranslation” (p. 
281).
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Chapter Five: Foucauldian Analyses of Texts Constituting the IRB System
"The 'welfare o f  the individual ’ is ju s t as imaginary as the 'welfare o f  the species ... ' " 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 299.
This chapter includes analyses o f several documents created within and for the 
maintenance of the IRB system. They include the Advisory Committee on Human 
Radiation Experiments, a 14-member body (one representative o f the general public and 
thirteen experts in bioethics, radiation oncology and biology, nuclear medicine, 
epidemiology and biostatistics, public health, history o f science and medicine, and 
law”) appointed in 1994 by President Clinton “to investigate reports o f possibly 
unethical experiments funded by the government decades ago” (ACHRE, 1995, 
Executive Summary, p. 1). The ACHRE released its report in 1995. This was one of the 
most well funded and accommodated commissions {i.e., presidential instructions were 
to give this commission whatever documents it wanted in pursuit o f its goals) ever to 
study human subjects o f research (far and away the largest until the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission [NBAC] in 2001).
In contrast to this broad, historically scoped, upper-executive level entity’s 
report, other analyses are conducted on important but less comprehensive documents 
produced by federal administrators (who are not necessarily “representative o f the 
general public” nor “experts.”) One o f these administrative texts is a “state o f the 
system” report produced by the GAO (General Accounting Office) in 1996. which was 
used heavily by Sen. John Glenn in proposing the Human Research Subjects Protection
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Act o f 1997, an analysis o f which is also offered in this chapter (see next paragraph).
The other administrative text selected for analysis is a “guide” to the Common Rule (for 
use by researchers and IRB members, or their international equivalents). This guide was 
produced by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1999, and is 
described as a “companion” to the Common Rule.
Finally in this chapter, a proposed U.S. Senate bill is analyzed. The Human 
Research Subjects Protection Act of 1997 (S. 193) was proposed by one o f the most 
famous research subjects o f all time (and U.S. Senator) John Glenn. The analysis 
includes not only the text o f the Act itself, but the context surrounding and contributing 
to the text, i.e., consideration about documents supplied by the administration used in 
constructing the Act, and the extent to which researchers or participants themselves 
were asked to contribute information or ideas about how to best design a “new 
program.” (See also footnote # 121, p. 101 for a local example o f this phenomenon.)
These documents were selected in order to focus this section o f the analysis on 
federal-level operations and development, and for their diversity (specifically, 
executive, administrative, and legislative documents are represented, retrospective looks 
at the system [GAO and ACHRE documents] along with contemporary “guides” to it 
[the USAID text], and how these documents become “nested”).
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE) Report: Analysis
In considering Foucault’s questions (see Appendix A, p. 344; see also Manning, 
1989) it becomes apparent that the ACHRE (1995), while not having the power to make
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laws directly, does (substantially) define important terms, including “suffering,” 
“shortcomings,” “needs” (four references contained in parts of only two sentences; see 
introduction to part 3 o f the ACHRE report), “protections,” “basic rights,” “the interests 
o f subjects,” “the distinction between research and therapy,” “limits o f the benefits o f 
research,” and what is “obscure” and “ambiguous” (see ACHRE, 1995, Executive 
Summary, Key Findings, or
http://tis.eh.doe.gOv/ohre/roadmap/achre/summary.html#findings, accessed May 25, 
2002).
Another observation is that the ACHRE and other bodies refer to “subjects,” 
“participants.” and “patients” interchangeably, which is problematic (see DHHS OIG, 
1998d, p. 21; researcher user-list from the University o f Pittsburgh Medical Center,
May 23, 2000). This cultural reproduction (i.e., the term “participant” used in this way) 
has become an important point o f confusion. That the term “participant” includes 
interviewees, survey respondents, the observed (who undergo no treatment), and 
clinical patients adds to the notion that there is no difference among these types of 
participation, and, following that, a single set o f rules is adequate.'^* One term to 
describe all participants is not adequate, as it makes no distinction among diverse forms 
o f  treatment. And the same may be said about the rules. In other words, to fail to
‘ This “single set o f rules” preference may be associated with ideas about fairness, i.e.. treating all 
participants the same in the name o f being fair. Other fairness issues have been raised about the adequate 
protection of participants in non-federally funded studies (for example U.S. House, 1998, Jun 11. 
particularly then-director ofOPRJl Ellis’s testimony; DHHS OIG. 1998b. 1998c; NBAC. 1997. 2001), 
the argument being there should be no distinction made between participants in federally funded studies 
and those not federally funded in terms o f protections. This argument, i.e.. that funding source shouldn’t 
matter in terms of protections that should be provided, 1 believe, is a more acceptable argument than the 
notion that participants, in the interests o f standardization and fairness, need the same regulations 
regardless o f treatment (or lack of it) or the level o f risk involved.
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distinguish among interviewing participants, observing people, drawing blood, giving 
people experimental medications, installing medical devices in peoples’ bodies creates a 
lack of sensitivity to “treatment”— the very phenomenon that should be the focus  of 
protecting human subjects, and therefore, must be the primary focus o f  regulators. A 
similar case can be made with respect to (mis)use o f the term “doctor” rather than 
“researcher” or the more precise “research doctor.”
Use of other terms is problematic for the qualitative researcher. Cassell (1982) 
points out that “Linguistic confusion appears when ‘subject’ is [used to] characterize ... 
someone studied by a wide range of research methods” (p. 145). Cassell suggests that 
by using the “familiar sociological concept o f role to analyze the term subject" (p.
144). we can think o f roles as coming in pairs, roles indicate relationships. Following 
this, “other reciprocal role relationships in social research are those between interviewer 
and respondent, ethnographer and informant, observer and observed. All involve 
particular relationships which differ significantly from one another” (p. 145). And, the 
group o f methods described by Cassell (1982) and discussed above, differ even more 
significantly from medical {i.e.. drug and device) trials.
The lack o f focus on the treatment particularly at the institutional level 
(discussed in the following chapters) is one o f the primary ways social scientists are 
procedurally included, without much thought, into an ill-fitting system. According to 
the .American Association University Professors (AAUP, 2001, p. 3), “social-science 
research was included almost from the outset in the system o f regulatory oversight, 
although there was also recognition from the beginning that, in the words o f the surgeon
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general o f the U.S. in 1966, “there is a large range o f social and behavioral research in 
which no personal risk to the subject is involved” (Gray, 1982, p. 331). If no personal 
risk is involved, what procedures (to protect from risk) can logically be imposed?
Both federal regulations and local interpretations o f  them provide for expedited 
and exempted reviews when risks are “minimal” (see 45 CFR §46.101 and University 
o f Oklahoma, IRB policy and procedure. Section 4, as examples). The OHRP states, 
“ Institutions may elect to review all research under the auspices o f the institution even if 
the research qualifies for exemption under 45 CFR §46.101(b)” (OHRP, 1995). Most 
institutions, it appears, do this (see below).
The meaning o f “exempt” differs from federal to local institutional uses, and 
from IRB to IRB. Further, in the regulatory vernacular, “exempt” is far from the 
common meaning one might attribute to the word.'^^ First, self-exemption is not 
typically allowed in university settings, though the process for studies that are exempt- 
able vary considerably. The University of Oklahoma’s exemption policy is explicit (see 
OU Policy, Section 4), though the University o f Utah and the University o f Texas at 
Austin both have policies in place to “review” exempt studies. The University o f Texas 
at .Austin’s policy appears to be the most like a “real” exemption, at least in terms of 
time taken for the review. The UT policy states that every effort will be made to process 
the exempt studies within 2-3 days. The applications/research protocols that must be
This can create problems for students attempting to graduate, for example. Those students who read 
the (federal) regulations may assume the word “exempt” means “free from rule or obligation.” In 
regulation-ese it hardly means “free from obligation.” i.e.. the student must complete (in most places) a 
lengthy application document. If they do not go through the “exemption” procedure/process, they may 
later find themselves in an academic misconduct review and/or scrambling to get their data rendered 
“admissible” for their (often completed) dissertation/thesis.
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submitted for exempt studies'^"* must (generally) be read by at least one member o f the 
IRB, and often two or more “reviewers” are involved in “exempting” a study.
With respect to expedited reviews, the OHRP policy states “An expedited 
review procedure consists o f a review o f research involving human subjects by the IRB 
chairperson or by one or more experienced reviewers designated by the chairperson 
from among members o f the IRB in accordance with the requirements set forth in 45 
CFR 46.110” (http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/guidance/expedited98.htm, 
especially the first footnote, accessed May 25, 2002).
Informed Consent Backgronnd.'^^ In general, it is agreed that the term 
“informed consent” was first used in a landmark legal opinion in a medical malpractice 
case issued in the 1950s (see ACHRE, 1995, Introduction). However, “consent” was 
established as a requirement when the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was created 
in 1947 (ACHRE, 1995, Introduction). The concept was expressed in a letter from the 
chief o f the AEC’s Medical Division and two AEC lawyers, who summarized (ACHRE, 
1995, Chapter 1, The First Wilson Letter'^^) “ ... it was most important that it be 
susceptible to proof that any individual patient, prior to treatment, was in an 
understanding state o f mind and that the nature o f the treatment and possible risk 
involved be explained very clearly and that the patient express [his] willingness to
.\t  the University of Utah. University of Texas at Austin, and the University of Oklahoma, and 
elsewhere, the application forms are the same for exempt, expedited, and full-board studies, see 
handbook'policy websites for each school).
' "  .\s  outlined by the ACHRE (1995).
Carroll Wilson was the general director o f the Atomic Energy Commission at the time o f its formation.
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receive the treatment.” (Also note the use o f the term “patient.”) Initially, the lawyers 
suggested a written release from the patient, however, it was agreed that at least two 
doctors’ written certification would be sufficient (from the First Wilson Letter, as cited 
in the ACHRE Report, 1995, Chapter 1). So, even early on, (SINS) STRUCTURES, 
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS. SIMULATIONS such as the 
bias toward believing a doctor’s word ensures that the patient understands the procedure 
and is protected, more precisely (two) doctors’ signatures stood for, i.e., equaled 
adequate p ro te c tio n .F u rth e r , the AEC legal staff defined the terms, established the 
procedures, evaluated, and revised them. Just how the legal staff was authorized to take 
these steps is not entirely clear. The texts were produced “at least in part, [in a] 
straightforward effort to define the rules according to which the AEC would provide 
contractors with research funding” (ACHRE, 1995, Chapter 1, The First Wilson Letter). 
The chair o f AEC’s Interim Medical Advisory Committee in January 1947 requested 
that the AEC legal department determine the “ financial and legal responsibility” o f the 
AEC when “clinical investigations” using federal funds are conducted (ACHRE, 1995, 
Chapter 1).
During the years, the process, (if not the purpose), o f informed consent has 
changed. Written consent of actual participants was suggested in the First Wilson Letter 
in 1947 but later dropped at the request o f the chair o f the Interim Medical Advisory
'■ O f course, given the commercialization of the research enterprise (Blumenstyk & Wheeler, 1998, Mar 
20). this situation today many times represents a conflict of interest in that (research) doctors are often 
stockholders in the pharmaceutical companies whose products they are “researching.” It has been argued 
by many that conflict of interest issues are being neglected by IRBs in part because o f the IRB members’ 
fairly evident preference for the less political focus on the wording o f consent documents. (See Okie. 
2001. Aug 6; Cho. 1997. Aug 1: Andrews, 2000, Mar 10; Brainard, 2000, Mar 17; and DHHS OIG 
2000a.)
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Committee (ACHRE, 1995, Chapter 1). With the implementation o f the Common Rule 
in 1991, Wilson’s suggestion was (re-)adopted more than 40 years later.
Historical Development Contributing to Complexity' o f  the Federal System. As 
mentioned previously, the federal system is difficult to decipher for federal regulators 
themselves, and even more so for other participants in the system. For example, 
informed consent requirements, as outlined in the Common Rule (45 C.F.R. § 46,
1991 ), contain many o f the same requirements for researchers as those first proposed in 
the 1940s, but today the requirements are more specific, more articulated (ACHRE, 
1995; see also p. 166, herein). Rules are refined, even re-refined at the federal level. 
Next, rules are interpreted by the institutions (the focus o f the following chapters). The 
IRB system has gained more detail in the 44-year interim between the 1947 AEC letters 
and the establishment o f the Common Rule (see ACHRE, 1995, Chapter 14, History of 
the Common Rule since 1974, p. 1). For example, more specificity has been added to 
regulations regarding the use of fetuses, pregnant women, psychosurgical procedures, 
children, prisoners, the mentally infirmed (see the National Research Act, 1974, and 
recommendations o f  the National Commission for the Protection o f Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research between 1974 and 1978). The Belmont Report 
(1979, and also produced by the National Commission for the Protection o f Human 
Subjects o f  Biomedical and Behavioral Research) added more precise criteria for 
distinguishing research from medical treatment (see O ’Connor, 1979). The sheer 
increase in the length o f documents during this historical development is evidence o f at
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least the convolution o f regulation today, if not actual increases in regulatory 
specificity, scope, and burden.'^®
Rule refinements (transformations) continue (and continue to beg the question of 
the need for many o f them, and for any of them in many situations). The NBAC (1997, 
2001 ) noted the dual standard o f protection in the U.S.: one for subjects in federally 
regulated research and another for those in unregulated research, i.e., not funded 
federally. The NBAC (1997) called for a single standard o f basic protections, and the 
provision that every person in the U.S. who participates in research should have the 
twin protections o f informed consent and independent review o f  risks and benefits 
involved. If this suggestion is taken (and it was also discussed by Ellis in his testimony 
before the House, see U.S. House, 1998, Jun 11), these and subsequent policymakers 
(framers, shapers) will change the status of (quasi) voluntary compliance by universities 
for studies not involving federal funds to mandatory status, thereby broadening the 
(legal, federal) definition o f “participant” substantially (yet changing nothing about the
'■’* The 1947 Nuremberg Code is approximately one page long (contains 10 tenets; fewer than 500 
words). The 1963 Declaration of Helsinki, produced by the World Medical Association, is approximately 
three pages long (1250 words), involving 22 tenets. The Belmont Report (1979) is approximately 11 
pages in length, 4650 words, and each o f the tenets presented is several paragraphs long, as opposed to 
the one or two sentences comprising the tenets in the Nuremberg and Helsinki documents. The Common 
Rule (1991) is not concise enough to be stated clearly in tenets, or even in one document. It must be 
"mined” from the federal code involving several areas of federal regulation (Titles 45 and 2 1. among 
others, see .Appendix B. legal citations section) and. in another area that is problematic to the notion that 
all research participants should be treated the same way (and other notions), the Common Rule is not 
"really” common: it often differs from agency to agency. (The Common Rule is codified in Titles 7. 10. 
14. 15. 16. 22. 24. 28. 32. 34. 38.40, and 49. in addition to Titles 45 and 21 o f the Code of Federal 
Regulations.)
'■'* No provision o f U.S. law explicitly requires that informed consent and independent review of research 
involving human subjects be obtained for research not sponsored by the federal government (see DHHS 
OIG 1998e. p. /; see also Ellis’ testimony before U.S. House, 1998, Jun 11).
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“real” participation). This NBAC (1997) suggestion has not become law, though laws 
were proposed in both the U.S. House and the Senate. (In the Senate, the Human 
Research Subject Protection Act o f 1997, S. 193; and in the House, the Human 
Research Protection and Promotion Act o f 2000, H R. 3569.) However, the NBAC final 
report was issued in 2001, and while it is somewhat more specific, it is not inconsistent 
with the earlier draft. The NBAC (2001) concluded (as summarized by Brainard, 2001, 
Jan 12, p. A 24): Congress should create a new, independent office to oversee human- 
subjects research (exhibiting the more-is-better bias), and the office would develop and 
reinforce new, government-wide rules for such research. NBAC (2001) would require at 
least half the members o f IRBs not be affiliated with the institution and at least half 
should not be scientists. Further, the NBAC (2001) stated Congress should pass 
legislation requiring that all human subjects o f research be covered under federal 
regulations— even research sponsored by corporations without federal funds. Further, 
IRBs should directly monitor the informed-consent process when doing so would 
significantly enhance protection o f human subjects, and that researchers and IRB 
members who approve research should be certified by independent organizations.'^” 
Another problem with understanding federal regulations, and speaking to the 
convoluted nature o f  them, may be the fairly large number o f  interpretations at the 
federal level (various agency “guides” to understanding the Common Rule, for
Many of these rules or versions of them are being implemented, but as administrative rules rather than 
statutorily. Congressional action is not needed to adopt the rules, adding strength to the argument that 
Congressional involvement and bill-sponsoring activity was politically valuable perhaps, but unnecessary 
tor any other purpose, including interest in human subjects of research or in changing rules. The 
argument is already supported by the existence of civil and criminal penalties for hurting people, and 
these penalties not only encompass all research, but myriad other behaviors.
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example). An analysis o f one o f these “guides” (published by USAID) is included in 
this chapter.
Federal Politics and Power: Sounding Good: Saying Nothing. The IRB 
regulator)' system is clearly affected by political maneuverings'*’'. Perhaps commissions 
and Congress are similar to quantitative researchers— they have to find significance 
(numerically, in the case o f quantitative researchers; politically in the case of 
commissions and Congress). More than a decade and a half after the Belmont Report 
(1979), the ACHRE (1995) issued their final report. From Chapter 15 o f the ACHRE 
report:
There is no evidence in this review that research in which human 
subjects are exposed to radiation is any more ethically problematic than 
other kinds o f research involving human subjects; in fact, our results 
suggest that human subject protection may be more effective in radiation 
research than elsewhere, perhaps because some radiation research is 
reviewed by a radiation safety committee as well as an IRB. (Chapter 15, 
Discussion section, p. 1)
In considering this statement, several assumptions on the part o f the ACHRE are 
apparent. The first part o f this sentence (up to the semicolon) implies that all research is 
the same because radiation research does not differ from “other kinds o f research,” with 
respect to ethical concerns. The ACHRE declares this is the case based on “no 
evidence” to the contrary. The lack o f specificity in the use o f  the term “other kinds” o f
The lack of agreement about who will head the FDA is one among hundreds o f examples. With the 
(demonstration of) concern about protecting human subjects on the part o f  politicians, it seems the 
activity- is more political than protecting. Drug companies lobbied against Bush’s last candidate for the 
post; the commissioner’s job. one important to protecting human subjects, has been vacant for more than 
a year (since Bush took office); see Zuckerbrod (2002, Feb 21). Deetz (1995) states “Even what 
governmental regulatory policy remains is largely influenced by corporations ” (p. 27).
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research implies the ACHRE knows about “other kinds” o f research and can make
comparative judgments about the ethical concerns in each. Readers (including most
significantly policy makers) don’t know how many “other kinds o f  research,” or
whether the ACHRE’s implication is all other kinds or any other kind.
In the second part o f the sentence, the ACHRE states that their “results suggest”
protections may be “more effective in radiation research than elsewhere.” The
ambiguity o f the term “elsewhere” broadens substantially the scope o f the statement.
Even more significant, perhaps, is the evidence offered for the justification o f the view
that radiation research protection is “more effective” because “some radiation research
is reviewed by a radiation safety committee as well as an IRB.” The authors o f this part
o f the sentence, o f course, beg the question {i.e., make SINSful assumptions) that more
review (i.e., review by both IRB and committees) automatically increases effectiveness.
Further, given the greater context o f the report in which this statement is contained
(specifically the context o f fairly strong criticism of the effectiveness o f IRBs, see next
paragraph) it seems inconsistent to (then) use an IRB review as evidence that “more
efficient” protections are delivered.
For example, on the same very' same page o f the ACHRE report (Chapter 15,
Discussion section, p. 1 ), the report states:
...our review suggests that there are significant deficiencies in some 
aspects o f the current system for the protection of human subjects. We 
have evidence that the documents provided to IRBs often do not contain 
enough information about topics that are central to the ethics o f research 
involving human subjects such as voluntariness o f participation, fairness 
in the selection o f subjects, and scientific merit. (ACHRE, 1995, Chapter 
15, Discussion section, p. I)
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In this passage, it appears the Commission is labeling and defining problems and 
expressing concerns, implying the importance of their concerns, declaring deficiencies 
and defining the degree o f them, and defining what constitutes “scientific merit.” First, 
with respect to implications about setting criteria, the degree o f deficiencies is 
“significant” (line 1 ) in "some aspects” (line 2) o f the system, according to the report. 
The term “enough” (line 4) used to describe the information provided to IRBs implies 
the Commission knows not only what quantity of information is needed by IRBs, but 
also the types o f information that is required, i.e., assuming knowledge o f the “topics 
that are central to the ethics o f ’ (line 4) human subjects research. Further, the ACHRE 
indicates exactly what these “central” topics are in lines 5 and 6: “voluntariness of 
participation, fairness in the selection of subjects, and scientific merit.” The importance 
of these assumptions is that they imply that the Commission (or other policy makers 
using the Commission’s report) can set the criteria, as mentioned, but also it 
implies/assumes that IRBs are capable o f  making these determinations, not only as 
provided by law but also in reality. Finally, this argument relies on evidence in seeming 
contradiction to statements about the reliability of that evidence used two paragraphs 
earlier, i.e.. the assumption that reviews of IRB information can lead to conclusions that 
some research is “[no] more ethically problematic than other kinds o f  research” yet in 
the second sample paragraph, IRB documents “often do not contain enough information 
about topics that are central to the ethics o f research.”
SINS, specifically simulations (Baudrillard, 1983), are demonstrated in the 
ACHRE’s use o f the term “documents,” (line 3) rather than any reference to “real”
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research activity— the ACHRE used the term “documents” as if they were speaking of 
the actual research environment. The most that a researcher can tell the IRB in a 
proposal or a final report will be “simulated” in that the account o f what happened 
would be an “average” or aggregate (and therefore nonexistent) “event” that would be 
explained by the researcher. Were the documents executed? How many of the 
participants “really” understood them? According to whom? Was the process adequate? 
Who says? The documents required tell us very little about what “really” happened in 
any specific, local case. This textual process may or may not serve a purpose or meet 
the goal (the process will create activity, but that’s not the same thing as goal 
attainment, as the deconstructionist/critical theorist/activist must point out) and the 
measure o f the usefulness o f the process will be based on whether the information 
provided in the document is “true” or not, another empty pursuit, o f course.
Could regulators do anything else? YES. They could do nothing (if one 
considers that nothing IS something).
Documents serving as stand-ins for regulatory/research activity are somewhat 
similar to comments reportedly made by OU President David Boren, particularly his use 
o f  the phrase “model o f compliance” rather than “model o f  protection” (see p. 206; also 
Schneider, 2000. Nov 6, for similar quote from University o f Pennsylvania officials in a 
similar predicament). It is notable that scientists are not allowed to/do not allow 
themselves to speak in such situations generally, adding to the detachment o f this 
discourse from the realities o f research, i.e., the people most directly involved in what 
happened (or those involved in similar pursuits) are not participating in the explaining
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of what happened (see also Weinberg, 2002, Jun, re: the lack of scientist’s voices in the 
cloning debate).
On the next page o f the report, the ACHRE (1995, Chapter 15, Discussion
section, p. 2) states that in their own study as well as an independent review o f that
study it was found:
... some consent forms currently in use are flawed in morally significant 
respects, not merely because they are difficult to read but because they 
are uninformative or even misleading. These are consent forms that have 
been approved by an IRB, and still they are problematic ... (p. 2)
As with the use o f the term “documents” previously discussed, the use o f the 
term “ forms” in line 1 in the preceding paragraph is indicative o f the notion that process 
meets purpose. And, the ACHRE reverts to the negative assessment o f IRB review, in 
fact surpasses the earlier criticisms, stating that IRB review may be “flawed” (line 1)“** 
in “morally significant” (line 1-2) ways. The ACHRE’s suggestion that the forms are 
“uninformative” and may be “misleading” (line 3) and “problematic” (line 4), in 
combination with the Commission’s earlier assumptions discussed above, implies the 
ACHRE has the ability and the right, the authority to determine what is 
“uninformative,” “misleading,” and “problematic” in the informed consent process, in 
all kinds o f research and, therefore, all kinds o f participants, and that (evidently) IRBs, 
at least some of them, cannot. Even though the local IRB is right there, closer to the 
liquid and local, i.e., “real” research activity, the ACHRE views itself as more 
knowledgeable, more able to know how to inform, how to avoid misleading
Perhaps this is due to the production of flawed forms in the first place, or failing to acknowledge that 
all forms are flawed, and therefore all reviews based on forms are also flawed.
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participants, and how to define and avoid morally significant problems. These 
assumptions are not reasonable, sensible, or possible.
In 1996, about a year after the release o f the ACHRE report, the General 
.Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report to the “Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate” who was, at the time. Senator John 
Glenn. Glenn later sponsored a bill, S. 193, 1997; the bill and its relationship with the 
GAO document analyzed next are described later in this chapter.
GAO: Analvsis
The first feature o f the GAO report (1996) for consideration is contained in the 
cover letter. In the first paragraph of that letter, the GAO acknowledges, employs, 
perpetuates, and legitimizes the results o f the ACHRE (1995) report by stating: “These 
and other issues [the 40-year Tuskegee syphilis study, the injection o f elderly patients 
with live cancer cells, and the U.S. government's radiation experiments] related to 
protecting human research subjects were recently addressed by the President's Advisory 
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments” (p. 1). The GAO (1996) concludes (and 
implies that others including the ACHRE have also concluded) that these atrocities have 
“demonstrated breakdowns in the protection o f human subjects in scientific experiments 
sponsored by the federal government and others” (p. 1 ).
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The power o f  certain discursive forms: "In B r ie f  and "Results ” synopses. The
GAO ( 1996) in the report to Sen. Glenn, states;
Today's oversight o f tens o f thousands o f HHS-funded research and 
FDA-regulated drug studies appears to have reduced the likelihood that 
serious abuses o f human subjects, comparable to past tragic events, will 
occur. The conspicuous activity o f local institutional review boards and 
human subject protection efforts by federal agencies have heightened the 
research community’s awareness o f ethical conduct standards, increased 
compliance with federal regulations, and served as deterrents to abuse o f 
subjects’ rights and welfare. However, little data exist that directly 
measure the effectiveness o f human subject protection regulations, (p. 2)
This passage is the first paragraph under the heading “Results in B rie f’ (GAO, 
1996, p. 2). The abundance o f qualifiers in the passage dilutes the impact o f “results.” 
For example, the GAO states that oversight today “appears” to have “reduced” the 
“ likelihood” (line 2) that “serious” abuses (line 2) will occur. “Serious abuses” are at 
least partly defined as being “comparable to past tragic events” (line 3). In spite o f the 
qualifiers and the tentative nature o f the first sentence o f the passage, the next sentence 
seems to ignore the limitations posed by the first, making a sweeping three-part 
conclusion. First, the G.AO states that “conspicuous activity” (line 4) o f IRBs and 
federal agencies “have heightened the research community’s awareness” (not “appear to 
have” but have, and further, not simply changed awareness, but heightened it, and not 
just certain individuals but, it is implied, the entire “community”) o f “ethical conduct 
standards” (line 6). On the surface, this second sentence appears to be a more assertive 
statement, however, if  one considers the statement speaks to “heightened” “awareness” 
(fairly elusive concepts, both awareness and height o f it across individuals) rather than
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improved protections. The second broad conclusion (positioned as “results”) is that 
this “conspicuous activity” on the part o f IRBs and federal regulators has “ increased 
compliance with federal regulations” (lines 6-7) and the third sweeping conclusion is 
that these activities have “served as deterrents to abuse o f subjects rights and welfare” 
(line 7-8). It is difficult to understand the next sentence in this context, especially the 
acknowledgement that “little data exist” that “directly measure” the “effectiveness” of 
regulations. If we consider what “effective” regulations might be, primarily they would 
be followed, i.e., complied with. For regulations to be ignored doesn’t imply they are 
“effective.” So if there is no data (evidence) that the rules are effective, how does the 
GAO conclude (within the same paragraph, especially) that the “heightened awareness” 
o f the “research community” leads somehow to “ increased compliance” and as 
“deterrents to abuse?” 1 conclude that such “Reviews o f Findings” and similar 
discursive forms are powerful (and substantially oversimplified) texts, whether accurate 
or epistemologically sound or not. They help create and perpetuate illusions. Synopses 
(and sound bytes) simulate reality, mostly via over-simplification.
In viewing these passages collectively, not only are these commissions and 
federal agencies allowed to say that something is (consent forms flawed, awareness 
heightened, and compliance increased, for example), but what the (alleged) flaws are, 
what the effects o f (allegedly) heightened awareness and (allegedly) increased 
compliance are. This requires any contra argument include at least two levels: first, 
countering the existence o f the phenomenon at all, and only then addressing the folly of 
any proposed conclusions, results, or solutions. I argue, based on these examples, that it
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is at this first level, i.e., the assumption without question o f the existence o f the 
phenomena as described by the “experts” presented by the government, where many 
(SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, 
SIMULATIONS operate, i.e., the SINS dwell in the assumptions by researchers (and 
regulators and others) that regulators know what needs to be included in consent forms 
across the range o f study types and risks, and/or that measures required o f researchers 
produce the intended effects on research participants or are even accomplished in the 
way the regulators intended, and/or assumptions that statements such as “w e're all 
working together to produce (in some logical way) a system that benefits the 
participants o f research” are true (for everyone involved). Further, the commissioners 
and regulators seem to be myopically focused on the process, making little if any 
distinction between the process and the purpose o f regulation, and operate with the 
apparent bias that more rules, regardless o f  the ineffectiveness o f past rules, offer 
solutions to problems. Finally, as pointed out, the rules offered as solutions have little to 
do with the original “problem” which itself is often not established. As the preceding 
three passages indicate, (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS. 
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS are shown to be operating in many of the 
assumptions made by both the ACHRE (1995) and the GAO (1996), as well as the 
regulatory bodies about which they are reporting.
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Human Research Subject Protection Act o f 1997: Analvsis
The year after the GAO (1996) report. Sen. John Glenn introduced the Human 
Research Subject Protection Act (S. 193, 1997).'^^ As proposed, Glenn’s bill would 
have escalated regulatory power. In his comments introducing the bill (S. 193, 1997; 
see Congressional Record, p. S645, 1997, Jan 22) Glenn states, “What it comes down to 
is there are no criminal fines or penalties for violating the spirit or the letter o f that 
Nuremberg Code that should be the basis of all o f our informed consent in this 
country... In fact, our own Constitution says ‘The right o f the people to be secure in 
their persons ... shall not be violated’” (Congressional Record, S645, 1997, Jan 22). He 
adds, “there is no explicit statutory prohibition against improper research ... there is no 
law on the books requiring that informed consent be obtained” (Congressional Record, 
p. S645, 1997, Jan 22). These statements suggest that criminal penalties would make 
laws better (both the spirit and the letters; of course making laws against violating the 
“spirits” o f laws has proved to be problematic historically; see also GAO, 2001, p. 7). 
Glenn also cites in his comments the ACHRE (1995, final report), the NBAC (1995, 
interim progress and status reports), and the GAO (1996).
Glenn (Congressional Record, 1997, Jan 22, p. S645) states that four “major 
gaps” exist in the current regulatory system. Several (SINS) STRUCTURES, 
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS can be 
illuminated within this political, as distinguished from scientific, discourse.
Glenn had became one o f the most famous research subjects in the U.S. when he returned to space 
more than 35 years after his first voyage.
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First, Glenn says, not all agencies have adopted the Common Rule; he names 
specifically the U.S. Department o f Labor and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC). This suggests a SINS-flil bias toward regulation, specifically toward belief in 
the effectiveness o f at least the Common Rule (an institutionalization; “I” in SINS), if 
not rules in general and/or the belief that rules operate for the “common good” (belief in 
rules in general/for the common good are examples o f  the first “S” in SINS, structures, 
and a Habermasian cultural reproduction). Further, Glenn’s ’ remark suggests that a 
“common” rule for all agencies is not only possible, but desirable (a structure, i.e., the 
belief that standardization is good, possible, needed, required, etc., and also the 
Common Rule itself is an institutionalization-al outcome o f the structure; and, finally, 
these activities and the talk seem normal to most o f us. i.e., whether we agree with 
Glenn, or even believe him, we find it normal that people would talk about rules in this 
way of “rules solve problems” or “rules protect people.”
In the several incidents Glenn uses to support his contention (see below, in this 
paragraph) that there “really [is] a problem out there” and not just a “paper loophole,” '^  
Glenn’s evidence addresses only in tangential ways the “lack o f Common Rule 
adoption” (the “problem” as Glenn expresses it, i.e., failure to adopt the Common Rule 
will result in a catastrophe). In making his case that there are problems that his law 
would fix,'^^ Glenn relies on the ACHRE report (1995), and several ineidents; the use 
o f homeless alcoholics by a pharmaceutical company, psychiatric experiments on
Here Glenn is defining, contrasting “real” problems with “paper” problems, interestingly.
SINS at structure level, i.e., people operating with the idea that laws fix problems; it’s what we do, we 
pass laws or advocate the passing of laws, even if we may often say/liear "laws don’t work” or “the 
punishment doesn’t fit the crime.” etc.
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children and mentally ill in New York, FDA approval o f the use o f human growth 
hormone, implantation o f fertilized embryos in patients without the consent o f  the 
donor, and unapproved use o f drugs. Only in the case o f the implantation o f embryos is 
one o f the main provisions o f the Common Rule (informed consent) addressed. And, 
none of the situations Glenn describes involve the two agencies (Department o f Labor 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) he mentioned as not having adopted the 
Common Rule, central to supporting his “problem” thesis. (See also Foucault’s 
questions and examples of analysis. Appendix A, Examples 1 & 2, p. 346-347.)
The second gap in the system as Glenn views it is that not all research 
institutions voluntarily adopt the system, and “if  any improper research is discovered at 
these institutions, there are very few steps available to the federal government to do 
much about it” (p. S645; see also Ellis testimony before U.S. House, 1998, Jun 11).'^* 
Glenn points out most institutions receiving federal funds for any purpose do apply the 
Common Rule. This (SINSful) statement implies the federal government is effective at 
doing something about improper research, and begging the questions once again of the 
need for the Common (or any) Rule, and how a system that lacks direct oversight differs 
in any meaningful way from a system based on voluntary compliance. Finally, his 
provisions for penalties, etc. (see p. 153, below) do not address this statement, i.e., the 
solution doesn’t match the problem as presented (if not established).
This statement demonstrates structural-level SINS, i.e.. a bias toward the belief that government can 
and will do something and knows what to do, etc. and also demonstrates a naturalization o f the reliance 
on government to do something.
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Third, “a huge area o f  all the private medical research out there ... is not under 
the Common Rule unless they just choose themselves to just voluntarily do it” (p.
S645), Glenn says. With this statement, Glenn reinforces the (SINSful) notion that 
human agency (active voluntary compliance in this case) is somehow less legitimate or 
effective or valuable than laws on the books with no or little oversight o f them. Again, 
if no oversight is conducted, compliance is (in any “real” way) voluntary. Glenn further 
implies with his statement that voluntary compliance is not a d e q u a te ,a n d  further it 
implies that there can be something like “compulsory compliance.” (I would add that 
the local liquid nature o f the world would imply that the term “voluntary compliance” is 
redundant, and “compulsory compliance” is impossible.) Glenn’s statement also 
indicates a (SINSful) belief that the Common Rule constitutes protection, that 
application o f the Common Rule— by law— is needed. (Notice the use o f  “by law,” 
rather than by actiotu see quote from the Dalai Lama, p. 1, herein.)
Glenn’s bill (S. 193) proposed new rules that would require all research facilities 
to register with DHHS, and the registration would include stating “the principles 
governing the research facility” with respect to human subject research, naming the 
official responsible for the human subjects o f research at the facility, providing a 
membership roster o f IRBs at the facility, and “attestation that the research facility is 
complying with the protection requirements o f the Common Rule” (Congressional
Glenn states regarding a case he read about involving the use of drugs for “off label" purposes, 
“because the drugs were FDA approved and the doctor was not funded or connected to federally 
sponsored research, no IRB or informed consent procedures were required. Apparently, each patient 
signed a three-page consent form, but this was not approved by an IRB" (Congressional Report, 1997, Jan 
22. p. S645). This carries the implication that a three-page consent document that hasn’t been approved 
by an IRB is somehow less effective than a consent document of any length that has been reviewed. 
Further, he makes no claim about anyone being harmed.
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Record, 1997, Jan 22, p. S645). The legislation included a three-year re-registration 
requirement and a grandfather provision for those entities already operating under 
project assurances with DHHS; Glenn pointed out that “the vast majority” o f U.S. 
research facilities “have such assurances.” Use o f the term “assurances” rather than 
"assurance documents” indicates the institutionalization o f paperwork as protection and 
the naturalization that a signature on a document assures compliance. This usage is also 
an example o f a simulation (Baudrillard, 1983) in that the difference between the 
assurance and assurance document has become indiscernible.
In addition, the proposed law included “criminal penalties for failure to comply 
with the a c t ... [making it] a felony offense to experiment on someone without their 
informed consent” Glenn states (Congressional Record, 1997, Jan 22, p. S645; for 
related activity with respect to DHHS proposals to implement fines'*^, see Brainard, 
2000, Jun 2; for more recent federal views, see GAO, 2001, Research Protection and 
Promotion Act o f 2000, and, at this writing, the current legislative incarnation. Human 
Research Subject Protections Act o f 2002, dubbed the “biggest overhaul” o f human 
research protections since the enactment o f the Common Rule legislation in 1974, and 
in which greater statutory authority and more severe penalties— than in Glenn’s 1997 
bill— are proposed; see Washington Fax, 2002, Mar 28).
The proposed legislation does not address the problems or needs as described, 
and only one o f G lenn’s four “gaps” was consistent with the evidence he brought to
Proposing penalties demonstrates a belief in the effectiveness o f the institution of punishment, and the 
rather prevalent bias toward the belief that without some threat (and demonstrated in the sequence o f 
proposed bills and resolutions, ever increasingly intense threats) o f punishment, society couldn’t function. 
Chaos is surely not the only result of a lack of punishment, threats, coercion, etc.
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support for the need for a law: the fourth “gap,” specifically that some agencies have 
not adopted the DHHS rules regarding protected classes (such as the mentally infirmed, 
prisoners, children, etc.). It would appear, given the problems Glenn cited, that a 
broadening of the procedural provisions might enhance awareness o f these additional 
protection mechanisms. That o f course does not automatically translate to more actual 
protection. Further a huge majority o f the research in the U.S. is channeled through 
DHHS, which has adopted the Common Rule. Though the fourth “problem” as 
presented by Glenn does seem more supported than the other three, the affect o f the law 
he recommends would be minimal because not much research proportionately is done 
by other agencies and many o f those have already “voluntarily” adopted them. Even 
though this may be a "real” problem, its existence in this system is in no way clear. In 
deconstructing-language, then, it is a whole bunch o f talk about a teeny-tiny slice o f the 
“real” world, and a big political production having little to do with protection of 
research participants (see also Appendix A, Example 2, p. 346-347).
An additional point may be made about Glenn’s evidence. The “results” o f 
Glenn’s research, and “legitimizing discourse” are based on the use o f (somewhat 
incestuous rermal) data, (GAO, 1996, reliant in substantial part on ACHRE, 1995, and 
both then used to build the case for the Act o f 1997).'^° This series o f  political discourse 
includes President Clinton’s apology for the Tuskegee incident later in 1997, the series 
of DHHS GIG reports issued between 1998 and 2000 from the executive branch, along
The overw helming bulk of research in the U.S. is done by two agencies: DHHS and FDA.
' ° This is reminiscent of Becker’s (1963) analysis of the proliferation of marijuana stories that 
significantly influenced public opinion based on a few government (i.e.. political, and also unquestioned) 
reports, rather than a reliance on numerous scientific ones (p. 141).
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with the various congressional hearings conducted in close temporal proximity (and, it 
could be argued, in response) to each other (see Appendix A, Example 3, p. 347). These 
activities constitute essentially a debate between the executive and legislative branches 
o f the federal government, designed around a topic that allows politicians to show 
concern about “ irmocent victims” o f research, to assume moral high ground, appear 
busy doing something good, important, and effective, etc. Few voices o f scientist, 
researchers, or the researched or even local IRB members are heard. These political 
activities might also be used to illustrate the spinning (literally in contemporary usage) 
o f the seduction {i.e., “political positioning”) into \h^ simulation o f “public service.” ' '^ 
While it is not reasonable to offer “causal links” (in an absolutist sense) between 
these events'^*, it is also unnecessary to do so. That these events flow from each other, 
i.e.. are temporally located near each other, is an important consideration (see also 
Appendix A, Example 4, p. 347-348). The release o f the ACHRE final report in 1995, 
the establishment o f the NBAC and production o f interim reports by the Commission, 
the introduction o f S. 193 in 1997 and H R. 3569 in 2000, release o f the DHHS OIG 
reports between 1998 and 2000, fueled by the Tuskegee apology in 1997, Gelsinger’s
' 'David Kaczynski (brother of uni-bomber Ted), in talking about turning his brother in and the 
government’s (at least implied) agreement not to pursue the death penalty: “1 really assumed, based on 
our good intentions, based on our cooperation, that the system would pursue justice. Instead, what 1 was 
to see over the next couple of years was not the pursuit o f Justice. It was a very involved legal chess game 
with political ramification and somewhere justice got laid aside.” He continues to point out that we’ve 
had (in the U.S.) the death penalty for about 24 years, since the Supreme Court reinstated it, but that 
people who formerly agreed with it are abandoning their position because “they have seen how badly the 
system works. It’s not doing what it’s intended to do. It’s putting innocent people at risk...” (CNN.com, 
2001, .A.ug 1, accessed April 11, 2002).
' * Many do, and 1 would suggest it is “mostly” logical to do so. Patterns emerge, as I’ve illustrated, i.e.. 
an atrocity focuses our attention, parties to the situation build cases about what should be done, and the 
people allowed to do something do or don’t act. An example (of a logical) assumption of causality, 
among many, is the title of Brainard’s (1999, Dec 17) article, “Death o f research subject prompts debate 
about oversight o f gene-therapy trials.”
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death in 1999, and Roche’s in 2001 have culminated at least so far in a few very minor 
changes in the process.
Other political observations. Another argument that this activity on the part o f 
Congress and the administration was (mostly) politically motivated is that Congress and 
President Clinton (who weren’t exactly playing well together at the time; Clinton was 
impeached in December 1998) had to show deep (at least equal) concern and outrage 
for the victims o f research (specifically, the long-overdue public acknowledgment o f  the 
Tuskegee tragedy). President Clinton’s highly publicized (and politically effective, 
maybe even sincere) apology in 1997 to the victims and sur\ ivors o f Tuskegee was not 
lost on the U.S. Congress, each house o f  which introduced a bill in the 1997 session 
(see also Appendix A, Example 5, p. 348). Science is politics, and “has always been in 
conflict with narratives” (Lyotard. 1984, p. .xxiii\ see also Greenberg, 2001, Jan 19). The 
spin and positioning o f the campaigners (some regulators, some researchers, university 
presidents, professional organizations, senators, and presidents) are apparent. The 
competition to claim ownership o f the solution, not to mention the political value of 
demonstrating interest in protecting people, concern, compassion, outrage, etc. (and in 
the process vilifying all researchers) is evident, and not unique to this system. Larger 
cultural reproductions (SINS) o f compassion (that everyone should be compassionate 
and in defining what constitutes compassion in any given situation), intelligence (that 
we can measure it or that we can meaningfully use the term given there are so many
‘ Minor in comparison to the National Research Act (1974) or codification o f the Common Rule (1991).
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difTerent intelligences), doing a good job (who sets the standards for “good” etc., and 
the bias for work over play), operating in the public interest (a simulation, as described 
above), etc., provide substantial political mileage for legislators, federal regulators, and 
presidents. This political activity affects the “real” world o f research in only minor ways 
in terms o f the purpose but creates sometimes mind-boggling procedural effects. While 
the political activity may result in changes in approval ratings, it much less frequently 
results in substantive rule changes: neither S. 193 nor H.R. 3569 passed, for instance, 
and no changes were made to Title 45 during this time.' H.R. 4697 was introduced 
May 9, 2002 (Human Research Subject Protections Act o f 2002), and called by Sen. 
Edward Kennedy, the “biggest overhaul” o f the system since 1974 (see Southwick, 
2002, May 3; and Washington Fax, 2002, Mar 28).
One “real” effect of these political activities was the proliferation o f sanctions 
(not to be confused with a proliferation o f protection nor even a proliferation o f 
compliance, though either or both might occur) issued from May 1998 to June 2000 
when Ellis was OPRR director. His subsequent removal and the dismantling o f the 
office, in the name o f “concern” and “reform” seemed contrary to those ends. The 
activities were more about politics than protection (see Deetz, 1995, p. 130, re: politics 
o f perception, politics o f experience, politics o f personal identities, etc.).
If Glenn’s bill had passed, all research on human subjects would have been 
governed by federal protections. Data would have been collected that, for the first time.
‘ ■* I mention this lack of rule changes without assuming the argument that rules should change, or rules 
themselves provide protection. .\s  expressed, I reject those assumptions in favor o f one that holds 
personal values are much more closely related to protections and are much less regulate-able (see Sealey, 
2001. .Aug 17, particularly Winckler quote, and Cassell, 1982, p. 155).
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would document the extent and conditions o f research on human beings in the U.S. 
Anyone using human subjects without their consent would have been subject to 
criminal penalties although as I have argued, protections are provided in already 
existent civil and criminal laws (which may be among the reasons the bill died without 
a hearing). These bills, as with many similar ones, worked well politically but were 
legally, and mostly practically, impotent. This discourse does speak to the desire on the 
part o f some (Glenn and U.S. Representatives Towns and Shays, GAO, 2001, and 
others) to broaden and deepen regulatory power, and to make criminal penalties more 
explicit, (illustrating several SINS including notions that laws work, that people accept 
the notion that laws work, that more control is possible (through law), or is required, 
needed, desirable, etc.)
US.AID: Analvsis
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) points out in its 1999 
publication entitled “How to Interpret the Federal Policy for the Protection o f Human 
Subjects or ‘Common Rule,’” (February 2, 1999; see
http://www.usaid.gov/pop_health/resource/phncomrule2.htm, accessed May 25, 2002) 
that the publication is intended to be used as a “companion” to the Common Rule. 
US.AID authors state, “institutions must also adhere to o ± e r  laws and regulations 
applicable to their human subjects research including state law, foreign laws, and 
human subjects procedures o f the FDA” (p. 1). “Trust in the honest, conscientious 
judgment o f the human beings who serve on IRBs is pivotal to the entire system of
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protection of research subjects” (p. 1). Further, the USAID (1999) document states 
though certain types o f  research are exempt under the Common Rule, “they should not 
be considered exempt from common ethical standards” (p. 4). For example, a particular 
survey may be exempt, but USAID (1999) points out that it is “common courtesy and 
otherwise generally reasonable to ask permission and provide some simple information 
to respondents” (p. 4). The interest in promoting ethical behavior outside the Common 
Rule is “not intended as a mandate for more structured procedures,” they continue, but 
rather “to advance cultural ethical norms for research and non-research activities alike, 
to be exercised with discretion by institutions and individuals” (p. 4). They point out 
that consent form s  should not be contused with the informed consent process'. “It is 
important to recognize the informed consent process is a process o f communication and 
not just a legal requirement” (p. 3). The guide’s authors suggest the process should use 
"simple, understandable language” and should emphasize “required and most 
important” information, avoiding large amounts o f “additional information o f marginal 
use” to giving consent (p. 3)'^^. The authors add that the process should also involve 
actively listening to participants' individual concerns, and that researchers should 
request participants restate the major points related to the study.
The suggestion (or what might be termed, risking the oxymoron, suggested 
requirement?) that participants be asked to restate the major points related to the study 
rather than a suggestion that participants be able to restate the major points seems 
inconsistent with the USAID statement that informed consent form s  should not be
‘ ‘ This is in contrast to some local IRB’s interpretations (see p. 221. herein, re: length o f instructions vs. 
recommended length o f document).
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confused with the process. Further, it seems the authors are beyond the scope of their 
charge with the comment about the advancement o f cultural ethical norms for both 
research and non-research activities. And the “trust” in “human beings who serve on 
IRBs” may be pivotal, but more crucial (because so little oversight o f the process is 
conducted, possible, needed, or desirable) is trust in researchers and participants 
themselves (see O ’Connor, 1979).
Other General Observations
Critics (deconstniction o f  term). GAO (2001) states, “Some critics have argued 
that there are too few sanctions to match the range o f violations that occur. 
Acknowledging this problem, DHHS is considering a proposal for legislation that 
would enable FDA to lev-y civil monetary penalties for violations o f ... important 
research practices” (p. 7). The GAO did not elaborate on who the “critics” are (we can 
fairly presume these critics are not associated very closely with social science pursuits), 
nor do they provide any evidence on which they “acknowledge” (or establish, if and 
when they feel compelled to do so) the “problem.” And, as mentioned, this report and 
others illustrate the bias toward the belief that any of this makes a difference to the 
participants o f research. “Critics o f the bill argued [there is] no evidence that the 
absence o f regulation had caused significant harm to substantial numbers o f people, and 
asserted that the measure was a solution in search o f a problem” (Charo, 1999, Jun 25, 
p. A64).
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The use o f the term “critics” quoted in the previous paragraph is notable. This 
often-used term is almost a disparaging one, implying “troublemaker,” “rebel,” “boat 
rocker.” or the nearly-if-not-ultimately objectifying “obstacle.” The term certainly 
carries substantially less weight than “U.S. Senate,” or House, or Senator or 
Representative, Cabinet Secretary, or even Presidential spokesperson, or OPRR 
Director, especially when “critics” aren't named specifically, or balanced in stature with 
proponents. In the written language, the proponent group is comprised o f People 
described with Proper Nouns garnering Capitalization Status. A less biased presentation 
would be comparison o f comments from two senators— one pro, the other con— or two 
researchers, etc. Use o f the voiceless objectification “critics” is an example o f the ways 
cultural-level (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, 
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS become entrenched, and work to vilify 
criticism, conflict, and dissention, in spite o f often explicit but seemingly empty 
comments about their usefulness.
Institution and researcher impact. The changes that actually made a difference 
in the “real” world o f research involved moving the OPRR essentially up two 
hierarchical steps in the organizational chart. The organizational structure, prior to the 
change, was: at the top, the Secretary of DHHS, then DHHS director, then director of 
the Office o f Extramural Research, then OPRR. The change placed the OHRP directly 
under the Secretary o f DHHS (Federal Register, 2000, Jun 13; Brainard, 2000, May 
26b). A new director was named, which is significant as mentioned previously, because
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more sanctions had been issued by Ellis than all other previous directors combined and 
only one sanction has been issued since, that against Johns Hopkins in July 2001 (see 
Appendix A. Example 6, p. 348).
Summary
These political debates, bills, hearings, and proposals from the federal 
government are an indication o f who has (been given) the right to change things and the 
criteria they may establish. And it demonstrates the way contra activity is controlled. 
The mostly disgusting proliferation o f suggestions about ways to standardize, centralize, 
and regulate research practices has occurred, but “real” changes in “real” research (and 
the elimination o f “real” atrocities) have not occurred nearly as often.
The system, at the federal level, has grown bigger and slower, more specific yet 
more ambiguous, less responsive yet more aggressive. This growth is just as apparent at 
the institutional level, with more IRBs o f more types reviewing more research, in terms 
of volume and diversity, than ever before (DHHS OIG 2000b).
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The federal portion of this system reacts in emergencies, called “major” 
problems, “precipitating events,” or “catalysts.” Too often, these are euphemisms for 
“atrocities” and (generally overcoming remorse) “fear o f litigation.” According to 
Daniel K. Nelson. University o f North Carolina, “Our system for protecting human 
research subjects has evolved in response to relatively isolated events” (as quoted in 
Brainard. 2000. Apr 14, p. A45). Former Secretary o f Health and Human Services 
Shalala stated, in response to the Gelsinger death “in this town, anecdote becomes data” 
(as quoted by Marwick, 2000, May 4, p. 1 ). These events affect all researchers 
particularly because essentially the same processes, i.e.. reactionary regulatory 
responses, have occurred at the institutional level, to be considered in the following 
chapter.
Perhaps nowhere is there a better demonstration o f the explosion of information 
than in the world o f academic inquiry (consider medical innovations alone!). Regulating 
that inquiry is important, and this is because people, the human subjects o f research, in 
this case, are important. O f equal concern I contend is the avoidance o f over-
' *’ Kuhn ( 1970) is also useful in enhancing understanding about the events and processes related to IRBs. 
In examining documents written during and about a period spanning 50 or more years, something akin to 
Kuhnian paradigm shifts (what I’ll call “position shifts” dealing with a more localized situation than 
Kuhn was) can be demonstrated in the creation of the regulatory system and its functioning since. Kuhn 
suggests that when a particular paradigm in use is unable to account for anomalies (appearing with 
regularity everywhere in the lifeworld. including in human subject protection and regulatory matters), a 
switch to a new paradigm occurs. The switch to a different paradigm. Kuhn said, is discontinuous, not 
evolutional")' nor developmental (by design, at least). This is most apparent in the two primary positions 
assumed by the federal portion of this system. Federal regulators position themselves as enforcers (of 
rules which "ensure” safety and humanity) when that position seems to be politically beneficial, and as 
educators (possessors of knowledge and expertise) when that position seems more advantageous. These 
"position shifts” occur not in the interest o f protection of people but in the interest of positioning before 
them.
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regulation,' ' ' not only at the federal level but at the institutional level o f  interpretation 
as well.' These interpretations are the focus for the analysis included in the next 
chapter.
' The .4.AUP (2001 ) concludes “members of an IRB who have doubts about whether a research project 
should be exempt favor classifying the research as not exempt in order to avoid appearing cavalier about 
risks to human subjects. No one is likely to get into trouble fbr insisting that a research proposal is not 
exempt" (p. 7). 1 would suggest this speaks to the depth of the concessions made by qualitative 
researchers, i.e.. IRBs don’t fear litigation from abused researchers who have their r i^ t s  to free inquiry 
smashed by this tendency. .Also note that the AAUP describes this behavior o f IRB members as 
avoidance of “appearing cavalier” as opposed to what might be described as “real" fear o f “real" risk to 
“real" humans (see also O'Connor, 1979).
' Brainard (2001, Mar 9) quotes E. Greg Koski. director of CHRP, [Some IRBs are too cautious and 
need to find] "the appropriate middle ground" ... "We want to be sure we're not using a 50-pound 
hammer to drive a thumbtack, " Koski said (p. A21).
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Chapter Six: Displays of (SINS) STRUCTURES, 
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS) in 
Institutional Interpretation of Federal Texts
"Above all, 1 am talking about [the] systematic tendency to a kind o f  behavioral 
reductionism, consistently translating matters that have to do with signification, 
meaning, language, and symbolization into crude behavioral indicators, often justified  
in the name o f  a spurious 'scientism Stuart Hall, Ideology and Communication 
Theory, 1989, p. 43.
Cultural reproductions (Habermas, 1984) o f worldviews, ideas, knowledge, and 
beliefs contributing to the creation, evolution, and operation o f the IRB system were 
shown in the last chapter. Turning now to the second part o f Habermas’s (1984) model 
o f reproduction, i.e.. social integration, this idea will be utilized to explore the ways 
federal regulations are reproduced in institutional handbooks, on websites and other 
postings, and in the press. Social integration involves the reproduction o f norms and 
other patterns o f social membership (Habermas, 1984).
For more than a quarter century (since the enactment o f  the National Research 
Act in 1974). institutional IRBs have been playing a central part in the (presumed, and 
overwhelmingly intended) protection of human subjects participating in research 
projects. And for all the regulatory efforts, (infamous, sometimes horrendous, yet) 
prominent studies continue to draw attention to inadequacies o f IRBs and the regulatory 
system generally, i.e.. abuses still occur, and lapses in compliance appear to be rather 
frequent (ACHRE, 1995; DHHS OIG 1998b, 2000b; GAO, 1996, and others). This 
might lead one to ask what is it that makes this kind of regulation worth doing?
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Until the creation o f  a regulatory apparatus, which was not in place until decades 
after various concepts were accommodated as matters o f policy (ACHRE, 1995, 
particularly the Wilson letters dealing with informed consent, and written in 1947). The 
rules of research ethics are “more articulated” today (ACHRE, 1995, Discussion o f Part 
III. p. 1; see also DHHS [2000, Jun 6] Fact Sheet, especially section regarding Civil 
Monetary Penalties; Brainard, 2000, Jun 2.) Various templates for informed consent 
forms are examples o f this. The University o f Utah's informed consent template is five 
pages long; University o f  Texas at Austin’s form has expanded during the past two 
years, from about one and a half pages to 10 pages as o f May 2002; and the University 
of California at Berkeley’s model is barely one page in length. UC Berkeley’s form is 
titled “Low-risk Adult Survey/Interview Form” and is more targeted to social science 
concerns. (See University o f Utah, University o f Texas at Austin, and University of 
California at Berkeley entries in bibliography for website addresses for each o f these 
documents.)
Not only must there be an IRB in place where federally funded studies are 
conducted, but board membership criteria are also required by federal rules. IRBs have 
traditionally been required to have at least one person on the board who is non-affiliated 
with the university or other organization where the IRB operates, and one member with 
non-scientific interests.' ^  As mentioned, the norm in complying with this regulation
' .According to the OHRP guidebook, posted at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/irb/irb_chapterl.htm and 
accessed May 25. 2002. "The IRB must include at least one member whose primary concerns are in 
scientific areas and at least one member whose primary concerns are in nonscientific areas. It must also 
include at least one member who is not otherw ise affiliated with the institution and who is not part of the 
immediate family o f a person who is affiliated with the institution.” Additionally, "The IRB must make 
every nondiscriminatory effort to ensure that it does not consist entirely o f men or entirely of women. 
Selections must not, however, be made on the basis of gender. The nonaffiliated member o f the IRB
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has been since inception that the same individual serves in both capacities (DHHS OIG 
1998b; ACHRE. 1995), sort o f a dual token minority, a “non*.” As pointed out by Rep. 
Towns (U.S. House, 1998, June 11; also see next page) and others, this situation has 
served to marginalize the non-affiliated, non-scientific person, making the member a 
distinct minority-on-purpose. It seems reasonable to believe this “non*” person might be 
hesitant on most occasions to articulate coneems, and on the rare occasion when s/he 
might, might actually say something irrelevant (or that seems irrelevant to other, i.e., 
affiliated, scientific IRB members), or be focused on an issue outside the purview o f the 
IRB (and over time, stop contributing or questioning altogether). This is not to imply 
these members are in a general way incompetent, but they, by categorical admission, are 
less apt to know what is relevant, i.e., within the purview o f the board. Therefore, 
having the regulation in place has produced little if  any effect. It is another cumbersome 
yet meaningless activity (with the exception o f obligating non's to attend meetings).
The ambiguity in the rule provides opportunity to negate the effects o f the rule requiring 
non-affiliated, non-scientific representation on IRBs.
should be drawn from the local community-at-large. Ministers, teachers, attorneys, business persons, or 
homemakers are possible candidates. The person selected should be knowledgeable about the local 
community and be willing to discuss issues and research from that perspective. Consideration should be 
given to the type of community from which the institution will draw its research subjects. If the 
community is rural and agricultural, perhaps a farmer would be appropriate, in addition to a minister 
and. or attorney. If tlie community is predominately African-American, Hispanic, or other minority, then it 
would be advisable to have a member o f that particular minority (or those minorities, if there is more than 
one significant minority population) on the IRB. The nonaffiliated member(s) should not be vulnerable to 
intimidation by the professionals on the IRB, and their services should be fully utilized by the IRB” (see 
guidebook at http: ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/irb/irb_chapterl.htm. Chapter 1, .Administration of IRB, 
Membership; see also http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/assurance/regirbt.htm, regarding new 
registration rules posted Jan 11. 2001 and accessed May 25, 2002). These rules are presently being 
reconsidered, reflecting concerns voiced in U.S. House hearings (1998, Jun 11, and discussed on p. 152 
and 197 herein).
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The OHRP guidebook indicates the non-afTiliate should represent the local 
community, should not be vulnerable to intimidation by the professionals on the IRB, 
and that the non-affiliate should be “fully utilized by” the IRB (see footnote # 179, p. 
166; see also OPRR, 1993, p. 1-7). But, rather than the rule itself, it is the interpretation 
and execution o f the rule that is important to consider in this situation. The 
interpretation and execution have not historically (since implementation o f the IRB 
system in 1974) operated in a way that supports the spirit o f the rule. And this 
widespread (institutionalized) demonstration o f resistance to the inclusion o f different 
points of view seems counter to the most basic goals in academic pursuits.
Rep. Towns, in a statement during U.S. House (1998, Jun 11) subcommittee 
hearings, expressed his concern about the proportions o f IRB membership. “If federal 
law only requires one non-medical member, couldn’t a board dilute that member’s vote 
simply by expanding the numbers o f other members? Shouldn’t the number o f non­
medical members [be] proportional to the number o f medical members?” (p. 52; see 
also DHHS OIG, I998e, p. II).
The NBAC in May 2001 recommended nonscientists make up at least 25 
percent of an IRB's membership, and that a quarter o f the members should come from 
outside the institution. (A draft report issued in December 2000 had required half in 
both instances; see Southwick & Monastersky, 2001, Jun 1.) George J. Annas, professor 
o f health law at Boston University School o f Public Health, questioned the potential 
effectiveness o f the NBAC recommendation, saying “Community representatives have 
no authority and weight when they are outnumbered three-to-one by the researchers” (as
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quoted in Southwick & Monastersky, 2001, Jun I, p. A22). Community representatives 
(nons, “outsiders”) have traditionally been outnumbered by “scientific” members by 
four-to-one, or more. (The same could probably be said o f the ratio between qualitative 
and quantitative researchers; see NBAC, 2001, which found 75 percent o f current 
research reviewed by IRBs is clinical/biomedical).
Informed consent templates and the way non's have been developed are two of 
the ways federal provisions and historical development o f the system are played out at 
the institutional level. Next to be considered is the domain o f the local IRB in the 
regulatory context that includes the federal apparatus.
Local IRB Domain
IRB responsibility falls into two main categories: initial review and continuing 
review o f research projects (DHHS OIG 1998e). According to Ellis, former director o f 
the former OPRR, in his testimony before the U.S. House (1998, Jun 11), “The local 
IRB at the research site is the cornerstone o f our system o f protection o f human 
subjects. No research on human subjects may be initiated and no ongoing research may 
continue in the absence o f an IRB approval (45 C.F.R. § 46, see also U.S. House, 1998, 
Jun 11, p. 38). This is only true o f federally funded research, in legal terms, though in 
“reality.” nearly all research is subjected to IRB scrutiny, and even those studies defined 
as “exempt” are scrutinized, as mentioned (see GAO 2001, for example).
As research activities have spread from secret military studies and “atomic” 
medicine to university teaching hospitals, now spilling into the private sector, IRBs
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have been established in these new settings (DHHS OIG 1998c). Sites include state 
governments, managed care organizations, private universities, state psychiatric 
hospitals and other agencies, vitro-fertilization and weight-loss clinics, genetic tests 
developers, physicians, dentists, psychotherapists in private practice, industrial and 
corporate programs, and hybrids.'*® Independent, commercially driven review boards 
have developed (or have become more explicitly commercial; see DHHS OIG 2000a) to 
review research protocols and even conduct research, particularly for drug companies.
Institutional Institutionalizations and Ideologies
Four themes recur in the numerous and varied writings about organizations
working from the perspective o f ideology critique first offered by Marx (Alvesson &
Deetz, 1996)'*'. These are applicable not only in the present discussion o f institutional
contributions to the system, but to the evolution o f IRBs, as presented earlier, and the
co-opting o f social scientists, presented here and in Chapter Seven.
Alvesson and Deetz (1996, p. 199-201) explain these four themes:
In naturalization a social formation is abstracted from the historical 
conflictual site o f  its origin and treated as a concrete, relatively fixed 
entity. As such the reification becomes the reality rather than life 
processes. Through obscuring the construction process, institutional 
arrangements are no longer seen as choices but as natural and self- 
evident. The illusion that organizations and their processes are 
“natural’ objects and functional responses to “needs’ protects them
ISO .According to Gillham (2000. Jul 23), reporting for the Tulsa World, the H.A. Chapman Institute of 
Medical Genetics, a private research group, was moving its operations to the OU Tulsa Schusterman 
campus in the fail (2000). I called to verify (6/5/2001) and was told the Chapman Institute is located on 
the Schusterman campus.
Deetz (1995) states, "ideological critique was developed by German scholars in the 1920s and 1930s 
in response both to the failure o f Marxist economic analysis to account for new systems o f domination 
and the lack o f organized worker resistance, and to the capacity o f Hitler to utilize the culture industries 
to produce consent to national policies through appeals to existing social value premises” (p. 164).
170
from examination as produced under specific historical conditions 
(which are potentially passing) and out o f specific power relations” (p. 
199) ... [With respect to the universalization o f managerial interests] 
“particular sectional interests are often universalized and treated as if 
they were everyone’s interests. In contemporary corporate practices, 
managerial groups are privileged in decision-making and research. 
Management is ascribed a superior position in terms o f defining the 
interests and interest realizations o f the corporation and thereby of 
wide segments o f the population. The interests o f  the corporation are 
frequently equated with specific managerial self-interests” (p. 200) 
. . .“Central to the universalization o f managerial interest is the 
reduction o f the multiple claims o f ownership to financial ownership. 
[In the cases o f interest here, the reduction is to formal 
authority.]... The investments made by other stakeholders are 
minimized while capital investment is made central” (p. 200). 
[Regarding the primacy o f instrumental reasoning] “Habermas (1971, 
1975, 1984, 1987) has traced the social/historical emergence of 
technical rationality over competing forms o f  reason. Habermas 
described technical reasoning as instrumental, tending to be governed 
by the theoretical and hypothetical and focusing on control through the 
development o f means— ends chains. The natural opposite to this 
Habermas conceptualizes as a practical interest. Practical reasoning 
focuses on the process o f understanding and mutual determination of 
the ends to be sought rather than control and development o f means of 
goal accomplishment (Apel, 1979) ... “In a balanced system these two 
forms o f reasoning become natural complements. But, in the 
contemporary social situation, the form and content o f modem social 
science and the social constitution o f expertise align with 
organizational structures to produce the domination o f technical 
reasoning ... to the extent that technical reasoning dominates, it lays 
claim to the entire concept o f rationality and alternative forms of 
reason appear irrational” (p. 200). [And with respect to hegemony] 
“The conception o f hegemony suggests the presence o f  multiple 
dominant groups with different interests and the presence o f power and 
activity even in dominated groups. The integration o f these 
arrangements, however, favors dominant groups and the activity of 
both dominant and dominated groups is best characterized as a type of 
produced ‘consent.’ The hegemonic system works through pervading 
common sense and becoming part o f the ordinary way o f seeing the 
world, understanding one’s self and experiencing needs (see Angus, 
1992)” (p. 201). [Alvesson and Deetz continue,] “Several studies have 
shown how employees ‘strategize their own subordination,’ achieving 
marginal gains for themselves through subordination but also 
perpetuating dominant systems which preclude their autonomy and
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ability to act on their own wider interests (see Burawoy, 1985; Deetz, 
1995; Willmott, 1993) ... Willmott, for example, has explored how 
‘corporate culture programmes are designed to deny or frustrate the 
development o f conditions in which critical reflection is fostered’” ... 
(1993, p. 534 o f Willmott; as quoted by Alvesson & Deetz, 1996. p. 
2 0 1 ).
It is apparent that regulators and researchers maintain the process even when 
they find it absurd, pointless, counterproductive, and even when parts of the process do 
not seem right in a moral sense, i.e., they seem unfair, unjustified, unreasonable, doable, 
etc. (What power the structure has! More accurately, what power we give to the 
structure! To gain this kind o f compliance, the system must be constructed, to 
"seem real” at the very least. And, it seems to be a requirement, in order for the system 
to operate, that the simulation "seem right” (i.e.. reasonable, important, etc.) though 
sometimes compliance is gained simply because the system appears unavoidable, 
pointless to resist, or that it is self-evident, the "way we do things” (and eventually 
becoming "the way we have always done things”). No questions asked (anymore). 
Whying isn’t understood (or tolerated, even within oneself) anymore. (Also see 
.Adorno’s comment, footnote # 67, p. 60, herein.) The idea that (some of) these systems 
are unavoidable appears to be the general consensus concerning, for example, the 
Internal Revenue Service (1RS), frequently described as being as inevitable as death. 
Similarly, the IRB system is presented as "inevitable” in methods classes i.e., the
' ’*■ See Wilson, 2002, Mar 18. for an example of this “giving o f power” involving the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, and the recognition that the "real world” is not what the regulations are 
based on.
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system has been normalized by faculty who are in turn illuminating the naturalization 
path {i.e., culting, indoctrinating) for students. The IRB process is presented as 
“required” and often simultaneously described as “unclear,” “unreasonable,” and 
“nonsensical.” '^^
The development and implementation o f the rules at the federal level take on 
Theory Y characteristics (McGregor, 1960, also see discussion about effects of 
scientific management and classical management schools on development o f IRB 
system, p. 216)."^'’ However, institutional IRB members appear to differ from the 
federal regulators. In institutional policy handbooks, web postings, answers to 
applications, etc., a somewhat different approach is apparent, one which implies (on the 
part o f the institutional-level regulators) a serious (and unwarranted) decline in the trust 
o f others to be humane and reasonable (Theory X, in McGregor-ese), to “discharge their 
authority and responsibility in an honorable way,” (see footnote # 184, below). This 
situation exemplifies a universalization o f managerial interests, i.e., the existence o f 
regulations that involve obtaining permission to proceed carry the implications that 
researchers need to be told by managers/regulators what to do and how to do it, that
I have frequently heard students and faculty members in several methods classes say these things, and 
many o f the articles cited herein include similar comments.
.According to George G rob. Deputy Inspector General for Evaluation and Inspections (a federal 
position, somewhat obviously), in testimony before the U.S. House stated, “We don’t claim that the 
research abuses are particularly widespread. We just haven’t done enough random studies to know that 
that is the case.” [Notice the bias toward the need to do “studies” rather than believing their own 
experience. Further, DHHS produced four major reports analyzing the system and calling for reform, 
along with the ACHRE and the NBAC reports, and several GAO reports all issued in a 5-year span.] 
Grob continued, “And we recognize very much the dedicated and conscientious board members often 
working long hours as volunteers to deal with these problems” (U.S. House, 1998, Jun 11. p. 11). And 
Ellis, as head o f the OPRR, echoed Grob’s comments: “By goodwill, I mean people [researchers, in this 
reference] discharging their authority and responsibility in an honorable way and recognizing that in 
those instances where the protection of human subjects may conflict w ith the mission of an agency or an
173
they need to be controlled, etc., giving managers/regulators “a superior position in terms 
o f defining the interests and interest realizations” as described by Alvesson and Deetz 
(1996, p. 200). Deetz (1995) states, “What might be accepted as legitimate power 
differences is best represented as a system o f domination, because the empirical 
manifestation is that o f free consent, but yet structures are reproduced that work against 
competitive practices and fulfillment o f  the variety o f interests” (p. 164).
OUIRB Application Form: Analvsis
The OUIRB application form (http://research.ou.edu/Forms/index.htm, accessed 
May 25. 2002), a typical example, does not accommodate qualitative research. For 
example, the form requires substantial explanation beyond information about who the 
participants are, in the categorical sense. This, in theory, would be the first and in many 
cases, based on federal law, the only question a researcher should (or should be asked 
to) address. The specific treatment the researcher intends to utilize is the only other 
relevant issue for exemption consideration. The lengthy application form is not only 
counter to anything resembling “exemption,” but also to the nature o f much qualitative 
research, as discussed in this section.
The authors o f the form write: “Your application for the approval o f the use o f 
human subjects should consist o f eleven (11) copies o f  three parts: Part I, a completed 
application form; Part II, a description of your research study; and Part III, subject’s 
informed consent form for participation in your study” (OU Application, p. 1 ).
office, society dictates that the protection o f human subjects must come first, that the pursuit of new 
knowledge is optional and can be deferred” {Ibid., p. 50).
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Additionally, the author(s) state(s), “You should attach supplementary information 
pertinent to this study that will help the board members in their review o f your 
application, i.e.. questionnaires, test instruments, and letters o f  approval from 
cooperating institutions or/and organizations.'*^ (O f course, one might question the need 
to “really” develop these items until one knows they will be needed). Failure to submit 
these items will only delay your review” (p. 1, OU Application). Another managerial 
suggestion that resistance is futile.
This is the only application form available for human subjects research at OU. 
There is no “exemption” or abbreviated version (the only difference for the applicant is 
whether s/he is required to submit two copies or 11 copies o f  the application, as 
indicated below; the same form must be completed entirely in either case).'** On page 
two o f the application form, the author(s) write(s) “If you believe your use o f  human 
subjects would be considered exempt from review or qualifies for expedited review as 
defined in Sections 4 and 12 o f  the University of Oklahoma, IRB policy and procedures 
(website in bibliography), [an applicant] may submit two (2) copies o f  this application 
for initial review. If full Board review is required, [the applicant] will be required to 
submit nine (9) additional copies.” This means that if  the study is “really” exempt-able.
In requiring the permission letters, is the IRB not operating to protect operators o f “cooperating 
institutions and organizations” (i.e., business owners, or operators of parks, government administrators, 
etc.. who aren't (themselves) being studied? How, in the view o f the IRB members themselves, is this 
w ithin the board's purview? 1 would like to have asked.
It would seem reasonable that the application form could be designed in a (rather common) way to 
include such statements as “If you answer ‘No’ to the next question, skip to question X.” (Student loan 
forms are like this; if a student is taken as a deduction on the parent's income taxes, they complete certain 
questions, if not, they answer other questions. And, incidentally, the student loan program now has a 
provision for a “master promissory note” requiring a much shorter renewal form for continuing students 
rather than the complete form every year. This is somewhat like the blanket assurance alternative 1 
mention in Chapter Eight.) For example, if the researcher selects “No protected classes" and/or “No
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a researcher must complete the fairly lengthy application, and wait until it is the 
pleasure o f the OUIRB to find out whether or not they rule the study “exempt.” The 
OUIRB (and others) seem to be confusing exempt from  the process with exempt from  
full-board review.'. Exempt from the process should (come to) mean exempt from the 
process. No application, no waiting, no interference from the local IRB.
In Part 1 o f the application, (potential, hopeful) researcher/applicants are asked 
to provide the “project” time period. It is unclear if  this question is designed to solicit an 
answer about the duration o f the data collection portion o f the proposed study, or if it is 
to include other aspects o f the “project.” The authors may be asking this question as a 
way of determining if the study will be subject to continuing review, i.e., if the 
“project” lasts more than one year, under federal law it must be reviewed annually (see 
45 CFR §46.109[e]). This question could be posed differently, meeting the (presumed) 
need of the IRB, yet not creating a problem for researchers (in understanding the 
question in the first place, and in the impossibility o f anticipating the “exact” time 
frame for the “project”). If applicants were asked whether or not they anticipate the 
project lasting more than a year, (a simple yes/no proposition), and provided a reminder 
that if the answer is “yes” their project will be subject to, according to 45 CFR 
§46.109(e), continuing review and indicate where the applicant can obtain more 
information. As posed, the question is unclear, the reason for it is unclear, and, it 
appears, is unnecessarily specific.
identifiable participants.” the application form instructions might then say “Stop! You are not required to 
apply. You are exempt.”
I do not suggest an “exemption” form be created, though I might urge that the actual process of “real” 
exemption be “really” implemented.
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Also in Part I o f the form, the authors require the applicant provide the number 
of subjects. There is no reference to the number of subjects in a study being used as 
criteria for any regulatory activity at the federal level.’** The reason for the question is 
not clear, but it does appear to be an institutional development, i.e., not linked to any 
federal rule or provision. The number o f subjects is not significant, or pertinent to the 
regulatory function, and particularly as it applies to exemption considerations.
In addition to being cumbersome. Part II o f the application form is nearly 
impossible (and unnecessary) for qualitative researchers to complete. A description o f 
the study is required o f the applicant, which is to include four parts: a statement o f the 
purpose/objectives, research protocol, confidentiality provisions, and an assessment o f 
the benefits/risks to subjects. In the purpose/objectives section, the authors instruct, 
“Explain the overall purpose o f your study and its primary objectives, including the 
importance of the knowledge expected to result” (OU Application, p. 2). To explain the 
overall purpose is not a particularly problematic task for researchers, as it is often what 
a researcher starts with, i.e.. an idea, a purpose for looking at a phenomenon, a curiosity 
about something. However the last part, i.e., being asked to “include the importance o f 
the knowledge expected to result” is problematic (see Feller quote in Brainard, 2002, 
Mar 29b, p. .A25, re: sometimes not knowing the relevance o f research in 5, 10, 15, or 
20 years). While knowing the importance of the prospective knowledge is problematic 
for any social science researcher, it is perhaps even more true for a qualitative 
researcher who may have less knowledge a priori about what the (range of) results
Somewhat like the U.S. Representatives wanting to know how many IRBs operate. What difference 
does it make?
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might be. A key difference between these two types o f research is this: quantitative 
researchers almost always employ hypotheses (sometimes even directional ones), and 
while the researcher doesn’t know, in advance, whether or not any given hypothesis will 
be supported (or even what that support or lack o f it might “really” mean), the 
hypothesis creates a more “knowable” set o f activities for the researcher, a more precise 
“direction” for the research to take, and a more precise (and predictable) “ form” for the 
results (see Goffman, 1971, re: formulaic, hypothesis-driven pursuits, quoted on p. 90, 
herein).
Alternatively, qualitative research {i.e., nearly always designed without formal 
hypotheses) involves less advance knowledge about the direction the research activities 
will take or the final form for a research report about the activities. Asking for details 
about what knowledge may result from a qualitative study are not reasonable questions 
given the nature o f much qualitative research (observations, for example). In the case of 
observations, it is not possible for the researcher to know what s/he will actually see; it 
is only possible to state in a general sense what it is the researcher would be observing.
A similarity between qualitative and quantitative research is the lack o f 
knowledge on the part o f either about how important any findings might be, though 
both groups are asked to provide such “information” on application forms, grant 
proposals, etc. (In fact, it has become “natural” to be asked to supply such information, 
even if it is impossible many times to do so.) Being required to answer such questions 
suggests the applicant can somehow project benefits or knowledge that future readers
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might derive, hardly possible, I argue, and (totally) unnecessary for the protection o f 
subjects (especially when no treatment is administered).
The research protocol section of Part II requires the applicant to “Describe the 
study and procedures you will use, including a step-by-step description o f the 
procedures you plan to use with your subjects” (OU Application, p. 2). This entire Part 
11 is labeled “description o f the study,” making it unclear what the authors o f this sub­
section. also labeled “describe the study,” are seeking in terms o f an answer. To 
describe the procedures is not particularly problematic for the qualitative researcher; in 
fact, describing is simple for many procedures, i.e.. “watching people in their natural 
environment,” or “asking people questions about what they are doing.” Not much more 
can be said about the data gathering procedure (Wax, 1971. especially p. 6-10;
Weppner. 1977; Whyte, 1987; Gray, 1979, and 1982; Garflnkel, 1967; Geertz, 1988; 
.4gar. 1980; .Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000; Bantz, 1983; Brainard, 2001. Mar 9; Deetz & 
Kersten. 1983; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Fontana & Frey, 1994; Gubrium & Silverman, 
1989; Hall. 1989; Hamilton. 1998; Klockars, 1977; Lofland & Lofland, 1995; 
O'Connor. 1979; Klockars. 1979; Wilkins. 1979; Punch, 1998; Reiss, 1979; Van 
Maanen. 1988). Or. if interview data is to be used, the required (yet mostly pointless) 
description of the procedure might be “I’ll ask questions.” For the step-by-step 
description, a researcher might include, “I’ll ask if the participant would like something 
to drink. If the participant indicates s/he does wish to have something to drink. I’ll 
probe about the participant’s drinking preferences, and offer the available options 
(water, soda, tea, tequila, Aqua-Velva*, hemlock). If s/he indicates s/he is not
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interested. I’ll suggest we get started with the interview. I’ll then ask the first question, 
etc.
In explaining the confidentiality section, the authors o f  the application form
write:
Briefly describe the procedures you will use to assure confidentiality of 
the data you collect from your subjects, specifically address whether 
subjects will be identifiable from raw and/or refined data, how data will 
be protected from non-project personnel (e.g., stored in locked cabinets), 
whether the identifiable data will be destroyed'*^ when no longer needed, 
and whether project publications (theses, papers, videotapes, etc.) will 
allow identification o f individual subjects.” (p. 2 o f OU application 
form)
First, shouldn’t the (adult, un-incarcerated, mentally capable) research 
participants be able to decide if they care about their identities remaining secret? What 
if the participants themselves have no concern about it? And with much qualitative data, 
the researcher wouldn’t know the identities o f the subjects at all, unless, o f  course, an 
IRB forced the researcher to gather informed consent forms from subjects (who can
One problem with destroying information is raised by the .American Anthropological .Association 
(.AAA, 2001. Feb 15) in a response to the NBAC (2001) report: “O f great concern to anthropology is the 
attempt to restrict the preserv ation of research records and materials necessary for future analysis and 
inquiry or comparative studies. In some cases, researchers are required to destroy research data after a 
specified period of time. We understand how research records and materials from higher risk biomedical 
research may need to be destroyed. However, for many disciplines like anthropology and history the 
utility of research records and materials may not be realized until later.” The AAA goes on to ask for an 
exemption for "field notes, audio or videotape or film recordings o f interviews or social interactions, 
photographs, historical documents, among others.” The .AAA points out that these research records and 
materials are “vitally important for future consultation in longitudinal and comparative studies.” They 
recommend that “research records and materials from minimal risk research be exempted from the 
requirement. . .” (.AAA Response to National Bioethics Advisory report on Human Research Ethics, 
available online at http://www.aaanet.org/gvt/resnbac.htm, accessed June 3, 2002, cited as AAA, 2001, 
Feb 15). (NOTE: the AAA “supports strengthening the protection o f human participants in research” 
consistent with the federal government’s “mission.” and also suggests that if not “carefully honed” the 
"proposed changes (those recommended by NBAC) “could jeopardize the future o f anthropological 
research." See also Morley & Shockley-Zalabak, 1991, re: commitment level o f  individuals not “vested” 
in decision making. .And, see Geertz, 1988, p. 133-135.1 also recall a faculty member’s comment
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hardly be called “participants” in strictly observational data gathering activities).
Federal rules exempt these activities from the process, if data is recorded in such a way 
that participants/subjects are not identifiable. Once again, the local institution is 
intruding “more rigorously” in areas where the federal government doesn’t tread at all; 
see 45 CFR §46.101(b)(2)'''". Qualitative researchers aren't likely to know when data 
“are no longer needed” and their field notes are not likely to need “protection from non­
project personnel,'^'” at least not in the ways that would typically be o f interest to an 
IRB.'''-
The fourth section of Part II, titled “Subject BenefitHisk” includes these 
instructions: “Describe both the potential benefits and risks to subjects and society that 
may result from their participation in this project” (p. 2 o f application form). Several 
(unnecessary) problems are created for (qualitative) researchers in this regard. It is not 
that benefits and risks can’t be spoken about by these researchers, but this requirement 
is unnecessary for qualitative researchers in the overwhelming number o f cases simply 
because no risk (beyond that encountered in one’s life generally, i.e., “minimal” risk in 
federal terms) exists. This makes a contrived description the best (if  not the only) 
possibility for the application form. Further, explaining risk/benefits (or validity and 
reliability; see O ’Connor. 1979; Bantz, 1983; Bloor, 1997; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000,
regarding the response to my applications; referring to IRB members she said. “They are making this kind 
of research impossible to do.”
H.R. 4697. introduced in May 2002. the term “human subject research" is defined as “clinical research 
that is conducted with the direct involvement o f one or more human subjects," Section 491 A. Part 3(a).
There are exceptions, o f course, but they are rare. Mostly we are ordinary people watching other 
ordinary people doing ordinary things. And. it is also a very rare person who bothers to break into our 
offices to read field notes.
Roommates and'or office mates may spill coffee all over the data, for example, but this protection is of 
no concern to an IRB. one must presume.
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and others) is done in a somewhat different language by qualitative researchers than the 
same description offered by quantitative types (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Rorty,
1979'‘^ 3) with respect to fieldwork in particular, Cassell (1982) states "Calculating 
potential harms versus benefits offers little guidance to actors under the intense 
pressures o f the field. Few fieldworkers wish to harm those studied; most are eager to 
help them. Predicting the consequences o f one’s actions, however, is even chancier in 
the field than at home” (p. 155).
The IRB requirement for applicants to provide information about the "potential 
benefits ... to subjects and society that may result from their participation in this 
project,” is problematic for all researchers, producing forced self-aggrandizement 
perhaps, but little in the way of actual, relevant information. Far ranging social benefits, 
or risks for that matter, can’t be known in advance. What a researcher hopes to find 
frequently has no distinct form. This is the case in qualitative and other forms of 
exploration that involve looking-at exercises, rather than looking-for pursuits, i.e., 
generalized explorations without any hypotheses (much less directional ones). Further, 
if the IRB supposes researchers are capable o f making sophisticated predictions about 
potential benefits and risks, and honestly report about them, it seems reasonable to 
assume these same researchers could accurately and honestly report the simpler issue o f 
whether or not the study is “low risk,” "no risk,” or "minimal risk,” (based on 
definitions provided by what might come to be known as system  overseers rather than 
direct overseers). Researchers are at least as capable o f accurately and honestly
'''■ Rort>' says o f the scientific and humanistic camps, “both groups are self-sealing language communities 
that don't— and really can't—talk to each other" (see present study, p. 89).
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exempting themselves as anyone else is’^ ,  including regulators. Adding to regulatory 
problems is the ambiguity in the (federal) rules themselves, and considerable more 
ambiguity in the layers o f (institutional and individual) interpretation o f each of the 
rules.
Part III (OU Application, p. 3-4) is nearly an exact duplicate o f Part II, i.e., both 
include sections in which applicants are required to describe the study, potential risks 
and benefits, and confidentiality provisions. The difference is that in Part III (the 
informed consent form) the wording of the descriptions must be in “ lay language,” 
defined as “easily comprehensible to the person who is being asked to sign it as a legal 
indication o f voluntary participation in the proposed study and every effort should be 
made to limit the consent form to one page including space for the participant’s 
signature” (OU Application, p. 3). Yet the description o f what is to be included on the 
informed consent form is twice that long.'^^ Additionally, as Cassell (1982) points out, 
the definition o f “subject” should be debated in many cases, in an effort to find better 
rules (for unobtrusive methods for example). As mentioned, researchers should be 
asking questions related to whether they should apply at all, rather than how to go about 
it, or how long the application process will take in any given instance, etc.
Following the arguments o f the qualitative methodologists cited above, the 
informed consent process, as required by many institutions, doesn’t work if a researcher 
intends to study the natural environment. The process doesn’t allow for the preservation
-A.nd in a de facto  sense they do. in that they create the story of their study for the application form. 
By way of comparison, the University o f Utah's informed consent template is five pages long; no 
desired length for the actual form is mentioned (see University o f Utah entries in bibliography).
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of the natural environment; it corrupts it. Only the degree to which this occurs might be 
argued (see Geertz, 1988, p. 133; Capron, 1982).
The federal government’s definition o f “minimal risk” states “the probability 
and magnitude o f harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and 
of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance 
of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests” [45 CFR §406.102 (i)]. This 
would seem to allow preservation of the natural world for the numerous studies that 
require it, such as observational research, most surveys, and ethnography. Therefore, it 
appears it is the institutional level of interpretation where a “zone o f unreasonable 
interference” ''^  ^exists. People who are being observed are not participants, and they 
certainly aren’t patients. They aren’t subjects. They are objects in the natural world (see 
Foucault, 1972, pp. 40-49, re: the formation of objects). That is, they are objectified (see 
also Reiss, 1979. p. 67), called participants, patients, subjects, etc. However, those 
being observed, interviewed, and surveyed are receiving no treatment. And, most 
importantly, they are at no greater risk than that encountered in “daily life or during the 
performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests” as specified in 
federal law [45 CFR §406.102 (i)].
A  related observation about the OU Application: the protected classes (pregnant 
women, mentally disabled, mentally retarded, fetuses, elderly, prisoners, and children) 
are listed with boxes beside each to indicate yes or no to the question o f whether or not 
the study involves any of those groups (p. 2). In a similar way, a question could be
’ or ZUl (zoo-ey). used because o f the euphonic, and tactile relationship to gooey.
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added about whether or not the study involves public officials or other {prima facie) 
exemptible classes. This would make the process often much shorter for everyone, i.e.. 
if a study involves only public officials, instructions could indicate it is not necessary to 
complete the remainder of the application. Similar checklists might be utilized to reduce 
the likelihood that the entire application would be necessary, for example the degrees of 
risk as defined by the federal government, a list o f exempted categories, or a checklist 
o f general treatment types or methods, all o f which would, logically, be best assessed by 
the researcher. And, this mechanization o f the process appears consistent with the 
“standardization” obsession of regulators in general and other universities that provide 
for review of exempt studies.
As is apparent, the OU application process, even for studies that are exempt, is 
cumbersome. Required but unnecessary. When we “really” think about it, doesn’t 
“seem right,” or reasonable, and hardly resembles an exemption as we would, outside 
this context, define one. This situation is consistent with the view expressed by 
.\lvesson and Deetz (1996) quoted earlier, about naturalizations, compliance with 
managerial (regulator) demands, hegemonic acceptance, etc. What is the difference, for 
the applicant, between an exempted study and one that involves higher risk or protected 
classes? There are differences in the procedures for the actual study, but very few 
differences in the application process as it is interpreted and imposed by local IRBs.'^^
Changes made to the OU Application form between November 1999 (download date; no 
origination/revision date given) and October 2001 ; Part I: a) Applications are now due on the 1“ rather 
than the 5'*’ day o f the month; b) Space added for a request for applicant’s email address. Part II had no 
changes. Part III; a) addition o f the sentence “Two copies of the Informed Consent Form should be 
provided, one for the subject to retain for his/her records and the signed form which is returned to the 
researcher" to the end o f the first paragraph of instructions for this part; b) addition of the phrase “and 
every effort should be made to limit the consent form to one page including space for the participant's
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To summarize, it has become a self-evident “naturalization” (Alvesson & Deetz, 
1996, p. 199) that researchers must participate in the IRB system without regard to the 
kind of research it is they wish to conduct. Naturalization concerns ways a 
socially/historically constructed world comes to be treated as necessary, natural, 
rational, and self-evident (the “N” in SINS). The IRB application process (even for
signature" to the end o f the first sentence of paragraph t\vo of the instructions for this part; c) the outline 
for the informed consent form is re-structured to replace the category “Title" with “Heading," with the 
explanation. “The form should be clearly titled Informed Consent Form for research being conducted 
under the auspices of the University o f Oklahoma-Norman Campus" which had previously included the 
phrase “and indicated that the document is an individual’s consent for participation in a research project" 
(which is included in the “ Introduction" section in the newer version); d) In Roman numeral III, 
“Description o f the study," the new version has a phrase added to sentence one, “in language which is 
appropriate considering the age, educational level, etc. of the subject pool;” e) the last sentence of Roman 
numeral III changes from “Specify the expected duration of the subject’s participation" to “Specify the 
amount o f time required for the subject’s participation; ” f) In Roman numeral IV, part a, “Risks," a 
sentence is added to the end of the instructions: “ If no foreseeable risks beyond those present in normal 
everyday life are anticipated, a statement to that effect should be included; ” g) In Roman numeral V, part 
a, “Conditions o f participation," t\vo sentences are added to the end of what had been in the 1999 
document, “ For studies involving only adults, include a statement such as: To participate, you must be 18 
years o f  age or older. (Italic in original); and following that, “For studies involving minor children, a 
parental consent form must be included in addition to the participant’s assent form (Underscore in 
original.); h) part V-b, “Confidentiality," was previously a one-sentence explanation and now has three 
lengthy sentences added: “Avoid use o f the term anonymous if there is any reasonable possibility that 
subject’s identities can be established. If the research is anonymous (i.e.. a survey returned in pre­
addressed postage paid envelope with no way o f identifying the participant), a cover letter which clearly 
addresses all the components o f informed consent may be substituted for signed consent form. In the case 
of a telephone survey, a script clearly addressing all the components o f informed consent should be 
submitted for review; ” i) three sections are added to Roman numeral V: part d, “Course 
credit compensation for participation; part e, “Video/audio taping of any research activities; and part f, 
“Use of electronic media for informed consent;’’ and what had been part d, “Contacts for questions about 
research subject’s rights" in 1999 became part g in 2001, and retained its name. Minor wording changes 
in the first sentence were done, along with the addition o f “A statement directing inquires (sic) about 
rights, as a research participant to be made to the Office of Research Administration at (405) 325-4757 is 
a required component of informed consent;" and finally. Part VI, “Signatures" section, is much more 
articulated in the 2001 version. In 1999 a general statement about who must sign the form was included, 
but the new version is “Include the statement; I  hereby agree to participate in the above-described 
research. I  understand my participation is voluntary and that I  may withdraw at any time without penalty 
or loss o f  benefits (Italic in original), and a really confusing sentence replaces the one that had constituted 
the section before. The old section, in its entirety, read: “Informed consent must be documented by the 
signatures o f the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative. A copy shall be given to the 
person signing the form." But now, in addition to the “Include the statement: ” (also notice the use of 
“the" sentence, much more prescription now), it reads, “Informed consent must be documented by the 
signature o f the subject on subject’s informed consent form. When necessary, a separate form also should 
be provided for the subject’s legally authorized representative or guardian. A space to indicate the date 
signed should be included on all informed consent forms."
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minimal risk, non-treatment studies) has become “normal,” even when many parts o f  it 
are considered unreasonable (and even impossible) for some kinds o f studies as shown 
in the application analysis offered above.
The universalization o f managerial interest and suppression o f conflicting 
interests, as described by Alvesson and Deetz (1996), is apparent in the way the IRB 
processes are “handed down” from the federal and institutional regulators (as well as 
from faculty teaching methods classes) and “passed around” by researcher among 
themselves. Dissent among researchers, collectively or individually, is nearly unheard 
of; though many researchers and some regulators do complain, they don’t often act. 
This is evidence of the entrenchment o f the system and its processes.
The “the primacy of instrumental reasoning” as described by Alvesson and 
Deetz (1996), is evident in the roots o f the system, i.e.. it is a system designed for 
clinical/medical studies, and, therefore, it is a system that is irrelevant and ill-fitting for 
many methods in use today (particularly surveys, interviews, and observational 
research).'*^* One of the primary intents o f regulation is standardization (and through 
that a large amount o f control) o f decision making procedures, and as shown in the 
analysis o f the application form, for example, it is unreasonable to believe, given the 
range o f research methods, that any single form or procedure will fit all circumstances. 
This “one single system for medical and social research” mentality is in rather stark 
opposition, as Alvesson and Deetz (1996) point out, to Habermas’ “practical interest”
The NIH, in a report about behavioral and social sciences, demonstrates this well. In the report, 
treatment is mentioned frequently, and prediction, prevention, and control of illness is stated as the goal 
o f the research (unlike descriptions from qualitative researchers quoted herein, including Denzin and
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thinking (consistent with what I have described as “liquid and local” conditions). The 
more local (i.e., “real”) the decision making process, the more valuable, useful, 
practical, and possible it can be for the participants and researchers.
Finally with respect to hegemonic behavior, the IRB system and its processes 
are “hegemonically” maintained by the regulators and researchers. The rules and 
procedures are not questioned by many participants, who (hegemonically) accept the 
idea that rules and regulations in general work to intended effect and/or are 
unavoidable. Questions (of the whying sort) are rarely asked. When questions are 
posed, as discussed earlier, they often focus on minutiae, i.e., how to revise or 
accomplish a procedure rather than about the need for it (see also footnote # 17, p. 15). 
In addition to the bias that rules work or are needed, the application form demonstrates 
instances where common sense has been pervaded, allowing the form and the 
completion and submission o f it, to become part o f the “ordinary” world o f research, 
i.e., natural. Researchers are accomplices in their own subordination by participating in 
an unreasonable, ill-fitting system operated/dominated by people who often know 
substantially less (and often care even less than that) about (the details of) what is 
“really” going on in a given situation, method, or field o f research. Similarly, 
researchers aren’t demonstrating they care enough to “risk” changing the system.
The Entrenchment o f Bureaucratic Ideologv
Lincoln. .\gar. Geertz, and others, who talk about enhancing our understandings and offering thick 
description, etc. (See NIH, 2001, Jun 26, especially p. 4 and 5.)
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These micro-managerial interpretations o f the federal rules, particularly as they 
pertain to social research, constitute regulatory/administrative imperialism on the part of 
(institutional) IRBs, and, often, (at the federal and institutional levels) solutions in 
search o f problems. The IRB system, particularly at the institutional level, carries the 
implicit suggestion via explicit discourse that researchers must be carefully 
monitored— a Theory X approach (McGregor, 1960; also see Taylor, 1919/1947), i.e., 
the idea that researchers can’t be trusted and must be closely and constantly supervised, 
spoon-fed via “templates,” and monitored via the institution o f paperwork processes 
(see Brainard, 2001, Sep 28, for an alarming example). The application process is just 
one form o f m ic ro -m an ag em en t.T h e  institutional-level system, i.e., the actual IRBs, 
as with many other regulatory organizations,"™’ often posture (rather than act) in the 
name o f fairness, equity, safety, etc., and they do so utilizing a “lowest common 
denominator” mentality, i.e.. the IRBs often address problems that are first, rare; 
second, problems that existing rules didn’t prevent; third, problems that rules won’t or 
can 't fix (rules written that are beyond any practical scope o f enforceability or even
This is paniculariy true o f the mostly “social science" OUIRB {i.e.. they oversee no medical trials), re: 
intrusive application procedures. The clinical/medical IRB at the OU Health Sciences Center has only a 
two-page application (see http;//w3.ouhsc.edu/ORAyirb/IRBforms.htm, accessed May 25. 2002), and no 
lengthy explanations, risk/benefit analysis, etc. is required, even though for most studies, the risks to 
participants at the medical center would be greater than those in the social sciences. It would be 
reasonable to conclude that greater risks associated with medical trials would imply a greater need for 
scrutiny, perhaps involving a form longer than that used for less-risky social science projects. In short, in 
medial trials there are more questions that should be asked and more explanations that must be offered. 
The average participant knows more about being interviewed than about appropriate medical treatment.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued new standards for car and truck 
rollover resistance ratings in February 2002. Stephen Kratzke, associate administrator of NHTSA, when 
asked why NHTSA would even bother creating a new regulation if it didn’t do a better job of predicting 
accidents than the system already in place, said, “Because Congress told us we have to, and that’s the 
system we live under" (quoted in Wilson. 2002. Mar 18. p. 8). For a similar situation at U.S. Department 
of .Agriculture regarding the failure of meat inspections, see Ackerman (2002, May, p. 22) and related 
information in Tacio (2002).
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understandability); and fourth, rules that don’t apply to the “problem” at hand (and the 
enactment and enforcement o f which beg the question o f a problem, or a “fixable” one, 
at all). Given the circumstances o f reality, specifically that the future can’t be known, 
that people can’t be controlled every instant, that interpretations across people are not 
standard, life can’t be standardized, etc., it would seem that a Theory Y approach is the 
only realistic orientation for the regulators to assume, and, most importantly, it is 
apparently an adequate approach (based on the overwhelming lack of problems in social 
research).
Additional analytical frames. According to Alvesson and Deetz (1996), in the 
process o f naturalization a social formation is taken from its place and time, the “site o f 
its origin,” and treated as a concrete, relatively static entity. So. once the IRB is 
established, and rules posted, forms designed, and uploaded,*”* that often signals the 
end of questioning (no more whying, if it was ever allowed, or if  anyone allowed 
themselves to indulge). The simulation is comprised o f the mundane story o f 
compliance, mostly told re.rma/ogically time after time. “As such the reification [of 
various IRB processes and the purported “needs” for them] becomes the reality rather 
than life processes” (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 199; see also Baudrillard, 1983). 
Within the IRB system, for example, forms required by the IRBs at various institutions
■“'See footnote ~ 253. p. 251
■“* A faculty member told me early in 2002 that his local IRB chair bragged that the “whole procedure” 
was ‘Updated” and "redone.” .Apparently the IRB chair had no thought that the faculty member perhaps 
was wondering who came up with the new rules, and why he wasn’t given an opportunity to provide 
some input into the system rather than receiving it as a sort o f “gift from above.” I personally believe the 
system would be better for everyone if these administrators sought and utilized the input of 
faculty/researchers on a regular basis.
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have taken priority over the substance o f direct oversight (which, even if possible, 
would produce an image similar to Baudrillard’s description of second phase images, 
i.e., the masking or perversion o f a basic reality, 1983, p. 11). That is, an image that is 
distorted because the people being observed know they are being observed, à la the 
Hawthorne Effect (Mayo, 1933).
By obscuring the construction process, institutional arrangements such as 
application forms and processes, who must apply to whom, definitions and who can 
create and interpret them, etc., are no longer seen as matters o f choice, but as natural 
and self-evident (activities we “must” or at least “should” do, and definitions, 
particularly inclusionary ones in this case, that we “must” accept, etc.). This lack o f 
scrutiny/high level o f acceptance protects (SINS) STRUCTURES, 
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS from 
examination and eventually even from visibility. SINS in this case include notions that 
rules are generally good as a structure that “sets up” the possibility o f institutionalizing 
an application process, and the subsequent acceptance o f this form and process as 
natural if unreasonable, and the resulting simulation that the process is “really” doing 
what it was intended to do. The SINS contribute to the notion o f the process as 
“inevitable.” And, very significantly, the process becomes a part o f methods class 
curricula, i.e., indoctrination into the system is accomplished, and the system 
perpetuated. Foucault (1980) has suggested this (zone of) invisibility is where “real” 
power lives.
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Regulations are debated in public and private arenas by various parties, but these 
regulations are largely developed, adopted and interpreted in private (for example, the 
changes in the OU Application form and other changes, see footnote # 197, p. 185; and 
footnote # 202, p. 190). Because meetings are closed at OU, input from researchers 
about policy issues, including the application form, is rarely if ever solicited or given at 
the local, institutional level.
For these administrative activities to be conducted in an open environment, i.e.. 
open to all participants who are interested (and for researchers to require this where it is 
not “done this way”) would appear to be desirable to all involved in the system. A 
provision, similar to that in the federal system, to solicit and allow for written responses 
to rule changes might be usefully adopted by local IRBs (or. again, demanded by 
researchers; that this is not the case seems odd). Local IRBs might elect, for example, to 
convene an executive session to consider individual proposals, in the interest of 
protecting the privacy of individual researchers or participants. But when considering 
administrative issues, such as rule changes and appointments to the IRB. it should be 
apparent to the local IRB and other regulators that the more input from the participants 
in the system, the better the system will be, or at least the better the level o f  acceptance 
will be.
Regulations are highly subject to change and are not subject to much scrutiny 
about the purpose or justification for them, particularly on the part o f those trying to
Brainard (2000. Mar 17) indicates the meetings at Duke University are usually closed. Further, an 
apparent lack of understanding among OUIRB staff was also demonstrated from events in my own 
experience, i.e.. I was invited to an OUIRB meeting by one staff member, and then not allowed to attend
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follow them. Scrutiny and talk about purpose might, o f course, lead to de-regulation, or 
de-escalation in regulation. The purpose o f ideology critique is to reclaim organizations 
as “ social-historical constructions,” investigating the formation of the organizations and 
ways they are sustained and transformed “by processes both internal and external to 
them” (Alvesson & Deetz. 1996, p. 200; see also Giddens, 1979; Deetz, 1985). 
Institutions comply with the federal system voluntarily, except in the relatively limited 
number o f cases involving federal funding."'”  Clinical researchers were the first to be 
regulated (and now many times fall under the purview of the FDA*°^). But when social 
scientists were (or allowed themselves to be) co-opted by the system, the regulatory 
process, in many ways, became absurd.
The IRB system has been allowed to go too far. with respect to minimal risk"''* 
studies in particular (Fly\'bjerg, 2001). This is evidence o f the second theme presented 
by .Alvesson and Deetz (1996), universalization o f managerial interest. This case 
involves the missions and cultural reproductions o f operators within government 
bureaus, departments, agencies, legislative bodies, and the professional press, with their
by higher-level administrator who told me the meetings are closed. It seems this would be common 
knowledge among the staff, rather than a source o f confusion
This decision seems "really” reasonable, if one thinks that the focus of review of protocols, and 
subsequent approval or rejection (or exemption or expedition), should be based on the treatment, rather 
than on the funding source or other criteria less relevant to the human subjects themselves.
The FD.\ oversees (by virtue of interstate commerce provisions) research conducted to test drugs, food 
additives, and medical devices, as they are (nearly always) developed for use across the U.S.. at least. The 
oversight is done whether studies are federally-funded or not, because in order to market these products, 
they must have FDA approval.
.As mentioned (much) earlier (footnote fr 61. p. 52) and other places herein, according to the Common 
Rule (45 CFR § 46.102 (i), minimal risk means "that the probability and magnitude o f harm or discomfort 
anticipated in the research are not greater in and o f themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily 
life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.”
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near myopic focus on clinical trials"®  ^(see Figure 1, p. 50). This exclusion o f the needs 
and interests of social science researchers (because of the seemingly singular focus on 
clinical trials, or the unfortunately prevalent idea that somehow one set o f rules can 
work for both clinical and social research) creates many problems. Regulators, if they 
have conducted research and are typical researchers, have mostly been involved in 
clinical research (this is also perhaps a bias/blindness on the part o f  those 
hiring/appointing regulators; see also NIH, 2001, Jun 26, p. 1-6; and NBAC, 2001, re: 
percentage of clinical studies reviewed by IRBs). The rules are made with clinical trials 
in mind.'°^ Alvesson and Deetz (1996) suggest “management is ascribed the superior 
position in terms o f defining the interests and interest realizations o f the corporation and 
thereby o f wide segments o f the population” (p. 200). Guided, at least loosely, by the 
general federal rules, local institutional regulators through their interpretations, tell 
researchers in highly specific ways what is important in the conducting o f research, i.e., 
when they are in compliance with the details o f IRB interpretations. The local IRB, via
■" In the numerous reports in the Tulsa World. US.4 Today, and Chronicle o f  Higher Education (see 
Gillham, 2000. Jul 23; Winslow. 2000. Jul 22; Basinger. 2000 Jul 24; and Pound, 2000. Jul 10a and b and 
2000. Jul 11 .as examples) regarding the sanctions at the University of Oklahoma, no indication that any 
kind o f research (that was supervised by IRBs) other than medical trials existed. In Ellis’ comments 
before the U.S. House ( 1998, Jun 11 ), he did actually refer to “behavioral research” as part o f a 
denominator (see transcript, p. 94). With respect to the media coverage specifically, the information is 
given to reporters by regulators and university officials (much less often by scientists or participants), and 
is indicative of how they think and. therefore, how they approach rule making, i.e.. with little 
understanding, and even less regard (acknowledgement, even) of behavioral science. In an evaluative 
report of NIH commissioned by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (see NBAC 2001), it was 
found that 75 percent o f ctirrent research reviewed by IRBs is clinical and biomedical in nature. .Mso see 
NIH. 2001. Jun 26. particularly p. 1-6 for an example of this myopia.
■“*' .And. rather than engage in the “real” struggle to decide about a system to fit social science needs, it is 
much easier to simply adopt the (uninformed if not imbecilic) attitude, as expressed by federal regulators 
at an open meeting at OU, that “there’s no conflict” between the rules as applied to clinical trials and 
social science. .Amazingly, the response to that comment from those attending the forum was not to object 
to the comment, but the subsequent statement, in hegemonic support of a bad system and without doubt 
demonstrating an imbecilic attitude, was an argument about how asking questions in an interview can be 
more dangerous than drawing blood or administering drugs.
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the discursive formation that constitutes the system (Foucault, 1972) tells researchers 
what constitutes “appropriate” human subjects research, and when they are doing it. 
(SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, 
SIMULATIONS contribute to the attitude that IRB processes are necessary, self- 
evident, inevitable or unchangeable; the idea that local IRBs make rules consistent with 
federal rules; the belief that conflict, dissention, and anarchy are negative (often 
inherently evil) forces; and the notion that in spite o f what seem to be highly 
unreasonable and nonsensical processes within the system, that somehow the overall 
system is reasonable and sensible. We tell ourselves that there must be something we 
don’t know, or aren’t able to understand {i.e., we rely on mysticism). This is another 
byproduct o f a simulated existence, i.e.. we confront what is clearly, locally “really” 
stupid, and suggest it is stupid because of our own ignorance. That is likely true only 
some of the time.
The emergence, dominance, and persistence o f instrumental reasoning, 
specifically technical rationality, “governed by the theoretical and hypothetical and 
focusing on control” (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 200) an “unswerving application o f 
[science] methods without reflecting on knowledge-constitutive interest”, i.e.. “[taking] 
the historical traces o f  suppressed dialogue and reconstruct[ing] what has been 
suppressed” (Habermas, 1971, p. 315),*°^ is readily apparent at the institutional level in 
the IRB system. This instrumental reasoning is apparent in the way the rules are written, 
by and for whom. It is also apparent that the interests o f the participants are at least
' Habermas says that “false consciousness has a protective function” (1971, p. 315).
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occasionally supplanted by alternative purposes, i.e., protection o f funding sources, 
avoiding litigation, political posturing, etc. As mentioned, most o f the activity is 
paperwork that clearly dominates the system and the people (researchers and regulators) 
participating in it. These participants go along, most generally without much resistance, 
as if this paperwork, original or revised, produces the desired (and/'or an undesired, 
and/or any or no) result. Adopting and following this process in great detail “protects” 
us from actual engagement in issues surrounding the purpose o f what is being done. 
Treating the procedures as handed-down, customary, “self-evident” routines 
“unburdens” researchers from the necessity o f directly examining issues in the use o f 
human subjects and issues in steps to protect them. (For customs as unburdening, see 
Schütz & Luckmann (1973. p. 298).
Historically, much more two-way communication is generated in the local 
IRB/individual researcher interface than in either the federal regulator/local IRB 
interface or the federal regulator/individual researcher level. The two latter interfaces 
are almost exclusively one-way, and the large majority o f interfaces involve mostly 
impersonal communication, unless some anomaly/tragedy occurs (a death and/or 
sanctions, as examples). Researchers don’t interact and correspond with federal 
regulators until'unless a “problem” arises. There is no natural interface in the system 
design.
Testimony given during the U.S. House (1998, Jun 11) hearing revealed the 
OPRR didn’t know the exact number (could not offer a guess to within several hundred) 
of IRBs operating at that time, maintained no central registry, nor a clearinghouse of
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complaints or any other paperwork institutions are required to file with the federal 
government. Only the assurance documents (and then only if  federal funding is 
involved) were maintained by the OPRR. Ellis indicated, “We do currently have a list o f 
the name and address o f every IRB that’s under our authority” (U.S. House, 1998, Jun 
11. p. 65). The OPRR had no legal reason to keep such a list; they have no jurisdiction 
unless federal funds are involved. It may have been the posture o f the OPRR that (given 
the overwhelming majority of institutions follow the rules voluntarily) there was no 
organizational compulsion to insist upon a registration process for IRBs. However, this 
is one o f the first things that the new incarnation o f regulators, i.e., the OHRP, changed 
after the (somewhat superficial) structural changes to the system in June 2000 (see IRB 
Registration and Federalwide Assurance [FWA] Questions and Answers at 
http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/humansubjects/finreltn/faq.htm, accessed May 25, 2002). 
The OHRP now has a highly articulated, complex, and mandatory registration 
procedure for IRBs and discussion of certification or accreditation activities are gaining 
prominence in the discourse (see Soulhwick, 2002, May 3; Human Research Subject 
Protections Act o f 2002; and Southwick & Monastersky, 2001, Jun 1 ).
Reliance on instrumental reasoning, aiding dominant groups’ ability to invisibly 
accomplish their ends, is described by Habermas (1971) as instrumental technical 
reasoning, “The understanding o f meaning is directed in its very structure toward the 
attainment o f  possible consensus among actors in the framework o f a self-understanding 
derived from tradition” (p. 310), Instrumental technical reasoning is apparent in the way 
regulators (appear to view) themselves and their power, responsibilities, authority, etc.
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For example, by offering training, as suggested by Ellis when he was head o f OPRR 
(and now Greg Koski, director o f the new OHRP) these regulators create and maintain 
the "proper” view that is to be held (somewhat like textbooks, stylebooks, handbooks, 
guidelines, curricula, summaries, reviews, etc.). Koski, as quoted in Brainard (2000, Jul 
21, p. A21), says, “Most clinical researchers lack formal training about how to conduct 
clinical research in an ethically appropriate manner, and should be provided with such 
training.” Koski’s comment demonstrates this creation and maintenance of the "proper 
view,” i.e., through his use o f "formal training” in order to act in an “ethically 
appropriate manner.” He did not say that clinical researchers don't know how to act 
ethically, or that they are not acting ethically, but that they lack formal training about 
how to act ethically, and that the OHRP can provide such "knowledge” (begging at least 
two questions; whether researchers know or not, and whether the OHRP knows or not). 
The federal views become institutionalized in this way (Koski's "right” to define what 
the problem is and who has it, and the solution and who has that) and his 
(organizational) right to establish and maintain the (only) "proper” views and behaviors 
(demonstrating the managerial/regulator imposition set forth in Alvesson and Deetz. 
1996).
Based on their interpretations o f the federal provisions (not only each individual 
provision, but also the view o f the role o f the federal government/regulation overall), 
institutional regulators create lists o f approved standardized forms, templates for forms, 
and provide even more highly specific (and more-rigorous-as-virtuous) details about
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what must be stated on the fo rm s .* In  other behavior at least in part designed to 
standardize, i.e., define and set and police standards in this case, the National 
.Association o f IRB Managers has offered the IRB Management Certification 
Examination since 1995, indicating the development of tools to standardize the 
thinking, and subsequent certification of IRB members themselves (see National 
.Association o f IRB Managers [NAIM, 2001], or http://www.naim.org/cert.htm, 
accessed May 25, 2002; see also Southwick & Monastersky, 2001, Jun 1; and 
Southwick, 2002, May 3). These are highly presumptuous attempts to control the 
process. Hegemony is a process o f infiltrating common sense (after having devalued it 
in the hegemonic discourse o f science, as mentioned) and becoming part o f the way we 
construct reality, the way we view the world, understand ourselves, experience needs, or 
get certified (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996; Gramsci, 1971). We now “need” (and actively 
seek) IRB approval as researchers (and regulators, based on the previous paragraph, 
may be actively seeking approval too, i.e., certification), however, the “real” the need is 
for people to be treated ethically {i.e.. fairly, safely honestly, etc.). This creates a 
discrepancy between what is and what could have been or what could be, regardless of 
how wide or narrow the gap between (the size o f which can’t be known). As 
postmodernists might argue, if  we leave the future to the future, it might be better than 
anything we can engineer, or delude ourselves into believing we have designed, 
strategically planned, or even affected. The need for IRB approval is not inevitable; 
death is inevitable; filling out forms is minutiae, and not inevitable.
See the consent form templates from University of Utah, University of Texas at Austin, University of 
California at Berkeley, and the University o f Oklahoma; websites are in the bibliography, p. 339-340.
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There is usually a difference between the interests o f  the dominators and the 
dominated, even if the dominated don’t feel dominated (this speaks to the depth o f the 
SINS) or are not able (or willing) to admit/articulate the problem. It is unreasonable to 
presume to know what the dominated want or need, or even who they are, but to argue a 
discrepancy can be seen, as in this case, is reasonable. Regulators, in order to complete 
their job mission, attempt to standardize the process o f gaining approval for human 
subjects research. Researchers, though not continually re-inventing wheels, are 
inherently looking for something that hasn’t been done before (perhaps describable as 
“neo-standard"). In fact, the size o f the discrepancy, (an unknown value), might be 
viewed as an indicator o f the (necessarily estimated) depth o f  oppression (at least in part 
attributable to SINSful acceptance). Lack of visibility, as Foucault (1980) would 
suggest, enhances the effectiveness of power (see also O ’Connor, 1979, especially p. 
226).
When visible, motives, reasons, damages, and other objects can be described 
and critiqued, and debated and changed much more readily. Open conflict about the 
differences in those motives, reasons, and points o f view are more likely to occur; new 
decisions can be made (as well as new ways o f  going about making them), old ones 
abandoned, usually with plenty of creativity, blame, satisfaction and other by-products 
of the activity readily apparent.
A sterile world o f  sameness is, o f course, the great risk in hegemonic success. 
“Cultural diversity is dissolved in the acid bath o f  the core corporate values’’ (Willmott, 
1993, p. 534), but “management control strategies are seldom fully successful ...
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Resistance and some level o f cultural diversity normally prevail” (Alvesson & Deetz, 
1996. p. 201). Telecommuters and others who take unorthodox approaches to work and 
organizing'" have survived, for example; some have even become more prevalent over 
time. According to In-Stat (2001, Feb 24), roughly 24% of the U.S. workforce is 
estimated to telecommute some time during the week in 2001. This works out to be 
more than 30 million at-home workers. In-Stat expects this percentage to increase to 
28% in 2004, growing to nearly 40 million workers. Research diversity, including the 
ways o f approaching the work o f research, is important (in my own hegemonic 
discourse). The system we have installed, however, works against diversity (as many 
similar systems do). Trends toward homogeneous processes are particularly important 
to avoid in educational pursuits where developing "new” ways o f going about or 
looking at things is often a major purpose o f the activity.
At the workplace, people now “find” their physical (company softball and/or 
training facility), social (company parties, support groups), political (union dues 
funneled to PACs, the boss' bumper sticker, and more overt m eans),''* financial 
(paychecks, insurance, retirement plans, and assorted carrots), and even spiritual lives 
(company mentors, motivators, inspirational corporate counseling). This creates a 
“total” environment, much like cultists o f  other sorts, that serves to strengthen the bonds 
o f control within the system, and weaken “outside” links with family, community, etc.
■" Troublemakers, critics, and anarchists, including investigators of investigators and those who abdicate 
regulatory systems, also come to mind. Also see Van Maanen (1978) on watching the watchers.
See Blackwell (2001. Jan 9), On career and citizenship and companies: When employers play politics.
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In this way, management control is not limited to our professional lives. Deetz (1992) 
suggests “the decline o f vision, hope, and community in politics has paved the way for 
management ideologies and practices” to fill what he calls “the vacuum” (as discussed 
p. 209 o f Alvesson & Deetz, 1996). If a person’s life is/contains a vacuum, 1 suspect 
these forms of control work even better than if  a person has a strong identity in place. 
This is relevant to the student researchers, as mentioned previously (see p. 202 and p. 
247-248, herein). 1 don’t mean to suggest students’ lives are any more or less vacuous 
than other lives, however, students are not as likely to have a strong identity as 
researchers the first few times they make an application to an IRB. This “control” idea 
also bears strong resemblance to Theory X (McGregor, 1960) thinking, implying 
challenges to the integrity, recall, and humanity o f all researchers, students and others. 
Student researchers, therefore, while being exempted in some disturbing ways, are, 
perhaps, more abused by (an unclear, contradictory, unreasonably convoluted) the 
system than application savvy, politically astute researchers, ones with IRB experience, 
and who have perhaps more confidence, ability, and willingness to circumvent what 
they have concluded are tedious and pointless, required but unnecessary processes (see 
Manning. 1978; see also Overland, 2002, Feb 19, re: corporate circumvention o f IRB 
processes via conducting trials in other countries).
Corporate cultures and government/institutional structures, when viewed as text, 
suggest culture members become “readers” who bring their experiences and awareness 
o f other texts and other cultural forms, their histories and their own moods and 
personalities to their reading o f texts. They “enter into the text, changing its nature and
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reproducing it as they consume it” (Linstead & Grafton-Small, 1992, p. 344). Reality 
and truth are liquid  rather than solid, it appears, logically alarming some (positivists, 
propagandists, and itinerarians, as examples) who believe it is possible, necessary, 
and/or desirable to control the routines o f others.
Whether regulators label a situation as “problematic” or an “infraction,” or 
describe a situation as “systemic” or “ local,” whether they impose sanctions or conduct 
investigations, whether the U.S. Congress passes a bill to supplement current laws with 
the force o f more law or not. and whether a researcher considers a study doable or not 
in the face o f IRB rules are examples of the outcomes o f “text reading.” Variance in 
readings reveals underlying values in conflict (notions about the rights o f individuals 
versus the common good, for example), the range o f interpretations brought to any 
given text, and even which texts one will “read” at all. And, in matters o f academic free 
inquiry, federal regulators appear to adopt a “ least restrictive environment” position.
But this policy does not hold at the institutional level o f interpretation (see AAUP, 
2001). It appears odd that institutions do not embrace this basic tenet o f  administrative 
law {i.e., “ least restrictive” as preferred over “more rigorous”) as a win-win possibility 
among IRB members, researchers, and participants in research.
Dialectical tensions in the system. Work in hermeneutics (see Alvesson & 
Skoldberg, 2000. particularly p. 52-109) is useful in considering the IRB system in its 
very complex social context, particularly in helping to formulate questions for the 
purpose o f continued and enhanced whying. For example, framing the tensions between
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institutional compliance with regulation (the event) and competition with other research 
institutions for funding (the context), and attempts o f institutions and researchers to 
negotiate the political environment, avoid litigation and sanctions (or explain either or 
both and to balance all these things and more) lead to many important questions about 
the IRB system o f protections, focusing on those questions about actual protection o f  
human subjects, such as conflicts o f interest, personal and institutional funding pressure 
and its effects on researchers’ strategies, considerations about the qualifications (and/or 
accreditation) o f IRBs and/or the members o f them, etc. (See Andrews, 2000, Mar 10; 
AAUP, 2001; ACHRE, 1995; NBAC, 2001; Blumenstyk, 2000. Nov 6; 2001. Apr 26; 
Blumenstyk & Wheeler, 1998, Mar 20. Southwick & Monastersky, 2001, Jun 1; 
Southwick, 2002, May 3; and Human Research Subject Protections Act o f  2002.)
Sanctions against the University o f Oklahoma-Tulsa Campus issued in June 
2000 were related to concerns about patient safety, and brought about as a result of an 
outside consulting firm’s report and a whistleblower’s efforts. This situation involved a 
clinical study in which the principle researcher was also the inventor (and the 
manufacturer, see below) o f the vaccine used in the study, as well as being a doctor to 
the patients participating in the study. (None o f the patients referred to this individual as 
a researcher, as anything other than “doctor,” which is indicative that the consent was 
“really” as confused as it was informed.) In addition to this conflict o f interest, the 
situation on that campus was incestuous in that the doctor/researcher in charge o f the 
study, Michael McGee, had also, and without FDA or any other authorization, 
manufactured (without the required outside monitoring) the vaccine that he then
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administered to patients. The events were conspiratorial in that McGee and IRB 
chairman Daniel Plunket misrepresented to patients and members o f the IRB the 
reasons for an earlier suspension o f the study, i.e.. Plunket, who later retired rather than 
resign or be fired, didn’t inform the rest o f the IRB or the president o f the Tulsa 
campus, the vice president for research, the federal government, or anyone else about 
the earlier suspension o f the trial. Plunket and McGee kept the issue between 
themselves."'^ It took one (rather courageous and persistent) whistle-blowing nurse to 
take the information about the mis-management o f this clinical trial to the federal 
regulators, who issued sanctions in June 2000. In all, four heads rolled including those 
of the principal researcher in charge o f the trial, Michael McGee, who was also vice 
chairman o f the Department o f Surgery; Harold Brooks, dean o f  the college o f medicine 
at the University o f Oklahoma-Tulsa; Edward Wortham Jr., the director o f the Office o f 
Research at the OU Health Sciences Center; and Daniel Plunket, the chairman o f the 
college o f Medicine’s IRB and senior associate dean for clinical affairs (see Winslow, 
2000, Jul 22). Winslow (2000, Aug 1) reported about the aftermath o f the sanctions and 
firing, specifically the level o f confidence patients had in the vaccine and the 
doctor/researcher. There were also letters to the [Tulsa World\ editor from patients 
during this time, and Time (Lemonick & Goldstein, 2002, April 22) featured the events 
in a cover story). None o f those rules worked in this case. In spite o f this rather massive
The "story” that McGee and Plunket presented indicated the vaccine was in short supply due to the 
overwhelming response to the study. In fact, a private auditing firm had recommended the study be 
stopped because o f numerous safety concerns.
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rule failure,"'"’ OU officials then created new rules and processes such as new layers o f 
checks, including unannounced spot checks; the appointment o f a new central research 
compliance office; a 24-hour hotline allowing anonymous callers to report violations; 
mandatory employee training about compliance; and, similar to the institution-to-federal 
government assurance document, an oath, processed from individual to institution. And, 
officials stated the obligatory cliche, i.e., the new rules are designed to, according to the 
Tulsa World (Kerr, 2000, Jul 21) “ensure an incident like this wouldn’t happen again,” 
as was heard in similar form from officials in response to Nuremberg, Tuskegee, 
University o f Pennsylvania, Duke, Johns Hopkins, and so on and on. OU President 
David Boren said it was “good” that the incident happened when it did (before more 
than one percent o f  GU’s research was conducted in Tulsa), and talked about becoming, 
not (necessarily) the model o f human protection, but the model o f compliance, “ I do 
think we will see the day when these procedures will be used by other universities as a 
handbook” (Boren, quoted in Gillham, 2000, Jul 23; for details o f  other cases, see 
Andrews, 2000, Mar 10 regarding the Gelsinger case at the University o f Pennsylvania; 
Cho, 1997, Aug 1, a discussion about the increasingly dubious ties between money and 
academics/clinical trials and the effects on rules; Brainard, 1999, Oct 1, about sanctions 
at the University o f  Chicago and the resignation o f a chancellor there). Rather than a 
handbook, the events at OU are being used as a case study in how not to conduct studies
Obviously rules requiring researchers to get approval to manufacture vaccines, and to report problems 
they experience in a trial, and to bring problems to the entire IRB (not just the chair), along with rules 
designed to prevent conflicts of interest did not work to prevent these acts of (professional) incest, and 
conspiracy.
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(see Lemonick & Goldstein, 2002, Apr 22; and Southwick, 2002, May 3, re: testimony 
about the case in Senate committee hearings).
Tensions about priorities. IRBs focus on minutiae,''^ even sub-minutiae and 
concerns well outside their purview (Brainard, 2000, Mar 17). Beyond those used by 
Brainard, examples o f minutiae, myopia, and expansionism I have learned about 
directly {i.e.. in “real” life) include board member “suggestions” about the title o f 
studies, whether or not the IRB has “jurisdiction,” and whether or not a study is “valid,” 
(a study which may employ methods with which the IRB member has little or no 
familiarity, but who may assume s/he does, and in a manner o f confusing authority with 
superior knowledge, apply “clinical trial” standards. And it appears IRBs focus too 
intently on (representations of) studies {i.e., protocols from researchers) requesting 
permission to conduct studies involving no treatment"'^ (see Brainard’s study, “An 
inside look at how a university tries to protect human subjects,” 2000, Mar 17, in which 
he observed and interviewed Duke officials after the sanctions there and came to 
conclusions similar to those mentioned here). Many university scholars and government 
ofTicials at an August 2001 conference sponsored by the DHHS expressed concern that 
scrutiny o f researcher’s financial interests would fall to IRBs. “These panels, which are 
required by federal regulations to monitor the risks of proposed research involving
This is not to suggest federal regulators are substantially different from institutional ones in this 
regard. See Brainard (1999, Sep 10) regarding sanctions at the University of Illinois at Chicago, and Burd 
(1995, Apr 14), for similar information about the University of Virginia. Many government reports cited 
herein have indicated the same problem, particularly DHHS OIG and GAO reports in 2000 and 2001.
For example, a history professor, Alan Lessof, o f Illinois State University states that oral history "is so 
outside the realm o f what human-subjects protections were originally designed to deal with that a rational 
person would wonder what is happening," as quoted in Brainard (2001, Mar 9, p. A 21 ).
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human subjects, are widely viewed as overworked and understaffed. Only about a 
fourth o f the IRBs surveyed by the inspector general at [DHHS] routinely review 
conflict-of-interest issues” (Brainard, 2001, Feb 16, p. A33; see also DHHS OIG 1998b, 
2000b; Mangan, 2000, May 19, and 2000, Oct 30; Blumenstyk, 2000, Nov 6; Okie,
2001, Aug 6). 1 would add that the local IRB members would be under undue pressure, 
i.e., they would be under pressure not to stand in the way o f funds, i.e., disapprove 
certain studies. This is a situation in which “local” may be too close to home. It is not 
the best system that could be developed if the goal is human subjects protection. But, as 
mentioned, that goal is mostly superficial in the way processes are developed.
Conflicts o f  interest tensions. Large financial rewards have become more and 
more a part o f the research environment. Conflict o f  interest policies have evolved, 
including disclosure requirements, at research facilities in universities and in 
professional journals. In May 2000, Harvard University drew fire for “considering 
whether to ease some financial restrictions in its conflict-of-interest policies” (Mangan, 
2000, May 19. p. .A.47; see also Mangan, 2000, May 26). According to Mangan, the new 
guidelines were perhaps necessary to retain researchers. Harvard’s policy, according to 
many o f those quoted in Mangan’s articles, is the strictest policy in the country. Sheldon 
Krimsky, a professor o f urban and environmental policy at Tufts University, said 
“Harvard seems to be moving in a direction that’s going to lead to more conflicts o f 
interest and greater secrecy in research” (as quoted in Mangan, 2000, May 19, p. A47). 
Krimsky continues, saying if Harvard relaxes its policy, it would be “lowering the bar at
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a time when we’re getting more information that indicates that close ties between 
universities and industry have adverse consequences to the health o f science and to the 
public interest” (as quoted in Mangan, 2000, May 19, p. A47).*'' Mangan also states 
that Harvard’s consideration to ease its policy is “responding to competitive pressure” 
and surmised that the death o f gene therapy patient Gelsinger in 1999 “may cause some 
schools to tighten their controls over sponsored research” (2000. May 19, p. A 47).'”^
By October, in another article by Mangan (2000, Oct 30), the debate about 
conflict o f interest had escalated, leading to the formation o f a panel (the effort led by 
the president of the Association o f American Medical Colleges) to “help forge a 
consensus on how schools should deal with the problem” (Daily News section). The 
president o f the Association o f American Medical Colleges. Jordan Cohen, said, 
medical schools need to agree on a consistent strategy for confronting financial conflicts 
of interest that are steadily eroding public confidence in clinical research (and taking 
social scientists with them, incidentally and unfortunately). “We risk great peril if we 
fail to respond to the growing perception that financial conflicts o f interest have gotten 
out of control” (Daily News section). (Notice the use o f  the term “growing perception” 
rather than an acknowledgement that financial conflict o f interest is a “real” 
problem."''^) Cohen states “A conflict o f interest is like potential energy: it has the
*' Krimsky was also quoted in Blumenstyk (2001. Apr 26). about disclosure policy in scientific journals. 
"Something's ofT' Krimsky said, when the results indicated conflict of interest/financial disclosures were 
only found in 0.5 percent of the articles examined in the study (Daily N e^s  section).
■'* Harvard eventually decided not to ease their restrictions (see Mangan. 2000. May 26).
The results of a suivey of doctors in 2002 found 58 percent o f those doctors responding had received 
research funding from drug companies, and 38 percent served as company employees or consultants. 
Further, only 7 percent thought their ties to the companies affected their own recommendations, and 19 
percent thought such ties did influence other doctors (Choudhry. et al.. 2002. Feb 6; see also CNN.com. 
2002. Feb 6).
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capacity to cause something to happen, but until unleashed, [it] is simply a lurking 
presence” (as quoted in Mangan, 2000, Oct 30, Daily News s e c t io n ) .T h e  debate has 
further escalated to the level o f the OHRP proposing rules for “institutions, clinical 
investigators, and IRBs to consider when dealing with issues o f  financial interest and 
human subject protection” (see OHRP, 2001, Jan 10; available:
http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gOv/nhrpac/mtgl2-00/finguid.htm, accessed May 25, 2002; also 
see Brainard, 2001, Feb 16.) However, more than half the states are considering or have 
already passed laws designed to eliminate barriers to collaboration between universities 
and private companies, with “conflict-of-interest fears [taking] a back seat to economic 
development” (Schmidt, 2002, Mar 29, p. A 2 6 )." ‘ Many of these states made sizable 
expenditures on research universities, tightening up the relationship between “learning” 
and “learning to profit.”
Ricoeur (1971) states “In the same way that a text is detached from its author, an 
action is detached from its agent and develops consequences o f its own. This 
autonomization o f human action constitutes the social dimension o f action” (p. 541) not
■*“ It would appear that even proposed accreditation groups in this system are not immune to conflict-of- 
interest difficulties. Southwick and Monastersky (2001, Jun 1) report that an IRB accrediting group, in a 
wolves-guarding-the-hen-house arrangement, "will be financed by fees from universities and institutions 
that seek the group’s seal of approval. In addition, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America, a trade group representing drug and biotechnology firms, and the Burroughs Wellcome Fund 
will help finance the organization” (p. A22; see also Southwick, 2002, May 3). This hardly helps stop the 
"steadily eroding public confidence” and "growing perceptions” that financial conflicts have gotten out of 
control. (See also Boseley, 2002, Feb 7, re: scientists taking money for papers ghostwritten by drug 
companies.)
Oklahomans adopted a constitutional amendment in 1998 and also approved a change in a law that had 
prohibited public property from being used for private gain, to allow private companies to have access to 
university laboratories (State Question 680 and 681). The state chapter o f Common Cause complained 
that the initiatives put taxpayers in the position of subsidizing corporate research (see Schmidt, 2002, Mar 
29 and also the Oklahoma Election Board website.
http://www.oklaosf.state.ok.us/~elections/98gen_sq.html, accessed May 25, 2002, for information about 
the amendments).
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only because organizations are produced by numerous actors whose individual roles are 
not distinguishable, but also because “our deeds escape us and have effects which we 
did not intend” (p. 5 4 1 ). This includes what we write. These effects are apparent in the 
IRB system, as in Cohen’s comments above, i.e., conflict o f interest issues are a 
“lurking presence” constituted by “growing perception[s].” These ideas resonate with 
those from the NIH: “Why are there concerns? Concerns are raised when financial 
considerations may compromise or have the appearance o f  compromising an 
investigator’s professional judgment and independence in the design, conduct, or 
publication o f research” (NIH, 2000, Jun 5, Notice OD-00-040, emphasis added). These 
concerns don’t mention human subjects specifically, and point out the “appearance o f 
compromising” as (equally) important.
The power o f  atrocities. At the instimtional level, changes and interpretations 
are rarely driven, at least directly, by atrocities or sanctions. Both, thankfully, are rare; 
unless the system changes dramatically, most institutions will never experience them 
directly. However, many institutions are affected when atrocities or sanctions occur 
anywhere (see comments after Duke sanctions in Brainard, 2000, Mar 17, especially 
Duke associate professor o f medicine and philosophy and bioethicist Jeremy Sugarman, 
who is quoted. “I got e-mail every day [after the suspensions were announced] from
That financial considerations do compromise researcher integrity (the degree might be argued, and 
would vary from individual to individual, life being liquid and local) might be considered a phase one 
image, à la Baudrillard, 1983). The idea of "appearance of compromising" can be described as 
“masking or perverting" a basic reality (phase two), and the failure to acknowledge that compromise 
exists in these situations contributes to sorcery (phase three) in “masking” the absence o f reality (see also 
p. 63. herein). These ideas may also be applied to the ideas that the same rules are adequate for both 
clinical and social research (see footnote # 208, p. 194).
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people at other universities who said, ‘There go we, but for the grace o f God’”). Self­
regulation, normalizing cultural creations, conceding, and behavior too similar to 
mooing follow atrocities and sanctions, with institutional regulators (with managerial 
superiority) often being the first over the cliff, followed very shortly by the compliant 
non-whying herd o f researchers."^
In the absence of (almost exclusively medical) atrocities, tragedies, or sanctions, 
local institutional regulatory drive must (necessarily) come from local experiences. 
Changes in personnel o f an IRB itself or higher-level managers/administrators may 
create change. New people have new (if not necessarily good ideas, in the view of 
some; ideas are perceived as bad if they don’t support the status quo, o f course), and 
incumbents possess a generalized anxiety toward change and difference, a “natural” 
desire to maintain their way o f life, to avoid change and the unknown (a form of 
psychological inertia perhaps) regardless o f the organization examined. This contributes 
to the static nature o f IRB systems (and plenty o f other bureaucracies). This is not to say 
that resistance to changing rules means there is no activity in the IRB system, rather that 
the activity leads (nearly) nowhere (see next section). As Brainard (2000, Mar 17) 
suggested, it is easier, and safer, to focus on wordsmithing consent forms than to 
attempt to answer larger— and self-reflective— philosophical questions about what they 
as regulators are doing overall, or what they are entitled to do in any given instance. As 
.\dom o (1989a) writes, “the completely reified and mediated is a sanctuary from
“  .\dom o (1989b) says, "Lower classes have fewer illusions, are less ‘idealistic’” (p. 272).
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immediacy and life” (p. 130; see also Schütz, 1973, p. 298, and footnote # 209, p. 195 
herein for a relevant statement from Habermas).
SINS-ful sameness. It might be expected that the IRB system would produce 
high levels o f standardized, often strategized, formulaic discourse that doesn’t change in 
meaningful ways the “real” world o f human protection. As shown in various examples 
herein (including Glenn’s discourse, both in the writing o f the bill and the act of 
defending the virtues/establishing the need for it, and, further, in the result o f  the 
efforts— the bill never got out o f committee, i.e., any result related to the purpose o f 
regulations was nothing much, though other benefits may be said to have been gained. 
The discourse may have enhanced Glenn’s political capital, or reduced litigation 
potential for institutions, including many government agencies conducting research. But 
to a much lesser extent were protection provisions affected."*"*
(SINS) STRUCTURES. INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS,
N.ATUREALIZATIONS. SIMULATIONS (such things as the institutionalization o f the 
application process/forms, the naturalizations associated with “the way we do things” at 
the IRB. etc.) operating in the local regulatory system have worked to create 
sameness*"^. This standardization may be beneficial to the IRBs by alleviating, if not
“ ■* Postmodernists might argue there can be no “single" change as a result of any discourse, such as a 
rule, and that we cannot know the effects of the discourse anyway: there may be many several effects, or 
none, and they w ould vary greatly regardless, making many effects hardly recognizable at all, and not 
conclusively related to any particular piece of discourse, for any particular individual, at any particular 
time or place.
“ ■ .A.domo (1989b) says. “Society needs this tireless intellectual reduplication o f everything that is. 
because w ithout this praise of the monotonously alike and with waning efforts to justify that which exists 
on the grounds o f its mere existence, men would ultimately do away with this state of things in 
impatience" (p. 274).
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eliminating, the need to fully engage in protocol reviews because eventually (maybe 
even rapidly) the proposals become intensely formulaic as researchers adopt the IRB 
rules, specifically, conforming to the application process (a comfortable “default" as 
described by Habermas. Schütz, and Adorno and mentioned on the preceding page). 
Conformity, by definition, breeds sameness. I would suggest it is possible, even likely, 
that applicants whose proposals conform, i.e., reflect the formula, are more often and 
more quickly approved, and those applicants whose proposals do not conform are 
subjected to more scrutiny and more often rejected than “standard” applications (this is 
the case at the OUIRB, though if my own somewhat unorthodox applications had been 
approved it would have been possible for me to provide more precise observations).
This is, it might be argued, a form o f “pre-approval” bias, albeit with no guarantees. 
Often IRBs, in the revise-and-resubmit routine, “guide” the researcher to conformity 
and cookie-cutter sameness, if the researcher doesn’t find it on her/his own"*^ (see 
Brainard, 2000, Mar 17 and White, et al.. 1995, for discussion o f typical reasons for 
IRB rejection: see footnote # 233. p. 226). The process, particularly of the researcher’s 
application, becomes an IRB review o f the structure o f the proposal rather than a review 
of the treatments described in the proposal.
This way of conforming is similar to the tendency o f many people to “listen for what to say” rather 
than listen and consider what one “really” thinks or might wish to say. In an example o f Baudrillard's 
image phases, we often are listening to others in order to determine what it is the “other” wants to hear 
(rather than “really” listening to what it is they are saying), then we deliver the appropriate script (rather 
than what it is we might “really” wish to say). Another example involves researchers who know that in 
their study there is no risk to participants. For these researchers, then, the entire application exercise 
(necessarily) becomes about “pleasing the IRB” and not about “protecting human subjects” who have 
nothing from which to be protected.
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Other effects. Other local effects include the following as potentialities o f the
system, given the federally mandated structure and a university based IRB’s expectable
membership (at least historically): activities related to the avoidance o f lawsuits;
previous experience with the applicant, topic, and/or methods; and the IRB member’s
own view o f power. A generally absent yet potentially important “local effect" is
researcher insistence on a better system; resistance of a simultaneously intrusive and
impotent one. Demanding a voice in the process {i.e.. legitimation rather than
marginalization) and/or participating in passive rebellion rather than in an inappropriate
system are rather obvious choices not often selected (perhaps in a socio-professional
version o f survival o f the fittest, i.e.. to win. one must play the game; dissenters, by
definition almost, don’t “fit in” as they are playing a different game, too often whying
about rules, making trouble. etc.)“ '. Adorno (1989b) says it this way:
If we were looking for an ideological justification o f a situation in which 
men are little better than cogs to their own machines, we might claim 
without much exaggeration that present-day human beings serve as such 
an ideology in their own existence, for they seek o f their own free will to 
perpetuate what is obviously a perversion of real life. So we come full 
circle. Men must act in order to change the present petrified conditions o f 
existence, but the latter have left their mark so deeply on people, have 
deprived them of so much o f  their life and individuation, that they scarcely 
seem capable o f the spontaneity necessary to do so. (p. 275)
Power sources. Legitimate power, it is argued in the definition provided by 
French and Raven (1959). is exercised only to the extent that control is acceptable to the
"  Deetz (1995) says. “Tautologically, workers are considered motivated as long as they are productive” 
(p. 103). He continues, saying that human resources are [positioned as] objects for managerial control, 
"and the discursive fiction of motivation is treated as if it were the thing being manipulated, not the 
people, thus hiding the control move, suppressing conflict over the legitimacy o f control, and prohibiting 
discussion o f meaning" (p. 103).
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controlled. This idea is not inconsistent with Foucault (1980), Giroux (1988), Hall 
(1986, 1989), and Weber (1947, pp. 324-341), who was an original source on this sort 
o f definition -  he called it “legitimate authority” rather than “power.” These notions 
about power are particularly relevant in the IRB system, as this system is heavily 
reliant, on both the federal and institutional levels, upon voluntary compliance*'*, and 
most research is unsupervised (see “lack of direct oversight” concerns in DHHS OIG 
1998b, 1998d; GAO, 2001; NBAC 2001, and others). This is another example o f the 
way power operates as a relationship (Foucault, 1980), i.e., power must be given before 
pow er may be possessed. Researchers have given power to the system. And, if one is to 
follow the liquid and local line o f argument, specific researchers give specific power(s) 
to specific regulators at specific times. They don't have to. They do. They may (falsely) 
believe they have no choice. But, “really,” they, we, do.
Impacts o f Various Dogma on Current Svstem
Scientific management theory. Scientific and classical management theories as 
mentioned previously, comprise some of the earliest attempts to understand the 
complexity o f organizations. The works o f Taylor, Fayol, and Weber are examples. 
Taylor (1919/1947) first set forth his views of scientific management as early as 1911. 
Fayol and Weber published work about the same time, although not available in English 
until the 1940s; Taylor's work wasn’t compiled and published until 1947. The IRB 
system was being formed about the same time as these works were becoming available
* The .\AUP (2001 ) reports, “approximately 75 percent of the largest American research institutions, 
which for the most part are research universities or hospital affiliates of universities, have voluntarily
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(the AEC was formed in 1947). These theories share a common tenet, namely that 
organizational efficiency is determined by the efficient design o f work and the 
organizational structure, not inconsistent with Lyotard’s (1984) performativity ideas. In 
looking at the historical developments, these classical theories may be useful in gaining 
better understanding o f the social context that existed at the time o f IRB development, 
and the (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS,
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS we enjoy/endure today.
Taylor's (1919/1947) scientific management system suggests, among other 
things, that there is “one best way” to perform any job (part o f the root ball o f the 
(SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, 
SIMULATIONS o f standardization), and that employees should be selected in a 
measured way (based on test performance or longevity, for example). In the IRB 
situation, not only federal rules about how many people and what categories must be 
maintained on the board, but local traditions may exist, such as having all the colleges 
represented on the board, or other “local” criteria that may become viewed as the “one 
best way” of “doing regulation” (see Sacks, 1970).
Another element o f the scientific management system is that labor should be 
divided so that managers plan and workers follow those plans, i.e.. an authoritarian 
hierarchical system. IRB members operate, as do many regulators, with don’t-ask-why, 
do-it-because-l-said-so, 1-didn’t-make-the-rules, it’s-the-way-we-do-it-around-here 
attitudes. Rules may be interpreted in sometimes vastly differing ways and applied in 
still other ways, suggesting the rules themselves are liquid, but the pattern o f the
extended the IRB review system to all human-subject research” (p. 3).
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process is more solid. For example, one application may take much longer to consider 
than a similar one for no apparent reason, (knowledge gained from numerous personal 
conversations during the past few years with fellow graduate students and professors) 
yet the process o f making the two applications is virtually identical. And, sometimes 
even similar content may be in present in two or more applications treated differently by 
an IRB. i.e., depending upon a particular reviewer’s view on a particular day, decisions 
may be inconsistent over (rather short periods of) time. These inconsistencies may also 
be due, in part, to the attitudes o f both the regulators and researchers that (at least 
occasionally) they are doing something that seems “nonsensical” or contrived (a we- 
have-to-do-this-even-though-it-seems-silly feeling even regulators must get from time- 
to-time). It is difficult to be “logical” or under a blanket o f nonsensical 
circumstances/circumventions (creating/contributing to circumvisions perhaps?).
Fayol’s ( 1916/1949) general management theory outlines 14 fundamental 
principles. Those relevant to this study are his notions o f authority and responsibility, 
discipline, order, and perhaps most relevant, the subordination o f individual interests 
and the development o f esprit de corps (or more contemporary monikers: “production 
teams,” or “corporate cults”). Faculty members encourage students to write applications 
with the goal o f gaining approval— that is the focus of discussion in methods classes, 
both qualitative and quantitative. The discussions are not focused on the “real” purpose 
but on the process and strategies for enduring/accomplishing it.“  ^This is unfortunate
This is an example o f getting a know-how education, without getting much know why, and this is 
primarily because whying is not encouraged in classrooms or in the broader educational environment -  
w e haven’t the time, which is another entire study of a strange counterproductive process-over-purpose 
situation. Could faculty say why. discuss why, in any sensible way and with a straight face?
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for everyone concerned, with the possible exception o f the IRB members themselves. 
They enjoy standardized applications and even (an insidiously) comfortable 
standardization o f studies, contributing to job conditions that are simpler (and safer, 
politically and legally.) “Standardization” may be a preference o f many people (not just 
regulators, but faculty, too, for example). But I would suggest this is an example of 
hegemonic thinking. Many of these same people might also acknowledge, if they 
“really” thought about it. that almost always standardization o f a (nonsensical) process 
is not a superior option to exemption from that process. In qualitative methods classes, 
for example, it would be preferable (and consistent with the purpose o f IRB regulation) 
for many of the IRB proposals required o f students (and subsequently evaluated by 
faculty) to be eliminated. Exemption is far preferable to standardization. I argue, for 
some Very Big reasons (avoiding intellectual suffocation not the least among them) and 
some smaller reasons (attempts to standardize the non-standard world can be a Very Big 
pain in the ass, though dismantling a standardizing structure is an Even Bigger One). O f 
course, thinking un-hegemonically is difficult, troubling, risky, and exhausting.*^”
Process “templates” are a manifestation of managers' (regulators’ in this case) 
co-opting o f volunteer “subordinates” (researchers, particularly) to take part in the 
system, i.e.. to participate in the (SINS) STRUCTURES.
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS. NATURALIZATIONS. SIMULATIONS o f the 
regulatory (and as a gift, dominant) “scientifically managed” cultural reproduction.
.A.nd it can lead to rather substantial trouble for the thinker (especially thinker-as-activist). internally 
and externally. Troubles like the loss o f popularity and status that comes with staging passive (or active) 
rebellion, pesky incarceration/assault threats, or the development o f an actual and/or ongoing need for 
bail bonds and/dr bodyguards are (perhaps overly colorful) examples.
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Illustrating this is the behavior o f the many graduate students and faculty members who 
circulate advice about what sorts o f studies should be avoided (or adopted) if reasonably 
quick IRJB approval is to happen. Their advice is based on their own individual histories 
with the IRB, what they feel they understand of the IRB policies, and rumor, too.
One o f the (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS,
NATUREALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS in the IRB system is the belief that a “best for 
all” condition exists, à la Taylor, and Plato. (1 would suggest that the idea o f a 
“common good” as possible is required to drive a system toward standardization, i.e., 
“template fever.”) Even regulators themselves indicate that if “template fever” runs too 
high, the template may add symptoms (demonstrating, incidentally, that regulators can 
admit that even templates have points of diminishing returns) rather than operating as a 
cure for a sick system. (In this “fever” scenario, it would follow that the system could 
occasionally become delirious). The OHRP, in its letter to Johns Hopkins University 
(OHRP, 2001, Jul 19) outlining the reasons for sanctions in the wake o f the death o f a 
healthy volunteer in an asthma trial, stated, “OHRP is concerned that the boilerplate 
informed consent document is difficult to understand and contains information that may 
be irrelevant for certain research projects” (p. 8) yet on the previous page, language 
used by the OHRP seems to contradict, or at least point out the difficult dialectical 
tensions between providing enough but not too much information on the consent 
form.*^' In particular, OHRP (2001, Jul 19) suggests that the IRBs “encourage
.Among other things. Forester (1989) argues “planners who seek to meet public needs face even greater 
challenges than their more romanticized private-sector counterparts, the corporate ‘strategic’ planners ’ (p. 
4). Forester (1989) concludes, “Compared to the job the public sector planners have, the planner with 
private-sector clients has it easy” (p. 4).
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investigators to limit the length o f informed consent documents, and as a result, 
important information is being excluded;” “OHRP again strongly recommends that the 
informed consent document boilerplate used by the IRBs and checklist be modified to 
include the additional elements at 45 CFR 46.116(b);” and “OHRP is concerned that the 
informed consent documents approved by the IRBs often appeared to include complex 
language that would not be understandable to all subjects” (p. 7). A similar situation, 
with respect to limiting the length of informed consent forms to something substantially 
shorter than the instructions provided, exists at the University o f  Oklahoma, as 
mentioned (see University o f Oklahoma, IRB application form, 
http://research.ou.edu/Forms/index.htm, accessed May 25, 2002.). These statements do 
little to clarify what Johns Hopkins should do, but they speak volumes about the 
difficulties in delivering informed consent in the “real world”"^ * and the inconsistency 
in the simulation, bom from dialectical tensions in the “real” world. In the OHRP letter 
to Johns Hopkins (OHRP, 2001, Jul 19), regulators indicate that the use o f  a boilerplate 
and complexity o f the form may have contributed to the problems related to the death o f  
a volunteer, that the informed consent form “appeared to include complex language that 
would not be understandable to all subjects.”
Not only are the subjects o f research perhaps unable to understand the complex 
language o f consent forms, similarly, researchers may not, as mentioned, understand the 
complex language used in or the structure o f the process. For example, the instmctions
A web search (Google, October 5, 2001) for the term “informed consent” yielded 724,000 hits. These 
included both federal and institutional references. Just at the federal level, the DHHS website rendered a 
total o f 3,460 documents; within the NIH site, a total of2,185 hits; and the OHRP website alone yielded 
103 documents. Add to this din the interpretations at the institutional level, and the notion o f “confused
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o u  provides to explain the informed consent document and how to successfully 
negotiate it are substantially longer than the “recommended length” o f the informed 
consent document itself. While it is understandable that this would occasionally be the 
case in the world, it is particularly troublesome here. Given that many o f the 
instructions include lengthy passages about actual verbiage that must be included on the 
informed consent document (an example o f wordsmithing, as has been mentioned 
previously, see footnote # 18, p. 16, p. 212, and p. 221), it appears the “ instructions” are 
impossible (or nearly so) to follow, i.e.. to include all the required information produces 
a document longer than the recommended length, found in the same set o f  instructions.
Finally, Weber (1947), in reporting his observations o f bureaucratic functioning, 
suggests the “ideal” organization {i.e., a “real” bureaucracy) in the eyes o f  practiced 
bureaucrats has six basic features: a clear hierarchical system of authority; a division o f 
labor according to specialization; a complete system of rules regarding the rights, 
responsibilities, and duties o f personnel; exhaustive procedures for work performance; 
impersonality in human organizational relationships; and selection and promotion of 
personnel solely on the basis o f  technical competence. These ideas are institutions, 
visible in merit systems o f public employment, for example, and certainly in the IRB 
regulatory system. Finally, Alvesson and Deetz (1996) suggest “Taylor’s and Weber’s 
treatment o f rationalization and bureaucratization showed from the start the corporation 
as a site o f the development o f modernist logic and instrumental reasoning” (p. 194).
consent” (see p. 17) becomes a reasonable, even likely scenario, among everyone, i.e.. the regulators, the 
researchers, and the participants.
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The IRB system creates a thorough illusion that Weber, Fayol, and Taylor were 
published yesterday.
Structural/Functional explanations. In the 1950s, structural-functional theory 
dominated sociology, the emphasis placed on the power o f institutionalized norms to 
detennine behavior. Beginning in the 1960s, sociologists began to abandon this 
thinking. In 1967, GaiTmkel rebelled, arguing the deterministic models presented people 
as “judgmental dopes” who couldn’t do their own thinking. It’s fairly clear that 
sometimes we won’t do our own thinking. And other times, it appears, we cannot. Not 
under the rules, anyway. The informed consent process in social sciences, and the 
Theory X management techniques o f institutional (and institutionalized) IRBs have 
provided a system that treats both social science researchers and participants as 
unthinking and imbecilic, respectively (if not respectfully). In the IRB system, the 
process now dictates much researcher behavior. But, as described in earlier chapters, the 
IRB system is especially sensitive to the larger political context, and therefore driven by 
various outside forces. Few o f the changes produced are directly related to human 
subjects protections, and even more rarely related to the actual event that “started” a 
given debate (see p. 22, and footnote # 172, p. 155). It is understandable why 
researchers might become confused in making applications. Strategies that worked at 
one time (when Ellis was director o f OPRR vs. Koski as head o f OHRP, for example, or 
rules regarding stem cell research with Clinton as president vs. rules under the Bush 
administration, or when the local IRB changes membership composition, experiences
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outside criticism, or is sanctioned) are deemed (or “really” become) ineffective (or less 
than optimally so) for no apparently good reason, i.e.. no evidence is provided to 
support a/the change(s) proposed. Institutional regulatory responses to these outside 
(and some at least arguably irrelevant) forces take a variety o f  forms, (most often, rule 
or enforcement proliferation in response to a generalized need to “do something,” see 
particularly the headlines in Brainard, 1999, Dec 17; 2000, Feb 4; 2000, Apr 14; 2000, 
May 26a & b; 2000, Jun 2; 2001, Jan 5; 2001, Jan 12; and 2001, Feb 16, as examples) 
and numerous activities occur simultaneously (parties to the situation feel compelled to 
“do something,” demonstrated in the same Brainard headlines cited above, as well as 
the articles themselves), the synergy o f which transcends individual events in affecting 
the system.
de Saussure (1915/1966), a father o f structuralism, stated that words are not 
meaningful in isolation (consistent with G.H. Mead and others), but receive their 
meanings because o f their differences {i.e., in the minds o f  the meaning makers, an anti 
people-are-dopes position) from other words o f the same systems, de Saussure used the 
term la langue to describe the system o f a language, which needs to be treated 
differently than the actual speech o f the people who use the language, which he 
described as parole. La langue is a social product, transmitted to the members o f the 
linguistic community, and it comes to exist "in the mind" o f each speaker, affecting the 
way the world is understood. I believe that even though the phrase “in the mind” is 
used, what is being described is an example o f (SINS) STRUCTURES, 
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS operating
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mostly out o f  mind once they are learned. This lack o f  visibility contributes to the power 
o f these terms and processes. Many fewer questions arise once the system is installed, 
once it is learned, whether it is “understood” or “questioned” or not.
Entrenchment. The IRB regulatory system is so entrenched (full o f (SINS) 
STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, 
SIMULATIONS) it no longer needs overt coercion to operate smoothly. Fear o f 
litigation, fear o f sanctions, fear of personal humiliation, fear o f financial loss are 
coercion, and are often perpetrated (covertly) on oneself. These bars (see p. 44) are seen 
as an inevitable part o f research life.
IRBs have lots of carrots, especially as far as student researchers are concerned, 
and unless IRB members are highly vigilant, they are inherently coercive -  students 
“know” they can’t publish (and will, therefore, certainly perish attributable to other 
SINS beyond the scope of the present study) without the approval o f the IRB to live 
their research lives, or at least finish their programs. IRBs control the definition of 
“timely” (for example, what constitutes a timely response from the IRB or from 
researchers, what constitutes a timely report to regulators about problems with a study, 
and determining what is considered a “timely” submission or a “timely” response from 
a local IRB. See also OU Policy, Section 6, parts 1 and 3; Section 11.2, part 1; Section 
12.2, part 1) and are above student scrutiny, i.e.. the board doesn’t have to answer to 
student whying, evident by the lack o f due process or appeals structures. The OUIRB 
policy regarding the use o f human subjects states in Section 10, part 5, when the
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OUIRB disapproves an investigator’s request"^^, “notification shall include a statement 
o f the reasons for its decision and the investigator shall be given an opportunity to 
respond in writing or in person.” [The OUIRB] may, at its own discretion, “re-review 
and reconsider its decision to disapprove a research activity at any time” (OU Policy, 
Section 10, part 5). This could hardly be considered the intersection of Adequate 
Appeal Avenue and Reasonable Regulation Road.
To provide guidelines, as the federal regulators do, suggesting what is right is 
substantially less intrusive than requiring paperwork that is designed (in futility and 
perpetuity at once) to ensure people do the right thing. Rules do not replace a 
researcher’s personal values or lack of them, as argued previously (see p. 27-29 and 
244-246; see also Cassell, 1982). Trust o f researchers on the part o f institutions allows 
“blanket assurance” from researchers (and that is a leadership option they have 
available, i.e.. no federal rules prevent it). But, a blanket assurance for researchers is not 
“normal,” therefore, system staticity {i.e., inertia) being a strong prevailing tendency, 
blanket assurance is less likely to be done at the institutional level. If it were adopted, 
the focus o f classroom discussion might shift toward discussion about protection, 
because the process would be minimal, simple, painless, mostly unremarkable and 
forgettable, as, 1 would argue, a “good” process should be. There are, o f course, 
political and psychological, even financial benefits to making things appear worse than
.\ccording to a study conducted by the Emergency Medicine Residency Programs at Akron General 
Medical Center and Butterworth Hospital in Grand Rapids, Michigan, (White, et al., 1995) common 
reasons for (medical) protocol rejections were informed consent problems (54 percent), poor study 
design (44 percent), unacceptable risk to subjects (34 percent), ethical or legal reasons (24 percent), and 
lack of scientific merit ( 14 percent). (Note: Some applications had more than one “problem.”)
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they are, namely the establishment o f the illusion o f  the “need” to “do something” in 
a given situation and that “doing something” would actually positively impact anything 
(also see footnotes # 26 and 27, p. 22).
Under the proper conditions, such as clear, non-coercive written agreements and 
the tendency to keep one's word, employees (researchers) seek out and accept 
responsibility and exercise self-control and self-direction (McGregor, 1960). Policies 
like these are more likely to develop a climate o f trust. Distrust and coercion was 
demonstrated in the past few years o f federal regulatory activity, when more sanctions 
were imposed in 20 months than in the 20 years prior (Brainard, 2000, Feb 4). And, 
Congressional activities in 1997 (and those since) were attempts to put a system 
promoting distrust and coercion in place, i.e., more rules, more direct supervision, and 
(redundant) criminal punishment provisions. These actions appear to have been 
attempts to enhance political capital (see Joe Kennedy’s prepared statement to the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, U.S. Senate. 1994, Jan 13, p. 3-4). 
And, Campbell (1999, May 28) quotes a university IRB official as saying “I think it is 
more than just a coincidence that the Inspector General releases this damning report 
about IRBs last summer (referring to DHHS OIG 1998b; see also Campbell, 1998, Jun 
12), Congress holds a hearing about it, then all o f a sudden OPRR comes out with this 
flurry o f suspensions,” p. A30).
^  For example, very few baby sitters slap kids around, but if a few are caught (or staged) on videotape 
and these tapes are viewed on news programs, talk shows, and in court rooms, a whole new industry is 
bom: miniature portable, wireless cameras, and a whole new level o f surveillance, fear, distrust, and. the 
not-so-new (over) drive to profit
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Diverse Voices Offer Similar Reasons for Change
The authors o f the DHHS OIG reports and similar documents have concluded 
that the IRB regulatory system is in need o f reform, and diverse voices have identified 
similar problems and offered similar reasons for and suggestions about them. These 
voices include the following: OPRR, 1999; NBAC, 2001; NIH, 1999; Monastersky,
2001, May 21 ; Greenberg, 2001, Jan 19; Brainard, 2001, Jan 12; Brainard, 2001, Mar 9; 
Brainard, 2000, September 13; WTieeler, 1991, Dec 4 (who quoted long-time regulatory 
observer and Yale professor of law, medicine, and psychiatry Jay Katz as having called 
informed consent “a charade”); Burd, 1994. Feb 9; AAUP, 2001; ACHRE, 1995; 
Brainard, 2000, Feb 4. Brainard, 2000, Mar 17. Brainard, 2000, May 30; Brainard,
2000. Sep 13; Campbell, 1997, Sep 12; Campbell, 1998, Apr 3; Charo, 1999, Jun 25; 
Charo, 1999, Mar 26; GAO, 1996; GAO, 2001; Geertz, 1988; Gray, 1982; Insiiiuiional 
review boards: A system in jeopardy, 1998, Jun 11; Hayes, Hayes & Dykstra, 1995; 
Healy. 1999, Jul 30; NBAC. 1997; OHRP, 2001, Jan 10; Okie, 2001, Aug 6; Pence,
2001. Jan 12; President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1981; U.S. House, 2000, May 3; Punch, 
1998; Tropp, 1982; and Wheeler, 1991. Dec 4.
“IRBs review too much, too quickly, and with too little expertise” (DHHS OIG, 
1998b, p. ii)~^^. “This system was created to deal with a simpler research environment," 
says Arthur L. Cap Ian, director o f the Center for Bioethics at the University of 
Pennsylvania (as quoted in Walker, 1996, Nov 8, p. A29). Caplan continues, “The
Members of a review board at Columbia University, for example, were overwhelmed when asked to 
review a study on xenotransplantation (Walker. 1996. Nov 8).
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volume o f research proposals has gone up, the pace o f  scientific activity has increased 
considerably" (p. A29). In addition, some researchers and universities have acquired a 
financial stake in the growing number o f studies sponsored by private industry, Caplan 
says, raising concerns about conflicts o f interests. Some argue it no longer makes sense 
to give university officials, whose institutions depend on money brought in by 
government-sponsored clinical research, so much of the responsibility for maintaining 
the ethical standards o f research. "The local character o f these panels is more and more 
dubious," given the "amount o f  money at stake," says David J. Rothman, professor of 
social medicine at Columbia University's College of Physicians and Surgeons, and a 
member o f that university's IRB (as quoted in Walker, 1996, Nov 8, p. A29).
This perceived need for reform (DHHS OIG 1998b; Brainard, 2000, Sep 13; 
GAO, 2001, and others) is based on problems such as those found to be inherent in 
bureaucracies, i.e.. the system is slow moving and reactionary, with a bias toward over­
regulation, overly complex and ambiguous federal regulations, and even more 
ambiguous institutional renditions o f them.’ '*’
A \ the institutional level, (and based on the proliferation o f rules there), distrust 
of researchers and coercion appear prevalent. And as mentioned, inconsistencies across 
IRBs exist, at least in part due to the localized nature of the IRB system, and perhaps 
enhanced by the transience o f faculty/scholars. Finally, problems are apparent with new
Brainard (2000, Mar 17) states “Although the board [Duke's IRB] tinkers more with the wording than 
the substance of proposed experiments, some researchers at Duke and elsewhere say clinical research has 
become so specialized that IRB members—especially the commimity and medical-student 
representatives— lack sufficient expertise to adequately evaluate risks posed by research proposals" (p.
, \3 1 ). Robert Califf. chief executive officer o f the Duke Clinical Research Institute, which coordinates 
multi-site clinical trials in 50 nations, said “All over the U.S.. you have amateurs reviewing professionally
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areas o f  research that are not covered under the rules (as shown in the gene therapy 
cases, particularly Gelsinger) and new/emerging/re-emerging unobtrusive methods 
(many have argued unduly) restricted by the rules (see AAUP, 2001). Several views, 
critical and others, are desirable in attempting to gain an understanding o f the system 
(an understanding that would be likely enhanced by direct observation). That 
understanding must surely precede any intelligent attempt to effectively (by any 
dogmatic standard) reform the system. Compared to what it took to develop, maintain, 
expand, and entrench the system, it appears it takes much more effort to reform (or 
eliminate or ignore) it. And, to eliminate any parts o f  it will require, it appears, 
substantially greater effort than the more frequent but still somewhat rare'^' “lateral 
revisions” (what we might call minor rule changes that don’t “really” increase or 
decrease the burden o f the regulation nor change the effects o f it in any significant way; 
i.e.. change for the sake o f change, activity for the sake of image). But to convince 
people (researchers and regulators) that it can be eliminated will, it is likely, take the 
most effort o f all. (I recall a story about, I believe, W.K. Kellogg. When asked how 
much money it takes to get into the cornflakes business, he replied, “To build the 
facility? SX million. To get people to buy them? Three times as much.”)
Even with the widespread voluntary adoption o f regulations by institutions (at 
least, supplying the text that “constitutes” adoption), many research settings do not 
adhere to the Common Rule (45 C.F.R. § 46, 1991), intentionally or not. Some may
done clinical research." as quoted in Brainard (2000. Mar 17. p. A31). For historical perspectives, see 
O'Connor ( 1979).
^  Mostly there is talk rather than action, which probably produces a positive effect on the process.
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interpret the Rule in any given situation differently than regulators or lawmakers 
intended, or fail to apply the Rule in instances when regulators would, and so on. 
Additionally, there certainly must be some degree o f intersubjective disagreement 
among various IRB members, discontinuity with change in the board chair, outside 
pressures, etc.
Still the larger questions are not related to how we have come to accept, expect, 
dread being treated like incompetent, immoral idiots by power-crazed jackasses*^*, but 
whyl Adorno (1989a, p. 133), states “conformity has replaced consciousness” and 
observes advice that is valid every day is idiotic (see Adorno quote below, p. 233).
Risks o f Over-regulation
Charo (1999, Jun 25), professor o f law and medical ethics at the University of 
Wisconsin at Madison, and a member o f the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
(NBAC) asks:
How many people have been used in studies that lacked the basic 
protections o f  the Common Rule? Nobody knows, because no law 
mandates the collection o f data on human subjects used in research.
How many o f those people thought they were patients rather than 
research subjects? Nobody knows. How many were injured or 
received substandard care? Nobody knows. How many o f them paid, 
privately or through their insurance, for the privilege o f being 
unwitting subjects? Nobody knows, (p. A64)
The term "jackass” has a fairly specific meaning in this usage. “Jackass” is used to describe, generally, 
a male (a brother, cousin, friend, or more rarely an uncle or father, or close colleague) or a collective of 
both genders (often applied to politicians, police, regulatory boards, etc.). It implies the person or entity is 
being excessively stubborn and obstinate, and is acting stupid. If the person is actually stupid, s/he is 
generally referred to as a “dumbass” rather than a “jackass.” These definitions and their nuances hold in 
Oklahoma and somewhat beyond, though I’m not sure of the outside boundary o f the vernacular region 
(see Zdorkowski & Carney, 1985, re; vernacular regions).
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Given that criminal charges are rarely brought, even in medical trials, and there 
is no explosion in civil damage suits, it appears that these questions are slightly 
paranoid, especially as they might be applied to the “minimal risk” conditions o f much 
social scientific research “treatments,” i.e., involving participants who are not patients. 
While vigilance is perhaps good, paranoia is debilitating. I would counter Charo's 
questions with (perhaps) paranoid ones o f my owm: How many studies aren’t attempted 
because o f stifling regulation? How many researchers have given up attempts to study 
sensitive issues, unlawful activities, protected classes, the important fringe? How many 
times? How many people might have been helped if regulation hadn’t prevented certain 
studies?
Within the IRB system, it is not apparent that decisions are based on widespread 
observation o f the system. No data exist because (virtually) no oversight e x i s t s . H o w  
can w e expect to understand a system such as the IRB if we can’t even look at it closely 
to see how it operates?"'*”
IRB decisions about sanctions, “needed” rule changes, new (marketed as better 
by regulators’ definitions) procedures, etc., are often based on emergency responses to 
various pressures. These pressures are often political ones, those induced and 
perpetuated by media and spin doctors. This may contribute to over-regulation, i.e.. 
over correcting after an atrocity or compliance violation is discovered and becomes
Ellis in testimony before U.S. House Subcommittee on Human Resources, (see U.S. House. 1998, Jun 
11 ). stated [OPRR] files “are replete with examples o f human subjects involved in research that are not 
formally protected by the twin protections of IRJB review and informed consent. These are very 
frustrating cases for our office because our authority stops the moment we determine that there are no 
federal funds involved” (p. 52). We might presume that once the “authority” stops, so does observation. 
i.e.. investigation, at least on the federal level.
See footnote ~ 54, p. 48, re: my own application status at the OUIRB.
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public (see Koski’s comment in footnote # 178, p. 164, regarding hammers and 
thumbtacks). And (process based) “compliance” has replaced (purpose based) 
“protection” as the most salient set o f issues— a simulation in which the process 
obscures the purpose.
The prevalent belief that regulatory systems, including IRBs, cause little if any 
“real” harm by over regulating is dangerous (see O ’Connor, 1979, who compares 
research regulation wiAi that of business, stating “The record o f federal attempts to 
regulate business is hardly encouraging as a model to be followed,” p. 226). Too much 
regulation is the preferred error when the health and safety o f human subjects o f 
research (overwhelmingly patients) are involved, to be sure. But as indicated, that 
situation is uncommon; punishment here has been generally for violations o f rules, not 
harm to people. But just because too much regulation may be preferable if a true 
dilemma should exist, that does not render over-regulation harmless (see O ’Connor, 
1979), and the harms are exponentially higher when the problem is system-wide, and 
invisible. Further, news o f atrocities and abuses has increased the tendency toward more 
(over) regulation. As mentioned, rules don’t work to give values to those who don’t 
already have them, and lack of rules doesn’t take a person’s values away. Yet, when a 
researcher defaults to what is perceived as a more doable study {i.e., more doable under 
the burden o f too many and too many ill-fitting and'or irrelevant rules), this defaulting 
may be harmful. (See my questions in answer to Charo, p. 231 above.)
Adorno (1989a) states “The attitudes which the culture industry calls forth are 
anything but harmless. If an astrologer urges his readers to drive carefully on a
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particular day, that certainly hurts no one; they will, however, be harmed indeed by the 
stupefaction which lies in the claim that advice which is valid every day, and which is 
therefore idiotic, needs the approval o f the stars" (p. 134).
The system as it presents itself at the OUIRB appears oftentimes to stifle rather 
than facilitate the pursuit o f  knowledge (academic inquiry, at least), but the hegemonic 
(positivistic) discourse also promotes *“thinking-in-a-bo.\-ism” in a place where that 
kind o f non-thinking should be discouraged, rather than prescribed. Who can blame 
researchers, especially students, for following a path o f least resistance, especially in the 
face o f all the encouragement they receive in that regard? The "real" pressure to finish 
one's program o f study, and tendencies to follow the path o f least resistance are anti- 
educational. Why should we expect students indoctrinated in this way to become 
"educated" later?
It appears we "really" need to do something, and it seems apparent no one else 
cares as much, has as big an incentive, (is in as much "danger” ) or is as qualified as the 
researchers themselves. Reform of the system perhaps, then, begins with reforming our 
owTi attitudes about the system, and about reform. And an acknowledgement of, no 
matter how confusing, painful, or exhausting, the "real" nature o f things.
*■" Punch ( 1998) reports some professors argue students should abandon the classroom in order to “knock 
on doors, troop the streets, and join groups;" they should Just “get in there and see what is going on” (as 
Punch cites Howard Becker advising a bemused British student asking what “paradigm” he should 
employ in the field). Qualitative research may be seen as potentially volatile, even hazardous, 
necessitating adequate preparation before someone is allowed to do field work. Punch recalls this position 
w as strongly advocated by John Lofland at an .4SA seminar on participant observation, where he 
‘Virtually demanded a certification of competence before the researcher be let loose in the field” (p. 157). 
Punch argues for the "get out and do it” perspective and warns against “leaning too far toward a highly 
restrictive model for research that serves to prevent academics from exploring complex social realities 
that are not always amenable to more formal methods” (p. 157). And Denzin and Lincoln (1998a) suggest 
“too much critique will stifie this [qualitative] project” (p. 410).
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Chapter Seven: SINS in Qualitative Research Endeavors, Individual Effects
"For the present, it will be sufficient that I repeat to you what I have said before 
about our two minds. One is our true mind, the product o f  all our life experiences, the 
one that rarely speaks because it has been defeated and relegated to obscurity. The 
other, the mind we use daily fo r  everything we do, is a foreign installation." don Juan, to 
Carlos Castaneda, quoted in The Active Side o f  Infinity, p. 9 (emphasis in original).
Habermas (1984) termed the third part o f his model o f  reproduction
“socialization" in which social identities, motives, and expressions o f  the self are altered
and developed. Ideas about the individual-in-society will be explored in this chapter.
Adorno (1989b) says.
Human beings find their ‘roles’ in that structural mechanism o f society 
which trains them to pure self-conservation at the same time that it denies 
them conservation o f their Selves ... The all-powerful principle o f identity 
itself, the abstract interchangeability o f social tasks, works toward the 
extinction o f their personal identities, (p. 270)
In terms o f method. Forester (1993) argues for the exploration o f concrete social 
interactions, i.e. promises, threats, agreements, deals, conflicts and so on. Forester, 
along with Foucault (1972), utilizes textual interactions for study, as will be done here.
Relevant Aspects o f Qualitative Research
As established, qualitative research implies an emphasis on process and a search 
for depth o f understanding o f perceptions, meanings, interpretations, and behaviors, in 
contrast with the measurement o f the quantity, frequency, or even intensity o f  some 
externally defined variables (operationalizations, most prominently). I focus on those
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aspects o f  qualitative research that make the phenomena very difficult to control, 
predict, or standardize.'^' Much qualitative work is designed to detect SINS. It is an 
area o f the “real” world where (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, 
NATURALIZATIONS. SIMULATIONS (here obvious methodological examples 
include ideology critique, resistance readings, observing, surveying, and interviewing— 
especially about how one goes about ordinary ways o f living and reasons offered about 
why, etc.) are perhaps more apparent to qualitative researchers— it is the qualitative 
researcher's area, i.e., a relatively common part o f their work, to discover, describe, 
discuss, and/or deconstruct (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, 
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS. The kinds o f SINS on which a researcher 
may focus, and what the researcher does with the SINS (describe, deconstruct, defend, 
debunk, etc.) varies, contributing to diversity (and many different labels such as critical 
theory, ethnomethodology, textual analysis, participant observation, etc.) in qualitative 
research approaches and results.'"*^
Individual qualitative researchers use a wide array o f interconnected methods, 
and the enterprise is a creative adaptive process (Denzin & Lincoln. 2000, and 
numerous others cited herein, including the work of Van Maanen, Agar, and Punch). It
Scholars in the social sciences and humanities are “reporting similar run-ins with IRBs." Brainard 
(2001. Mar 9) states. “The projects in question include oral-history interviews, survey research, 
anthropological fieldwork, and journalistic interviews” (p. A21). “Some researchers complain that IRBs 
are reviewing research projects that are exempt from review, or that they are delaying the approval 
process for projects that should be exempt” (Brainard. 2001, Mar 9. p. .\2 I ). It is perhaps because 
qualitative methods (interviews, surveys, anthropological fieldwork, etc.) are difficult to control, predict, 
or standardize that they should be exempt, and that any attempt to regulate them will produce (as I have 
argued) “real” data contamination and legitimate researcher complaints.
See Smith ( 1988) w ho proposes skeptical pluralism as a way of making sense of human 
communication and knowledge about it, as an alternative to the laws/systems/rules trichotomy (Cushman. 
1977; Cushman & Pearce, 1977a). Smith categorizes modem philosophies into four styles: phenomenal
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is inherently impossible to know in advance exactly what will be done or found in 
qualitative research (see also discussion. Chapter Six, re: application form difficulties, 
p. 174-185, herein). If new methods are needed, they are created, often parts o f existing 
methods pieced together or used in new ways. All (or some) o f this often occurs 
retrospectively. The qualitative researcher engages in what might be called “emergent 
construction” o f the study, in terms o f  both content and method. Qualitative research is 
inductive, the research process cannot be formulated in detail in advance. It is this 
creative discovery process that, while increasing the difficulty o f regulating it, greatly 
contributes to the scientific value o f qualitative research. Much qualitative research is 
conducted in the course o f doing quantitative studies, although this activity is often not 
considered (therefore not labeled) “research.” Via this (lack of) labeling, a very “real” 
exemption is created.
IfViar is an organization? Schütz (1973, especially p. 16-17) focused on the 
meaning interaction has for the participants, and Berger and Luckmann (1966) contend 
that reality is constituted by the participants, i.e., participant meaning is reality. 
Foucault (1972) takes a step to the position that discourse actually constitutes 
organizations. Foucault (1972) also puts forth a useful framework for illuminating 
various aspects o f organizations, including what he terms “discursive formations.” This 
would suggest that researchers have more power to deconstruct the IRB process, in the 
literal sense, than they may presume they have. The process is constituted, as Foucault
(focused on things, empiricism), operational (focused on thoughts; operationalism), naturalistic (focused 
on actions; emotion), and phenomenological (focused on words; reason).
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(1972) contends, through discourse (and certainly the IRB system relies on written 
texts). Therefore, regulators cannot “really” accomplish the process without the 
researchers’ cooperation, i.e., researchers have to play along (and research participants, 
too) in order to make the regulation process work. In this way, power to regulate is 
given rather than a given but this distinction does not often rise above the horizon of 
awareness. (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, 
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS such as “operating for the greater good” and 
perceptions o f the IRB processes as being “necessary” or “unavoidable” are apparent.
Schütz’ (1973) ideas are related to the work of Habermas (truth as 
intersubjectivity, 1987, p. 71-72) and Coffman (frame analysis, 1974). Lived experience 
is “intersected by world time, biological time, and social time, and is sedimented in the 
unique sequence o f an articulated biography” (Schütz and Luckmann, 1973, p. 103). 
Mead (1934), according to Schütz and Luckmann (1973, p. 42-43), is to be given credit 
for having analyzed the “reality structure” o f the relationship between physical objects 
and human action and the manipulation of those structures. Mead’s (1934) idea of the 
“manipulative zone” supports the description o f the lifeworld offered by Schütz (1973, 
p. 208). Mead (1934) set forth the idea that meanings are not individually determined 
but are derived through social interaction. Meaning, like power, doesn’t occur in a 
vacuum, i.e.. power is given and meaning is made, as described above. They (power and 
meaning) are negotiated in the discourse, through what Foucault (1972) has described 
as the “relationships o f power.”
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The shared group meanings make up the world o f individual actors, and these 
shared meanings provide the framework in which action is carried out, although they do 
not cause or fully determine behavior. Mead (1934) contends. These ideas are related to 
the IRB system in that they describe the “common world” o f the IRB system, the shared 
meanings among and between regulators and researchers, the (overwhelmingly textual) 
framework that indicates what actions are "supposed” to be taken by an individual, etc.
It is particularly crucial in a regulatory system that shared meaning exist for the 
participants, especially the (SINS) STRUCTURES. INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, 
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS (such as the mysticism embedded in beliefs 
that “rules are good,” “ following rules is good,” “rules are needed,” etc.), with gradually 
more and more layers o f interpretation (whether or not a certain rule is a good rule is, 
who must follow which rules, etc.) heaped on. And, it is essential (for the system to 
work) that power be given to the regulators. This may be a source o f researcher 
justification and rationalization for “bending” the rules, i.e.. circumventing various 
processes, occasionally talking (officially or not, whether considered reasonable or not, 
and from any side o f a controversy) about the absurdities o f a system .'^
Emerging issues. Situations developing in the research arena, for example gene 
therapy and stem cell research, require new labels. This is a right generally extended to 
regulators— even when the researchers themselves during the course o f their work and
With respect to the stem cell controversy for example. Douglas Johnson, legislative director for the 
National Right to Life Committee, told the Los Angeles Times, the NIH "may think it can protect itself 
by requiring that the embryos actually be killed by someone not receiving federal funds, or by requiring
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in their applications or elsewhere first suggest terms, the endorsement, positioning, and 
vilification o f terms is a function o f regulators (along with, most often subsequently, the 
press). In view o f Foucault’s (1972) position that institutions are actually comprised o f 
discourse, labeling, categorizing, and characterizing phenomena are especially strong 
sources o f  power."'*^ Examples o f  labeling activity in the IRB system include special 
discursive constructions such as “ informed consent” and The Common Rule, Multiple 
Project Assurances, etc. Regulators construct these, define them, “acronymize” them, 
and implement them, and researchers accept them as required without much regard for 
whether or not they are necessary or how much they restrict research and/or affect the 
findings o f research.
The initial creation of rules and definitions, and the subsequent interpretations o f 
them comprise the vast majority o f the communication activity involved in this system, 
and many o f these socio-historical structures are considered as “real” concrete physical 
objects by individuals, as obvious, and unquestionable, and (the focus o f this chapter) 
mostly, self-evident. Further, as Deetz (1995) points out, “To the extent that a person 
uses [a] codified form, he or she implicitly consents to the values and processes by 
which it was formed. The potential interest-laden value debate is thus suppressed in the 
face o f the neutral and natural” (p. 136).
the federally funded researcher to clock out when he kills the embryos, but these would be subterfuges 
and do violence to the clear intent o f  the law" (as quoted in .Andrews, 1999, Jan 29, p. B4).
For example, Davis (2000, Aug 12) suggests the label homosexual "perversion” says as much about 
society as it does about science.
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Other Relevant Theories and Observations
Many o f these (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS,
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS can be seen and have been reported by others,
including the findings o f  the AAUP survey conducted in spring 2000 (AAUP, 200
The survey responses indicated:
Some researchers gave good marks to their campus IRBs for drawing 
their attention to ethical issues and for improving their proposals. Others 
reported excessive delays in review of researcher proposals, failures of 
IRBs to follow federal regulations that apply to survey research and oral 
history, and members o f IRBs having little familiarity with social- 
science research compared to what they know about clinical and 
biomedical research. Some worried that the regulatory structure could 
improperly restrain freedom o f inquiry and the pursuit o f knowledge, and 
others claimed that it had done so already, (p. 3)
A (complete) lack o f ambiguity (impossible o f course) in the system is sought 
by regulators, consistent with Weber’s observations about the goals o f bureaucracy and 
McGregor’s description o f the Theory X view of the capabilities and culpabilities of 
people. Even researchers, often frustrated by a lack of clarity in the rules, seem to want 
a lack o f ambiguity and more consistent interpretations. This contention is supported by 
Schütz’ notion that people may enjoy the simplicity regulation brings.'"’^
The .\.\U P  report is the result of meetings held in 1999 and 2000 involving representatives of the 
.American .Anthropological Association, the American Historical Association, the American Political 
Science .Association, the American Sociological Association, the Oral History Association, and the 
Organization of American Historians. The primary purpose of the meetings was to explore the 
experiences of social scientists in the IRB regulatory system.
Schütz and Luckmann ( 1973) state “The social stock of knowledge transmitted to the individual 
relieves him of the necessity of ‘independently’ solving a whole series o f important everyday 
occurrences. As a consequence o f this, the individual has in principle the possibility o f turning toward 
new ' and thus not-yet-solved problems that are also perhaps not even recognized. This is not Just the 
case for new ’ problems in everyday life. More importantly, such an unburdening allows one to turn to 
non-every day problems. Making use o f this opportunity to acquire new knowledge ‘independently’ is in 
turn socially conditioned. Because the prevailing social stock of knowledge frees every individual from 
finding ‘independent’ solutions to broad provinces of typical everyday problems, one could in principle 
assume that new elements always flow out o f subjective, more or less ‘independent’ solutions to ‘new’
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Goffman 's frames. In the social interactioa/sociai construction area. Go Oman 
(1974) points out various ways that primary frames can be transformed or altered, and 
analyzes the way experience is organized for individuals. (SINS) STRUCTURES, 
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS may be 
considered “primary” fiâmes (see Goffman, 1974, p. 21-39), i.e., many aspects o f the 
IRB system “are neatly presentable as a system of entities, postulates, and rules” 
(Goffman, 1974, p. 21), and “allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a 
seemingly infinite number o f concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (p. 21). Frames 
may be created through discourse, and are at least mostly invisible to the participants 
themselves in the day-to-day lifeworld, even if they weren’t always so, i.e., frames are 
learned, so when they were first being learned they were more visible, perhaps.
Goffman (1974) adds, when writing about primary frames, that the person is 
“likely to be unaware o f such organized features as the framework has and unable to 
describe the framework with any completeness if asked, yet these handicaps are no bar 
to ... easily and fully applying it” (p. 21). As mentioned earlier, when considering 
active consent, and the systemic processes that render coercion unnecessary, the 
worker’s own 5c//^understanding o f his/her experiences becomes central (see p. 59, 99, 
and 224).
Questions useful in considering these aspects o f the IRB system (in addition to 
those provided by Foucault, see Appendix A, p. 344) are provided by Forester (1993): 
“What makes possible or impedes a worker’s finding out information at the workplace.
problems, into the stock of knowledge” (p. 298). Tliese ideas speak to the notion o f self-regulation and its 
prominence in that they suggest we (sometimes necessarily) default to rules by choice.
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challenging rules or norms, or expressing needs, feelings, his or her identity, way of 
being?” (p. 131) Answers to these questions aid understanding of the ways SINS 
operate in the IRB system, for example, why don’t researchers challenge norms?
Express needs? Reject the ridiculous?
Schütz and Adorno: Relief and sanctuary. One o f  Schütz’ notions is particularly 
relevant to the IRB system as it relates to individual researchers. Schütz and Luckmann
(1973) state, "The social stock o f knowledge transmitted to the individual relieves him 
o f the necessity o f independently solving a whole series o f important everyday 
occurrences ... more importantly, such an unburdening allows one to turn to non- 
everyday problems" (p. 298). Adorno (1989a) says “each product [of the culture 
industry] affects an individual air; individuality itself serves to reinforce ideology, 
insofar as the illusion is conjured up that the completely reified and mediated is a 
sanctuary from immediacy and life” (p. 130). We erect and respect (and eventually 
become blind to) the bars. We “contain” ourselves.
This freedom not to think is an example, even if troubling in other respects, of 
(SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, 
SIMULATIONS described by many of the theorists mentioned here including Adorno 
(1989a, p. 132) regarding the SINS related to the adoption o f the “vacuous, banal, or 
worse” culture industry); and Schütz, (1973, p. 3-4) regarding the SINS of experiencing 
things in the world as self-evident and/or unavoidable, and an overall lack of 
questioning. In addition to the more common use o f  stereotyping (Lippman, 1922) as it
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is applied to people, I believe that we also stereotype systems {i.e., social structures) and 
for the same reasons we stereotype people: in order to make the world more 
manageable/comprehendible/simpler/easier. One might say, for example, " IRB (or any) 
regulation works.” If the person convinces him/herself that it is true, s/he doesn’t have 
to think more intensely or directly about human protection (or whatever a particular 
regulation is about). Following the rules (the means) becomes the (relatively simple) 
end. Brings relief (Schütz). Is a sanctuary (Adorno).
Values and rules. Gadamer (1960/1989) maintains we cannot escape the 
historically conditioned character o f our own understanding of texts, laws, rites, and 
other objects o f hermeneutical study. We cannot approach objects (life or science) in a 
value-free, undistorted context"'*’* (see also Deetz, 1978). In other words (SINS) 
STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, 
SIMULATIONS, in this case in the form of values, are present in every researcher’s 
worldview (by virtue o f his/her person-hood) including the perhaps desirable SINS such 
as humanity, compassion, trustworthiness, etc., whether discussing structures of the 
lifeworld, discursive formations, or values; whether conducting quantitative, qualitative, 
rhetorical, critical analysis or some other analysis; and whether the researcher 
acknowledges the presence o f  his/her values or does not.
We could attempt this, but it would be pointless as one person’s value is another’s vice; one’s 
protection, another’s intrusion. Abortion v. individual freedoms and capital punishment are examples. 
Life is liquid and local, and universals don’t work to describe it very effectively. This may be especially 
true where values/morals are concerned.
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Values are more deeply held (in the heads and hearts o f  individuals, i.e., 
intrinsic phenomena), perhaps because they are more “readily available” (rules are 
extrinsic, found in books or on websites, or somewhere apart from the individual). 
Further, we “write” our own values, we control them (even when we don’t think we can 
or don’t exercise control). Ordinarily, most o f us have much less control over the 
writing o f rules. And, finally, we always control our own compliance with and 
interpretations o f the rules, again, even when we don’t think we can or don’t exercise 
the control.
Therefore, people act most often on their own (local and liquid) values, and 
(most times) tolerate (for some reason and to various degrees) the rules {i.e.. attempts to 
standardize personal values, set them in concrete with the expectation that concrete will 
stay put, and. perhaps, that jackhammers don't exist). Meanwhile. IRB members 
maintain the fairly strange idea that they are somehow affecting the research 
environment in the intended way (regarding the ability o f the system to establish and 
meet process goals, see GAO, 1996 and 2001; NIH, 2001, Jun 26, and 2000, Jun 5; 
ACHRE, 1995: AAUP, 2001; and DHHS GIG, 2000b), and in a positive way, even 
thinking they (the regulators and the processes) are necessary for the safety o f research 
participants and patients. This demonstrates confusion and is delusional, on the part of 
the IRB members, but even more curiously, on the part o f the researchers who “go 
along” with procedures that are (often and often clearly) b iz a rre .In s titu tio n a l IRB
Rose (1986. Oct) addresses both the vaiues-as-more-immediate-than-ruies issue and the ease-with- 
which-we-participate-in-our-own-subordination observation. “Historically torture has been a tool of legal 
systems, used to get information needed for a trial or ... to determine guilt or innocence” ... “In other 
words, torture didn’t come into existence to give vent to human sadism” (p. 38). Edward Peters, author of
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members are not, I argue, significant to the purpose o f regulation, regardless o f the 
control they demonstrate over the process. Values are most related to the regulatory 
purpose, and, as with values, purpose is therefore more familiar to people. The purpose 
enters our psyches on an emotional level, it makes good sense to us, it “seems right.” 
Rules, on the other hand, are related to regulatory process and are endured rather than 
embraced, not desired, tolerated at a more superficial level. Rules are less salient than 
values. Therefore, processes are (generally) followed: purposes are fe ll. IRB members 
don 't affect researchers and participants (i.e., they don’t change what is fe lt toward 
participants), rather they have effects on them (they change what is done). The process 
is often criticized for creating problems including problems that have harmed research 
participants (see Campbell, 1997, Sep 12; 1998, Apr 3; Brainard. 2000, Feb 4; 2000, 
Mar 17; 2000. Jul 21; 2000. Sep 13; 2001, Mar 9; DHHS OIG. 1998b, 1998d. 2000b; 
G.AO, 2001; Gray. 1982; AAUP. 2001; Whyte, 1987; O ’Connor. 1979. and others).
Individual Effects
.^Wesson and Deetz (1996) reason that if identity is socially produced, it will be 
relatively stable in homogeneous societies, but as a society becomes more fragmented 
and/or more simulated, i.e., the discourse becomes less and less connected to any “real 
world” reference, identity-stabilizing forces are lost. While suggesting the possibility o f 
tremendous freedom and opportunity for dominated groups, this idea also suggests that
a book about torture (quoted by Rose. 1986, Oct) says “the institution o f torture creates sadists; the 
weight of a culture is necessary to recruit torturers” (p. 38). Rose (1986. Oct) adds. “V^Tiat’s horrifying is 
how easily you can persuade someone that he is working for the common good” (p. 39). She uses 
Milgram's (1963) experiment as an example.
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the lack o f stability may lead to naturalization strategies in which people voluntarily 
cling themselves (concede to; contain themselves within) consumer identities (we are 
what we have), corporate identities (we are what we do), academic identities (we are 
what we think we know), etc.'^^ (see also Willmott, 1994).
With respect to an individual researcher’s social and moral obligations. Punch 
(1998) states, “On the one hand, there is the nature o f the researcher’s personal 
relationships with people [s/lie] encounters in the field. On the other hand, there are the 
moral and ethical aspects related to the purpose and conduct o f research itself. In effect, 
how far can you go?” (p. 166). Neither academic programs nor the regulatory system 
itself seems to be able to make this clear or reasonable.
Student researcher exemption. As a member o f a qualitative methods class, 1 
witnessed the problems o f many students in the class who had not yet gained approval 
at the end o f the semester for their class projects, even though their applications had 
been made, generally, a few months earlier. According to the authors o f the rules, 
students are generally exempt from the IRB process.'^' What “real” reason exists for
I see this as very similar to children following rules. We “know” children are “growing up" when they 
stop (their sometimes incessant, nearly always cumbersome) whying, i.e.. questioning of authority. 
(Slowing down on tattoos and piercings are further signs). When, and if. they begin to acquiesce to what 
we dominators (adults) know is best (dogma) and when they stop succumbing to peer pressure (usually 
different dogma) they are termed “more mature.” This is amusing in the face o f IRB regulation: Very 
w ell educated, highly-dominated adults, behaving as obedient (mature) children, i.e.. not challenging 
authority or creating trouble or conflict, succumbing to peer pressure parading as professionalism.
Section 5 o f the OUIRB policy handbook states. “In most cases, class research projects which involve 
human subjects and which are conducted by students as exercises to learn how to conduct research do not 
require review by the IRB-NC. However, both students and their advisors and instructors are asked to 
inform themselves o f the requirements associated with the use o f human subjects in research projects 
such as maintaining confidentiality and obtaining written informed consent to participate in the study 
before the project begins to protect subjects from physical and/or mental harm, from putting themselves 
at risk of civil or criminal liability, and from revealing sensitive aspects about their own behavior. Class
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this (lack of) reasoning? What reasoning makes the exemption of students reasonable? 
None.
First, this exemption appears to indoctrinate students in a way contrary to the 
goals o f education in general, and IRB procedures and the perpetuation o f them in 
particular. The exemption policy suggests to the students (and faculty) that IRB rules 
are frivolous formalities rather than essential protections. Exempting students from the 
process marginalizes the purpose. Second, it renders the student’s data unusable for 
future projects, “teaching” what might be called “academic wastefulness” or 
“ inefficiency,” or another exercise in “class project futility.” Finally, and most 
important, the policy doesn’t do what it is “intended” to do, i.e. protect human subjects. 
Unless extraordinary circumstances exist, what prevents an IRB from acting quickly 
{i.e., within a week or two) on proposals involving minimal risk to human subjects? 
Using no unprotected classes? Where no treatment is involved? Why are such studies 
reviewed at all?
research projects which are conducted with an expectation that the results o f the research will be made 
public through publication, including publication in a thesis or dissertation or presentation at a meeting, 
must be reviewed and approved by the IRB-NC before the project begins. In addition, all class research 
projects which involve protected groups as defined in 45 Code o f Federal Regulations Part 46 {i.e.. 
special populations, such as, but not limited to, fetuses, pregnant women, in vitro fertilization o f human 
ova, children, prisoners, and persons institutionalized as mentally disabled) must be reviewed and 
ajjproved by the IRB-NC before the research can begin.
■■■ These contrary indoctrinations, wastefulness, inefficiencies and goal-missing may happen all the time, 
but they are not good reasons to (continue to) perpetuate them. Similarly, the adage “it’s easier said than 
done" (which is almost always true) is inadequate reason for inaction, as is “1 can’t do it by myself.” This 
last statement is also likely true in terms of accomplishing things, but one can start alone.
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Concluding Remarks
As discussed elsewhere, the central (legitimate) foci for protections o f human 
subjects o f social science research involve matters o f privacy, confidentiality, and 
informed consent. Invasion o f privacy issues are addressed with the assurance of 
confidentiality. But, as with most rules, they are impotent. Even assurances with the 
best intentions are not absolute. Sometimes, it should be acknowledged, “people who 
participate in research have to accept a considerable measure o f exposure, particularly if 
the popular media pick up on the research" (Punch, 1998, p. 176).
Assurances o f absolute anonymity such as these are at best precarious. To assert 
that no harm or embarrassment will come to a participant is somewhat like making a 
promise “to always be there," walking out the door, and being killed by an oncoming 
truck. There are some promises we can’t make, life and death being what they “really” 
are. This speaks too about the liquidity and locality o f promises themselves. Promises, 
like regulations, have more to do with intent than prediction. More to do with 
immediate context than remote control.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion
"H'e are much less Greeks than we believe. We are neither in the amphitheatre, 
nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine ... is it surprising [then] that prisons 
resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons? " Michel 
Foucault. Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f  the Prison, p. 217. 228
Regulation is. inherently yet relatively, restrictive, cumbersome, and myopic. 
Pursuant o f "ideal” forms; focused on standardization. One-best-way absolutism. Bars.
“Every historical period has probably had its particular equivalences o f 
traditionalists, modernists, critical theorists, and postmodernists, those who lament the 
passing of a purer time, those instrumentally building a future, those concerned with 
disadvantaged segments and the direction of the future, and those seeing fragmentation 
and decay mixed with radical potential” (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 193).
The IRB regulatory system has reached and passed any possible point o f 
diminishing returns, and moved to the creation of detrimental effects. How important is 
it that we stop participating in our own subjugation, marginalization, and domination, 
in, at least, the IRB system? It appears that (in this little IRB slice o f the world) if we 
wish to continue to observe the natural world and report what we see in it {i.e., to 
continue with qualitative methods, it is o f critical importance to dismantle major 
portions o f this system, including local "more rigorous” interpretations o f federal rules 
(see p. 181 and 198). We must re-focus on “real” concerns that involve “real” and 
rapidly expanding risks such as conflicts o f interest.
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IRB Purpose, and Mine
What are IRBs “really” doing for the benefit o f human subjects o f qualitative 
and survey (non)treatments? My experience (not that much o f it can be mentioned here 
in any specific way; in lieu, see quote from AAUP, 2001, p. 241 herein.) suggests that 
local IRBs convolute the process for researchers, infringe on their rights to conduct free 
inquiry, and contaminate the natural world. Further, IRBs are not offering “protections” 
to human subjects o f these treatments, mostly because none are needed.'^^ Informed 
consent, for example, has no bearing when the (qualitative) researcher and participant 
are necessarily “being ordinary people” as Sacks (1970, as compiled by Jefferson, and 
included in Atkinson & Heritage, 1984) might put it.
The pursuit of process (regulation) has surpassed the pursuit o f  purpose 
(protection). My purpose here is to deconstruct the (many) regulatory apparatuses via 
the illumination o f the self-regulatory behaviors present. I believe this is the most 
expeditious route to deconstruction and eventual deregulation. Regulators won’t 
deconstruct themselves; they need our encouragement and assistance. And, we must 
first see what it is they do to us (the SINS) before we will muster much effort to stop it.
In the past t\  ^o years of searching. I have not found cases in which social scientists have been sued for 
damaging a survey or interview participant or a person who was being observed by a social scientist. I 
have searched Google, OHRP. NIH. Chronicle of Higher Education, and other sites using the following 
search term combinations: “lawsuit social science,” “lawsuit social scientist.” “lawsuit social science 
privacy." and “lawsuit privacy.” I foimd no information relevant to the kinds of “problems” that might 
need to be solved regarding the protection o f interview and survey participants and observed persons. 
Further, nothing I have read in the materials I have used in this dissertation and in the related research 
indicates a lawsuit, a pattern of complaints, or any other indications of problems in this area. See also 
foomote # 37, p. 27, and Gray (1982) specifically p. 331 re: studies without risk. Because “no risk” and 
“very low risk” (and defined in terms o f both number o f risks and degree of risk) are labels used by the 
federal government (and have been used for decades), it is logical to presume categories of “no problem” 
and “very low [number of/degree of] problems” might result.
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Qualitative Research Issues
Long-term as well as immediate effects o f both federal and local regulatory 
decisions are important to consider. To think about, write about, and act about. Science 
is. as is religion, politics (see Forester, 1989, p. 3-4). Like religion before it, positivistic 
science became and both have mostly remained, to use M arx's words, the opiates o f the 
intellectual and marketing masses for the past few hundred y e a r s . “Common” sense 
may be coming back into vogue (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000), and if it is, situations 
(including regulations) that “seems odd” to people may begin (or continue) to matter 
more. Positive connotations o f terms such as “grassroots” and “town hall meetings” are 
evidence o f this possible regaining o f respect for the local, the “common knowledge” or 
“common s e n s e . I t  would appear the programs designed to enhance self-respect 
(especially trusting and acting on one’s own knowledge and judgment) might be 
working to enhance the social capital o f skepticism and dissention. To demarginalize, 
de-objectify critics. To embrace and enjoy (rather than only sometimes tolerate) 
diversity.
Marx' actual words were, "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless 
world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people" from the preface of Contribution 
to the Critique o f  Hegel s Philosophy o f  Right (1844). And this quote has been invoked in diverse ways. 
•According to Bartlett's Familiar Quotations online. “The formulation has invited many variations, 
including the observation by Edmund Wilson in Letters on Literature and Politics ( 1977): ‘Marxism is 
the opium of the intellectuals.’ and. according to psychiatrist Thomas Szasz writing about drugs in The 
Second Sin (1973): ‘In the United States today, opiates are the religion o f the people”' (See 
http:. w"w\v-.bartleby.com/66/23/38123.html. accessed May 25, 2002.)
■■■ .An event recounted in a book by BBC reporters David Edmonds and John Eidinow (2002) involved 
Ludw ig Wittgenstein. Karl Popper, and Bertrand Russell. During a disagreement with Popper. 
Wittgenstein allegedly waved a poker at Popper, was told by Russell to put it down, and Wittgenstein 
complied. In reviewing the book, Trachtman (2002. .Apr) said the poker waving was “a warning, to all of 
us. that whenever philosophers, or scientists, or any other intellectual elite claim to possess some truth 
that runs counter to common sense, they are talking nonsense” (p. 124). Trachtman (2002. Apr) says that 
Wittgenstein talked about formal languages, like those of philosophy and science, saying that because
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Many investigators, particularly students and faculty with whom I’ve spoken 
from 1999 to 2002, have said there is something more interesting they would explore if 
they “could get it past the IRB” or they are breaking the rules occasionally, or 
circumventing the process in order to do something o f greater interest and importance to 
them, and, at least perhaps, to all o f us (suggesting for a moment that some findings are 
useful!). The “need” for these regulatory processes that control many types o f minimal 
risk studies is rarely if ever supported. But, it isn’t questioned in meaningful ways, 
either. If the need exists, we don’t know it. Participants need no protection from 
unobtrusive researchers. Researchers need protections to their entitlements: they are 
entitled to their values, their perspectives, and (most all) their pursuits. But, according 
to the rules, researchers are required to alter the normal experience (the lifeworld, as 
described by Husserl, Dilthey, Schütz, and others) o f the people being studied (by 
telling them they are being studied, and in other ways) even though those people are not 
at risk in any significant way or number. Extremely few participants in social scientific 
studies are in need o f proieciion at all, as protection already exists when considering the 
remedies available in criminal and civil courts. And for those who are at risk, it is, 1 
argue, the decisions o f researchers that are critical, and not the rules or lack o f them.
In explaining to participants that a study is being conducted, the explanation 
alters the researcher and the researched, i.e., the “real world.” Once they are affected, 
researchers are, simply, no longer studying the “real” world, but an altered research 
environment— an artificial world comparable to those o f the social psychological
these languages “follow strict rules and rule out contradictions, they lack common sense and give a 
misleading view of the world” (p. 135).
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experiment and the social survey. And it is altered for no good purpose: not the fear of 
harming humans, but the fear o f harming the rules, the process.
I’m skeptical about changing, affecting, manipulating the natural environment 
and referring to the data gathered in that environment as “empirical” data. This situation 
is the result of what I have called “required but unnecessary” regulatory requirements 
(see p. 36, 48, 185, and 202 herein; also GAO, 2001; AAUP, 2001). Along with every 
layer o f federal regulation also come the attendant local interpretations, often described 
as (virtuously) “more rigorous.”'^*
The treatments qualitative researchers ask for permission to inflict include 
observing people in their natural world, asking people questions in conversation, or 
recalling relevant aspects o f one’s own life in what might be called retro-obser\ ation, 
reflexive methods (Alvesson & Skoldberg, 2000) and other activities. This is maybe the 
central reason for the unmanageability, the “unregulat-ability” o f qualitative research, 
the lack o f a priori knowledge o f what will be data, who might supply it, when the data 
may become useful or how long it may remain so (see concerns about IRB rules 
requiring the destruction o f anthropological and other data in AAUP, 2001), or even 
what the point o f the studies might ultimately be.
These treatments are at least as irmocuous as survey research. However, 
quantitative and survey protocols are perhaps more familiar to IRB members, and meet
This was mentioned by a local IRB chair several times in an open forum in Fall 2001. The chair used 
the words “more rigorous” and, in this context, that means more restrictive and rigid.
”  It can be argued that as an ethnographer “ ... one never really leaves the field because the experience 
itself may be elaborated and experienced throughout the ethnographer’s life” (Crawford, 1996, p. 163). 
This is “real” life, and impossible to control, “regula-torily” or otherwise. As Klockars (1979) and others 
have suggested, researchers should be skeptical o f well-meaning bureaucrats and their (inevitable)
254
with less apprehension, resistance, or scrutiny.'^® Perhaps IRB members (most o f whom 
demonstrate more familiarity with quantitative methods than qualitative ones'^^) are 
more comfortable with the quantitative researchers standardized, formulaic, and precise 
specification of the procedures in step-by-step and moment-to-moment detail all 
rendered in an explicit, articulated (if unmakeable) promise. For example, a researcher’s 
local experiences, accurately remembered, reported, and rendered relevant, are not only 
adequate for use as data (see Hayano, 1979; Foucault, 1980; Crawford, 1996; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000), but often highly desirable. And these particular activities, along with 
many other qualitative research endeavors, “need” no regulation, (O f course, having a 
higher ratio o f qualitative researchers on IRBs would most likely help everyone 
involved.)
Some o f the problems with trying to regulate qualitative research are apparent in 
the application form (see application form analysis in Chapter Six, p. 174-185. herein). 
For example, the methods in the qualitative approach are developed (as are the 
questions) as the process continues. This “reality” considerably confounds any attempt 
to describe the study in advance.‘ °^ When a researcher is looking a/, rather than looking 
fo r , it is impossible to be precise in the same way as in a clinical trial or other
attempts to make rules and guidelines. We should all be wary of them, and o f our own tendencies to 
follow them.
Qualitative methods may be disorienting to those who are unfamiliar with them, because “they require 
stepping out of one's usual framework for making sense of daily life and stepping into the unfamiliar 
world of others. Consequently, the results o f qualitative research may require reconceptualization of 
mainstream values and perspectives or the examination of the underlying reasons for those perspectives” 
(Denzin & Lincoln. 2000. p. 11).
The numbers o f each would tend to support this as well. MB AC (2001 ) reported that 75 percent of 
current research reviewed by IRBs is clinical and biomedical in nature.
Field observ ation differs from some other models o f observation in that it is not only a data-collecting 
activity. Frequently, perhaps typically, it is a theory-generating activity as well (see Lofland & Lofland. 
1995; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).
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hypothesis-driven approach in an application process. Regulation makes this type o f 
study “undoable” (or the regulation is undoable, as is the point here) whether it is the 
intent o f  regulators (to be impossible) or not. The processes related to regulation corrupt 
"real world” data whether that is acknowledged by regulators and researchers or not.
Given the rules that have been in place for more than 25 years, 1 argue that many 
"natural” settings have been (historically and continue to be) "altered” rather than 
"natural,” and the degree to which this may be true is largely dependent upon the 
affiliation (or lack) o f the researcher and the associated IRB regulations or lack o f them, 
and (perhaps most important) the interpretations o f the regulations by local IRBs, i.e., 
what the IRBs required that particular researcher at that particular time to do that may 
have altered the natural ("real”) environment. Even though the treatment may not have 
changed significantly, if  at all, the environment did (because o f the rules), and therefore 
the results did. Maybe significantly. Maybe not. These rules have and continue to work 
against what are perhaps the least risky forms o f research (see also Geertz, 1988). It 
doesn’t seem possible that qualitative researchers can both do adequate work and follow 
the rules (Geertz, 1988, p. 133, who speaks o f the right to write ethnography being at 
risk).
Many qualitative methods involve no activity that is o f any greater risk than that 
found in ordinary everyday life. In many qualitative endeavors, nothing resembling 
"treatment” is involved. This, 1 argue, is the prima fac ie  case for abdicating the system. 
Where can there be risk if  there is no treatment?'®‘ And where there is no risk, there
If researchers find it necessary to reveal the identities of private individuals who are participants, they 
can make that judgment and proceed to get permission or have their asses sued off if they don’t.
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should be no IRB involvement by definition. Regulations may be (legitimately) viewed 
as required but unnecessary by many qualitative researchers (and government 
researchers, see GAO 2001, p. 6).
Concession. Circumvention. Contamination
Researcher concession. That qualitative research is not easy to regulate is not 
the biggest problem. That no one has established the need for regulation in the first 
place, and that very few have openly challenged a system that doesn’t work are bigger 
problems, in my view.
As the AAUP (2001 ) suggests, social scientists were co-opted into the 
regulatory system “from the beginning.” but how did it happen? Why? And why is it 
that some social scientists aren’t? 1 believe social scientists opted in themselves, in part, 
to enhance the “scientificity” o f their work, i.e., to appear more legitimate in scientific 
terms by succumbing to the same scrutiny as the positivists. (Somewhat as several 
Indian tribes have become “nations” to, perhaps, “appear” more valid, more sovereign. 
Also, see Flyvbjerg, 2001 re: the scientificity issue.)
Some individuals (1 would argue students are an especially relevant group in this 
situation) are susceptible to manipulation, which can lead to domination by a group or 
(an automated) structure. Given power by individuals, driven by (SINS) 
STRUCTURES. INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS,
.Additional rules seem—are— redundant. If researchers don’t need to use identities, then it is the case that 
the researcher owns his/her own experience and the IRB process becomes absurd (unless signing one’s
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SIMULATIONS including the anthem that conflict is negative, and fueled by 
tendencies toward compliance and obedience, researchers in the IRB system allow at 
least two forms o f domination, i.e.. localized “parental” control o f  the IRB itself, as well 
as big-picture peer pressure, i.e., researchers are dominated by the behavior o f  other 
researchers. So, in this case o f IRB regulation, what works to constrain and subordinate 
researchers may be their own concession, based on the desire, following Schütz’ 
thinking, to maintain a “focus on non-everyday problems" and to take advantage o f the 
“stock o f knowledge” as presented by regulators (what might be called 
“unacknowledged knowledge”). Relieving vital risk and responsibility, one can take 
solace and defense, if  necessary, in “1 was just following rules” mentality.
In workplace structures, conflicts are minimized and eliminated with managerial 
tactics; (SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS,
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS of the “don’t rock the boat,” “be a team 
player,” “follow the leader” (even if over the cliff) variety help create there’s-no- 
problem-here illusions. Certain SINS are reinforced (notions that conflict and rebellion 
are good are rarely among them, even if it is said that they are welcomed) with 
doctrines including job enrichment programs, TQM, organization as family, and dress- 
for-success formulas,'*’* and even research methods classes/seminars, when the leaders 
advocate/require participation in an unreasonable system, and describe it as “ inevitable” 
and, simultaneously, unreasonable. These models often contribute to illusions {i.e..
own consent form seems reasonable).
Some may use different equations 
and some (researchers) do things differently (or wrong, in the IRB view) because of the way they were
on purpose (1 say dress for comfort, plan for success, for example)
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simulations) o f well being, development, progress, happiness, satisfaction, “rightness,” 
etc. More bars.
“Most members o f culted organizations may have choices, but organizational 
coercion keeps them from being exercised” (Amott, 2000, p. 93). Culted employees (or 
conditioned researchers, 1 suggest) “have turned over their right to make decisions” (p. 
93; see also Schütz & Luckmann, 1973, who says, ” ... the prevailing social stock of 
knowledge frees every individual from finding ‘independent’ solutions to broad 
provinces o f typical everyday problems . . .” p. 298; see also Adomo, 1989a;
Horkheimer & Adomo, 1944/1972; and Habermas, 1971).
Qualitative researchers, in particular, have conceded too much for too long.
They have conceded so much in fact that they can no longer do their work under the 
rules. Perhaps inventing circumventions is somehow better, easier, involves less 
conflict, causes less trouble, etc. than casting off an impotent system. 1 would agree that 
in the short term, it is. But not overall. Eventually the “real” world must be “really” 
encountered, i.e., experienced.
However, in the IRB system, researcher assimilation, in a sense meant by both 
Baudrillard and Rand, is nearly complete in that compliance is held as equal to 
protection and as virtuous, or at least inevitable. Compliance, though itself often 
difficult, remains the path o f least resistance, and the need for regulation is too rarely, 
nearly never questioned. There is no whying. Assimilation into the regulatory system 
seems inevitable, adding to the likelihood it will be. Baudrillard (1983) makes a similar
indoctrinated rather than a lack of indoctrination. Left to our own instincts, we might, perhaps, dress 
“better” and “protect” more.
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case about U.S. colonization, “At the beginning [of the process], a moment o f stupor 
and amazement before the very possibility o f escaping the universal law o f the Gospel. 
There were two possible responses: either to admit that this law was not universal, or to 
exterminate the Indians so as to remove the evidence. In general, it was enough to 
convert them, or simply to discover them, to ensure their slow extermination” (p. 20).
So it goes with thinkers, as with Rand’s “[people] o f the mind” (Rand, 1957/1992, 
particularly John Galt’s speech, p. 923).
Researcher circumvention. Circumvention, public, private, and corporate’^^ , 
occurs frequently in the face o f “required but unnecessary” regulation. Being required 
to gain informed consent when employing no treatment (observations and/or 
involvement o f non-identified [and therefore non-] participants) is an example o f the 
problem and informal “ local” solution, i.e., circumvention.
Informed consent provisions require a form that specifies, among other things, 
that the subject may withdraw from the research project at any time. How does this 
work in research involving participant observation, for example? And issues o f 
sampling, i.e.. people who “wish” to participate may vary substantially from those who 
are simply observed. As Weppner (1977) observes, this threatens the continued 
existence o f much “street-style” ethnography (p. 41). When Powdermaker ( 1966, and 
recalled in Punch, 1998) was confronted with a lynch mob, was she supposed to ask the
See Overland. 2002, Feb 19. regarding pharmaceutical company plans to conduct trials in India, “at a 
time when such research is facing increasingly tough oversight in the United States” (Daily News). This 
activitv would appear to support Deetz (1995) who states “Global economies weaken all state units” (p. 
27).
260
participants to stop the proceedings while she delivered informed consent forms? Or, 
worse in my view, was she simply to avoid writing about her experience? Gaining 
consent is inappropriate because activity is taking place that cannot be interrupted. 
Researchers (especially qualitative ones, the primary focus o f this analysis) may (of 
necessity, in order to do the kinds o f work they do and preserve the study environment) 
circumvent the process, but, much more rarely, the purpose. Even if one doesn’t trust 
researchers themselves to do what is “right,” there are already laws against abusing 
others (research participants or not). And, there is very little risk, if any, inherently in 
observational/survey/interview methods; even if researchers using these methods 
wanted to, there is little they could to do actually harm people.
Contamination o f  the natural world. In much fieldwork there seems to be no 
way around the predicament that informed consent— divulging one’s identity and 
research purpose— will “kill many a project stone dead” (Punch, 1998, p. 171). And if it 
doesn’t kill the project, as it can be argued it did in my case and countless others,*^ it 
can drastically skew the data and results. And it causes in my estimation, a loss o f 
“spirit” for this kind o f research. As I have argued, the study is no longer o f the natural 
world, but o f an altered research environment. Data becomes contaminated, often with 
socially desirable behaviors and explanations, accounts and attributions o f participants. 
The natural world becomes a much more contrived one. IRB requirements so
I had the audacity to try it. Many, I surmise, would argue based on the response o f the OUIRB to my 
applications, there is little reason to try, and this is evidence o f the level o f self-regulation, or 
“unacknowledged knowledge” that operates in this system.
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contaminate data that to gather it would be pointless. It could be likened to adding a 50 
percent margin o f  error to a quantitative venture, or finding significance at .0000001.
Even when/if the natural world can be preserved as a place o f study, sometimes 
(as in my case) researchers are simply regulated out o f business, i.e., the process 
becomes impossible to accomplish and/or permission is simply never granted; the 
application is ignored. “One need not always be brutally honest, direct, and explicit 
about one's research purpose, but one should not normally engage in disguise. One 
should not steal documents. One should not directly lie to people. And, although one 
may disguise identity to a certain extent, one should not break promises made to 
people” (Punch, 1998, p. 172). 1 ask, how does this differ from “ordinary life” values? 
There is no need, indeed no way to regulate these values. People, including researchers, 
who have these values use them, and those who don’t have or use them aren 't affected 
by rules in the way the rules were designed to affect them.'*^
Cans (1982) expresses:
The social scientist attempts to describe the world as it is, and he must 
therefore observe people in their normal, everyday ways. Should he hide 
his purpose, either by not telling them of his participant-observation role, 
or by asking interview questions which get at more than they seem to on 
the surface, he does so because he has no other alternative. If he bares all 
his research purposes, he may be denied access to the very society he 
wants to study. If he forswears participant-observation and gathers his 
data solely by interviewing, he can get only reports o f behavior, but not 
behavior itself. If he is completely open about his participant-observation 
or interview questions, his respondents are likely to hide information 
from him— not necessarily by intention— by giving him access not to
Though these values are "teachable” and guidelines and the experiences o f other researchers would be 
useful for new researchers, regulation of these matters is not possible or reasonable, I am suggesting.
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behavior but to appearances; not to what people do, but how they would 
like their doings to appear publicly, (p. 405)*^^
It is “not ethically necessary, nor methodologically sound to make known 
specific hypotheses, background assumptions, or particular areas o f interest” (Van 
Maanen, 1978. p. 334).*^' Further, quantitative researchers aren’t required to reveal 
their hypotheses to participants. As a senior American academic at an ASA seminar on 
field methods put it bluntly, “You do lie through your teeth” (quoted by Punch, 1998, p. 
173). The process o f regulating qualitative non-treatment, minimal/no risk research 
must be revealed as the façade (simulation) it is. Why haven’t we abandoned it before 
now? SINS.
Too much regulation contributes to another “real” world phenomenon. 
Unnecessary yet required rules (somewhat like “fascinating but unpublishable” 
manuscripts; see Wax, 1971, p. Lx) and processes create a sort o f underground arena of 
research activity, (what 1 call) “the invention o f circumvention” techniques. Researchers 
engaged in fieldwork often confess to professional misdemeanors, namely the ones
■'* This adds to the argument about the appropriateness o f texts as “constitutive” data in studying 
organizations (Foucault, 1972. and others).
Perhaps a good example of this is a study I proposed to do for my dissertation. I proposed to study the 
informed consent process, touted in several government and other reports as “needed." But. in order to 
“really” study the “real” informed consent process, the study would have to be done covertly for two 
reasons. First, it would be unduly confusing for participants to be told about a “study of the informed 
consent process" they are going to undergo for the “original” study in which they have agreed to 
participate. These participants would have to undergo my explanation, and be asked to sign the informed 
consent form for my study, and then would receive similar explanations and forms from the researcher 
conducting the “original" study. As established, often one such form or process is confusing enough 
(even this explanation is confusing!). Second, the researcher administering informed consent for the 
“real" study would very likely alter their behavior (knowing they are being watched, and specifically 
which behavior is being watched) with respect to administering informed consent forms and provisions. It 
appears, therefore, that even though the study is clearly “minimal risk" under the federal definition, and 
that the topic can be approached scientifically, and has been described by many people and groups as a 
process that needs to be studied, under the rules, it can't be done in the way it must be done to yield
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mentioned by Wax (1971, p. 168-170) and Gans (1982, p. 405). Punch (1998) asks 
“what sanctions should we impose for these breaches o f professional standards? Should 
we drum these miscreants out o f  the profession? That seems a rather severe punishment 
for coming clean on their predicaments in the field” (p. 171)*^ ®. As 1 asked earlier, what 
are researchers to do? A similar situation is explored by Manning, 1978, who discusses 
sitnationally justified actions (i.e., what 1 call liquid and local) in the field o f  policing, 
this situation being similar to what researchers (and all o f us, 1 would argue) face in the 
lifeworld. Regulations will never be able to account for every situation, and oversight 
can never be complete. It must be recognized that people must (and therefore do) decide 
what to do. Again, guidelines and shared experiences, i.e., learning how to do things is 
different (and preferable and possible) from acting as if  we can control them.
.Abusive institutional interpretations. As Forester (1983) states:
When organizations or polities are structured so that their members have 
no protected recourse to checking the truth, legitimacy, sincerity, or 
clarity claims made on them by established structures o f authority and 
production, we may find conditions o f dogmatism rather than o f social 
learning, tyranny rather than authority, manipulation rather than 
cooperation, and distraction rather than sensitivity, (p. 239-40)
The abyss between federal rules and local institutional interpretations is often 
huge. For example, the federal system exempts from  the process much research that 
institutional interpretations make impossible under the process (the contamination o f the
useable data. Informed consent rules prevent (legitimate, needed, and non-risky) observation of the 
informed consent process.
.\nd it is important to remember what we may be doing “wrong” is not "really” wTong, but is wTong 
onlv under the rules.
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natural world, for example.'^’ Lengthy application processes even when studies are 
exempt under institutional rules on prima facie  conditions are an example. Such prima 
facie  conditions might include requests to interview public officials or to involve 
participants in observational situations in which the identities o f  the “observed” 
(somehow labeled “participants” by authors o f the OUIRB handbook. Section 4.4) are 
not known, and obviously therefore, cannot be recorded. Institutional interpretations do 
not always accommodate federal rules."’” Lawful or not, many IRB rules are created 
and/ or followed by 10s o f organizations, 100s o f regulators, 1000s o f institutions 
(IRBs), 10s o f 1000s o f researchers, and 100s o f 1000s o f two-legged research 
participants for, often, many years (also see p. 72 herein). Regardless o f legality or level 
or duration o f conformity, it seems foolish to ask people to sign a form that says they 
are being interviewed, or that they are completing a survey. These things are obvious. It
Federal regulators, as was mentioned, operate with a Theory Y (McGregor. I960) mentality toward 
institutions (see Grob and Ellis testimony, cited as U.S. House. 1998. Jun 11; and Human Research 
Subject Protections Act of 2002. where “research” is defined as “clinical”). Institutional regulators on the 
other hand operate à la Taylor, assuming a Theory X (as described by McGregor. 1960) posture with 
researchers.
■ " .According to the .AAUP (2001 ), “Whether, in a particular instance, the risk is more than minimal is for 
an IRB to decide. The IRB can. and usually does, require that the researcher submit documentation to 
verify that the project is indeed exempt from review, and the quantity submitted can rival in bulk what is 
required for research that is not exempt. At the University of Nevada. Reno, the "statement of Exemption 
from Review by [the] Human Subjects Committee" asked the researcher to send along with the completed 
statement the “informed consent form and instruments, i.e.. questionnaire, test, interview transcripts, 
stimulus material, letters o f permission form sites of performance, etc.” (p. 7; also see University of 
Nevada entry in bibliography). And the University of Oklahoma IRB policy and procedure. Section 4 
provides (emphasis in originaI)“TH E DETERMINATION OF W H ETH ER O R NOT RESEARCH 
WOULD BE CONSIDERED EXEM PT FROM REVIEW W ILL BE MADE BY THE (OUIRB). 
However. 45 CFR §46.101 is clear about the categories of research (six in all) that are explicitly exempt 
from the policy, even when human subjects or government funding are involved. The six categories are 
research in education settings on instruction techniques, curricula, or classroom-management methods; 
research involving the use o f educational tests, survey procedures, interview procedures, or observ ation 
of public behavior, unless the subject can be identified and disclosure o f the subject’s responses could put 
the individual at risk of criminal or civil liability or could damage the subject’s financial standing, 
employability, or reputation; research involving elected or appointed officials or candidates for public 
office; research using existing data, documents, or records, as long as these resources are publicly
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seems foolish that we as researchers have to prepare a document that has to be 
scrutinized by a board, the members o f which have perhaps never participated in, much 
less conducted, qualitative research. These requirements seem foolish because they are 
foolish. Many rules are inadequate, ill-fitting, and/or irrelevant when translated from 
medical science to social science. Some argue that informed consent procedures are 
unnecessary even in some clinical trials, and inconsistent in others (see Truog,
Robinson, Randolph, & Morris, 1999; see also GAO, 2001, p. 3, regarding 
inconsistencies produced at the federal level).
In my own experience, I have seen the rules constituting the process restrict the 
view of the process. This is a very serious matter, and contrary to informed 
interpretations o f relevant law."^' Legally, administrative rules are based on several 
tenets. Among them, at least two are locally relevant. First, administrative rules should 
not contradict higher-level law such as state and federal constitutions and statutes.*’* It 
is in no one’s best interest for local IRBs to restrict researchers’ First Amendment 
privileges.
A second tenet o f administrative law is that people subjected to the law are to be 
treated “the same way,” however, similar to the notions o f “a greater good” or
available or the human subject cannot be identified; studies o f public benefit or service programs; and 
research focusing on consumer consumption of food and the taste and quality of food.
■ ' In the Human Research Subject Protections Act of 2002. social science, it appears, isn’t considered 
research. In the act, "research” is defined as "clinical” studies, see Section 491.A. Part 3(a).
■ ‘ Such contradictory rules may be made, and in fact may be followed for decades by thousands. 
However, if just one litigious dissenter (i.e.. whyer, activist troublemaker, etc.) comes along and 
challenges the rule, it is likely to be found “imconstimtional” and sometimes the agency that made the 
rule is punished. Given that "avoiding litigation” may be the strongest pursuit of many such agencies, it 
appears to be in everyone’s best interest (regulators and the regulated) in the long term to avoid making 
such contradictory rules. One way the IRB system could accomplish this is for local IRBs to adopt federal 
rules as they are written. This may not completely eliminate local interpretation of the federal rules, but it
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“universals in human behavior,” this is an idea with very low correspondence to 
conditions in the "real” world. Even in the face o f this system flaw, many regulators 
persist in attempts to write “comprehensive” rules (that pretend) to cover any situation 
(clinical or social) that might arise, ensuring (in their imagination, perhaps) that the 
abstract sysiem is the “same” for any participant. Rules added to existent ones (ones 
that were not the “same for all” and that did not prevent crimes or atrocities) won't help. 
Next, nothing can be done “comprehensively” and attempts to standardize the lifeworld 
in such a way is often o f no great consequence in meeting the purpose for 
“comprehensive” policies, rules, etc. (Attempts to be “comprehensive” similar to 
looking for universals in human behavior.) Additionally, as demonstrated in at least two 
situations, those with very similar proposals and requests are not treated “the same way” 
by the OUIRB (student exemptions and other situations described herein, including the 
lack o f disposition o f my own applications). This speaks, in my opinion, more to the 
nature o f life than the (in)competence o f the OUIRB (or others). In this regard most 
administrative law is set for failure. The extent to which we ignore this failure is the 
extent to which these systems work. We first build the bars, and then put ourselves on 
the restricted side o f them. And then, we just sit there in Schutzian relief. An 
.4domological sanctuary.
The American Anthropological Association (2001, Feb 15), in addressing 
proposals made by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission in their draft report 
(see NBAC, 2001) states that “proposed rule changes ... could jeopardize the future of
reduces the number o f layers of local interpretation, and the tendency to make “more rigorous than 
federal" a virtue in the minds of local yokels.
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anthropological research” (p. 1). A lawyer who represents academic-research 
institutions and who sits on the National Human Research Protections Advisory 
Committee, said, referring to a Maryland Court o f Appeals decision regarding the use o f 
children in studies, that all research involves some amount o f risk, and that the court’s 
decision effectively raised safety requirements for research involving children to 
unprecedented heights, “i t ’s a no-risk standard,” he said. “That’s certainly farther than 
they need to go” (quoted in Curry, 2001, Sep 7, p. A32)' \  Currently the Bush 
administration is requiring “agencies to ensure than any scientific results they release be 
“capable o f being substantially reproduced” (Brainard, 2001, Sep 28, Daily News; also 
see description o f Bush’s plan, p. 2-3, herein). This o f course is not a goal o f many 
social science pursuits, and. many researchers who conduct social science research do 
not believe it is possible, desirable, or (as in my case) desirable to believe it is possible 
(critical theorists and other anti-positivists for example).
In many ways, the regulations don’t fit. i.e., they don’t fulfill their intended 
purpose, and the process often produces negative affects associated with under- and 
over-regulation in a given context, and is very prominently featured in the regulation o f 
social science research, and elsewhere.
IRBs. and regulatory entities generally, operate in a closed fashion (most IRB 
meetings are closed, for example, and local IRBs don’t usually solicit input when 
considering rule changes, we don’t vote for IRB members, etc.). These boards issue 
statements rather than provide explanations, and they do so according to their own time
* ' "Really.” and we must hope, obviously, it is further than they are capable o f going.
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frame. Local IRBs are in no regulated way accountable to the people they serve, 
participants nor researchers.
For example, the OUIRB makes no commitments about how long the approval 
process takes (as the University o f Texas at Austin does, see p. 134, herein), the board 
often answers correspondence aggregately, i.e., “facelessly,” without a specific voice, 
does not demonstrate an attitude o f service to (many) students, and provides no 
adequate form o f appeal (see OU Policies and Procedures, Section 10, Part 5; see also p. 
225, herein).
So, here and now, what are qualitative researchers to do? They are marginalized 
and dominated, much like faculty members are by administrators, doctors by insurance 
companies, and lots o f other “real world” horrors. I argue that qualitative researchers 
are a muted group, particularly students. Muted group theory (Kramarae, 1981) utilizes 
interpretivist/interactionist notion, based on Mead’s (1934) theory o f objects, that the 
power belongs to those who label (and not inconsistent with Foucault’s ideas)."^^
Label Power
Quantitative exemption-by-label. Speaking to inconsistency in IRB regulation, 
given that much qualitative work takes places before quantitative instruments are used, 
i.e., during the development o f instruments, much o f the “real” research conducted by 
quantitative researchers is not acknowledged as research, and therefore “gets past the
■ Somewhat like the ratio o f disparaging terms used to describe women to the number o f similar terms 
available to describe men, I believe if we looked, we would find more disparaging terms (and 
connotations) for “rebel” than for “conformist” I might call this the troublemaker/team player dialectic. 
For example, on the negative side there are terms such as troublemaker, boat rocker, being difficult, or a
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IRB.” This is in spite o f the fact that much of what quantitative researchers are doing 
(when developing instruments, for example), treats people as “subjects” in that they are 
subjected to more than being watched. This way of treating the developments o f 
instruments constitutes what might be called an “exemption-by-label.” In the “real” 
world, human subjects are involved, but they are not labeled as subjects because the 
(often very similar) activities are not labeled as research. Positivists often do not 
acknowledge that asking people questions about instrument clarity, pre-testing survey 
instruments, etc., is human subjects data. I’m not advocating these activities should he 
regulated, but to exempt by label rather than by treatment is a troublesome 
inconsistency in the system, and, o f  course, evidence to support a reduction o f 
regulatory interference in these types of work at least as much as it provides evidence to 
support an increase in scrutiny.
Because o f the lack o f clarity in rules, many times researchers in the newer 
social sciences have not opted into the system {i.e., they don’t realize they are 
“researchers”) and have not been forced to participate thus far. 1 have learned in 
conversations with people that certain departments doing very similar “treatments” are 
much less aware o f IRB regulation. Cultural geography, civil engineering, and film 
studies in particular have come into my awareness in conversations during the past few 
years." ^  These departments have not labeled the IRB as necessary or relevant; nor, it
critic, or a renegade, or dissenter, even “outlaw.” On the other side, terms such as “supportive” and 
“team player" are used to describe those who conform (especially without whying).
■ ’ It may seem creepy, i.e.. SINSflil, to advocate the study of people who don’t know they are being 
studied. But. as discussed, these methods don’t provide the researcher with advance warning. Anybody 
may say or do something important (i.e.. something that might become data) at anytime, and the 
importance might be recognized at still different times. This situation is very conducive to a blanket 
approach, but impossible to ask for permission specifically in advance, i.e.. people, time, place, etc. It
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appears, has the IRB, in this case, labeled cultural geography, civil engineering, or film 
studies as non-compliant.
Student exemption-by-label. With respect to student exemptions, and just as 
institutions have opted in to IRB scrutiny for all subjects, whether the study they are 
involved in involves federal funds or not, where is the logic in suspending the process 
based on whether or not the researcher is earning course credit, i.e., is a student? Aren’t 
all human subjects o f research equal in terms of deserving protection? Don't researchers 
have the right to pursue questions o f interest without unreasonable interference? We 
must acknowledge the dialectic between participant rights and researcher rights exists, 
and there are limits to what rules o f any kind can do with respect to that tension.
.Assurance-by-label. In terms o f providing assurances, we cannot predict to 
what uses research will be put. Who can define “undeserved harm,” “greater than 
minimal risk,” even “somewhat greater than minimal risk” and other equally vague 
terms often used in guidelines*'*’. For example, when graduate students refer to a 
dissertation, do they mention it will be housed in a library, indexed in a variety of 
places, and open to all? The more sensitive the activity being studied, the more likely it 
is that participants will fear consequences, and the “single most likely source o f harm in 
social science inquiry {i.e.. non-medical) is that the disclosure o f private knowledge can
may be years before a relevancy is established, before a little chunk o f the past-lifeworld becomes data. 
The idea that people, when in public, are observe-able, i.e.. can be photographed and their actions written 
about, is consistent with the rules for reporters. And all of this is in addition to the need to avoid 
contaminating the natural environment.
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be damaging” (Reiss, 1979, p. 73). Professional codes (rules) and what is considered 
sound advice (norms) may not be at all clear in the field, given that the “real” world is 
highly liquid and local. “Real life” and, therefore, the research environment must 
accommodate various degrees o f impression management, manipulation, concealment, 
deception, etc. It is the job o f many qualitative researchers to determine ways these 
activities operate (along with other SINS). And hardly can a researcher “explain” to a 
participant first what the study is about, and then gather meaningful (unaffected) data 
about these same phenomena. To even explain that “research” is being conducted adds 
to the level o f impression management, enhanced use o f socially desirable {i.e., altered) 
behaviors and other “affectations” described. There is no process and no assurance that 
can make “real life” conform, no more than we can control the weather or other aspects 
o f  the natural {i.e., “real”) world. We can offer our own personal assurances to do the 
best we can. That should not be confused with absolute assurance, and certainly not 
with a written form, regardless o f the title o f that form, who demands it, or who signs it. 
It may be the best we can do, or it may not be, but it is not assurance, regardless.
Questions as labels. Basic political issues, i.e., issues that many would advocate 
should be argued “happily ever after,” are in this way transformed into (labeled as) 
technical problem-solving issues, according to Alvesson and Deetz (1996). For example 
in the IRB system, attempts to regulate how people should take care o f other people via 
standardized handbooks, forms, codes o f conduct, etc., are not productive. Qualitative
■ " "Minimal risk” is somewhat clear (in the federal definition) but further distinctions are more comedic 
than clear.
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researchers and many others should be asking "‘Why am I doing this?” {i.e., the 
application procedure, for example) rather than the technical (non) problem solving 
activity o f  asking, ''How  do 1 do this?” The differences in the questions posed serve to 
frame {à la Goffman) a bad system as inevitable.
Rules Aren’t Values
In the context o f the protection o f human subjects, procedural rules do not 
replace nor work in lieu of values. As procedural rules are substantially less salient than 
values, rules are most often unnecessary (often not even known). If people have values, 
these procedural rules don’t matter. Circumvention o f rules may become the norm when 
the rules are not tied to a purpose, have no value, cannot be understood, etc. If people 
don’t have values, these procedural rules don’t matter, e ither.'"  The system— since its 
development, through all the debates, changes, chances to change not taken, and under 
the (current and past) rules— remains only as good as the conscience o f researchers. 
(And sometimes rules become tools used to perpetuate harmful situations. See 
Solomon, 1985, regarding Tuskegee syphilis study; see Morley & Shockley-Zalabak, 
1991, for discussion about mature organizations and constraint on innovation.)
■ Regulation. I contend, is not “creatively" developed, i.e.. if 1 become a manager or regulator, I don’t 
just go to the mountains to think up a policy book. Regulations are rooted in what people already do. That 
behavior is subsequently standardized into codes o f conduct. We watch what we are doing, and write it 
down and send it to others who are thinking of developing programs like ours, for example. Rules thereby 
reflect the values we are using in “real” life. Rules are in this way subsequent and subordinate to values, 
rules are not an a priori condition o f values. The reverse is more likely. Compliance to the code of federal 
(or other) regulation is incidental: it is the moral code o f the individual that guides behavior. “Scientists, 
not university review boards, bear primary responsibility for protecting human subjects," Greg Koski, 
director o f OHRP, acknowledges (as quoted in Brainard, 2000, Jul 21, p. A21).
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Researchers are, as are people in general, usually (even overwhelmingly) 
humane and ethical. It seems pointless to ask them to write about their ethical stance in 
dozens o f nearly identical IRB applications. Ethics are relatively stable over time, 
therefore this application activity is a form o f redundantly inappropriate penance (and 
based on SINS). The system has produced risk in certain research areas. Especially 
risky to researchers. To research. To free inquiry.
Alternatives^^*
IRB members’ and researchers’ preconceived and perpetuated (SINS-ful) 
notions o f research and regulation must be altered. “Social structure should grow from 
the bottom rather than be enforced from the top” Deetz (1995, p. 170) concludes. The 
irrelevant, overly restricting, often justifiably circumvented, ill-fitting, debilitating 
system as it relates to qualitative methods in particular must be decentered and 
disprivileged, from within or outside or both. Regulators (bureaucrats and other 
cultists), who operate in deeply entrenched systems, may be “unmeltable ethnics” 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 68), i.e., maybe they cannot change. Where that is the case, 
the system’s dismantling must begin from the outside."^’
■ In presenting both critical theory and postmodern approaches, I recognize the inherent fallacy of 
making (overt) recommendations. By labeling recommendations “alternatives,” 1 hope to create an 
important distinction. In making the suggestion (recommendation veiled as alternative) to adopt blanket 
assurance for researchers, 1 contradict basic tenets of postmodernism (i.e.. the future can't be planned, 
and who is to say one dogma is any better than another; see Huspek, 1991). 1 find myself in a dilemma; 1 
can't seem to resist the urge to make suggestions 1 feel might improve the system, even if doing so 
creates the aforementioned philosophical explosion. However, because what 1 advocate essentially 
constitutes abandonment o f (especially the application-parading-as-exemption) process, 1 feel less tension 
in my argument, via these relatively simple rationalizations.
See “Call for overhaul” section, p. 21, and discussion about diverse voices making similar calls for 
change, p. 227.
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The contemporary common-sense credo “It’s easier to beg forgiveness than ask 
for permission” implies two pervasive ideas; first, prima facie, permission is (at least 
perceived as) difficult to obtain; people experience some degree o f apprehension and/or 
anxiety about it. Second, forgiveness is (again, perceived as) easier to obtain, perhaps 
because the acts for which one might seek absolution (if not salvation) were great, 
pretty good, worked out all right, were reasonable, at least défendable, somehow 
understandable. Justifiable. As I have argued, researchers (and others dominated 
unnecessarily and unreasonably), circumvent (justifiably) processes, as distinguished 
from purposes.
Rather than attempting to fix the process (by abandoning rather large portions of 
it in some cases), researchers have tended to avoid making changes in the rules, as 
reported in GAO (2001 ), and DHHS GIG reports (in particular 2 0 0 0 b ) . I n  
considering the IRB system (and other regulatory entities) we may regularly see (then 
quickly look the other way) violations o f the process (rules), for example reports may 
be late and paperwork backdated, bids may be split, etc. Much more rarely do we see 
violations o f the purpose (people). Even more rarely do we look away from harmful 
situations. This is supported by the talk surrounding sanctions, i.e., federal sanctions 
were (in no way to minimize the exceptions) overwhelmingly for non-compliance with 
rules rather than “harming” people (Brainard, 2000, Mar 17; see footnote # 136, p. 117, 
about U. o f Virginia, Duke, and Chicago). Notably, the sanctions were nearly the same
"Minimal progress" has been made in overall reform o f federal regulations, according to DHHS OIG 
(2000b). IRBs have no more flexibility nor are they more accountable for results. Too much IRB 
attention remains focused on review responsibilities of “questionable protective value" according to this 
report and others cited herein.
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in terms o f breadth, depth, and duration, whether non-compliance with processes was 
alleged, or a death reported. In other words, federal regulators don’t seem to consider 
the severity o f the (sometimes actual) “crime” when assessing punishment, much like 
the institutional regulators don’t appear to consider treatment types when assessing 
protocols (though 1 have heard it said that while the OUIRB makes little distinction 
between asking questions and injecting drugs, they do make a Big Deal about the details 
o f questions, occasionally raising opposition to questions about occupation, marital 
status, and general income level on questionnaires). This opens the door to the argument 
that the focus o f local IRBs is the maintenance o f the flow o f funding or the avoidance 
o f litigation long before any issues o f human protections. This is, I argue, in large part 
to the acknowledgement on the part o f regulators including Koski, Ellis, Grob, and 
others quoted extensively herein who have said even though sanctions are issued, rarely 
is the problem abuse o f  a patient (and never in what I’ve learned has an interview or 
survey participant claimed damages, certainly substantially more rare than the already 
rare abuse o f patients in medical trials): it is almost always a paperwork {i.e., a process) 
deficiency. If, on the other hand, abuses were frequent and severe, I do believe IRB 
members would be focused on those participant concerns related to the problems (not to 
imply they would devise relevant rules, but they would most likely be talking about the 
problems as they relate to the abuse as they see it). And once again, if  the government 
or an IRB defines something as “NO RISK BEYOND THAT FOUND IN ORDINARY 
LIFE” then what is it they see themselves “protecting” against?
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Alternative One: Blanket Assurance for Researchers
Because there is (virtually) no direct regulatory oversight o f the research 
process, a blanket assurance system for researchers would more accurately reflect what 
is “really” going on in the research environment {i.e., perpetuating a less abstract 
simulation, perhaps).'**' Researchers, on their honor, carry out their protocols as 
approved, or they don’t. Only the researcher and the participant, in a liquid and local 
negotiation, directly oversee (or undersee or see at all) the process. Researchers, 
including (if not in particular) students, should be able to readily explain how they 
handle issues involving privacy and confidentiality, and one “blanket” explanation o f 
the researcher’s policy, adequately ambiguous, is adequate. Even researchers, because 
o f the liquid and local nature o f the world, cannot predict every situation that might 
occur, and subsequently ask and gain approval for each situation, each new idea that 
emerges along the course o f the study. Researchers (those who interact with 
participants) must be able to explain their intentions to specific participants at specific 
times using their own values as guidance. Participants are not without their own 
abilities, specifically the ability to use their own values in agreeing to participate or not, 
or to continue participation, etc. In other words, the notion o f “needing to be protected” 
is patronizing in many cases. Finally, it must be acknowledged that that law itself is a 
liquid and local phenomenon.
This would appear to have another benefit: reducing the size of the local IRB workload. Somewhat 
similar to unsuper\ ised probation, the rules that must be followed for the structure to be successful are 
(mostly) clear, and (again, mostly) no force or coercion is (or has been for some time) necessary. If we as 
a society can make simplified systems for unemployed persons and convicted felons, it “seems right” to 
do it for graduate students and faculty researchers. And, the precedent exists at the federal level. With no 
formal oversight system in place and few assessments made about oversight activities, adherence to 
federal regulations is based more on trust than on other forms o f evidence (see DHHS OIG, 2000b).
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Prominent in the federal rules is the requirement that the informed consent of 
participants be obtained and a record of that consent maintained. I support this part of 
the process. Informed consent may or may not be a written form. Allowing researchers 
to develop the consent process to suit the needs o f the particular participants balanced 
with the needs o f the researcher is the only sensible, “doable” process based on the 
nature o f life. A blanket “oath” is the best (and only) way to go about this.
Alternative Two: Making Important Distinctions
Researchers must counter the labeling power o f regulators, making clear the 
distinctions between patients and non-patients (participants), doctors and researchers, 
therapy and research, and (see below. Alternative three) exempt vs. exemption process. 
Further, these terms must be used as specifically as possible, and new labels developed 
as needed. Researchers themselves have much power to label, and it should be used. If a 
coalition o f professional organizations'*" (such as the AAUP, anthropology groups, oral 
historians, and others joining each other) encourages their membership to label their 
studies “NO RISK” and “EXEMPT UNDER FEDERAL RULES” regardless of 
whether an application form has a space for it or not, is an example. All o f these 
alternatives are especially important for social scientists, and most o f all for qualitative 
researchers employing unobtrusive methods.
i.e.. an actual coalition o f groups, involving many individuals
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Alternative Three: Avoid Attempts to Regulate Liquid and Local Phenomena
We must avoid the pretense that regulators can successfully define for the world 
(and for participants in particular) what constitutes protected and non-protected classes, 
sensitive and non-sensitive topics, and obtrusive and unobtrusive research and other 
phenomena too slippery to standardize. Whether an organism is a fetus, a child, or a 
prisoner is generally discernable (pregnant women are somewhat less so). Researchers, 
overwhelmingly, would not have difficulty distinguishing these classes. However, what 
an individual may consider sensitive or obtrusive is not regulate-able.
What exemptions are is not necessarily the problem, but the interpretation o f  
what can be done in the process o f  exempting (“the process o f exempting” is an 
apparent oxymoron, but it is literal in this situation) is problematic, i.e.. it doesn’t work 
as an e.xemption. One may consider just the time to make the application to “real”-ize it 
is not an exemption, for example. Exemption, if  not lefi to the fine devices o f the 
researchers themselves (this system is in lieu o f  admission that this is “really” the case, 
of course), should be post-card simple: Will participants be identifiable? Any kids? 
Anybody who’s incarcerated? Any feti involved? Neither researchers nor regulators 
should be troubled by anything more and federal law allows for such a system.
In fact, to do more than “really” exempt, when that is the label used, produces at 
least one problem. Both students and their professors new to the area o f regulation may 
misinterpret the label used with the widespread meaning o f the word “exempt.” That is, 
student researchers and their advisors may take the word literally, and this would be 
acceptable if  they were reading/operating under the federal regulations, but taking the
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word “exempt” at face value in local interpretations is not acceptable. (Students can be 
thrown into a “research misconduct” inbox and have their projects, including 
dissertations, held up until the “problem” is settled, for example.) If a student or faculty 
advisor or researcher finds the local policy unclear, a logical place to seek clarification 
would be to read the federal rules on which the local interpretations are based. The 
federal exemptions might lead a student or other researcher to conclude they are exempt 
and fail to make an application to the local IRB. In this case, potentially, a very costly 
mistake. What “seems right” (in this case following federal law) is “locally” wrong. 
Federal exemption is not local exemption is not exemption in the common definition of 
the word; the word then becomes a very slippery, if not meaningless, term. And, how 
are the readers o f these texts to know words don’t mean what they “usually” mean?
Alternative Four: Insist Treatment be the Focus o f IRB Consideration
Somewhere along the way, science lost to politics. Faculty lost to 
administrators.'^^ Researchers lost to regulators. Doctors lost to the insurance industry. 
.And so on and on we see the victories o f capitalism. Scientists, doctors, faculty 
members, and researchers are required to do things that don’t “seem right.” Things that 
don’t “make sense.” (For example, preparing syllabi before meeting a class, prescribing 
or failing to prescribe certain medications or treatments, etc.). These losses are 
alarming, but not as alarming as the fact that scientists, doctors, faculty, and researchers
See Snyder (2000; .AAUP’s Footnotes Fall 2000’s cover story), in which Charles Osgood of Princeton 
University is quoted as having said in 1914, “perhaps no more important question could be investigated 
now than that o f the faculty’s power to govern the purely academic functions o f the college or university’’
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are mostly conceding. There seems to be no “fight" on the part of researchers. Maybe 
we just don’t have time. Productivity is winning over possibility (see Lyotard. 1984, re; 
performativity). Research is losing to regulation, via concession, circumvention, and 
contamination.
Micro-management o f  minutiae: A reason to live. Debates in IRBs too often 
focus on minutiae. "Oftentimes, IRBs get very mired in consent forms." Jeffrey P.
Kahn, director of the Center for Bioethics at the University o f Minnesota-Twin Cities. 
"That should not be their main focus. They need to keep their eyes on the prize, which 
is the protection o f subjects o f research.” Federal rules require consent forms to contain 
many details, “so that's an easy place to spend time," Kahn said. "To try to assess risks 
and benefits is a more difficult and ongoing challenge" (as quoted in Brainard, 2000, 
Mar 17. p. A-31; see also list serve postings from University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center^^ and University o f Utah’s online handbook which includes a five-page consent 
template, and a 25-page assurance document (MPA), the University o f Texas at 
.Austin’s consent template has grown from less than two pages to more than 10 pages in 
two years and the Texas MPA from 19 to now 23 pages long; OUIRB doesn’t have one 
available online (as o f  May 2002), but the University o f Oklahoma Health Science
(p. 1). Osgood states that this power “declines in many institutions to almost nothing” and is “more 
gravely menaced every year" (p. 1 ).
For example, a message from the operations manager at the IRB at the University o f Pittsburgh 
Medical Center, dated August 30. 2001. broadcasts “After reviewing the standard language in the 
template consent form in the IRB Reference Manual, it was determined that it is inappropriate for a 
research participant to contact the Institutional Review Board in the event of a research-related injury. A 
change has been made under the Compensation for Injury section to remove the reference to the IRB as 
well as the telephone number. Please refer to the Sample Consent Form in Chapter 8 for further 
information."
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Center does (see entry in bibliography for website); it is 10 pages long (see University 
of Utah listings in bibliography, and also University o f Texas, University o f Oklahoma, 
etc.).
The number o f research proposals that review boards assess each year has at 
least tripled in the past 20 years (in part due to the “inclusionary” definitions o f who 
"must” participate), while the number o f boards has remained about the same, says 
Charles R. MacKay, an NIH scientist studying the effectiveness o f review boards for 
the agency (quoted in Walker, 1996, Nov 8). The GAO (General Accounting Office) 
reported in March that in some cases, panel members spent only one to two minutes on 
each proposal'*^ (Walker, 1996, Nov 8). Brainard (2000, Mar 17) concluded the IRB 
members operated more like manuscript editors than researchers. This situation also 
illustrates Foucault's ideas about texts as constitutive o f organization.
Campbell (1998, Apr 3) quotes Milton Goldberg, president o f the Council on 
Governmental Relations, representing 140 universities that account for 90 per cent o f 
the federal research grants to academe was quoted, “IRB time is precious; regulatory 
refinement o f the type suggested here [loosening rules for expedited reviews o f some 
kinds o f research] allows the IRB to focus more attention on research in which the risks 
to human subjects are greatest.” I would agree that there are surely more important 
matters for consideration than the wording o f a form for a study that should be exempt 
under federal rules.
O f course, this is two minutes too many in many cases.
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Alternative Five: Passive Rebellion (Researcher Self-exemption)
Engaging in passive rebellion (in this case, ignoring the local IRB system in 
favor o f following federal rules), and encouraging others to do so is the kind of dissent 
that is dis-allowed by managerial domination (Alvesson & Deetz, 1996; Willmott, 1993, 
and the works o f Marx, Horkheimer, Adorno, and others). These are the debates that are 
silenced by “following rules is best even when rules are bad" (SINSful) mentality 
(though 1 argue it isn’t “really” thinking)}^^
(Regulators) allowing researchers to exempt themselves (if researchers choose 
not to take their entitlement to exemption under federal rules) would represent a shift on 
the part o f local IRBs from a Theory X to a Theory Y (McGregor, 1960) stance. 
Researchers are capable o f reading and interpreting rules: they are capable of exempting 
themselves from the process. If or when they have questions about exemption, they can 
always choose to go to the IRB for clarification (making IRB “really” useful). Many 
federal government agencies (including the FDA and NIH) seem to agree, saying that 
IRB time is precious and should focus more attention on research involving the greatest 
risks to humans (see Campbell, 1998, Apr 3, ACHRE, 1995). Researchers conducting 
no-harm studies should for the benefit o f the researchers and regulators, (and “no-harm” 
being what it is. the regulated, too) should be exempted from the application process. 
The American Political Science Association (APSA. 2001, Feb 14) states “expedited 
reviews [are found] to be expeditious in name only” and that “to insist that [research
In other words, it is frightening to think that we ask “Who would ignore the rules? That would be 
craz\" rather than askinc “Who would follow crazv rules?”
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posing no threat to participants] should be subject to even administrative review 
unnecessarily burdens both investigators and the review process” (p. 2).
A blanket assurance document from the researcher could certainly include a 
commitment that informed consent will be obtained and records o f it maintained (this is 
also reasonable for the researcher’s own self interest), that the researcher would comply 
with all federal and state laws as they pertain to the treatment o f others. If the researcher 
is in doubt as to whether a class o f people is protected, or whether an issue is considered 
sensitive (although, as I have argued this can only be decided locally, by the person 
actually answering the questions, or refusing to) the researcher can make a formal 
request for a ruling (interpretation) to the local IRB (and rendering another benefit: IRB 
members can have a focus on more substantive protection issues, thereby better serving 
researchers and the researched). Questions such as treatment and class o f participants 
does not require a lengthy application for the researchers, nor any review on the part o f 
the IRB. Further, a (truly expedited) process would also reduce the tension between 
what the local IRB typically considers “expedited” and “exempt” to mean, and w hat 
researchers consider the meanings to be. Further, the long stream o f applications could 
be greatly reduced if the researchers were “really” exempted, the provisions for which 
are already in place at the federal level (OHRP Human Subjects Policy specifically 
states institutions may review studies which are exempted under federal provisions, but 
that the review process is not required. See
http:/'ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gOv/humansubjects/guidance/hsdc95-02.htm, accessed May 25, 
2002. Also see Campbell, 1997, Oct 24, for an example).
284
Additionally and significantly, the “need” for this regulation has not been 
established. The process is debilitating in the rather obvious ways just mentioned, i.e.. 
burdening both regulators and researchers, as mentioned, by contributing to self­
censorship o f ideas and draining the energy from researchers. Not just the physical 
energy the process requires, but the system drains enthusiasm from researchers. Most 
seem to agree the process is not needed, yet we allow it to persist.
It is important to point out that everyone was exempt until about 25 years ago 
(with the passing of the National Research Act in 1974). And, the rules that were put 
into place in the 1970s were limited in scope. These rules were only expanded to 
include nearly everyone in 1991. barely more than a decade ago. And it is also 
important to note that before the rules were put into place, the biggest atrocities by far 
were perpetuated by researchers working for the federal government (see ACHRE. 
1995). This “inclusionary” trend (now invasionary) on the part o f regulators does not 
work and is not needed.
Miscellaneous and Mostlv Missed Opportunities to Address “Real” Needs
The following ideas may be useful attempts to change the system. First, a 
registry o f projects that are exempted might be useful to universities, for statistical 
purposes and decision and labeling practices. Next, local IRBs might dismantle portions 
of their oversight mechanisms that are unneeded in order to invest in re-directing efforts 
to situations involving risk to participants such as conflicts o f interest, as mentioned. 
.And. IRBs might become more concerned with other “problems” such as hammering
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out policies to protect researchers who (boldly) report findings that anger drug 
companies or other researchers, etc. (see Blumenstyk, 1999, Apr 9). There are pressing 
issues (perhaps), but these are not the issues consuming the energy o f the system.
Finally
1 advocate these alternatives, and want to make one more point about the 
centrality o f treatment in regulation. As stated, if there is no treatment, there “needs to 
be” no regulation. The language here is important, i.e., there is a difference between 
“regulation is not needed” and “there needs to be no regulation.” Government, including 
institutional IRBs, is obligated to create the least restrictive environments rather than 
the most invasive and impotent policies.
Social Darwinists feel government should interv'ene only when necessary to 
remove barriers that limit laissez-faire practices. Progressives on the other hand, hold 
that government should accommodate— ideologically, legally, and financially— the 
pursuit of social progress (Hamilton. 1998). These ideas are apparent in current IRB 
regulatory debates, and progressives are ahead in defining what the IRB system of 
regulation “should” be doing. The (SINS) STRUCTURES,
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS of positivistic, 
progressive dogma are operating, demonstrated by researchers’ self-censoring, 
conforming, compromising convolution o f their programs o f research and their rights to 
free academic inquiry. These compromises may be much more severe and costly than 
the researchers wish to or even can acknowledge. Many, apparently, don’t see the bars.
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The pretense o f value-free inquiry for the human disciplines is over, and 
researchers now struggle to develop situational and transsituational ethics that apply to 
any given research act, or across similar acts. This doesn’t “standardize” the system, 
though; ethics can only be applied in more limited ways than (perhaps) we wish, i.e., we 
might be able to “bridge” across a farm pond, but not the Pacific. We must make our 
expectations more realistic. Neither regulators nor regulations are suited for or to this 
task. Researchers themselves, in conjunction with their participants, are the most 
qualified— morally, intellectually, politically, and practically— to decide exactly what to 
do in a particular situation.
Who could be opposed to reducing oppression? (Or apple pie, moms, or 
libraries?) Who would oppose lessening the workload on both IRB members and 
researchers? Being able to devote more time (researchers, professors, and regulators) to 
the consideration o f protection issues surrounding research that carries greater risks to 
humans?
Maybe qualitative researchers themselves (as mentioned earlier) have concerns 
about how “scientific” their work “appears” to be. I argue that abandoning an impotent 
IRB system does not lessen the scientific nature o f qualitative research. If anything, it 
works to energize the field, currently demoralized by watching free inquiry going the 
way of (dripping into the same sewer as) academic freedom and rights to intellectual 
property"^^.
In my case, as an example, denial of permission to conduct inquiry at all, i.e.. my applications were 
“essentially” ignored. Further, I was prohibited from interviewing public officials—a particularly 
egregious, probably imlawful, certainly unreasonable local interpretation of rules.
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It appears promises bom during The Enlightenment and continued during the 
reign o f positivism just haven’t been kept. There is plenty that “positivism” can’t do. 
.A.bsolutism and standardization are flawed concepts. SINS-ful perpetuation o f these 
regulations and practices obscure important alternatives and silence important debates 
(for example, use o f  the term “radical” when terms such as “practical” or “reasonable” 
are at least as appropriate).
Developments in medical science during the past 30 years are nothing short of 
amazing, yet many diseases remain. Life goes on; death goes on. There is plenty 
regulators can’t do; and even more they shouldn’t attempt. And, plenty that researchers 
shouldn't allow  them to attempt.
We have become more diverse in the way we study human behavior. To 
maintain a “real” qualitative/quantitative dichotomy is no longer, if it ever was, 
reasonable.'*'*^ The art is matching the right method with the right question rather than 
determining, with an absolutist, dogmatic, hegemonic mentality what the right method 
is. Questions should lead the researcher, rather than a philosophical allegiance to a way 
o f answering (or as in the present study, describing and whying).
The case is similar for regulation. Matching the right regulation with the right 
treatment (the right risk), speaks to the purpose for regulation, rather than declaring The 
Process, entrenching it, and maintaining it, all the while begging the questions “Who is
I have defined qualitative research very broadly with the intent that no “real” dichotomy exists in the 
present study. Essentially I have used the labels to indicate a continuum o f research, methods, 
perspectives, and most importantly, treatments.
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being harmed?” and “Where is the need?” “What is the point o f this?” “HOW CAN 
THIS BE?”
As mentioned elsewhere, in the world o f regulation eventually almost all parties 
to a particular regulatory system will admit it contains ambiguities and absurdities. That 
we have become conditioned to accept this as “natural” or “the best we can do” is a 
manifestation, as described, o f (SFNS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, 
NATURALIZATIONS, SIMULATIONS. Sometimes, regulators should do (and 
“really” can do) nothing. 1 support acknowledging rather than ignoring the limitations 
o f rules and rule makers.
Values guide rather than rules; humanity is more basic than is compliance. The 
local situation, i.e.. the treatment, the topic, the situation, and the “needs” o f the study, 
and a researcher's own values are parts o f  the formula. Generalized, and thereby often 
irrelevant, rules are numerators totaling zero. And. we know the effect o f that on 
denominators. Nothing remains nothing.
The values o f research participants should be acknowledged, as well. Research 
participation in the past may have been more altruistic. Many participants were willing 
to participate in studies that might benefit others, even when the potential benefit for 
them personally was negligible or nil. And, that might be true today (see CNN.com, 
2002, May 26). except participants aren’t often given that chance. Contemporary (local) 
clinical research is marketed, packaged, spun. Participants, particularly sick ones 
(because medicine is where the money is), are taunted with “potential treatment 
benefits” and “hopeful preliminary results.” And o f course, before results can be
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produced and sold (published), patients (or healthy participants) must be found and 
convinced. This spin creates further ambiguity in the therapy-research dialectic, and 
contributes more to “spoiling the field” than any contribution a qualitative researcher 
could muster. These are concerns that should be the focus o f IRB a t t e n t i o n . M o r e  and 
more frequently doctors own stock in companies that are “ interested” in the scientific 
data. In earlier times, we perhaps had over-zealous doctors (or more precisely, research 
doctors) to fear. Now we have greedy, over-zealous research doctors to fear. Medical 
journals are in a similar predicament, the debate presented in a variety o f media and 
especially prominent in the past decade.
Interview or survey participation will never be as risky as giving a person a drug 
or installing a medical device. The line between therapy and research conflict will never 
be as convoluted for interview and survey participants. How-to questions about the IRB 
application process remain, often asked by researchers in “minimal,” “no treatment,” 
and/or “no risk” situations (in methods classes and on user lists, for example). But more 
important by far, yet too rarely asked, are the questions about why.
Difficult but necessary versus required but unnecessary. Changing systems is 
difficult, but desirable, (and for certain kinds o f minimal risk research) necessary. 
Opposition to existing structures occurs, according to Foucault (1980), not through 
assumption o f the role o f the universal intellectual but through that o f  the specific
IRBs which currently review mostly social science protocols could certainly be utilized for 
considering the privacy aspects o f medical trial proposals for example. The obvious benefit would be 
reducing IRB workload, in turn producing faster (even more thorough and helpful, useful) responses to 
researchers.
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intellectual. (Earning respect on one’s own terms for example, or the demonstration of 
one person making a difference, o f being the one who “gets the cheese;” see foomote # 
292, p. 293.) Foucault (1980) describes “specific intellectuals” as ordinary people who 
understand their circumstances and have the ability to express themselves independently 
o f the “universal theorizing intellectual” (a “life is local and liquid” perspective). “Not 
in the modality o f  the ‘universal,’ the ‘exemplary,’ and the ‘just-and-true-for-all,’ rather 
within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own conditions o f life or work 
situate them” (p. 126). We are too often discouraged from engaging in selective ethics, 
situational leadership, anecdotal evidence, gut feelings, even merit raises, seeming to 
prefer dogma to thought. Why? In our simulation, it is easier. W e’ve made it “safer” to 
go along. Why? Even where we see the simulation, it is, sadly but evidently, more 
acceptable than change for most. Apathy wins.
(SINS) STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS, NATURALIZATIONS, 
SIMULATIONS related to the belief that interpretation is not scientific, and that 
leaving things to people’s own judgment is bad or risky, and other “matters of 
subjectivity” are too often demonized, one of several somewhat obvious SINS of 
positivism and Taylorism. This demonizes humans (at least doubts them, a priori, yet 
we give trust, a priori and in perpetuity it seems, to rules, systems, and officials). 
Disturbingly, during manual recounts o f ballots in Florida in 2000, strong insinuations 
were made that machines were more reliable, more accurate, and more neutral*’® than 
the humans making and operating them, for example.
Republican Party representatives in particular seemed to cross the line from appreciation of machines 
to reverence for them. And something else: Because the undercounted votes were strongly in favor of A1
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Foucault (1980) says this specificity is the level at which criminals challenge 
prison conditions, welfare workers and clients seek to change the bureaucracy, 
consumers organize against corporations, and, I would add, the regulated challenge the 
regulators, faculty challenge administrators, doctors challenge insurance companies, 
people (individuals) challenge (local) (SINS) STRUCTURES, 
INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS. NATURALIZATIONS. SIMULATIONS. Whying 
should become more prominent in every discourse, according to my dogma.
1 do not subscribe to the notion that something called “the greater good” exists 
or that standardization is possible or desirable (Nietzsche, 1968). Regulatory processes, 
which are purported to operate in (even ensure in the vernacular o f some) the “greater 
good” cannot. Regulations might have a tendency to work somewhat for some people 
sometimes. To acknowledge this is not nihilistic, rather it is a prerequisite to better 
regulation.
It might be at this moment in a dissertation that an “Ideas for future study” 
section “should be” forthcoming. However, I feel in this, and similar cases o f qualitative 
research, that it is inappropriately risky to do so. It might be later said, given the local 
interpretation o f federal rules, that I gathered data in a premeditated fashion (via living 
and talking about issues relevant to that life) rather “authentically” recalling “data.”
Gore. I disagree with many assessments made that machines are not Republican or Democrat. 
Inexplicably, (perhaps) these particular machines seemed to be Republican.
Postmodernism and Baudrillard’s simulations have this in common: the most common critique of both 
is that they are nihilistic. If postmodernism says “no one can know anything” and Baudrillard says that 
"nothing is real.” one might ask. what is the point? The point is that without an acknowledgment that the 
world is full of viable ideas if not absolute “positive” knowledge, and that we have the ability to alter our 
simulated lives, it is. I maintain, the failure to acknowledge that is nihilistic. Not to mention tedious. And 
scarv.
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No matter how many times we may say it, write it, read it, or hear it, most o f the 
time regulatory systems are not “the best we can do.” But they will remain “all that we 
have” until we acknowledge we don’t want (to tolerate) what we have anymore. And 
that acknowledgement will only be the beginning of deconstructing the IRB system.'^* 
“What can we do?” should not, in this case, be asked rhetorically. It is time to realize 
the “games o f power” are, or have already become, “states o f  domination” (Foucault, 
1988, as quoted in Hindess, 1996, p. 99). There has been too a long period of 
contortional, conformiating compliatorianism. It is now time for, at the least, some new 
definitions. Perhaps a new dictionary will be next.
Who will be the Hundredth Monkey (Schell, 1982)7 At what point will those for 
whom systems do not work stop contributing to the “requisite level o f mass loyalty” to 
those systems (Habermas, 1975)7 When will we openly, publicly, recognize the 
legitimation crisis in the regulation described here? When will we begin to act in public 
ways to change rather than conform to bad policy?
If we keep quiet about what is wrong, we are part o f what is wrong.
.A.mott’s (2000) Intemet-era proverb suggests “The early bird gets the worm, but the second mouse 
gets the cheese” stating “cuited organizations cut off the head’ o f innovators in an attempt to keep the 
organization under strict control ... It’s the second, third, or fourth person to try a new method that finally 
‘gets the cheese,’” he concludes (p. 99). So far, no one has accounted for what happened to the hapless 
earlv worm.
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Foucault’s questions and examples o f analysis
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Tabic 1
Foucaiildian A nalytical Fram ew ork (A dapted from I’he Archcieoloff)’ o f  K nowledge, 1972)
Foucault’s critical scheme consists of a set of questions designed to uncover potential discursive formations and, thereby, systems of 
knowledge, power, and ethics. He provides a heuristic system of 12 questions grouped in threes under four headings, implying that discursive 
formations may appear in four functional areas: objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, or strategies.
(Some examples o f these phenomena that appear in this dissertation appear in bold print.)
w
en
Category
(Functional Areas)
1 O bject— Determine how 
something becomes an object 
o f  discourse (Development 
of vernacular used In IRB 
system)
2 Enunciative modality— 
Explore speaker roles in 
discursive events (Who 
has knowledge & 
expertise?)
3 Concept— Explore the 
operative system o f  
knowledge in closer 
detail (Who defines 
things?)
4 Strategy—Confront the 
pragmatic functions o f  
discursive acts (Who do 
they serve?)
Question 1 1-a “Surfaces o f 
Emergence,” aimed at 
discovering where discourse 
occurs
2-a W ho is speaking, 
societal role or position 
required to speak 
(Presidents, federal & 
local regulators, 
legislators, researchers)
3-a Concerns the order 
o f  discursive acts; 
internal organization o f  
particular groups o f  
statements, patterns o f  
interaction, reasoning, 
and expression
4-a Determination o f  
what is and is not 
consistent with the 
discourse under study 
(IRB’s differing 
responses to similar 
protocols)
Question 2 1-b “Authorities o f 
delimitation,” concerned 
with who has the power to 
name and define the subject 
o f  discourse
2-b Determination o f  the 
arenas in which discourse 
obtains legitimacy, the 
institutional sites o f 
discourse (Congress, 
handbooks, media)
3-b Examines types and 
patterns o f  statements 
that arc or are not 
sanctioned in or 
knowledge systems 
(Voices of students & 
scientists)
4-b Investigation o f  the 
relationship that one set 
o f  discourse has with 
another set (institutions' 
renditions of federal 
rules)
Question 3 l-c “Grids o f  specification,” 
description o f  the systems by 
which the object is defined 
and catcgori/cd
2-c Relationship o f  
speakers to other groups 
and domains o f  objects, 
status o f  speakers in the 
web o f  human relations & 
objects they have 
legitimacy to speak about
3-c “ Procedures o f 
intervention,” the ways 
in which statements are 
transferred from one 
domain to another 
(Federal register, 
statutes, handbooks)
4-c Assessment o f  the 
function the discourse 
serves for nondiscursive 
practice (Maintenance 
of the status quo; 
Following process 
without regard for 
purpose)
Examples of Foucauldlan analysis
Example 1 (from p. 151, above)
Foucault’s questions are useful in considering Glenn’s text. First we may consider that 
Glenn is the person arguing (addressing Foucault’s questions 1-a, 1-b, 2-a, 2-b, and 2- 
c). Next, there is what Glenn uses (the evidence) to make a case and then how he 
structures the argument (addressing Foucault’s questions l-c, 3-b, 3-a, 3-b, 3-c, 4-a, and 
4-b). .A.nd finally, the argument about why Glenn may be making the argument, i.e.. the 
balance between politics and protection, the appearance o f the safety o f science and 
actual, unmeasurable, unforeseeable safety o f science (Foucault’s question 4-c).
Example 2 (from p. 151 and 154, above)
In the several incidents Glenn uses to support his contention that there “really [is] a 
problem out there,” (the ACFIRE report in 1995 and his examples: the use o f homeless 
alcoholics by a pharmaceutical company, psychiatric experiments on children and 
mentally ill in New York, FDA approval o f the use o f human growth hormone, 
implantation o f fertilized embryos in patients without the consent o f the donor, and 
unapproved use o f  drugs) in only the case o f the implantation o f  embryos is one o f the 
main provisions o f  the Common Rule (informed consent) addressed. And, none o f the 
situations Glenn describes involve the two agencies (Department o f Labor and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission) he mentioned as not having adopted the Common 
Rule, central to supporting his “problem” thesis, specifically that the gap in Common
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Rule adoption matters. Foucault’s question 2-a, i.e., accepting who can say there’s a 
problem, and 1-b, i.e., how “problem” is defined are addressed here. Also notable in this 
situation is that Glenn had been an actual research participant and it is likely assumed 
that his experience adds to his expertise, though this too may be a SINSful assumption
Example 3 (from p. 155, above)
The following observations “answer” several o f Foucault’s questions, including 3-a, 3- 
b, 2-c, 4-b, and 4-c. First, the “results” o f Glenn’s research and his “legitimizing 
discourse” are based on the use o f the GAO (1996), which was reliant in substantial part 
on ACHRE (1995), and both then used to build the case for Glenn’s Act o f 1997. 
Included in the series o f political discourse are President Clinton’s apology for the 
Tuskegee incident later in 1997, the series o f  DHHS GIG reports issued between 1998 
and 2000 from the executive branch, along with the various congressional hearings 
conducted in close temporal proximity (and, it could be argued, in response) to each 
other. These activities constitute essentially a debate between the executive and 
legislative branches o f  the federal government, designed around a topic that allows 
politicians to show concern about “ innocent victims” o f research, to assume moral high 
ground, appear busy doing something good, important, and effective, etc.
Example 4 (from p. 155, above)
That the events listed flow from each other, i.e., are temporally located near each other, 
is an important consideration: The release o f  the ACHRE final report in 1995, the 
establishment o f  the NBAC and production o f  interim reports by the Commission, the
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introduction o f S. 193 in 1997 and H.R. 3569 in 2000, release o f  the DHHS OIG reports 
between 1998 and 2000, fueled by the Tuskegee apology in 1997, and Gelsinger’s death 
in 1999, culminated in very minor changes in the process. This series o f events 
addresses Foucault’s questions 3-a and 4-b.
Example 5 (from p. 156, above)
The section “Other political observations” addresses Foucault’s questions 3-a, 3-b, and 
4-b related to the order o f discursive acts, patterns o f statements, and relationships 
among groups o f statements.
Example 6 (from p. 162, above)
This paragraph focuses on Foucault’s questions 2-a, 2-b, and 2-c: The changes [to the 
IRB system at the federal level] that actually made a difference in the “real” world of 
research involved moving the OPRR essentially up two hierarchical steps in the 
organizational chart. The organizational structure, prior to the change, was: at the top. 
the Secretary o f DHHS. then DHHS director, then director o f the Office o f Extramural 
Research, then OPRR. The change placed the OHRP directly under the Secretary of 
DHHS (Federal Register, 2000, Jun 13; Brainard, 2000, May 26b). A new director was 
named, which is significant as mentioned previously, because more sanctions had been 
issued by Ellis than all other previous directors combined (and only one sanction has 
been issued since, that against Johns Hopkins in July 2001).
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Appendix B
Resource list of documents related to human subjects protection
(Websites accessed June 1, 2002)
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Legal Citations
(Note: All website addresses in this appendix were accessed June 1, 2002)
The primary laws guiding use o f human subjects in social science research are 
found at:
45 CFR §46.101 to §46.409
Text of 45 C FR  §46 online:
http:, /ohsr.od.nih.gov/mpa/45cff46.php3
Those laws guiding medical trials and substances or devices for use by humans 
include:
21 CFR §56.101 to §56.124 
21 CFR §10.1 to §10.206 
21 CFR §50.1 to §50.48 
21 CFR §312.1 (Drug research)
21 CFR §812.1 (Device research)
In addition. The Common Rule (Federal Policy) is also codified, 
according to NIH, at:
(Department o f Agriculture)
(Department o f Energy)
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration) 
(Department o f Commerce)
(Consumer Product Safety Commission)
(International Development Cooperation Agency,
Agency for International Development) 
(Department o f Housing and Urban Development) 
(Department o f Justice)
(Department o f  Defense)
(Department o f Education)
(Department o f Veterans Affairs)
(Environmental Protection Agency)
(National Science Foundation)
(Department o f Transportation)
7 CFR §lc
10 CFR §745
14 CFR §1230
15 CFR §27
16 CFR §1028
22 CFR §225
24 CFR §60
28 CFR §46
32 CFR §219
34 CFR §97
38 CFR §16
40 CFR §26
45 CFR §690
49 CFR §11
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Websites o f  the agencies within the purview o f the 
Department o f Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the 
National Institutes o f Health (NIH) and other resources 
(All websites listed were accessed June 1, 2002)
Nuremberg Code
http:, 'ohsr.od.nih.gov/nuremberg.php3
Declaration of Helsinki
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/helsinki.php3
Belmont Report
http: ohsr.od.nih.gov/mpa/belmont.php3
Department of Health and Human Services Websites
DHHS Topics in Human Research Protections
http:,6 www.hhs.gov/topics/humanresearch.html
Office of Human Research Protections (formerly OPRR)
http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/
Bioethics Resources on the Web
http://www.nih.gov/sigs/bioethics/IRJB.html
NIH Websites
(NOTE: NIH is comprised o f 27 separate institutes and centers, and is itself one o f eight 
health agencies that is part o f the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. For a 
brief program summary for each institute and center, go to http://www.nih.gov/icd/)
NIH, Office of the Director
http://www.nih.gov/icd/od/
Center for Information Technology
http:,7 W W W .cit.nih.gov/home.asp 
Center for Scientific Review 
http://www.csr.nih.gov/
National Cancer Institute
http:/W W W .nci.nih.gov/
National Center for Complementar) and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM)
http :,/nccam. nih. go v/
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National Center on Minority Health and Health Disparities (NCMHD)
http://www.ncmhd.nih.gov/
National Center for Research Resources (NCRR) 
http://www.ncrr.nih.gov/
National Institute on Aging (NIA)
http://www.nih.gov/nia/
National Institute on Alcohol .Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA)
http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/
National Institute o f Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID)
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/defkult.htm
National Institute o f Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS)
http://www.niams.nih.gov/
National Institute o f Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering (NIBIB)
http://www.nibib.nih.gov/
National Institute o f Child Health and Human Development (NICHD)
http://www.nichd.nih.gov/
National Institute on Deafness and other Communication Disorders (NIDCD)
http://www.nidcd.nih.gov/
National Institute o f Dental and Craniofacial Research (NIDCR)
http://www.nidcr.nih.gov/
National Institute o f Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK)
http://www.niddk.nih.gov/
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)
http://www.nida.nih.gov/
National Institute o f Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS)
http://www.niehs.nih.gov/
National Eye Institute (NEI)
http://www.nei.nih.gov/
National Institute o f General Medical Sciences
http://www.nigms.nih.gov/
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI)
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/index.htm
National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI)
http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/
National Library o f Medicine 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
National Institute o f Mental Health (NIMH) 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/
National Institute o f Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS)
http://www.ninds.nih.gov/
National Institute o f Nursing Research (NINR)
http ://WWW' .nih. go v/ninr/
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Warren Grant Magnuson Clinical Center (NIH Hospital)
http://www.cc.nih.gov/
John E. Fogart) International Center
http://www.nih.gov/fic/
Other Government Websites (General Information/Search Engines)
Search engine for identifying and retrieving federal and state government information 
http://www.google.com/unclesam
Official government search engine; more than 47 million pages of government 
information
http://www.firstgov.gov
FDA home page provides information on all aspects o f the drug and device approval
processes, including human subjects protection
http://www.fda.gov
FDA regulations on human subject protection addressing informed consent (21 CFR 50) 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_99/21cfr50_99.html
FDA regulations on the composition and activities o f Institutional Review Boards 
http://ww-w.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_99/21cfr56_99.html
FDA Information Sheets 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/ohrt/irbs/default.htm
NIH site designed to assist researchers in recruiting human subjects for clinical trials 
clinicaltrials.gov
Sites related to social science research
Protection of Participants in Behavioral and Social Sciences Research
http://obssr.od.nih.gov/IRB/protect.pdf
NIH. Guidelines for the Conduct o f Research Involving Human Subjects at the National
Institutes o f Health (Revised 3/2/95)
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guideIines.php3
National Library of Medicine. Current Bibliographies in Medicine. “Ethical Issues In 
Research Involving Human Participants” (Jan. 1989 to Nov. 1998; 4650 Citations) 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/pubs/cbm/hum_exp.html
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NIH. Analyses o f Epidemiologic and Ethnographic Study Data, NIH Guide, Volume 
22, Number 8, February 26, 1993
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-flles/not93-073.html
National Institute o f Mental Health, Effort designed to find opportunities to apply 
basic behavioral science in an effort contribute to improved clinical practice. 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/tbsia/priority.cfm
NIH. Instructions to Reviewer for Evaluating Research Involving Hunan Subjects in 
Grant and Cooperative Agreement Applications (April 25, 2001) 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer/hs_review_inst.pdf
NIH. Regulatory Burden, Human Subjects Protections, Workgroups report (Web 
posting 12/11/2000)
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/regulatoryburden/humansubjectsprotection.htm
NIH. Report o f the Advisory Committee to the Director, NIH from the Office for 
Protection from Research Risks Review Panel (June 3, 1999) 
http://www.nih.gov/about/director/060399b.htm
Answers to questions frequently asked o f NIH’s Office o f Human Subjects Research 
(OHSR) and Responsibilities o f the OHSR (Revised August 2000) 
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/info/ainfo_l.php3 
http:/'ohsr.od.nih.gov/info/hinfo_8.php3
Examples of guideline documents/administrative activities
NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical 
Research (NIH Guide, Vol. 23, No. 11; March 18, 1994) 
http://grants.nih.gOv/grants/guide/notice-files/not94-100.html
National Institute o f Allergy and Infections Diseases, Guide to Requirements for
Research Grants Involving Human Subjects (August 29, 2001 ) 
http://wA\"w.niaid.nih.gov/ncn/tools/humansubjects/guidereq.htm
NIH, Office o f Extramural Research, Ethical and Safe Conduct in Science and 
Organizational Operations
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps/part_ii_2.htm
Enhancing the Protection of Human Subjects in Gene Transfer Research at NIH, 
Advisory Committee to the Director, Working Group on NIH Oversight o f  Clinical 
Gene Transfer Research (July 12, 2000) 
http :, / w^ wv^ . nih. go v/about/director/07122000.htm
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NIH Council of Public Representatives, Minutes of Meetings
http://w\\'w.nih.gov/about/publiciiaison/COPR.htm#minutes
NIH Policy and Guidelines on the inclusion o f Children as Participants in Research 
involving Human Subjects (Release Date: March 6, 1998) 
http://\vww4.od.nih.gov/ocm/contracts/rfps/childpol.htm
National Institute o f Mental Health, Board o f Scientific Counselors, Minutes of 
Meetings
http://intramural.nimh.nih.gov/bsc/minutes I-99.htm 
http://intramural.nimh.nih.gov/bsc/minutes 10-OO.htm
National Human Subjects Protections Advisory Committee
http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/nhrpac/nhrpac.htm
FDA, Clinical Trials and Institutional Review Boards
http://w"\^’w.fda.gov/oc/oha/default.htm#clinical
Entries about grant solicitations are offered as examples o f  where such solicitations can 
be found. The specific grant solicitations included here may, obviously, have expired 
since publication o f  the present study.
Websites related to U.S. Congress
Bills:
http://thomas.loc.gov
Committees:
http://www.house.gov/house/CommitteeWWW.html
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/
Hearings:
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/cong017.html
Congressional hearings (http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/cong017.html)
Do current federal regulations adequately protect people who participate in 
medical research? Hearing before the Subcommittee On Criminal Justice. Drug Policv. 
And Human Resources, o f the House Committee On Government Reform. 106'*’ Cong., 
C' Sess. (December 9, 1999).
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Human subjects research: Radiation experimentation: Hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources. 103"  ^Cong., 2"*^  Sess. (January 13, 1994).
Human subjects research protection. Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Criminal Justice. Drug Policv and Human Resources, o f  the House Committee on 
Government Reform, 106“' Cong., 2"“ Sess. (May 3, 2000).
Institutional review boards: A svstem in ieopardv: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Human Resources, o f the House Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight. 105“’ Cong., 2"“ Sess., (June 11, 1998).
Issues raised by human cloning research. Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
ght and Investigations, o f thi 
Cong., r '  Sess. (March 28, 2001).
Oversi e House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 107“’
The medical information protection and research enhancement act o f  1999, 
Hearing before Subcommittee on Health and Environment, o f the House Committee on 
Commerce, 106“’ Cong., C  Sess. (July 15, 1999).
Medical records confidentiality in the modem delivery o f health care. Hearing 
before Subcommittee on Health and Environment, o f the House Committee on 
Commerce. 106’“ Cong., 1*’ Sess. (May 27, 1999).
Oversight o f research in the Veterans Health Administration: Hearing before the 
U.S. House o f Representatives Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations and 
Subcommittee on Health. House Committee on Veterans' Affairs. 106’“ Cong., T’ Sess. 
(.4pril 21, 1999).
Patient confidentiality. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Health, o f the 
House Committee on Wavs and Means. 105’“ Cong., 2”“ Sess. (March 24, 1998).
Protecting human subjects: Status o f recommendations. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice. Drug Policv and Human Resources. House 
Committee on Government Reform. 106’“ Cong., 2”“ Sess. (May 3, 2000).
Protection of human subjects o f research in the Veterans Health Administration, 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, o f the House 
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. 106’“ Cong., 2"“ Sess. (September 28, 2000.)
Radioactive fallout from nuclear testing at Nevada test site. 1950-60, Special 
hearing before a Subcommittee o f  the Senate Committee on .Appropriations. 105’“ 
Cong., U’ Sess. (October 1, 1997).
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Safeguards for Military Personnel Ordered to Use Experimental Drugs. Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on National Security. Veterans Affairs, and International 
Relations. House Committee on Government Affairs. 106'*' Cong., T‘ Sess. (November 
9, 1999). (See also http://www.fda.gov/ola/1999/newdrugs.html, accessed June 1,
2002.)
Stem cell research. Hearings before a Subcommittee o f the Senate Committee on 
Appropriations. 105'*’ Cong., 2'“* Sess. (December 2, 1998) and 106'*' Cong., P ' Sess. 
(January 12. 1999; January 26, 1999).
The unethical use o f  human beings in high risk research experiments: Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, o f the House Committee on 
Veterans Affairs. 106'*' Cong., 1*' Sess. (April 21, 1999).
The unethical use o f placebo on vulnerable human beings in high risk research 
experiments. Hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight. 105'*' Cong.. 2"'* Sess. (April 22, 1998).
Government reports
Useful indices
Cumulative Subject Index to the Monthly Catalog o f U.S. Government 
Publications. 1900-1971. Washington, DC: Carrollton Press.
Cumulative Title Index to U.S. Public Documents. 1789-1976. Washington, DC: 
United States Historical Documents Institute.
Reports
ACHRE (Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments). 1995. 
Archived data used to compile report. Index. [Online.] Available: 
http://www.nara.gOv/nara/electronic/brd.html#achre, accessed June 1, 2002.
-ACHRE. Multimedia resources to accompany report. [Online.] Available: 
http://tis.eh.doe.gov/ohre/multimedia/index.html, accessed June 1, 2002.
BN A (Bureau o f National Affairs). 2000, April 6. Accreditation Failing to 
Receive Payer/Provider Support: AMA to Discontinue Accreditation Program. BN A 
Health Care Daily, p. d l4 .
BN A. 1996, December 11. AMA House o f Delegates Approves Physician 
Accreditation Program. BNA Health Care Daily, p. d4.
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Clinton, William J. 1995. Protection o f Human Research Subjects and Creation 
of National Bioethics Advisory Commission. Executive Order 12975. Federal Register 
60(193): 52063-52065.
CPSC. (U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission). 1997. The institutional 
guide to CPSC policv on protection o f human subiects. Washington, DC: CPSC.
(Note: To search for .pdffiles o f the following DHHS OIG reports, go to: 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/oeisearch.html)
DHHS OIG. (U.S. Department o f Health and Human Service, Office of 
Inspector General). 1995. Investigational devices: Four case studies. (DHHS 
Publication No. OEI-05-94-00100). Washington, DC: DHHS.
DHHS OIG. 1998a. Low-volume institutional review boards. (DHHS Publication 
No. O EI-01-97-00194). Washington, DC: DHHS.
DHHS OIG. 1998b. Institutional review boards: A time for reform. (DHHS 
Publication No. OEI-01-97-00193). Washington, DC: DHHS.
DHHS OIG. 1998c. Institutional review boards: The emergence o f  independent 
boards. (DHHS Publication No. OEI-01-97-00192). Washington, DC: DHHS.
DHHS OIG. 1998d. Institutional review boards: Promising approaches. (DHHS 
Publication No. O EI-01-97-00191). Washington, DC: DHHS.
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approved research. (DHHS Publication No. OEI-01-97-00190). Washington, DC: 
DHHS.
DHHS OIG. 2000a. FDA oversight o f clinical investigators. (DHHS Publication 
No. OEI-05-99-00350). Washington, DC: DHHS.
DHHS OIG. 2000b. Protecting human research subiects: Status o f  
recommendations. (DHHS Publication No. OEI-01-97-00197). Washington, DC: 
DHHS.
DHHS OIG. 2000c. Recruiting human subiects: Pressures in industry-sponsored 
clinical research. (DHHS Publication No. O EI-01-97-00195). Washington, DC: DHHS.
DHHS OIG. 2000d. Recruiting human subiects: Sample guidelines for practice. 
(DHHS Publication No. OEI-97-00196). Washington, DC: DHHS.
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DHHS. Office o f Research Integrity. Canadians Developing Misconduct 
Policies. [Online.] Available: http://ori.dhhs.gov/html/resources/Marchl995.asp, 
accessed June I, 2002.
DOE. (U.S. Department o f Energy). 1992. Protecting human research subjects at 
the Department o f Energy: Human subjects handbook. Washington, DC: DOE, Office 
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federallv funded biomedical research. (GAO Publication No. GAO-01-65R). 
Washington, DC: GAO.
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protections, but concerns remain: Report to the Senate Committee on Health. Education. 
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775T). Washington, DC: GAO.
GAO. 2000. VA research: Protections for human subiects need to be 
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Health. Education. Labor, and Pensions. Publication No. HEHS-99-55, Testimony in T- 
HEHS-99-70). Washington, DC: GAO.
GAO. 1998. Human tissue banks: FDA taking steps to improve safe tv. but some 
concerns remain: Report to House Committee on Commerce. (Publication No. HEHS- 
98-25). Washington, DC: GAO.
GAO. 1996. NIH extramural clinical research: Internal safeguards are kev to 
safeguarding Phase 111 trials against misconduct: Report to congressional requesters. 
(GAO Publication No. HEHS-96-117). Washington, DC: GAO.
GAO. 1996. Scientific research: Continued vigilance critical to protecting 
human subiects: Report to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs . (GAO 
Publication No. HEHS-96-72, Testimony in T-HEHS-96-102). Washington, DC: GAO.
Gene theraov: Is there oversight for patient safe tv? Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Public Health. Committee on Health. Education. Labor, and Pensions. 
106'*' Cong., 2"'* Sess. (February 2, 2000).
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Human subiects research: Radiation experimentation: Hearings before the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 103"* Cong., Sess. (January 13, 
1994).
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Endnotes
' Organizational communication scholars and critical theorists often conduct studies about power. Marx, 
who provided the basis for critical theory, concluded that religion is the "opium o f the masses" and 
encouraged workers to "shed their chains,” indicating the not-too-underlying motives of critical theorists. 
Marx suggests that the superstructures of politics, religion, and culture were driven by economics (a 
deeper structure). These structures are often invisible, and that is often by design. Loyalty, patriotism, 
devoutness, and various virtues are established by the "ruling” class, and in the name of money. This has 
many implications for regulatory activities, including issues related to ethics, morals, and values, and 
more recently prevalent, profit. In postmodernism, power is treated differently. Foucault has been 
explicit (Foucault 1977/1995; 1980). The power that is of interest is not that one possesses or acquires, 
that is simply the appearance of power. Power is in the discursive formation itself -  the combination of 
linguistic distinctions and ways of reasoning that, together with other aspects, organize social institutions. 
(See .\lvesson & Deetz, 1996, p. 209).
" Differences between critical theory and postmodernism are important. According to Alvesson and Deetz 
(1996), critical theory works toward individual autonomy and better social choices, hope for social 
agreements that better fulfill human needs. Postmodernism rejects this as simple replacement o f one 
dogma with another, creating perhaps new elites and new forms of marginalization. In response to that, 
■■Mvesson and Deetz (1996) suggest, critical theorists respond that "without reflection, consensus and 
rationality, there is no politics, no agenda for a constructive alternative.” Postmodernism counters: 
"Politics are by necessity local and situational; responsiveness is more important than systematic 
planning.” Critical theory answers: "Local politics are too weak to confront system-wide gender and class 
dominations as well as global poverty and environmental problems." Postmodernism maintains: 
"Organizing against domination both props up and solidifies dominant groups; it creates its own forms of 
domination.” Critical theory "wants us to act and provides direction and orchestration; postmodernism 
believes that such a move will be limited by the force of our own subjective domination and encourages 
us to get out of the way and allow the world to pull us to feelings and thought heretofore unknown; but 
critical theory does not have enough faith to let go. And so on” (p. 211-12)
Frederick Suppe (1977) divided the development in the philosophy o f science (or paradigm shifts, in 
Kuhnian) into five phases, starting with the philosophy of Ernst Mach and the Vienna circle in the 1920s. 
(The Vienna Circle was first known as "The Ernst Mach Society.”) During this phase it was proposed that 
science should limit its statements to descriptions of the regularities that held in observations. During the 
second phase, beginning in the 1940s, the philosophy of science was expanded to include theoretical 
statements that referred to nonobservable entities and the construction of an axiom-based network of 
universal statements. The third phase, in the 1960s, consisted o f the critique of the assumptions of logical 
positivism and was paralleled by the fourth phase, which proposed alternative systems for science based 
on an analysis of the history of science. The contemporary or fifth phase (historical realism) is a 
deconstruction of science based on pragmatic reason and an acceptance of the influence of historical 
conditions on scientific inquiry. In contrast, Jacob (1989) outlines a fivefold division o f “qualitative 
research traditions” (ecological psychology, holistic ethnography, ethnography of communication, 
cognitive anthropology, symbolic interaction). She also distinguishes between the "paradigms o f social 
sciences:” which she considers a "disciplinary matrix used as a heuristic framework” and says she uses 
the term "tradition,” saying "If the sciences operate with paradigms, the social sciences are steered by 
traditions” (p. 229). However, Shils (1981) suggests that realistic social scientists don’t mention tradition 
(see p. 93, herein).
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" Qualitative research is described as crosscutting five “historical moments," all of which operate 
simultaneously operate in the present. Denzin and Lincoln (2000) describe them as the traditional ( 1900- 
1950). the modernist or golden age (1950-1970), blurred genres (1970-1986), the crisis o f representation 
(1986-1990), and postmodern or present moments (1990-present). The traditional period is associated 
with the positivist movement; modernist and blurred genres are connected to postpositivist arguments and 
a new variety of interpretive, qualitative perspectives emerged, including hermeneutics, structuralism, 
semiotics, phenomenology, cultural studies, and feminism. The crisis of representation occurred when 
researchers struggled with how to locate themselves and their subjects in reflexive texts, and the 
postmodern moment is characterized by a new sensibility that doubts all previous paradigms. “Qualitative 
research means different things in each o f these moments” (p. 3). “The present moment is defined,” 
Richardson ( 1991 ) argues, by a new sensibility, the core of which is “doubt that any discourse has a 
pnvileeed place, any method or theory a universal and general claim to authoritative knowledge” (p.
173). "
'In 1974. Congress passed the National Research Act that would profoundly affect research. The National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research was 
established by the .\ct. The Commission's charge was to examine the protections o f the rights, welfare, 
and well-being of human research subjects, which many observers feared had slipped (tom the 
expectations set forth after World War 11 in the Nuremberg Code (and in the face of the Tuskegee 
atrocity). Their work would lead, during the decade, to the Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and 
Guidelines fo r the Protection o f  Human Subjects o f  Research in 1979. In the same year, the Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) began revising the 1974 rules on protecting subjects (set forth 
in the National Research Act) and the NIH policies (which had been developed and released in 1966). (It 
wasn’t until 1981 that the Department of Health and Human Services (HEW changed to this in 1979) 
gave its final approval to 45 CFR 46. In 1976. DOE’s predecessor agency, the Energy Research and 
Development Administration (ERDA), published similar policies to HEW on the protection of subjects in 
research. DOE adopted the Common Rule as Part 745 o f Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR 745). By 1991. 16 Federal agencies had adopted the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human 
Subjects, known as the “Common Rule” in the form of regulations applicable to all human subjects 
research these agencies conduct or sponsor.
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